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    <title>MHP - News and Analysis from Seeking Alpha</title>
    <description>'MHP' Tag RSS Syndication from SeekingAlpha.com</description>
    <author>
      <name>SeekingAlpha.com</name>
    </author>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp</link>
    <item>
      <title>Buffett Sells More Moody's Shares: Exit or Rebalancing?</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/171379-buffett-sells-more-moody-s-shares-exit-or-rebalancing?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">171379</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>While the dominant headlines yesterday centered around Warren Buffett &amp; Berkshire Hathaway's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/brk.a' title='More opinion and analysis of BRK.A'>BRK.A</a>) acquisition of Burlington Nothern Santa Fe (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bni' title='More opinion and analysis of BNI'>BNI</a>), we wanted to highlight one of his other recent moves.</p><p>Having already <a href="http://www.marketfolly.com/2009/07/hedge-fund-news-update.html">trimmed his stake in Moody's</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) a few times prior, legendary investor Warren Buffett has sold even more shares of the ratings agency. On October 28th, 2009, Buffett sold 1,133,027 shares at a price of $24.8637. Additionally, he sold 19,600 shares the next day at a price of $25.2728 per share. This brings his total ownership to 38,066,685 shares. These sales are in addition to other transactions he completed back in the beginning of September where he sold 794,388 shares between $26-27. While he has obviously been selling shares, we need to highlight that he does still indeed own quite a sizable chunk of the company. We simply take note because he has now made multiple sales within a few months. <span><span></span></p></span>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 02:06:36 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Market Folly</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://marketfolly.blogspot.com/'>Market Folly</a> submits:</strong><p>While the dominant headlines yesterday centered around Warren Buffett &amp; Berkshire Hathaway's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/brk.a' title='More opinion and analysis of BRK.A'>BRK.A</a>) acquisition of Burlington Nothern Santa Fe (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bni' title='More opinion and analysis of BNI'>BNI</a>), we wanted to highlight one of his other recent moves.</p><p>Having already <a href="http://www.marketfolly.com/2009/07/hedge-fund-news-update.html">trimmed his stake in Moody's</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) a few times prior, legendary investor Warren Buffett has sold even more shares of the ratings agency. On October 28th, 2009, Buffett sold 1,133,027 shares at a price of $24.8637. Additionally, he sold 19,600 shares the next day at a price of $25.2728 per share. This brings his total ownership to 38,066,685 shares. These sales are in addition to other transactions he completed back in the beginning of September where he sold 794,388 shares between $26-27. While he has obviously been selling shares, we need to highlight that he does still indeed own quite a sizable chunk of the company. We simply take note because he has now made multiple sales within a few months. <span><span></span></p></span><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/171379-buffett-sells-more-moody-s-shares-exit-or-rebalancing?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bni">BNI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/brk.a">BRK.A</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/brk.b">BRK.B</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/csx">CSX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/unp">UNP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/market-folly">Market Folly</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How Are the S&amp;P's Dividend Aristocrats Performing?</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/171363-how-are-the-s-p-s-dividend-aristocrats-performing?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">171363</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>It seems it has been some time since I updated the performance of Standard &amp; Poor's Dividend Aristocrats. Year to date through November 4, 2009, the Aristocrats have generated a better return than the Dow Jones Industrial Index, 12.2% versus 11.7%, respectively. However, the Aristocrats performance has trailed the return on the S &amp; P 500 Index's return of 15.9%.<br><br>In the below table, I have shaded the rows for those companies that have cut their dividend this year.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:57:28 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>David I. Templeton</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://disciplinedinvesting.blogspot.com/'>David I. Templeton</a> submits: </strong><p>It seems it has been some time since I updated the performance of Standard &amp; Poor's Dividend Aristocrats. Year to date through November 4, 2009, the Aristocrats have generated a better return than the Dow Jones Industrial Index, 12.2% versus 11.7%, respectively. However, the Aristocrats performance has trailed the return on the S &amp; P 500 Index's return of 15.9%.<br><br>In the below table, I have shaded the rows for those companies that have cut their dividend this year.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/171363-how-are-the-s-p-s-dividend-aristocrats-performing?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/abt">ABT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/adm">ADM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/adp">ADP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/afl">AFL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/apd">APD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/avy">AVY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bbt">BBT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bcr">BCR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bdx">BDX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bms">BMS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cb">CB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cinf">CINF</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/clx">CLX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ctl">CTL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dov">DOV</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ed">ED</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/emr">EMR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/fdo">FDO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gci">GCI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ge">GE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jci">JCI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jnj">JNJ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/kmb">KMB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ko">KO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/leg">LEG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lly">LLY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lm">LM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/low">LOW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mcd">MCD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mmm">MMM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mtb">MTB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pbi">PBI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pep">PEP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pfe">PFE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pg">PG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pgr">PGR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ppg">PPG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/roh">ROH</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/shw">SHW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sial">SIAL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/str">STR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/stt">STT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/svu">SVU</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/swk">SWK</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/teg">TEG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tgt">TGT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/usb">USB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/vfc">VFC</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wag">WAG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wmt">WMT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xom">XOM</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/david-i-templeton">David I. Templeton</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>If Zelnick Had Bought BusinessWeek</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/170521-if-zelnick-had-bought-businessweek?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">170521</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>It's still unclear how many former BusinessWeek editors will be hired by Bloomberg L.P., but one thing is increasingly clear: it could have been a hell of a lot worse. <a href="http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20091030/businessweeks-future-is-cloudy-but-better-than-it-could-have-been-the-grim-non-bloomberg-scenario/">Peter Kafka describes</a> the nightmare scenario: a purchase by private equity bloodhounds ZelnickMedia that would have been only marginally better than a simple shutdown of the magazine.<br><br>This is how one-sided the Zelnick offer would have been: McGraw-Hill (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) would have wound up paying Zelnick to take BW off its hands. In return, BW would have been ripped limb from limb, and the entire staff would have been laid off.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2009 07:25:56 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Gary Weiss</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<img src='http://seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/gweiss.jpg' title='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' alt='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' width="75" height="100" border='1' align="left" vspace="6" hspace="6" /><strong><a href="http://garyweiss.blogspot.com/">Gary Weiss</a> submits: </strong><p>It's still unclear how many former BusinessWeek editors will be hired by Bloomberg L.P., but one thing is increasingly clear: it could have been a hell of a lot worse. <a href="http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20091030/businessweeks-future-is-cloudy-but-better-than-it-could-have-been-the-grim-non-bloomberg-scenario/">Peter Kafka describes</a> the nightmare scenario: a purchase by private equity bloodhounds ZelnickMedia that would have been only marginally better than a simple shutdown of the magazine.<br><br>This is how one-sided the Zelnick offer would have been: McGraw-Hill (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) would have wound up paying Zelnick to take BW off its hands. In return, BW would have been ripped limb from limb, and the entire staff would have been laid off.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/170521-if-zelnick-had-bought-businessweek?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tri">TRI</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/gary-weiss">Gary Weiss</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unrated Debt an Emerging Global Trend</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/169952-unrated-debt-an-emerging-global-trend?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">169952</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Once thought inconceivable, an interesting trend was uncovered in the October 29th <em><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125674070671913193.html">The Wall Street Journal</a></em>, there are a number of debt issuing firms foregoing the traditional credit rating process.  In an article titled <em>Credit Rating Now Optional, Firms Find</em>, the Journal points out some globally prominent firms and governments have decided not to have their bonds and debt backed securities to be offered rated by any of the major credit rating agencies.  Instead, these issuers are insisting that their investors do their own analysis of the cash flows and risks involved in each security.</p> <p>This is a noteworthy trend as ratings from the major rating firms like <a href="http://www.ockhamresearch.com/Financial/Financial-Services/Credit-Services/MCO">Moody&rsquo;s</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) and Standard &amp; Poor&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) in some cases were seen as a rubber stamp authenticating debt and its associated risks.  However, these agencies have come under scrutiny during the credit crisis as many of their ratings have been proven unreliable.  Some would argue that the credit crisis exposed risks in highly rated debt issues that seemed to catch the agencies asleep at the wheel.  The emergence of non-rated debt does suggest a lack of confidence or at least lack of necessity of these established guidelines.  As the CEO of Italy&rsquo;s Gruppo Campari was quoted as saying, &ldquo;Our reputation is good&hellip;.I don&rsquo;t think a rating would have mattered that much.