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Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stocks Basket Strategy As Of 5/20/16

May 22, 2016 2:03 PM ETGS, DHC, PAA, PBA, RRD, TCBI, PGX, NGHC4 Comments
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This topic was last updated here: Update For Exchange Traded Bond And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 5/16/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

I have snapshots of net trading gains for the following exchange traded bonds and preferred stock categories. The net trading gains were in small lots.

Trust Certificates: New Gateway Post= $28,971.16

Advantages and Disadvantages of Equity Preferred Floating Rate Securities= +$13,817.5

Baby Bonds - South Gent | Seeking Alpha= +$7,441.07

REIT Cumulative Equity Preferred Stocks= +$6,497.71

Aegon Hybrids: Gateway Post= +$4,512.81

TRUST PREFERRED SECURITIES - South Gent | Seeking Alpha= $4,122.09

ING Hybrids = $2,117.96

Non-REIT Fixed Coupon Equity Preferred Stocks = $2,337.47 (snapshots now at the end of REIT Cumulative Equity Preferred Stocks Post linked above)

Total: $69,668.36 since 2008 (excluding dividend and interest payments)

Synthetic Floater transactions are included in the Trust Certificate category.

Exchange Traded Bonds: New Gateway Post

ING Hybrids: Links in one Post

Trust Preferred Securities: Links in One Post

Baby Bonds - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

TRUST PREFERRED SECURITIES - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

Fixed coupon exchange traded bonds and preferred stocks have what I call asymmetric interest risk between the owner and the issuer that clearly favors the issuer.

I discuss the asymmetric interest rate risk of exchange traded fixed coupon securities here: Update For Bond And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 9/10/15 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

I discussed the interest rate risk and other material topics here: Update On Bond And Equity Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 8/14/15 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha (scroll to following titles in the Appendix section: Interest Rate and Lost Opportunity Risks for Fixed Rate Coupon Equity Preferred Stocks; Credit Risks; Volatility Risk for Equity Preferred Stocks)

The following table includes only exchange traded securities. I do not have a table showing my existing $1,000 par value bonds bought in the bond market. I will discuss some of those trades here.

Basket as of 5/20/16:

+++++++++++

Rationale for Transactions Discussed Below:

The underlying theme is to sell longer duration individual bonds, particularly those with junk ratings, and to buy investment grade bonds with shorter durations. This strategy reduces my interest rate risk through shortening my weighted average bond duration number.

For the bonds being purchased, I am focusing on the 2020-2025 time frame as the sweet spot in terms of yield and duration.

I lightened up on the equity preferred floating rate GSPRD since I owned too many shares. I may redeploy some of the proceeds into buying another 50 shares of the synthetic floater GYB, which has a GS junior bond maturing in 2034 as its underlying security.

Scroll to Item # 1. Added 50 GYB at $20.21: Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stocks Basket Strategy As Of 1/28/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

I did add one Canadian reset preferred stock as well.

I started a shift into Canadian reset preferred stocks in February since I received an aggregate superior yield to comparable U.S. fixed coupon preferred stocks while receiving some protection against a significant rise in interest rates due to the coupon resets, but having to assume the risk of a potentially lower coupon on the reset date as well. .

The first purchase was 300 of ENBPRP:

ITEM # 1. Bought 300 ENBPRP:CA at C$12.39: Update For Exchange Traded Bond And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 2/29/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha ("pays initially a 4% coupon on a $25 par value. . . At a C$12.39 total cost per share, that works out to be a 8.07% yield. Effective 3/1/19, the coupon will reset at a 2.5% spread to the 5 year Canadian government bond. The reset rate would remain in effect for five years whereupon it would be reset again.")

I ended this post after discussing 8 transactions. There are at least 4 more existing ones that will be discussed in the next update.

I will receive next week some more exchange traded bonds and preferred stocks as part of my mother's estate, along with a few $1,000 par value bonds.

+++++++++

1. Bought 1 Senior Housing 4.75% Senior Unsecured Bond Maturing on 5/1/2024 at 98.914

Senior Housing is an externally managed REIT that owns mostly senior living and Medical Office Building ("MOB").

