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I am a recent college graduate living in NYC looking for some form of employment related to the equity market. I have been investing for over two years both long and short. In June I will be sitting for the CFA Level I exam. Linkedin: Rodolphe Vallee @inbox101
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  • How Pennies Make Dollars  0 comments
    Jan 31, 2014 3:57 PM

    Current sentiment surrounding JCPenney and its prospects of a turnaround is cautious at best. Threats of insolvency, gross margin pressure and a slow sales recovery have dragged the stock to 30 year lows. Over the ensuing months, these concerns should subside as the market opens its eyes to the facts behind JCPenney's turnaround, resulting in a significant rally of its shares.

    Company Overview 2012

    Ron Johnson was appointed CEO to lead JCPenney out of a period of complacency. In doing so, he attempted to fundamentally disrupt the retail paradigm by overhauling pricing and reinventing the in-store experience. Arguing that JCPenney's brand image had been tarnished from years of discounts and "cheap" product, Johnson introduced a "fair and square" pricing strategy that attempted to maintain the product's integrity by pricing it at a "fair value." This value, under the previous discount strategy, reflected the merchandises selling price net of markdowns. Additionally, coupons, presented in 40% of all transactions in 2011, were eliminated, and promotions were cut from 592 to 12 per year.

    Within the first three months of Johnson's tenure, same store sales and gross margins fell 18.9% and 2.85%, respectively, as the new pricing strategy failed to resonate with the value hungry JCPenney consumer. As a result, the buyer migrated to other discount retailers who offered 50% off $50, rather than JCPenney's $25 fair value, as the former yielded $25 in savings.

    Not every move he made was bad. Johnson materially improved the look and feel of all 1100 stores and further developed "shops," an exclusive 300- 2,500 square foot section of the JCPenney store delegated to select brands. This delegation of space promoted autonomy over the merchandising presentation, aligning the "shop's" image with that of the brand. Over the course of three years, Johnson planned to introduce 100 "shops" that were connected by a 15 foot wide isle called "the street" and organized around a central attraction known as the "the square."

    To regain the company's image, 505 home department stores were renovated from the ground up, adding new brands such as Martha Stewart, Terrance Conran, and Johnathan Adler. Originally viewed as a sales catalyst, the launch of the home department proved otherwise, as designer merchandise was priced above the consumer's price point. The discontinuation of key private label brands, viewed as "cheap," made way for higher end products, such as Joe Fresh, which sold well in specific categories, but overall demand fell. Dissatisfied consumers demanded the reinstatement of these key private labels.

    Johnson's pricing mistakes outweighed the positive impact of his in-store merchandising improvements resulting in a revenue decline of 24.8% (~$4.3B) from 2012 to 2013 and his termination as CEO. Myron Ullman, the previous CEO, returned to stabilize the business and regain lost customers; he immediately reinstated private labels and promotional pricing.

    Key Investment Points

    Johnson's vision for "shops" and merchandise presentation will be the foundation for JCPenney's forward success, and the beginning of a paradigm shift in department store retailing. The aesthetic presentation of "shops" enhances the visibility and value of merchandise previously hidden by racks of clutter. This increases the number of items a consumer views per visit and in turn the probability of conversion (percentage of consumers that enter a store and make a purchase).

    The data behind "shops" supports this assertion. In Q2-12, while sales decreased ~23% YOY, Levi's "shops" increased their average selling price by $5 and their respective sales by 25%. An additional 33% sales increase was realized in the eight shops rolled out in Q3-12; however, considerable advertising revenue was spent promoting these brands, so this number likely needs discounting. A separate figure reported by Reuters and the Dallas News, had "shops" outperforming the remainder of the store by 20%. This trend will continue as current management builds on Johnson's framework.

    On the Q3-13 earnings call, Ullman stated, "given the proven success of Sephora and the encouraging performance by our Levi, Izod, Liz Clairborne, Arizona and jcp shops, attractions are going to remain a strategic emphasis. We aren't going to set a specific number of shops. We will test and build out the ones that customers clearly want." The expansion of shops, combined with the reinstatement of promotional pricing and reemergence of key private labels should materially increase conversion rates. This leaves JCPenney competitively positioned as industry foot traffic continues to decline.

    The construction of 505 department stores and 7000 shops had a onetime material adverse impact on sales, and its completion provides a catalyst for growth in 2014. 8.6% of JCPenney's total square footage was idle from the commencement of construction on February 1st, 2012 to the home launch in June of 2013 (Average 19k sq. ft. *505 stores/111.6M sq.ft.). Combined with 2012's "shop" construction, Q2 and Q3-12 saw periods of 15% idle floor space (7.2M sq ft. + 19k sq. ft. *505 stores/111.6M sq.ft). This trend continued into Q4-12 and Q1-13, as 9.86% floor space was at times idle (11m sq.ft/111.6M sq. ft.). No definitive numbers were given for the 3-4 shop constructions throughout 2013, but the significant idle floor space is likely comparable to Q1-13.

    At the end of Q2-13, management realized non-renovated home stores outperformed those that were renovated. The failure resulted from poor spacing allocation, the organization of goods by brand rather than by category, and higher end merchandise not resonating with the consumer. However, online home sales for the quarter were strong, implying in-store structural issues was the culprit for weak sales. This resulted in major repurposing of home department merchandise throughout the back half of 2013.