&rdquo;</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2009 16:38:25 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ockham Research</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href="http://www.ockhamresearch.com/">Ockham Research</a> submits: </strong><p>Once thought inconceivable, an interesting trend was uncovered in the October 29th <em><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125674070671913193.html">The Wall Street Journal</a></em>, there are a number of debt issuing firms foregoing the traditional credit rating process.  In an article titled <em>Credit Rating Now Optional, Firms Find</em>, the Journal points out some globally prominent firms and governments have decided not to have their bonds and debt backed securities to be offered rated by any of the major credit rating agencies.  Instead, these issuers are insisting that their investors do their own analysis of the cash flows and risks involved in each security.</p> <p>This is a noteworthy trend as ratings from the major rating firms like <a href="http://www.ockhamresearch.com/Financial/Financial-Services/Credit-Services/MCO">Moody&rsquo;s</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) and Standard &amp; Poor&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) in some cases were seen as a rubber stamp authenticating debt and its associated risks.  However, these agencies have come under scrutiny during the credit crisis as many of their ratings have been proven unreliable.  Some would argue that the credit crisis exposed risks in highly rated debt issues that seemed to catch the agencies asleep at the wheel.  The emergence of non-rated debt does suggest a lack of confidence or at least lack of necessity of these established guidelines.  As the CEO of Italy&rsquo;s Gruppo Campari was quoted as saying, &ldquo;Our reputation is good&hellip;.I don&rsquo;t think a rating would have mattered that much.&rdquo;</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/169952-unrated-debt-an-emerging-global-trend?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ockham-research">Ockham Research</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Look at Earnings: Visa, Interactive, McGraw-Hill </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/169400-a-look-at-earnings-visa-interactive-mcgraw-hill?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">169400</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><strong>McGraw-Hill (NYSE: <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) &mdash; Cloudy Forecast</strong></p><p><a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/168917-the-mcgraw-hill-companies-inc-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript">Earnings Info</a>: Earnings dropped 14%. MHP earned $1.07 a share compared to $1.23 in the same year ago period.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 05:42:31 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>wall street cheat sheet</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[
<strong><a href='http://wallstcheatsheet.com'>Wall Street Cheat Sheet</a> submits: </strong><p><strong>McGraw-Hill (NYSE: <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) &mdash; Cloudy Forecast</strong></p><p><a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/168917-the-mcgraw-hill-companies-inc-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript">Earnings Info</a>: Earnings dropped 14%. MHP earned $1.07 a share compared to $1.23 in the same year ago period.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/169400-a-look-at-earnings-visa-interactive-mcgraw-hill?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/iaci">IACI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/wall-street-cheat-sheet">wall street cheat sheet</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>McGraw-Hill&#8217;s Earnings Decline</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168939-mcgraw-hills-earnings-decline?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168939</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><strong>McGraw-Hill Companies</strong> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) recently reported third quarter 2009 results. Quarterly earnings of $1.12 per share surpassed the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.06, but fell 8.9% from the $1.23 delivered in the prior-year quarter.<br><br> On a reported basis, including one-time items, earnings fell 13% to $1.07 per share. The decline in the top line, partially offset by stringent cost controls, resulted in the fall to the bottom line. Due to effective cost management, the company now expects to achieve the high end of earnings guidance range of $2.20 to $2.25 per share for fiscal 2009.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:39:14 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Zacks.com</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href="http://register.zacks.com/ucd/step1.php?ALERT=alpha&ADID=ALPHA_content_welcome">Zacks.com</a> submits: </strong>
<p><strong>McGraw-Hill Companies</strong> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) recently reported third quarter 2009 results. Quarterly earnings of $1.12 per share surpassed the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.06, but fell 8.9% from the $1.23 delivered in the prior-year quarter.<br><br> On a reported basis, including one-time items, earnings fell 13% to $1.07 per share. The decline in the top line, partially offset by stringent cost controls, resulted in the fall to the bottom line. Due to effective cost management, the company now expects to achieve the high end of earnings guidance range of $2.20 to $2.25 per share for fiscal 2009.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168939-mcgraw-hills-earnings-decline?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/zacks-com">Zacks.com</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Q3 2009 Earnings Call Transcript</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168917-the-mcgraw-hill-companies-inc-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168917</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>)</p>
<p>Q3 2009 Earnings Call</p>
<p>October 26, 2009 8:30 am ET</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 15:05:16 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>)</p>
<p>Q3 2009 Earnings Call</p>
<p>October 26, 2009 8:30 am ET</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168917-the-mcgraw-hill-companies-inc-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Wall Street Breakfast: Must-Know News</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168795-wall-street-breakfast-must-know-news?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168795</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="http://seekingalpha.com/tag/wall-street-breakfast"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/images/article/sa-coffee-cup_150x124.png" class="article_big_cup" style="float: right; margin-left: 2px;" /></a></p><ul>   <li><b><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/global/27iht-ing.html">ING drops on spin-off, rights issue.</a></b> Dutch financial services company ING Group (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ing' title='More opinion and analysis of ING'>ING</a>) said Monday it will raise up to &euro;7.5B ($11.3B) in a share issue, and split up its insurance and banking businesses, after reaching a deal to repay the government half of its &euro;10B bailout loan ahead of schedule. ING has until the end of January to repurchase government-owned shares, and will launch the share issue on Nov. 25. &quot;We appreciate the ongoing support of the Dutch state,&quot; CEO Jan Hommen said, &quot;but fully recognize that it is in the best interest of all parties that we get back on our own feet as quickly as possible.&quot; Shares <font color="red">-8.1%</font> premarket.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125652033370307309.html">Peltz takes a foothold in Legg Mason.</a></b> Legg Mason (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lm' title='More opinion and analysis of LM'>LM</a>) will name activist investor Nelson Peltz to its board after he quietly accumulated a 4.3% stake; in exchange for the board seat, Peltz's Trian will agree to accumulate no more than 9.9% of the company over the next two years, and will vote its share in favor of the company's slate of nominees during that period. &quot;We welcome Nelson,&quot; Legg CEO Mark Fetting said in a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&amp;tkr=LM%3AUS&amp;sid=aIpuiZ4O0kdE">statement</a>. &quot;We look forward to benefiting from his insights and experience as we work together to build greater value for our clients and our shareholders.&quot; Peltz prefers to think of himself as a 'constructivist investor,' though he is known to pepper management with 'idea' phone calls and emails at late hours and on weekends.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125631965105804277.html">BofA's TARP exit hits snag.</a></b> Sources say Bank of America's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>) plans to repay its TARP loans have fallen into question  due to a dispute over how much more capital it needs to raise in order to exit government oversight. Having raised $40B in new equity since May, BofA thinks it's ready to return the government's $45B investment. But some officials say it should be required to raise more than the $40B determined by government stress tests, to give it the ability to deal with any potential economic relapses. Until it exits government assistance, BofA remains bound by pay czar Kenneth Feinberg's compensation limitations, which bank executives fear will hamper its abilities to recruit talent.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/10/26/nabe-survey-us-companies-expected-to-hire-invest-more/">NABE survey offers cheery outlook.</a></b> U.S. companies expect to hire and invest more over the next six months, according to <a href="http://www.nabe.com/publib/indsum.html">a survey</a> released this morning by the National Association for Business Economics, and for the first time in a year more businesses reported a rise in capital spending over the previous quarter than a decline. All 78 panelists said business decisions are being made with expectations of positive GDP growth in 2010; of those, 73% see real GDP expanding 1-3%. The survey &quot;provides new evidence that the U.S. recovery is underway,&quot; Chicago Fed's William Strauss said. &quot;Improving credit conditions might be part of the explanation, with respondents indicating that credit remains tight but less so than earlier in the year.&quot;</li>    <li><b><a href="http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/construction_and_property/article6890198.ece">Capmark goes under.</a></b> Not unexpectedly, troubled commercial real estate lender Capmark filed for bankruptcy protection on Sunday, wiping out the private-equity investments of KKR, Goldman Sachs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gs' title='More opinion and analysis of GS'>GS</a>) and Five Mile Capital, which bought 75.4% of Capmark for $1.5B in cash and more than $7B in debt in 2006; GMAC owns the remainder. Capmark is negotiating the terms of the bankruptcy with its creditors, including Citigroup (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/c' title='More opinion and analysis of C'>C</a>) and JPMorgan (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jpm' title='More opinion and analysis of JPM'>JPM</a>), but they have not yet reached an agreement over a prepackaged bankruptcy. U.S. banks hold more than $1T worth of mortgages backed by commercial property, on which analysts predict they could suffer losses in the neighborhood of $150B. Bad commercial property debts have played a pivotal role in the demise of many of the 106 banks that have failed so far this year.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.thestreet.com/story/10616548/1/fda-oks-use-of-biocryst-flu-drug.html">FDA OKs BioCryst's swine flu drug.</a></b> The FDA <a href="http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm187813.htm">approved</a> emergency use of BioCryst Pharmaceuticals' (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bcrx' title='More opinion and analysis of BCRX'>BCRX</a>) experimental intravenous antiviral drug peramivir to treat severe cases of H1N1. &quot;Based upon the totality of scientific evidence available, it is reasonable to believe that peramivir IV may be effective in certain patients,&quot; it said in a <a href="http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM187800.pdf">letter</a>. The authorization is only for hospitalized patients who are not responding to either oral or inhaled antiviral treatments, or for whom nonintravenous drug delivery is not feasible.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.forexyard.com/en/reuters_inner.tpl?action=2009-10-26T072250Z_01_PEK277410_RTRIDST_0_CHINA-ECONOMY-WRAPUP-1-PIX">China: undertones of an exit.</a></b> China's economic growth is likely to speed up this quarter, but the government will stay the course with its loose fiscal policy, senior officials said today. Still, analysts say the &quot;unmistakable shift&quot; in official statements signal Beijing is starting to think about how to unwind its pro-growth policies. China set itself a goal of 8% GDP growth this year, which officials say it's on track to fulfill.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/87210a7c-c1ac-11de-b86b-00144feab49a.html">Lloyds eyes outsourcer CPA Global.</a></b> Lloyds' (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lyg' title='More opinion and analysis of LYG'>LYG</a>) private-equity arm LDC is reportedly in talks to acquire legal outsourcing company CPA Global for &pound;400M ($652M). Lloyds is stepping up its buyout activity, aiming to become a dominant player in Britain's dwindling private-equity deal market.