Brad Thomas published a recent article here: Senior Housing Is Not A Five Star REIT But The Valuation Is CompellingSeeking Alpha

YTM=4.885%

Current Yield: 4.8%

Rated Lowest Tier Investment Grade (see snapshot below):

YTM: 4.885%

Current Yield: 4.8%

FINRA Bond Detail

Moody's Rating Baa3 (04/24/2014)
Standard & Poor's Rating BBB- (04/25/2014)

The FINRA chart shows channel trading in the 100 to 104 range between April 2014 (offering date) and October 2015, followed by some slippage into a 96-100 range bound.

SEC Filings

2015 Annual Report 10-K (risk discussion starts at page 38-"Our management structure and agreements and relationship with RMR LLC may restrict our investment activities and may create conflicts of interest or the perception of such conflicts." page 51; discussion of significant indebtedness starts at page F-28).

The large exposure to Five Star (FVE) is troubling which explains why I bought one bond rather than 2.

Five Star Quality Care, Inc. Announces First Quarter 2016 Results;

Five Star Quality Care's (FVE) Q1 2016 Results - Earnings Call Transcript | Seeking Alpha

That risk is discussed in the 2015 Annual Report starting at page 38: Scroll to "Financial and other difficulties at Five Star could adversely affect us." 10-K That is the first risk discussed in that summary of risk section.

The FVE risk is also highlighted in the next snapshot.

Recent Earnings: Senior Housing Properties Trust Announces First Quarter 2016 Results

MOB=Medical Office Building

During the 2016 first quarter, "41.2% of SNH's NOI came from 122 properties leased to medical providers, medical related businesses, clinics and biotech laboratory tenants, or MOBs, with 11.4 million leasable square feet".

"40.6% of SNH's consolidated NOI came from 231 triple net leased senior living communities with 26,114 living units. Occupancy at triple net leased senior living communities decreased to 84.5% for the most recently reported period, compared to 85.3% for the comparable period last year."

"15.4% of SNH's NOI came from 65 managed senior living communities with 8,535 living units. Occupancy at the managed senior living communities was 87.5% for the quarter ended March 31, 2016, compared to 88.0% for the comparable period last year."

Page 16 10-Q

This is a snapshot of the first quarter's FFO and "Normalized FFO" calculations:

Q1 2016 Results - Earnings Call Transcript | Seeking Alpha

Debt as of 12/31/15: Pages F-35 and F-36 10-K

I did not take a snapshot of the mortgages that totaled $627+M secured by $937+M net book value in properties.

I took a snapshot of the senior unsecured note maturities:

After year end, SNH sold $250 in 6.25% senior notes due in 2046: Propsectus

The last share offering was for 27M shares, plus the standard greenshoe, that were priced to the public at $22.2 per share: Prospectus; Senior Housing Properties Trust Announces Underwriters' Exercise of Option to Purchase Additional Shares

Other News:

Senior Housing Properties Trust Increases Revolving Credit Facility to $1 Billion and Closes on $200 Million, Seven Year Term Loan

Senior Housing Properties Trust Agrees to Purchase 38 Senior Living Communities for $790 Million-12/23/14 Release

2. Bought 2 Plains All American Pipeline L.P. 3.65% Senior Unsecured Note Maturing in 2022 at 93.955

Issuer: Plains All American Pipeline L.P. (PAA:NYSE)

PAA is an MLP energy infrastructure company that "owns an extensive network of pipeline transportation, terminalling, storage and gathering assets in key crude oil and NGL producing basins and transportation corridors and at major market hubs in the United States and Canada. On average, PAA handles over 4.6 million barrels per day of crude oil and NGL in its Transportation segment. PAA is headquartered in Houston, Texas."

A map of PAA's facilities can be found at page 18 of its 2015 Annual Report: 10-k (risk factors summarized starting at page 46)

One risk for bonds issued by pass through entities (MLP, REIT, BDC) is that money is flying out the door to the common shareholders. This constant outflow deprives the senior bond owners of a cash cushion and cash needed to grow the business. The pass through entity consequently has to raise cash by increasing debt or issuing stock.