    Over 95% of 2012 and 2013 was adversely affected by either construction or the repurposing of merchandise. This reduced sales from unutilized floor space and the areas around it, as construction impaired the in-shopping experience. Based on management's guidance, minimal construction will take place in 2014 and a significant amount of the home department organizational limitations will be mitigated by March, 2014. This will materially improve sales and sales per square foot as previously idle floor space now generates revenue. Additionally, sales of renovated home departments should significantly improve from Q2-Q4, 2014 due to the mitigation of structural limitations.

    The magnitude of margin destruction from current inventory overhang is significantly less than the realized destruction under Johnson; resulting in a net margin improvement. Based on management's comments, there will be no substantial discontinuation of brands, mitigating concerns of forced-selling margin deterioration that negatively impacted Q412&13's gross margins by 925 basis points. The current threat of inventory overhang is the home department, specifically furniture. 150 stores have high levels of furniture inventory, and an additional 150 stores have low/moderate levels. While this will adversely affect gross margins, its magnitude relative to overhang under Johnson will result in a net positive effect. This is further elaborated on in the Financial Overview section.

    The return to promotional pricing will protect gross margins from inventory overhang while driving sales. On the Q3-13 conference call, Ullman signified that margins obtained after promotional markdowns will not be remarkably different from 2011 (high 30's) due to sufficient markup levels. Understanding that previous historical margins were attained when greater than 72% of revenue was marked down by 50% or more, should mitigate concerns of substantial markdowns adversely affecting margins. Further, it should be viewed as a catalyst to move through the current inventory overhang; as the 2012 sales data clearly shows, the JCPenney consumer has a significantly higher probability of buying a marked down product. Additionally, the promotional "value" effect will materially drive sales as it is combined with new merchandising presentation, the return of key private label brands, and the repurposing of home.

    Same store sales have progressively improved with the repurposing of merchandise and the return of promotional pricing, proving a turnaround is unfolding. For the month of September, SSS were down 400 basis points, though up 580 basis points from August. In October, JCPenney realized its first SSS gain of 90 basis points YOY, most likely due to the reemergence of idle home space. After substantial repurposing of inventory and the return to promotional pricing, SSS increased 1010 basis points for November. However, many analysts mistakenly viewed this as a beat due a low base, created from Hurricane Sandy and reduced November holiday shopping hours in 2012. Subsequently, JCPenney's stock sold off on the news. In December, the company decided not to release SSS, re-affirming its quarterly guidance of positive SSS and improvement in margin YOY, as well as sequentially, and again the stock sold off. The market's negative response to both the November and December press releases is overstated due to the reasons below.

    Ron Johnson's comments at the Q3-12 earnings conference provide insight on November's low base as he stated, "We had an adverse impact of our performance from the storm, but, for us, the lion's share of the negative sales are coming from our business model. They are not coming from the impact of that storm." Additionally, "It is really hard to look forward and determine the impact of a storm like this on retail performance. There are a lot of people that have to go replenish home goods and clothing and a variety of other things. It is like Katrina, there was a pretty big aftermath of growth in the stores that were impacted by the storm…" Johnson did mention stores in the Northeast performed a "little lower" than other regions; however, the storm's impact was not mentioned in the Q4 conference call nor in the 2012 10-K. While there was an adverse impact, its extent was not material on November's sales.

    Secondly, JCPenney's had more holiday shopping hours in November 2012 than 2013. Thanksgiving fell on November 22nd in 2012, with Black Friday the 23rd. That leaves 7 additional days to sell merchandise at holiday prices, thus increasing sales. In 2013, Thanksgiving was November 27th, with Black Friday the 28th. That leaves one additional day in November that consumers can buy merchandise at holiday prices. In addition, Cyber Monday was not in November in 2013. Cyber Monday was December 2nd. The realignment of store merchandise with jcp.com should lead to robust Cyber Monday sales, for December that is.

    The non-material effects of Hurricane Sandy, as well as the shortened November 2013 holiday shopping season make November's SSS gain cleaner and larger than most analysts recognize. The gain is more likely attributable to a business strategy that resonates with consumers, rather than a low base from non-material events.

    December's non-release of sales data was covered by The New York Times, as they wrote, "In a note to vendors on Wednesday, Mr. Ullman elaborated slightly. He said that "the holiday season was certainly an interesting one, with a compressed calendar, winter snowstorms and challenging mall traffic." Despite that, the company emerged "in good shape," he said, and sales at its website, jcp.com, "continued to be robust." While December had its difficulties, the aforementioned clean SSS gain in November, the return to promotional pricing and the repurposing of inventory should result in a mild to moderate SSS improvement for the month of December implying share is being taken from other retailers. This trend will continue, and pick up steam, throughout 2014 due to pricing, merchandising and the return of the JCPenney customer.

    The rest of the report can be found here: theovallee.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/jcp-report1.pdf

    Disclosure: I am long JCP.

    Additional disclosure: I am long JCP and looking for a job in NYC - Inbox101

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