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Business/Story/A1Story20091025-175803.html">Blackstone hopes for magic from Merlin.</a></b> Looking to take advantage of buoyant equity markets, Blackstone (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bx' title='More opinion and analysis of BX'>BX</a>) is reportedly preparing to float its theme park operator Merlin Entertainments next year. Citigroup (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/c' title='More opinion and analysis of C'>C</a>), Goldman Sachs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gs' title='More opinion and analysis of GS'>GS</a>), Deutsche Bank (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/db' title='More opinion and analysis of DB'>DB</a>), UBS (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ubs' title='More opinion and analysis of UBS'>UBS</a>) and Nomura (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nmr' title='More opinion and analysis of NMR'>NMR</a>) are advising on what could be a $3.3B IPO. Merlin - which owns the London Eye, Madame Tussauds and the Sea Life centers - is the world's number-two park operator, after Disney (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dis' title='More opinion and analysis of DIS'>DIS</a>).</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125650595881806789.html">Madoff crony found dead.</a></b> Jeffrey Picower, alleged to have extracted $7.2B from Madoff's Ponzi scheme, was found dead at the bottom of his Palm Beach pool Sunday. Madoff trustee Irving Picard alleges Picower and a group of longtime Madoff investors knew or should have known of the fraud, because they requested and received oversized returns of up to 950% on their investments.</li> </ul>  <h2>Earnings: Mon. Before Open</h2>  <ul>   <li><b>Alberto-Culver (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/acv' title='More opinion and analysis of ACV'>ACV</a>):</b> FQ4 EPS of $0.33 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $358M (-7.2%) vs. $387M. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/cg98415.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Corning (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/glw' title='More opinion and analysis of GLW'>GLW</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.42 <font color="green">beats by $0.03</font>. Revenue of $1.48B (-4.9%) vs. $1.42B. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005538.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Lorillard (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lo' title='More opinion and analysis of LO'>LO</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $1.44 <font color="red">misses by $0.08</font>. Revenue of $1.42B (+26.1%) vs. $1.32B. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny98432.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>McGraw-Hill Companies (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $1.07 <font color="green">beats by $0.02</font>. Revenue of $1.88B (-8.4%) vs. $1.94B. Avg. daily volume for major exchange-traded derivatives fell 23.2% from a year ago. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny97844.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>National-Oilwell Varco (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nov' title='More opinion and analysis of NOV'>NOV</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.95 <font color="green">beats by $0.16</font>. Revenue of $3.09B (-14.5%) vs. $2.9B. &quot;While difficult credit market conditions have led to order rates below our expectations so far this year, we continue to pursue new rig opportunities aggressively, and seek and execute strategic internal growth and acquisition opportunities.&quot; (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005200.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>RadioShack (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rsh' title='More opinion and analysis of RSH'>RSH</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.30 <font color="red">misses by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $990M (-3.1%) vs. $961M. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/da98051.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Tellabs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tlab' title='More opinion and analysis of TLAB'>TLAB</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.07 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $389M (-8.3%) vs. $394M. Shares <font color="green">+2.1%</font> premarket. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/cg98454.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Verizon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/vz' title='More opinion and analysis of VZ'>VZ</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.60 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $27.27B (+10.2%) in-line. Shares <font color="green">+2.4%</font> premarket. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny98302.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Weingarten Realty Investors (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wri' title='More opinion and analysis of WRI'>WRI</a>):</b> Q3 FFO of $0.50 <font color="red">misses by $0.04</font>. Revenue of $145M (-6.2%) vs. $143M. Sees full-year FFO of $2.08-2.16 vs. $2.26 consensus.  Overall occupancy increased to 91.1% from 90.9% in Q2. &quot;Conditions across most of the existing portfolio appear to be stabilizing as retailers are learning to adapt to current market conditions by managing inventories.&quot; (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005460.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li> </ul>  <h2>Today's Markets</h2><p>Overseas markets were mostly higher Monday.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 07:19:08 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>SA Editor Eli Hoffmann</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="http://seekingalpha.com/tag/wall-street-breakfast"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/images/article/sa-coffee-cup_150x124.png" class="article_big_cup" style="float: right; margin-left: 2px;" /></a></p><ul>   <li><b><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/global/27iht-ing.html">ING drops on spin-off, rights issue.</a></b> Dutch financial services company ING Group (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ing' title='More opinion and analysis of ING'>ING</a>) said Monday it will raise up to &euro;7.5B ($11.3B) in a share issue, and split up its insurance and banking businesses, after reaching a deal to repay the government half of its &euro;10B bailout loan ahead of schedule. ING has until the end of January to repurchase government-owned shares, and will launch the share issue on Nov. 25. &quot;We appreciate the ongoing support of the Dutch state,&quot; CEO Jan Hommen said, &quot;but fully recognize that it is in the best interest of all parties that we get back on our own feet as quickly as possible.&quot; Shares <font color="red">-8.1%</font> premarket.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125652033370307309.html">Peltz takes a foothold in Legg Mason.</a></b> Legg Mason (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lm' title='More opinion and analysis of LM'>LM</a>) will name activist investor Nelson Peltz to its board after he quietly accumulated a 4.3% stake; in exchange for the board seat, Peltz's Trian will agree to accumulate no more than 9.9% of the company over the next two years, and will vote its share in favor of the company's slate of nominees during that period. &quot;We welcome Nelson,&quot; Legg CEO Mark Fetting said in a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&amp;tkr=LM%3AUS&amp;sid=aIpuiZ4O0kdE">statement</a>. &quot;We look forward to benefiting from his insights and experience as we work together to build greater value for our clients and our shareholders.&quot; Peltz prefers to think of himself as a 'constructivist investor,' though he is known to pepper management with 'idea' phone calls and emails at late hours and on weekends.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125631965105804277.html">BofA's TARP exit hits snag.</a></b> Sources say Bank of America's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>) plans to repay its TARP loans have fallen into question  due to a dispute over how much more capital it needs to raise in order to exit government oversight. Having raised $40B in new equity since May, BofA thinks it's ready to return the government's $45B investment. But some officials say it should be required to raise more than the $40B determined by government stress tests, to give it the ability to deal with any potential economic relapses. Until it exits government assistance, BofA remains bound by pay czar Kenneth Feinberg's compensation limitations, which bank executives fear will hamper its abilities to recruit talent.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/10/26/nabe-survey-us-companies-expected-to-hire-invest-more/">NABE survey offers cheery outlook.</a></b> U.S. companies expect to hire and invest more over the next six months, according to <a href="http://www.nabe.com/publib/indsum.html">a survey</a> released this morning by the National Association for Business Economics, and for the first time in a year more businesses reported a rise in capital spending over the previous quarter than a decline. All 78 panelists said business decisions are being made with expectations of positive GDP growth in 2010; of those, 73% see real GDP expanding 1-3%. The survey &quot;provides new evidence that the U.S. recovery is underway,&quot; Chicago Fed's William Strauss said. &quot;Improving credit conditions might be part of the explanation, with respondents indicating that credit remains tight but less so than earlier in the year.&quot;</li>    <li><b><a href="http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/construction_and_property/article6890198.ece">Capmark goes under.</a></b> Not unexpectedly, troubled commercial real estate lender Capmark filed for bankruptcy protection on Sunday, wiping out the private-equity investments of KKR, Goldman Sachs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gs' title='More opinion and analysis of GS'>GS</a>) and Five Mile Capital, which bought 75.4% of Capmark for $1.5B in cash and more than $7B in debt in 2006; GMAC owns the remainder. Capmark is negotiating the terms of the bankruptcy with its creditors, including Citigroup (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/c' title='More opinion and analysis of C'>C</a>) and JPMorgan (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jpm' title='More opinion and analysis of JPM'>JPM</a>), but they have not yet reached an agreement over a prepackaged bankruptcy. U.S. banks hold more than $1T worth of mortgages backed by commercial property, on which analysts predict they could suffer losses in the neighborhood of $150B. Bad commercial property debts have played a pivotal role in the demise of many of the 106 banks that have failed so far this year.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.thestreet.com/story/10616548/1/fda-oks-use-of-biocryst-flu-drug.html">FDA OKs BioCryst's swine flu drug.</a></b> The FDA <a href="http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm187813.htm">approved</a> emergency use of BioCryst Pharmaceuticals' (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bcrx' title='More opinion and analysis of BCRX'>BCRX</a>) experimental intravenous antiviral drug peramivir to treat severe cases of H1N1. &quot;Based upon the totality of scientific evidence available, it is reasonable to believe that peramivir IV may be effective in certain patients,&quot; it said in a <a href="http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM187800.pdf">letter</a>. The authorization is only for hospitalized patients who are not responding to either oral or inhaled antiviral treatments, or for whom nonintravenous drug delivery is not feasible.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.forexyard.com/en/reuters_inner.tpl?action=2009-10-26T072250Z_01_PEK277410_RTRIDST_0_CHINA-ECONOMY-WRAPUP-1-PIX">China: undertones of an exit.</a></b> China's economic growth is likely to speed up this quarter, but the government will stay the course with its loose fiscal policy, senior officials said today. Still, analysts say the &quot;unmistakable shift&quot; in official statements signal Beijing is starting to think about how to unwind its pro-growth policies. China set itself a goal of 8% GDP growth this year, which officials say it's on track to fulfill.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/87210a7c-c1ac-11de-b86b-00144feab49a.html">Lloyds eyes outsourcer CPA Global.</a></b> Lloyds' (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lyg' title='More opinion and analysis of LYG'>LYG</a>) private-equity arm LDC is reportedly in talks to acquire legal outsourcing company CPA Global for &pound;400M ($652M). Lloyds is stepping up its buyout activity, aiming to become a dominant player in Britain's dwindling private-equity deal market.</li>    <li><b><a href="http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Business/Story/A1Story20091025-175803.html">Blackstone hopes for magic from Merlin.