Trade Snapshot:

The YTM is 4.816% without the commission charge and 4.796% with it:

FINRA Bond Detail

Moody's Rating Baa3 (05/12/2016)
Standard & Poor's Rating BBB+ (12/02/2014)

Moody's recently downgraded its rating: Moody's downgrades Plains All American to Baa3; outlook negative

Definitive Prospectus Supplement (risks summarized starting at page S-7)

2015 Annual Report (risk discussion starts at page 47; debt listed and discussed starting at page F-22)

PAA SEC Filings

Company Website: PAA IR Home

Recent Earnings: Q/E 3/31/16

Greg L. Armstrong on Q1 2016 ResultsEarnings Call Transcript | Seeking Alpha

The common shares have been crushed in price over the past 2 years: PAA Interactive Stock Chart

See also: Plains All American Responds to Criminal Charges Filed Related to 2015 Accidental Release (the incident is discussed starting at page 66 of the 2015 Annual Report; on " December 31, 2015, our estimated undiscounted reserve for environmental liabilities (including liabilities related to the Line 901 incident, as discussed further below) totaled $185 million, of which $81 million was classified as short-term and $104 million was classified as long-term.")

3. Sold 100 of 400 GSPRD at $21: This was an execution of a GTC AON limit order placed a few weeks ago. I sold a higher cost lot at a small profit:

Trade Snapshot:

I used one of my free Fidelity trades.

Profit Snapshot: +$44.05

Item # 6 Bought: 50 GSPRD at $20.2 (6/7/14 Post)

Item # 1 Bought 50 GSPRD at $20.6 (12/26/12 Post)

Sometimes, I do get caught holding these equity preferred floaters for longer than I originally planned. My trading history for this security is summarized in the Appendix section.

Most Recent Discussion: 3. Paired Trade: Sold 50 GSPRJ at $25.67 and Added 50 GSPRD at $19.95: Update For Exchange Traded Bond And Preferred Stock Basket As Of 12/31/15 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

The Goldman Sachs Group Series D Preferred Stock (GS.PD:NYSE) is a floating rate equity preferred stock issued by the

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS). As such, it will be junior in priority to all bonds and senior only to common stock. This equity preferred stock will pay non-cumulative and qualified dividends at the higher of 4% or .67% above the 3 month LIBOR rate on a $25 par value. Prospectus Dividends are paid quarterly. The 4% coupon is likely to be the applicable rate for several years due to the Fed's Jihad Against the Saving Class.

Links to prior GSPRD round trip trades can be found in the Appendix.

4. Bought 100 PPLPRC at C$16.66:

Quote: Pembina Pipeline Corp. Cumulative Preferred A Series (PPL.PR.C:TOR)

Trade Snapshot (C$1 Commission):

Security Description: The Pembina Pipeline (PPL) cumulative preferred stock is currently paying a C$1.175 annual dividend in quarterly installments that translates into a 4.7% coupon on a C$25 par value:

Preferred-Share-Series-3-Prospectus.pdf

The current yield is 7.05% based on a total cost of C$16.66. The shares are lightly traded and I used a limit order. The shares closed at $16.56, spiking down late in the day on low volume.

That rate is in effect to 3/1/19 whereupon the coupon resets at a 2.6% spread to the five year Canadian government bond yield. To achieve the current 4.7% coupon, I will need the 5 year to be at 2.1% on the reset. Anything higher would be a dividend raise. Anything lower would be a dividend cut.

I recently eliminated my small common stock position and this is my substitute for that lot:

Scroll to Item # 1. Sold 50 PBA at $29.3:Update For Portfolio Positioning And Management As Of 4/29/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

Rationale: While I prefer to avoid the word "bet" when making an investment (as opposed to a trade), I am betting with this investment that the five year Canadian government bond will be meaningfully higher than 2.1% in March 2019. That may prove to be delirious.

I doubt that the rate will be lower than the current .75%: Canada 5 Year Government Bond Bond At that yield, the coupon would become 3.35% on the reset date and my yield at a total cost of C$16.66 would be reduced to 5.03%.

I suspect that a maximum possible 5 year yield in March 2019 would be around 4% which would translate into about a 9.9% yield. (.066% x. $25 par value=C$1.65 in annual dividends ÷ C$16.66 total cost= 9.9%)

Historical 5 Year Canadian Bond Yields:

Sourced: Selected Government of Canada Benchmark Bond Yields - 5 year

5. Sold 2 RRD 6.625% Senior Unsecured Bonds Maturing in 2029 at $86:

I still own two of these bonds.