</a></b> Looking to take advantage of buoyant equity markets, Blackstone (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bx' title='More opinion and analysis of BX'>BX</a>) is reportedly preparing to float its theme park operator Merlin Entertainments next year. Citigroup (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/c' title='More opinion and analysis of C'>C</a>), Goldman Sachs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gs' title='More opinion and analysis of GS'>GS</a>), Deutsche Bank (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/db' title='More opinion and analysis of DB'>DB</a>), UBS (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ubs' title='More opinion and analysis of UBS'>UBS</a>) and Nomura (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nmr' title='More opinion and analysis of NMR'>NMR</a>) are advising on what could be a $3.3B IPO. Merlin - which owns the London Eye, Madame Tussauds and the Sea Life centers - is the world's number-two park operator, after Disney (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dis' title='More opinion and analysis of DIS'>DIS</a>).</li>    <li><b><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125650595881806789.html">Madoff crony found dead.</a></b> Jeffrey Picower, alleged to have extracted $7.2B from Madoff's Ponzi scheme, was found dead at the bottom of his Palm Beach pool Sunday. Madoff trustee Irving Picard alleges Picower and a group of longtime Madoff investors knew or should have known of the fraud, because they requested and received oversized returns of up to 950% on their investments.</li> </ul>  <h2>Earnings: Mon. Before Open</h2>  <ul>   <li><b>Alberto-Culver (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/acv' title='More opinion and analysis of ACV'>ACV</a>):</b> FQ4 EPS of $0.33 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $358M (-7.2%) vs. $387M. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/cg98415.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Corning (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/glw' title='More opinion and analysis of GLW'>GLW</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.42 <font color="green">beats by $0.03</font>. Revenue of $1.48B (-4.9%) vs. $1.42B. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005538.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Lorillard (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lo' title='More opinion and analysis of LO'>LO</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $1.44 <font color="red">misses by $0.08</font>. Revenue of $1.42B (+26.1%) vs. $1.32B. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny98432.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>McGraw-Hill Companies (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $1.07 <font color="green">beats by $0.02</font>. Revenue of $1.88B (-8.4%) vs. $1.94B. Avg. daily volume for major exchange-traded derivatives fell 23.2% from a year ago. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny97844.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>National-Oilwell Varco (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nov' title='More opinion and analysis of NOV'>NOV</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.95 <font color="green">beats by $0.16</font>. Revenue of $3.09B (-14.5%) vs. $2.9B. &quot;While difficult credit market conditions have led to order rates below our expectations so far this year, we continue to pursue new rig opportunities aggressively, and seek and execute strategic internal growth and acquisition opportunities.&quot; (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005200.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>RadioShack (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rsh' title='More opinion and analysis of RSH'>RSH</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.30 <font color="red">misses by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $990M (-3.1%) vs. $961M. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/da98051.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Tellabs (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tlab' title='More opinion and analysis of TLAB'>TLAB</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.07 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $389M (-8.3%) vs. $394M. Shares <font color="green">+2.1%</font> premarket. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/cg98454.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Verizon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/vz' title='More opinion and analysis of VZ'>VZ</a>):</b> Q3 EPS of $0.60 <font color="green">beats by $0.01</font>. Revenue of $27.27B (+10.2%) in-line. Shares <font color="green">+2.4%</font> premarket. (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/091026/ny98302.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li>    <li><b>Weingarten Realty Investors (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wri' title='More opinion and analysis of WRI'>WRI</a>):</b> Q3 FFO of $0.50 <font color="red">misses by $0.04</font>. Revenue of $145M (-6.2%) vs. $143M. Sees full-year FFO of $2.08-2.16 vs. $2.26 consensus.  Overall occupancy increased to 91.1% from 90.9% in Q2. &quot;Conditions across most of the existing portfolio appear to be stabilizing as retailers are learning to adapt to current market conditions by managing inventories.&quot; (<a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/091026/20091026005460.html?.v=1">PR</a>)</li> </ul>  <h2>Today's Markets</h2><p>Overseas markets were mostly higher Monday.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168795-wall-street-breakfast-must-know-news?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/acv">ACV</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac">BAC</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bcrx">BCRX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bx">BX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/c">C</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/db">DB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dia">DIA</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dis">DIS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gld">GLD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/glw">GLW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gs">GS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ing">ING</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jpm">JPM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lm">LM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lo">LO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lyg">LYG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nmr">NMR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nov">NOV</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/qqqq">QQQQ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rsh">RSH</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/spy">SPY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tlab">TLAB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ubs">UBS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/uso">USO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/vz">VZ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wri">WRI</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/eli-hoffmann">SA Editor Eli Hoffmann</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Earnings Preview: McGraw-Hill</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168548-earnings-preview-mcgraw-hill?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168548</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><strong><span><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/10/23/saupload_mhp.png" align="right" hspace="6" vspace="6" />McGraw-Hill </span></strong><span>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) is expected to report Q3 earnings before the market open on Monday, October 26 with a conference call scheduled for 8:30 am. </span></p><h2><span>Guidance</span></h2><p><span>Analysts are looking for EPS of $1.05 on revenue of $1.94B. The consensus range is 99c-$1.13 for EPS, and revenue of $1.9B-$1.97B, according to First Call. The company lowered its FY09 guidance when it last reported earnings, expecting FY09 EPS of $2.20-$2.25, down from $2.20-$2.30, and the company anticipates coming in at low end of the range. Consensus for FY09 EPS is $2.24. McGraw-Hill also lowered its FY09 revenue estimates expecting growth down 5.5%-6.5% vs. prior view of a 4%-5% decline. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2009 14:04:29 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>theflyonthewall.com</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p><strong><span><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/10/23/saupload_mhp.png" align="right" hspace="6" vspace="6" />McGraw-Hill </span></strong><span>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) is expected to report Q3 earnings before the market open on Monday, October 26 with a conference call scheduled for 8:30 am. </span></p><h2><span>Guidance</span></h2><p><span>Analysts are looking for EPS of $1.05 on revenue of $1.94B. The consensus range is 99c-$1.13 for EPS, and revenue of $1.9B-$1.97B, according to First Call. The company lowered its FY09 guidance when it last reported earnings, expecting FY09 EPS of $2.20-$2.25, down from $2.20-$2.30, and the company anticipates coming in at low end of the range. Consensus for FY09 EPS is $2.24. McGraw-Hill also lowered its FY09 revenue estimates expecting growth down 5.5%-6.5% vs. prior view of a 4%-5% decline. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168548-earnings-preview-mcgraw-hill?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/theflyonthewall-com">theflyonthewall.com</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The eBook Wars: What Publishers Should Do</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168534-the-ebook-wars-what-publishers-should-do?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168534</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<div><div><div><div><p><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/10/23/saupload_screen_shot_2009_10_23_at_10.26.46_am.jpg" align="right" alt="Screen shot 2009-10-23 at 10.26.46 AM" hspace="6" vspace="6" />The eBook business is hot. Barnes &amp; Noble (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bks' title='More opinion and analysis of BKS'>BKS</a>) just announced its $259 Kindle-killer, <a href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/nook/index.asp">the GSM-connected Nook with a color touchscreen complimenting its eInk bland and white display</a>, Amazon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/amzn' title='More opinion and analysis of AMZN'>AMZN</a>) <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0015T963C/ref=ms_sbrspot_0?pf_rd_p=495025551&amp;pf_rd_s=center-1&amp;pf_rd_t=101&amp;pf_rd_i=507846&amp;pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&amp;pf_rd_r=0TFKCN5QKFKGJZAQWV63">started shipping the international edition of Kindle</a>, and Sony (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sne' title='More opinion and analysis of SNE'>SNE</a>) has <a href="http://news.sel.sony.com/en/press_room/consumer/computer_peripheral/e_book/release/41492.html">promised its Reader Daily Edition eBook reader for December</a>. Analysts everywhere (Yankee Group included) are sharpening their pencils and cuing up forecasts of hundreds of thousands of eBook reader sales for this holiday season. And why not; eBook readers take books and make them easy to buy and consume in today&rsquo;s Anywhere Economy.</p> <p><span>At the same time this eBook reader war has been capturing media attention,  <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/10/22/business/business-us-booksellers-doj.html?_r=1">a price war has been brewing over paper books</a>. Walmart (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wmt' title='More opinion and analysis of WMT'>WMT</a>) has cut best-selling hardcover prices to $10 from their normal $24 price tags. Amazon (the same place that sells $9.99 eBooks and the $259 Kindle) has matched Walmart&rsquo;s prices. Target (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tgt' title='More opinion and analysis of TGT'>TGT</a>), not to be outdone, has started pitching selected $9 hardcovers. Add to this the fact that most consumers cherish the flexibility of paper books &mdash; the ability to write in them, paste sticky notes in them, lend them to friends, and resell them when they are done with them &mdash; and the traditional book market is looking like it could make a comeback with consumers as well.</span></p></div></div></div></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2009 12:49:10 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Carl Howe</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<img src='http://seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/chowenew70px2.jpg' align="left" hspace="6" vspace="6" width="70" height="74" border='1' /> <strong>Carl Howe (<a href="http://www.blackfriarsinc.com/">Blackfriars Communications</a>) submits: </strong><div><div><div><div><p><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/10/23/saupload_screen_shot_2009_10_23_at_10.26.46_am.jpg" align="right" alt="Screen shot 2009-10-23 at 10.26.46 AM" hspace="6" vspace="6" />The eBook business is hot. Barnes &amp; Noble (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bks' title='More opinion and analysis of BKS'>BKS</a>) just announced its $259 Kindle-killer, <a href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/nook/index.asp">the GSM-connected Nook with a color touchscreen complimenting its eInk bland and white display</a>, Amazon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/amzn' title='More opinion and analysis of AMZN'>AMZN</a>) <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0015T963C/ref=ms_sbrspot_0?pf_rd_p=495025551&amp;pf_rd_s=center-1&amp;pf_rd_t=101&amp;pf_rd_i=507846&amp;pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&amp;pf_rd_r=0TFKCN5QKFKGJZAQWV63">started shipping the international edition of Kindle</a>, and Sony (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sne' title='More opinion and analysis of SNE'>SNE</a>) has <a href="http://news.sel.sony.com/en/press_room/consumer/computer_peripheral/e_book/release/41492.html">promised its Reader Daily Edition eBook reader for December</a>. Analysts everywhere (Yankee Group included) are sharpening their pencils and cuing up forecasts of hundreds of thousands of eBook reader sales for this holiday season. And why not; eBook readers take books and make them easy to buy and consume in today&rsquo;s Anywhere Economy.</p> <p><span>At the same time this eBook reader war has been capturing media attention,  <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/10/22/business/business-us-booksellers-doj.html?_r=1">a price war has been brewing over paper books</a>. Walmart (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wmt' title='More opinion and analysis of WMT'>WMT</a>) has cut best-selling hardcover prices to $10 from their normal $24 price tags. Amazon (the same place that sells $9.99 eBooks and the $259 Kindle) has matched Walmart&rsquo;s prices. Target (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tgt' title='More opinion and analysis of TGT'>TGT</a>), not to be outdone, has started pitching selected $9 hardcovers. Add to this the fact that most consumers cherish the flexibility of paper books &mdash; the ability to write in them, paste sticky notes in them, lend them to friends, and resell them when they are done with them &mdash; and the traditional book market is looking like it could make a comeback with consumers as well.</span></p></div></div></div></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168534-the-ebook-wars-what-publishers-should-do?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/amzn">AMZN</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bks">BKS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jw.a">JW.A</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sne">SNE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tgt">TGT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wmt">WMT</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/carl-howe">Carl Howe</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Have Moody&#8217;s and S&amp;P (and Fitch) Seen the Light (Part 2)?</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168195-have-moodys-and-s-p-and-fitch-seen-the-light-part-2?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168195</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<div>The original idea for this article, when it was conceived around the beginning of August, was to highlight a number of cases where S&amp;P&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) ratings for residential mortgage-backed securities remained completely unrealistic, and make a side comment about financial guarantor ratings. In August, S&amp;P downgraded some of the securities, so the order was reversed and financial guarantor ratings were discussed first (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/165236-have-moodys-and-s-p-seen-the-light-part-1">in Part 1</a>). By October 1, S&amp;P had slashed the ratings of all but one of the securities to be discussed (and many others like them) to deep junk.</div><div>The downgrades reveal just how far off the previous ratings were. They also make the ratings of financial guarantors like FSA, Assured Guaranty Corp. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago' title='More opinion and analysis of AGO'>AGO</a>) and MBIA Insurance Corp. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi' title='More opinion and analysis of MBI'>MBI</a>) seem outright bizarre and incongruous in relation to the RMBS ratings. FSA, Assured, and MBIA have direct &#40;RMBS&#41; and indirect &#40;CDO&#41; exposure to multiple securities from each of the pools discussed below, as well as many others that were downgraded along with them. Financial guarantor ratings will be revisited briefly after discussing the RMBS ratings.<b><font size="5"><span></div><div><span><font>RMBS RATINGS</font></span></div></span></font></b><div>The following table outlines Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P&rsquo;s current ratings for four RMBS securities. S&amp;P ratings as of the beginning of August are also shown for comparison purposes.</div><div> </div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div> </div>            <div>Pool</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div>Class</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div>Moody&rsquo;s Rating</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>Moody&rsquo;s Rating Date</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>Current S&amp;P Rating</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>S&amp;P Rating on August 1, 2009</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>DSLA 2006-AR2</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>2A-1C</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>Caa2</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>2/20/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AAA</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>CWABS 2006-18</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>2A3</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>Caa2</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>3/25/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>AA-</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AA-</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>AV5</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>B3</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>6/12/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CCC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AAA</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>M1</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>C</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>10/28/2008</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>B-</div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div>In the case of class 2A-1C of the Downey Savings and Loan transaction (DSLA 2006-AR2), S&amp;P maintained a AAA rating for almost six months after Moody&rsquo;s downgraded to Caa2. This security benefits from a financial guaranty policy provided by Ambac Assurance (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/abk' title='More opinion and analysis of ABK'>ABK</a>). S&amp;P downgraded Ambac to CC from BBB on July 28, about a week before downgrading class 2A-1C to CC on August 4.</div><div>S&amp;P downgraded class AV5 of JP Morgan (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jpm' title='More opinion and analysis of JPM'>JPM</a>) 2006-CH2 from AAA to CCC on October 1. Moody&rsquo;s had maintained a B3 rating for almost four months prior to S&amp;P&rsquo;s downgrade.</div><div>The rating for class M1 of CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust &#40;HEAT&#41; 2006-7 is remarkable because S&amp;P downgraded to CC on October 1, 2009, almost a year after Moody&rsquo;s downgraded to C. This security is likely to default within six months and never receive a principal payment.</div><div>Some summary statistics for each of these securities are provided in the following two tables, which were created based on reports produced by Wells Fargo (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wfc' title='More opinion and analysis of WFC'>WFC</a>), Bank of New York Mellon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bk' title='More opinion and analysis of BK'>BK</a>), and US Bank (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/usb' title='More opinion and analysis of USB'>USB</a>). The first table shows pool data as of September 30, 2009.</div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="480">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div><span>Pool</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Class</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Pool balance (millions)</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>60+ day delinquencies</span></div>            <div><span>FC/BK/REO</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Subordination</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>DSLA 2006-AR2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A-1C</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>699.7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>43.3%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>5.6%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CWABS 2006-18</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A3</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,027.7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>55.8%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>29.1%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>AV5</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>996.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>44.9%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>23.4%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>M1</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>509.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>56.4%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>5.6%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div><br>The table below provides similar statistics as of June 30. Performance has deteriorated slightly from June through September, but not enough to make a huge difference in ratings.</div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="480">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div><span>Pool</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Class</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Pool balance (millions)</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>60+ day delinquencies</span></div>            <div><span>FC/BK/REO</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Subordination</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>DSLA 2006-AR2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A-1C</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>743.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>42.3%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>7.7%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CWABS 2006-18</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A3</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,050.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>52.7%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>28.8%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>AV5</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,046.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>40.0%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>23.9%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>M1</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>555.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>55.9%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>9.7%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div>Recent losses on liquidated loans have average around 70% for the past several months on the Countrywide transaction (CWABS 2006-18). If 90% of the delinquent loans (including those in the process of foreclosure, in bankruptcy, or already foreclosed) are liquidated at an average loss of 70%, then these loans will produce pool losses a little over 35%. Many of the current (non-delinquent) loans have been delinquent recently, and are likely to re-default. If losses on these loans are large enough to offset excess spread interest &ndash; the difference between the interest rate paid on class 2A3 and other securities from this pool &ndash; then class 2A3 will default because the 35% is larger than the 29.1% current subordination. The rate of net new delinquencies is much higher than the 4% or so per year spread income on the loans in this pool, so a default is likely. This explains Moody&rsquo;s Caa2 rating. The rationale for S&amp;P&rsquo;s rating remains a mystery, yet the rating was affirmed in August. On the surface, the likelihood of default does not seem much different from the JP Morgan security that was downgraded to CCC.</div><div>Class 2A-1C of DSLA 2006-AR2 differs from many senior securities in that it does not benefit from pro rata loss sharing once the subordinate securities are wiped out. Instead, it absorbs losses for the other group 2 senior securities. Losses of around 20% on the group 2 securities would burn through 2A-1C, and begin to generate losses on the more senior group 2 securities. This security will continue to receive principal payments in the interim, so there will not be a complete principal loss (only 80%-90%). It has looked very likely for six months that losses would burn through class 2A-1C. It is remarkable that S&amp;P maintained a AAA rating for so long on a security that was highly likely to default and recover only a very small percentage. At a minimum, S&amp;P should have downgraded this security to Ambac&rsquo;s rating, a ridiculously inflated BBB at the time. In addition to downgrading 2A-1C, S&amp;P downgraded class 2A-1B3, which is senior to 2A-1C, to CCC on August 4. Moody&rsquo;s has rated 2A-1B3 Ca since February.</div><div>To be fair, S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings for most securities have been more reasonable than the ratings for the ones discussed here. However, these ratings are reasonably representative of a significant percentage (perhaps 20% or so) of S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings.<b><font size="5"><span><br><font size="3"><p><span><font>FINANCIAL GUARANTOR RATINGS</font></span></p></font></span></font></b>S&amp;P&rsquo;s recent downgrades, many of which affect securities wrapped by the financial guarantors, reveal yet another level of ridiculousness to the AAA ratings for FSA and Assured Guaranty Corp. Recent downgrades increase junk rated exposure to well over $15 billion for FSA and $7 billion for Assured Guaranty Corp., around seven times Assured&rsquo;s Statutory Capital</div><div>Recent single notch downgrades (to AA-) of Assured Guaranty Corp. and FSA show that Fitch does not want to be outdone in the inflated ratings game.  On the surface, a AA- seems more realistic than S&amp;P&rsquo;s AAA, but the AA- is drastically inconsistent with Fitch&rsquo;s RMBS Loss Metrics, which project severe losses. For example, Fitch projects lifetime principal losses of 71% on class A-2 of DBALT 2007-OA5. This equates to approximately $49 million on Assured&rsquo;s $65 million of exposure. Fitch does not project losses for CWALT 2007-OA10, but analyzes two similar pools with similar performance, CWALT 2007-OA3 and 2007-OA4. Fitch&rsquo;s projections imply principal losses of 70%-75%, or about $130 million, on the parts of CWALT 2007-OA10 that Assured wraps. Overall, Fitch&rsquo;s projections imply ultimate RMBS principal losses of over $2.5 billion for Assured. Based on the ceded percentages from Assured&rsquo;s recent Statutory financials, over $1.5 billion would be retained net. This is greater than Assured Guaranty Corp.&rsquo;s Statutory Capital, and would leave Assured Guaranty Corp. with $1 billion of claims paying resources to cover $2 billion to $3 billion of other (non-RMBS) below investment grade exposure and $135 billion of investment grade exposure.</div><div>Fitch&rsquo;s loss projections applied to FSA&rsquo;s portfolio would leave an even more crippled balance sheet, with losses eroding all or almost all of FSA&rsquo;s claims paying resources.</div><div>Fitch&rsquo;s RMBS loss projections produce present value losses for MBIA Insurance Corp. of around $14, $7 billion each on CDOs and direct RMBS, almost double the company&rsquo;s claims paying resources. It looks highly unlikely that MBIA will be able to meet its obligations.</div><div><b><span><strong><span><font>CONCLUSION</div></font></span></strong></span></b><div>After miserable failings on a massive scale in structured finance, a handful of remaining sham ratings are not all that significant from a practical standpoint. The fallout from past failures will cause serious reputational damage even if future ratings were perfect. However, the blatantly ridiculous ratings of the financial guarantors and a handful or RMBS securities reveal that the agency remains more concerned with damage control than restoring the integrity of its ratings. This is unfortunate, because S&amp;P and the other rating agencies offer many valuable services to a wide variety of parties. It would be nice if honest and competent ratings were one of these services.</div><div><strong><em>Disclosure:</em></strong><em> Short MBI, AGO, MHP</em></p></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 13:16:48 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Mark Alexander</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Mark Alexander submits:</strong><div>The original idea for this article, when it was conceived around the beginning of August, was to highlight a number of cases where S&amp;P&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) ratings for residential mortgage-backed securities remained completely unrealistic, and make a side comment about financial guarantor ratings. In August, S&amp;P downgraded some of the securities, so the order was reversed and financial guarantor ratings were discussed first (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/165236-have-moodys-and-s-p-seen-the-light-part-1">in Part 1</a>). By October 1, S&amp;P had slashed the ratings of all but one of the securities to be discussed (and many others like them) to deep junk.</div><div>The downgrades reveal just how far off the previous ratings were. They also make the ratings of financial guarantors like FSA, Assured Guaranty Corp. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago' title='More opinion and analysis of AGO'>AGO</a>) and MBIA Insurance Corp. (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi' title='More opinion and analysis of MBI'>MBI</a>) seem outright bizarre and incongruous in relation to the RMBS ratings. FSA, Assured, and MBIA have direct &#40;RMBS&#41; and indirect &#40;CDO&#41; exposure to multiple securities from each of the pools discussed below, as well as many others that were downgraded along with them. Financial guarantor ratings will be revisited briefly after discussing the RMBS ratings.<b><font size="5"><span></div><div><span><font>RMBS RATINGS</font></span></div></span></font></b><div>The following table outlines Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P&rsquo;s current ratings for four RMBS securities. S&amp;P ratings as of the beginning of August are also shown for comparison purposes.</div><div> </div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div> </div>            <div>Pool</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div>Class</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div>Moody&rsquo;s Rating</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>Moody&rsquo;s Rating Date</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>Current S&amp;P Rating</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>S&amp;P Rating on August 1, 2009</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>DSLA 2006-AR2</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>2A-1C</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>Caa2</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>2/20/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AAA</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>CWABS 2006-18</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>2A3</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>Caa2</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>3/25/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>AA-</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AA-</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>AV5</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>B3</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>6/12/2009</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CCC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>AAA</div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</div>            </td>            <td width="84" valign="top">            <div>M1</div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="top">            <div>C</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>10/28/2008</div>            </td>            <td width="96" valign="top">            <div>CC</div>            </td>            <td width="106" valign="top">            <div>B-</div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div>In the case of class 2A-1C of the Downey Savings and Loan transaction (DSLA 2006-AR2), S&amp;P maintained a AAA rating for almost six months after Moody&rsquo;s downgraded to Caa2. This security benefits from a financial guaranty policy provided by Ambac Assurance (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/abk' title='More opinion and analysis of ABK'>ABK</a>). S&amp;P downgraded Ambac to CC from BBB on July 28, about a week before downgrading class 2A-1C to CC on August 4.</div><div>S&amp;P downgraded class AV5 of JP Morgan (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jpm' title='More opinion and analysis of JPM'>JPM</a>) 2006-CH2 from AAA to CCC on October 1. Moody&rsquo;s had maintained a B3 rating for almost four months prior to S&amp;P&rsquo;s downgrade.</div><div>The rating for class M1 of CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust &#40;HEAT&#41; 2006-7 is remarkable because S&amp;P downgraded to CC on October 1, 2009, almost a year after Moody&rsquo;s downgraded to C. This security is likely to default within six months and never receive a principal payment.</div><div>Some summary statistics for each of these securities are provided in the following two tables, which were created based on reports produced by Wells Fargo (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wfc' title='More opinion and analysis of WFC'>WFC</a>), Bank of New York Mellon (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bk' title='More opinion and analysis of BK'>BK</a>), and US Bank (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/usb' title='More opinion and analysis of USB'>USB</a>). The first table shows pool data as of September 30, 2009.</div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="480">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div><span>Pool</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Class</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Pool balance (millions)</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>60+ day delinquencies</span></div>            <div><span>FC/BK/REO</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Subordination</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>DSLA 2006-AR2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A-1C</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>699.7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>43.3%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>5.6%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CWABS 2006-18</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A3</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,027.7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>55.8%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>29.1%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>AV5</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>996.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>44.9%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>23.4%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>M1</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>509.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>56.4%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>5.6%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div><br>The table below provides similar statistics as of June 30. Performance has deteriorated slightly from June through September, but not enough to make a huge difference in ratings.</div><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="480">            <tr>            <td width="187" valign="top">            <div> </div>            <div><span>Pool</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Class</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Pool balance (millions)</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>60+ day delinquencies</span></div>            <div><span>FC/BK/REO</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>Subordination</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>DSLA 2006-AR2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A-1C</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>743.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>42.3%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>7.7%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CWABS 2006-18</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>2A3</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,050.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>52.7%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>28.8%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>JP Morgan 2006-CH2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>AV5</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>1,046.2</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>40.0%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>23.9%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>        <tr>            <td width="187" valign="bottom">            <div><span>CSFB HEAT 2006-7</span></div>            </td>            <td width="72" valign="bottom">            <div><span>M1</span></div>            </td>            <td width="108" valign="bottom">            <div><span>555.4</span></div>            </td>            <td width="107" valign="bottom">            <div><span>55.9%</span></div>            </td>            <td width="97" valign="bottom">            <div><span>9.7%</span></div>            </td>        </tr>    </table><div>Recent losses on liquidated loans have average around 70% for the past several months on the Countrywide transaction (CWABS 2006-18). If 90% of the delinquent loans (including those in the process of foreclosure, in bankruptcy, or already foreclosed) are liquidated at an average loss of 70%, then these loans will produce pool losses a little over 35%. Many of the current (non-delinquent) loans have been delinquent recently, and are likely to re-default. If losses on these loans are large enough to offset excess spread interest &ndash; the difference between the interest rate paid on class 2A3 and other securities from this pool &ndash; then class 2A3 will default because the 35% is larger than the 29.1% current subordination. The rate of net new delinquencies is much higher than the 4% or so per year spread income on the loans in this pool, so a default is likely. This explains Moody&rsquo;s Caa2 rating. The rationale for S&amp;P&rsquo;s rating remains a mystery, yet the rating was affirmed in August. On the surface, the likelihood of default does not seem much different from the JP Morgan security that was downgraded to CCC.