Profit Snapshot: +$85.3

Scroll to Item # 1. Bought 2 RRD 6.625% Senior Unsecured Bonds Maturing in 2029 at 81.535: Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stocks Basket Strategy As Of 1/5/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

I was paid $ in accrued interest by the buyer.

I received a semi-annual interest payment on 4/15/16:

I currently own only 1 RRD 6.125% senior unsecured bond maturing on 1/15/17: Item # 1 Bought 1 R.R. Donnelley 6.125% Senior Bond Maturing 1/15/2017 at 89 (8/17/11 Post) At the time of purchase, the 2017 had a YTM of 8.515% and a current yield of 6.82%. RRD's senior unsecured debt was then rated Ba1 by Moody's and BB+ by S & P.

The current ratings are as follows:

Moody's Rating B1 (02/02/2016)
Standard & Poor's Rating BB- (11/06/2013

Rationale: There three reasons for trimming my stake in this bond.

1. I describe one important risk when I bought the bond as follows:

"Another risk is that RRD plans to separate into three publicly traded companies in October 2016. The debt division will be important. The company made this announcement on 8/4/15. SEC Filed Press Release It is anticipated that all of RRD's debt will remain with a company called CMCo with that company receiving cash proceeds from the other two companies upon the recapitalization: Page 12 Investor Presentation"

This kind of split leaves bond owners with less assets in the event of a BK and just makes me nervous holding the debt.

Moody's Downgrades RR Donnelley & Sons Company's developing outlook

The B1 rating for RRD's senior unsecured debt describes a "high credit risk". Page 7 Moodys Rating Symbols and Definitions.pdf

The Ba2 rating is equivalent to S & P's B+ rating. Based on the FINRA information, S & P is one notch higher than B+ at BB-.

2. I am shortening the weighted average bond duration in my individual bond portfolio based on potential interest rate risks due to interest rate normalization and/or an increase in inflation and inflation expectations.

3. RRD is debt heavy for a company operating in a business sector that is in a long term secular decline.

6. Eliminated TCBIL-Sold 100 at $25.62:

Quote: Texas Capital Bancshares 6.5% Junior Note due 2042 (TCBIL:NASDAQ)

Trade Snapshot:

Profit Snapshot: +$53.76

Scroll to Item # 4. Bought 100 TCBIL at $25: Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stocks Basket Strategy As Of 1/5/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

Security Description: The Texas Capital Bancshares Inc. 6.5% Subordinated Notes due 2042 (TCBIL:NASDAQ) is an Exchange Traded junior bond issued by the bank holding company Texas Capital Bancshares Inc. (NASDAQ:TCBI) that makes quarterly interest payments at the fixed coupon rate of 6.5% per annum on a $25 par value.

TCBI has the option to redeem at par value plus accrued interest on or after 9/21/2017. If not redeemed early, the bond is scheduled to mature in 2042.

Prospectus

7. Eliminated PGX at $15.05+:

Quote:

PowerShares Preferred Portfolio ETF Fund (PGX)

The round trip was commission free at Schwab.

Trade Snapshot:

Profit Snapshot: +$59.31

Scroll to Item # 1. Bought 200 PGX at $14.79-Commission Free in Schwab Account: Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 2/3/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

PGX's sponsor claims that the modified duration is 2.76 years and the effective duration is 4.44 years. The years to maturity is shown at 36.73 years. Product Detail PGX

Notwithstanding the deceptive name, this fund owns both exchange traded bonds that make interest payments and preferred stocks that pay dividends.

The exchange traded bonds generally have long maturities with the usual issuer option to redeem at par value 5 years after the IPO date.

What is the assumption underlying a short duration? The assumption is that the issues will be called when the issuer has the right to call. That may be a reality based assumption during a long and persistent period of declining rates and most issuers can easily refinance at much lower rates than the original coupon in five years.

The assumption of an early redemption is not based on reality when the coupons have been driven to historically low levels for the credit risks and interest rates start to rise. Then the assumption should be that the security will not be called and the relevant duration number needs to be calculated using the maturity date for bonds. Equity preferred stocks, which have no maturity dates, become perpetual securities with no realistic prospect of being called until rates decline significantly below the already low coupon levels.