</div><div>Class 2A-1C of DSLA 2006-AR2 differs from many senior securities in that it does not benefit from pro rata loss sharing once the subordinate securities are wiped out. Instead, it absorbs losses for the other group 2 senior securities. Losses of around 20% on the group 2 securities would burn through 2A-1C, and begin to generate losses on the more senior group 2 securities. This security will continue to receive principal payments in the interim, so there will not be a complete principal loss (only 80%-90%). It has looked very likely for six months that losses would burn through class 2A-1C. It is remarkable that S&amp;P maintained a AAA rating for so long on a security that was highly likely to default and recover only a very small percentage. At a minimum, S&amp;P should have downgraded this security to Ambac&rsquo;s rating, a ridiculously inflated BBB at the time. In addition to downgrading 2A-1C, S&amp;P downgraded class 2A-1B3, which is senior to 2A-1C, to CCC on August 4. Moody&rsquo;s has rated 2A-1B3 Ca since February.</div><div>To be fair, S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings for most securities have been more reasonable than the ratings for the ones discussed here. However, these ratings are reasonably representative of a significant percentage (perhaps 20% or so) of S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings.<b><font size="5"><span><br><font size="3"><p><span><font>FINANCIAL GUARANTOR RATINGS</font></span></p></font></span></font></b>S&amp;P&rsquo;s recent downgrades, many of which affect securities wrapped by the financial guarantors, reveal yet another level of ridiculousness to the AAA ratings for FSA and Assured Guaranty Corp. Recent downgrades increase junk rated exposure to well over $15 billion for FSA and $7 billion for Assured Guaranty Corp., around seven times Assured&rsquo;s Statutory Capital</div><div>Recent single notch downgrades (to AA-) of Assured Guaranty Corp. and FSA show that Fitch does not want to be outdone in the inflated ratings game.  On the surface, a AA- seems more realistic than S&amp;P&rsquo;s AAA, but the AA- is drastically inconsistent with Fitch&rsquo;s RMBS Loss Metrics, which project severe losses. For example, Fitch projects lifetime principal losses of 71% on class A-2 of DBALT 2007-OA5. This equates to approximately $49 million on Assured&rsquo;s $65 million of exposure. Fitch does not project losses for CWALT 2007-OA10, but analyzes two similar pools with similar performance, CWALT 2007-OA3 and 2007-OA4. Fitch&rsquo;s projections imply principal losses of 70%-75%, or about $130 million, on the parts of CWALT 2007-OA10 that Assured wraps. Overall, Fitch&rsquo;s projections imply ultimate RMBS principal losses of over $2.5 billion for Assured. Based on the ceded percentages from Assured&rsquo;s recent Statutory financials, over $1.5 billion would be retained net. This is greater than Assured Guaranty Corp.&rsquo;s Statutory Capital, and would leave Assured Guaranty Corp. with $1 billion of claims paying resources to cover $2 billion to $3 billion of other (non-RMBS) below investment grade exposure and $135 billion of investment grade exposure.</div><div>Fitch&rsquo;s loss projections applied to FSA&rsquo;s portfolio would leave an even more crippled balance sheet, with losses eroding all or almost all of FSA&rsquo;s claims paying resources.</div><div>Fitch&rsquo;s RMBS loss projections produce present value losses for MBIA Insurance Corp. of around $14, $7 billion each on CDOs and direct RMBS, almost double the company&rsquo;s claims paying resources. It looks highly unlikely that MBIA will be able to meet its obligations.</div><div><b><span><strong><span><font>CONCLUSION</div></font></span></strong></span></b><div>After miserable failings on a massive scale in structured finance, a handful of remaining sham ratings are not all that significant from a practical standpoint. The fallout from past failures will cause serious reputational damage even if future ratings were perfect. However, the blatantly ridiculous ratings of the financial guarantors and a handful or RMBS securities reveal that the agency remains more concerned with damage control than restoring the integrity of its ratings. This is unfortunate, because S&amp;P and the other rating agencies offer many valuable services to a wide variety of parties. It would be nice if honest and competent ratings were one of these services.</div><div><strong><em>Disclosure:</em></strong><em> Short MBI, AGO, MHP</em></p></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168195-have-moodys-and-s-p-and-fitch-seen-the-light-part-2?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago">AGO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi">MBI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/mark-alexander">Mark Alexander</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>First Casualty of the BusinessWeek Sale</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168127-first-casualty-of-the-businessweek-sale?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168127</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>That was fast. Steve Adler's <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/FineOnMedia/archives/2009/10/adler_to_resign.html">resignation</a> from BusinessWeek was announced late Tuesday, and according to <a href="http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/editor_out_at_bizweek_HvBGekz66ElKzWZbPlSXRO">Keith Kelly</a> it is likely to be followed by others. Kelly makes it seem as if the staff is in chaos, with one other top editor likely to go and the status of another unclear.<br><br>Bloomberg has a reputation for being no-nonsense in such matters--in contrast to McGraw-Hill (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>), which kept the magazine's top masthead in stasis even as it drowned in red ink. Still, I was expecting a bit more of a transition period.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 09:38:49 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Gary Weiss</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<img src='http://seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/gweiss.jpg' title='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' alt='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' width="75" height="100" border='1' align="left" vspace="6" hspace="6" /><strong><a href="http://garyweiss.blogspot.com/">Gary Weiss</a> submits: </strong><p>That was fast. Steve Adler's <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/FineOnMedia/archives/2009/10/adler_to_resign.html">resignation</a> from BusinessWeek was announced late Tuesday, and according to <a href="http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/editor_out_at_bizweek_HvBGekz66ElKzWZbPlSXRO">Keith Kelly</a> it is likely to be followed by others. Kelly makes it seem as if the staff is in chaos, with one other top editor likely to go and the status of another unclear.<br><br>Bloomberg has a reputation for being no-nonsense in such matters--in contrast to McGraw-Hill (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>), which kept the magazine's top masthead in stasis even as it drowned in red ink. Still, I was expecting a bit more of a transition period.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168127-first-casualty-of-the-businessweek-sale?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/gary-weiss">Gary Weiss</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Truth in Lessig's Critique of Transparency</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/168103-the-truth-in-lessig-s-critique-of-transparency?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">168103</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lawrence Lessig's recent thought-provoking <a href="http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency?page=0,0#">article</a> in the <i>New Republic</i> challenges the assumption that more sunlight is always a better disinfectant for corruption and bad behavior than less. <br><br>Although his primary focus is on how more transparency doesn't always lead to better political outcomes, there are obvious implications of his argument to the world of corporate governance and executive compensation.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 08:40:13 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Eric Jackson</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lawrence Lessig's recent thought-provoking <a href="http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency?page=0,0#">article</a> in the <i>New Republic</i> challenges the assumption that more sunlight is always a better disinfectant for corruption and bad behavior than less. <br><br>Although his primary focus is on how more transparency doesn't always lead to better political outcomes, there are obvious implications of his argument to the world of corporate governance and executive compensation.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/168103-the-truth-in-lessig-s-critique-of-transparency?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rmg">RMG</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/eric-jackson">Eric Jackson</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Good Debt Coverage for Sustainable Dividends</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/166430-good-debt-coverage-for-sustainable-dividends?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">166430</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Most companies use debt for a variety of reasons in their operations. It could be either short term or long-term obligations. If there&rsquo;s anything the <a href="http://www.dividendgrowthinvestor.com/2009/09/six-things-i-learned-from-financial.html">2007-2009 financial crisis</a> has taught us, it is that excessively leveraged companies could easily blow up after a chain of negative events. Thus it pays to know what the debt situation for a particular company you are investing in actually is.<br><br>Some investors typically focus on debt to total assets to gain a perspective on the amount of the leverage the company has. While this method is widely accepted by some investors, I believe that it has some shortcomings, which might prevent investors from seeing the bigger picture. Most importantly comparing debt to total assets does not tell whether a company could service its debt obligations or not.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2009 08:53:24 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Dividend Growth Investor</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://dividendgrowth.blogspot.com/'>Dobromir Stoyanov</a> submits:</strong><p>Most companies use debt for a variety of reasons in their operations. It could be either short term or long-term obligations. If there&rsquo;s anything the <a href="http://www.dividendgrowthinvestor.com/2009/09/six-things-i-learned-from-financial.html">2007-2009 financial crisis</a> has taught us, it is that excessively leveraged companies could easily blow up after a chain of negative events. Thus it pays to know what the debt situation for a particular company you are investing in actually is.<br><br>Some investors typically focus on debt to total assets to gain a perspective on the amount of the leverage the company has. While this method is widely accepted by some investors, I believe that it has some shortcomings, which might prevent investors from seeing the bigger picture. Most importantly comparing debt to total assets does not tell whether a company could service its debt obligations or not.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/166430-good-debt-coverage-for-sustainable-dividends?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/abt">ABT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/adm">ADM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/adp">ADP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/afl">AFL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/apd">APD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/avy">AVY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bbt">BBT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bcr">BCR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bdx">BDX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bms">BMS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cb">CB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cinf">CINF</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/clx">CLX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ctl">CTL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dov">DOV</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ed">ED</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/emr">EMR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/fdo">FDO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gci">GCI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ge">GE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gww">GWW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jci">JCI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jnj">JNJ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/kmb">KMB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ko">KO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/leg">LEG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lly">LLY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/lm">LM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/low">LOW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mcd">MCD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mmm">MMM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mtb">MTB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pbi">PBI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pep">PEP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pfe">PFE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pg">PG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ppg">PPG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/shw">SHW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sial">SIAL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/str">STR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/stt">STT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/svu">SVU</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/swk">SWK</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/teg">TEG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tgt">TGT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/usb">USB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/vfc">VFC</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wag">WAG</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wmt">WMT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xom">XOM</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/dividend-growth-investor">Dividend Growth Investor</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Questions Remain About Bloomberg's BusinessWeek Buyout</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/166397-questions-remain-about-bloomberg-s-businessweek-buyout?