A discussion of this issue can be found in this Wells Fargo publication:

Wells Fargo Impact of Rising Interest Rates on Preferred Securities.pdf

I would not pay any attention to the sponsor's calculation of duration unless the realistic forecast is a prolonged period of abnormally low rates that has periods where rates fall below where they are now.

8. Sold 50 out 150 NGHCZ:

Quote:

National General Holdings Corp. 7.625% Junior Note Maturing in 2055 (NGHCZ)

Trade Snapshot ($1 Commission)

Item # 2 Bought 50 NGHCZ at $23.2: Update For Bond And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 9/10/15 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

Profit Snapshot: +$95.65

Remaining Positions:

Item # 2 Bought 50 NGHCZ at $23.75 (a Roth IRA account)(same link as above)

Item # 3 Bought 50 NGHCZ at $23.19: Update For Exchange Traded Bonds And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 1/22/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

Security Description: NGHCZ is a 7.625% junior bond issued by National General Holdings that matures in 2055. On or after 9/15/2020, the issuer has the option to redeem at the $25 par value plus accrued and unpaid interest. At $25, the equity preferred stock NGHCP has a yield equal to the 7.5% coupon rate.

As with other exchange trade bonds, interest rate risk is asymmetric in favor of the issuer with the bond owners bearing most of the that risk. The asymmetric risk division is created by combining a long maturity date with an issuer option to redeem. That option is usually exercisable five years after the IPO date.

{Scroll to Appendix: 1. Exchange Traded Bonds and Preferred Stocks: Asymmetric Interest Rate Risks: Update For Bond And Preferred Stock Basket Strategy As Of 9/10/15 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha}

NGHCZ Prospectus

9. I discussed selling 100 DLRPRI in my last REIT update: Scroll to Item # 5. Sold 100 of 150 DLRPRI at $26.38: Update For Equity REIT Basket Strategy As Of 5/19/16 - South Gent | Seeking Alpha

++++++++++

Warning ON JBK:

Back in 2012: I eliminated my remaining position in the Lehman ABS Corp. 3.50% Adj. Corporate Bkd TRUCs Goldman Sachs Capital I Sec-Bkd Series 2004-6 (JBK:NYSE) Overall, I realized $692.18 through trading 200 shares.

I explained why I sold here:

Stocks, Bonds & Politics: Sold 50 JBK at $22.75/Reassessment of Current Synthetic Floater Positions (7/21/2012 Post)

I will drag and drop some of that discussion here and then update it with a current development. I was not following what was happening with this security since I no longer owned it:

" I decided that the Trust Certificate JBK was just not worth holding considering its historical baggage . .

JBK started out as a synthetic floater. A company believed to be a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers formed a Grantor Trust that sold trust certificates to the public at $25. The trust then used the proceeds to buy, from that Lehman subsidiary, Goldman Sachs Capital TPs with a fixed rate coupon of 6.345% maturing in 2034. A "swap agreement was attached to that trust certificate. It was the swap agreement which creates the float, hence the name synthetic floater. Lehman Brothers Specialty Financing was identified in the prospectus as the swap counterparty. JBK Prospectus

For as long as that swap agreement remained in force, the trustee would collect the fixed coupon payments made by Goldman Sachs Capital and then transfer those payments to the swap counterparty. In exchange, the swap counterparty would transfer back to the trustee what was owed to the owners of JBK. That amount would be the greater of 3.5% or .75% above the three month LIBOR rate, up to a maximum of 7.5%.

At the minimum coupon, the swap counterparty would earn a risk free spread of 2.845%. In that context, risk free simply means that the swap counterparty did not bear the credit risk of a GS default or a deferral of interest payments permitted by the TP under certain circumstances.

When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the trustee took the position that such a filing constituted a swap termination event that was not a trust termination event. I believe that is the correct position based on my reading of the prospectus. The trustee, thereafter, quit transferring the payments received by GS Capital to the swap counterparty. Instead, as provided in the prospectus, the owners of the TC JBK started to receive the fixed coupon payments made by GS Capital on a semi-annual basis. Since those JBK owners had been receiving the minimum coupon of 3.25%, this constituted a coupon raise for them from 3.25% to 6.345%, though they would no longer receive quarterly distributions.

The trustee took $100,000 out of the first semi-annual payment after the swap termination. Trustee Distribution Statement I noticed that deduction and made some brief comments about it at New Information about JBK.

A reader has informed me that the Lehman bankruptcy estate was claiming a right to compensation for a swap termination. And, that would explain the $100,000 debit by the trustee to pay lawyers to fight that claim . . . Personally, I think that such a claim is frivolous, but I have seen many claims lacking in merit succeed in my days.

There are several provisions in the prospectus that justify the trustee's position. . . "

End of Quote

Lehman initiated a "mediation proceeding" against the Trustee in the bankruptcy court, seeking either a Swap Termination fee or the payment of the fixed coupon amount. Additionally, the trustee is seeking state court relief to use Trust assets to defend against Lehman's claim.

"The Trustee has advised the Depositor that it intends to file a Trust Instruction Proceeding in Ramsey County, Minnesota, seeking "an order of the Court authorizing and directing the Trustee to use trust property to pay extraordinary fees and expenses that have been incurred by the Trustee in connection with the LBHI bankruptcy proceeding to date and hereafter, including, but not limited to the fees and costs of administering and defending the Litigation." Please refer to Sections 5 ("Distributions") and 8 ("Trustee's Fees") of the Series Supplement for further information regarding expenses."

Form 10-K

I noted the relevant provisions supporting the trustee's provisions in the previously linked post.

I will just take a few snapshots here from the prospectus:

A default by Lehman under (I) or (III) above is a swap termination event but not a trust termination event.

When that occurs, the prospectus makes the following clear statement that Lehman, as the defaulting party, is not entitled to a swap termination fee and the owners of JBK are entitled to receive their pro-rata share of the interest payments made by Goldman Sachs on its 6.345% trust preferred securities:

I am not aware of Lehman's argument but it has to be based on some theory that Trustee defaulted and hence there was both a Trust Termination and Swap Termination Event.

The trustee's defense is briefly summarized here and apparently relies on the preceding quoted provisions:

EX-99.2

JBK SEC Filings

The prospectus is a Lehman creation.

Notwithstanding the merits of the trustee's position, this latest event confirmed my earlier opinion that JBK simply has to much baggage for me own.

The Trust is apparently going to use trust property to defend against Lehman's ongoing claims and that could result in lower dividend payments. I have seen frivolous positions succeed, so I would not discount entirely that Lehman may secure a very large swap termination fee. I can not evaluate the odds since I do not know the argument or the purported facts that support it.

+++++++++

Appendix:

1. Prior GSPRD Trades:

Item # 5 Sold 100 GSPRD at $23.71-Roth IRA (April 2013)(contains snapshot of gain=$219.25)-Item # 4 Bought 100 GSPRD at $21.38 (February 2013);

Item # 6 Sold 100 GSPRD @ $23.89 (4/23/13 Post)(snapshot of realized gain $257.24)-Bought 100 GSPRD at $21.18 January 2013;

Item # 6 Sold 50 GSPRD at $20.03 July 2012 (snapshot of profit $42.47)-Item # 1 Bought Back GSPRD at $18.9 July 2012;

Item #2 Sold 50 GSPRD at $20.47 (March 2012)(snapshot of gain=$79.48)-Item # 1 Bought 50 GSPRD at $18.6 (September 2011 Post);

Item # 1 Sold 50 GSPRD @ $22.72 (April 2011)(profit snapshot=$41.07)-Item # 2 Bought 50 GSPRD at 21.58 (January 2011)

Total GSPRD Trading Profits: +$683.56

Disclaimer: I am not a financial advisor but simply an individual investor who has been managing my own money since I was a teenager. In this post, I am acting solely as a financial journalist focusing on my own investments. The information contained in this post is not intended to be a complete description or summary of all available data relevant to making an investment decision. Instead, I am merely expressing some of the reasons underlying the purchase or sell of securities. Nothing in this post is intended to constitute investment or legal advice or a recommendation to buy or to sell. All investors need to perform their own due diligence before making any financial decision which requires at a minimum reading original source material available at the SEC and elsewhere. A failure to perform due diligence only increases what I call "error creep". Stocks, Bonds & Politics:ERROR CREEP and the INVESTING PROCESS. Each investor needs to assess a potential investment taking into account their personal risk tolerances, goals and situational risks. I can only make that kind of assessment for myself and family members.

Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.

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