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">166397</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Bloomberg L.P. <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/FineOnMedia/archives/2009/10/bloomberg_wins.html">officially became the buyer</a> of BusinessWeek today, as expected. Here's a <a href="http://weblogs.jomc.unc.edu/talkingbiznews/?p=11255">memo</a> to the BW staff by the soon-to-be-former owner, and here's a <a href="http://weblogs.jomc.unc.edu/talkingbiznews/?p=11242">Bloomberg press release</a>.<br><br>A few things are left unclear in the official pronouncements, and they're not minor:</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2009 06:28:41 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Gary Weiss</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<img src='http://seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/gweiss.jpg' title='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' alt='Gary Weiss, Author and Business Week Journalist' width="75" height="100" border='1' align="left" vspace="6" hspace="6" /><strong><a href="http://garyweiss.blogspot.com/">Gary Weiss</a> submits: </strong><p>Bloomberg L.P. <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/FineOnMedia/archives/2009/10/bloomberg_wins.html">officially became the buyer</a> of BusinessWeek today, as expected. Here's a <a href="http://weblogs.jomc.unc.edu/talkingbiznews/?p=11255">memo</a> to the BW staff by the soon-to-be-former owner, and here's a <a href="http://weblogs.jomc.unc.edu/talkingbiznews/?p=11242">Bloomberg press release</a>.<br><br>A few things are left unclear in the official pronouncements, and they're not minor:</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/166397-questions-remain-about-bloomberg-s-businessweek-buyout?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/gary-weiss">Gary Weiss</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Insurance Firms Try to Break Free from Rating Agencies </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/166149-insurance-firms-try-to-break-free-from-rating-agencies?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">166149</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>The rating agencies are not just <a href="http://narrowtranche.blogspot.com/2009/09/rating-agencies-under-fire.html"><font>under fire</font></a> from regulators and lawsuits, but also threatened by new competitors from outside the traditional ratings roles.</p> <p>From the <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125495801640171987.html?mod=googlenews_wsj"><font>WSJ</font></a>:</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2009 06:03:41 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Walter Kurtz</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>The rating agencies are not just <a href="http://narrowtranche.blogspot.com/2009/09/rating-agencies-under-fire.html"><font>under fire</font></a> from regulators and lawsuits, but also threatened by new competitors from outside the traditional ratings roles.</p> <p>From the <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125495801640171987.html?mod=googlenews_wsj"><font>WSJ</font></a>:</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/166149-insurance-firms-try-to-break-free-from-rating-agencies?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/az">AZ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/blk">BLK</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/walter-kurtz">Walter Kurtz</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Options Trader Weekly Review: Not Such a Good Week</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/165875-options-trader-weekly-review-not-such-a-good-week?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">165875</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Not such a good week!</p> <p>Last week was FANTASTIC. We had <a href="http://www.philstockworld.com/2009/10/03/weekly-wrap-up-how-to-make-money-in-a-down-market/">28 winning trades out of 36</a> with an average gain of 42% on the winners and an average loss of 12% on the losers - now THAT&rsquo;S A GOOD WEEK.  We were stopped out of most of our bearish trades on Monday but we took a lot of new ones, which I&rsquo;ll get into later...  Of course, since we are rangish and play both ends, the good news is we still had our &quot;losers&quot; and puts that we sold on long positions. Those turned into huge winners in just 5 days:</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2009 13:23:05 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Philip Davis</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<img src='http://seekingalpha.com/wp-content/seekingalpha/images/pdavis_photo.jpg' align="left" hspace="6" vspace="6 width="70" height="83" border='1' /><strong><a href="http://philstockworld.com/">Phil Davis</a> submits: </strong><p>Not such a good week!</p> <p>Last week was FANTASTIC. We had <a href="http://www.philstockworld.com/2009/10/03/weekly-wrap-up-how-to-make-money-in-a-down-market/">28 winning trades out of 36</a> with an average gain of 42% on the winners and an average loss of 12% on the losers - now THAT&rsquo;S A GOOD WEEK.  We were stopped out of most of our bearish trades on Monday but we took a lot of new ones, which I&rsquo;ll get into later...  Of course, since we are rangish and play both ends, the good news is we still had our &quot;losers&quot; and puts that we sold on long positions. Those turned into huge winners in just 5 days:</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/165875-options-trader-weekly-review-not-such-a-good-week?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/aa">AA</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/aapl">AAPL</category>
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      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ibm">IBM</category>
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      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pgr">PGR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/prsp">PRSP</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/qid">QID</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/qqqq">QQQQ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rad">RAD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rimm">RIMM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/rsx">RSX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/schw">SCHW</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/srs">SRS</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/stld">STLD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/stly">STLY</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tbt">TBT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tscm">TSCM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/tza">TZA</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ure">URE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/uso">USO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wdfc">WDFC</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wfmi">WFMI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wfr">WFR</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/wgo">WGO</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/philip-davis">Philip Davis</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why Dun &amp; Bradstreet Could Go To $100</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/165536-why-dun-bradstreet-could-go-to-100?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">165536</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Dun &amp; Bradstreet (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dnb' title='More opinion and analysis of DNB'>DNB</a>) is a provider of business information with a history dating back over 165 years. Today's company has 3 business segments. Risk Management, driving about 64% of sales, provides reports and other information products that allow companies to determine creditworthiness of potential customers. This unit may best be thought of as a Moody's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) or S&amp;P (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) rating agency for private companies... In fact Moody's was spun off from the &quot;old&quot; Dun &amp; Bradstreet in 2000.</p><p>The second business unit is Supply, Sales, and Marketing (28% of sales), which provides information to help customers identify market segments, profile potential customers, build mailing lists, and evaluate current and potential suppliers. The third and final segment is Internet Solutions, consisting mainly of <a href="http://www.hoovers.com/">Hoover's</a>, which has basic information on thousands of public and private companies, and <a href="http://www.allbusiness.com/">AllBusiness.com</a>, a resource and advice portal for business managers.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2009 11:04:26 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Steve Alexander</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://www.magicdiligence.com/'>Steve Alexander</a> submits:</strong><p>Dun &amp; Bradstreet (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dnb' title='More opinion and analysis of DNB'>DNB</a>) is a provider of business information with a history dating back over 165 years. Today's company has 3 business segments. Risk Management, driving about 64% of sales, provides reports and other information products that allow companies to determine creditworthiness of potential customers. This unit may best be thought of as a Moody's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) or S&amp;P (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp' title='More opinion and analysis of MHP'>MHP</a>) rating agency for private companies... In fact Moody's was spun off from the &quot;old&quot; Dun &amp; Bradstreet in 2000.</p><p>The second business unit is Supply, Sales, and Marketing (28% of sales), which provides information to help customers identify market segments, profile potential customers, build mailing lists, and evaluate current and potential suppliers. The third and final segment is Internet Solutions, consisting mainly of <a href="http://www.hoovers.com/">Hoover's</a>, which has basic information on thousands of public and private companies, and <a href="http://www.allbusiness.com/">AllBusiness.com</a>, a resource and advice portal for business managers.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/165536-why-dun-bradstreet-could-go-to-100?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dnb">DNB</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/efx">EFX</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/expgy.pk">EXPGY.PK</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/steve-alexander">Steve Alexander</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Have Moody&#8217;s and S &amp; P Seen the Light? (Part 1)</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/165236-have-moodys-and-s-p-seen-the-light-part-1?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">165236</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<div>Moody&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) and Standard and Poor&rsquo;s (S&amp;P), the nation&rsquo;s largest Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, have faced a barrage of recent criticism over their ratings of structured finance assets. Continued criticism over past rating mishaps and reduced structured finance revenues are likely to pose the most significant challenges over the next year. However, it is interesting to consider whether the recent criticism has motivated Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P to provide competent and honest ratings. This will be done in two separate articles focused on two areas that have revealed major problems &ndash; ratings for residential mortgage backed securities &#40;RMBS&#41; and financial guarantors.</div><div><br>This article (Part 1) deals with financial guarantor ratings, which remain more troublesome than RMBS ratings. It suggests that Moody&rsquo;s recent ratings are not as unrealistic as Standard and Poor&rsquo;s ratings, some of which appear to be based on incompetence, fraud, or some combination of the two.</div><div><br>The table below outlines current ratings for three financial guarantors, Financial Security Assurance &#40;FSA&#41;, Assured Guaranty Corporation (AG Corp.) (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago' title='More opinion and analysis of AGO'>AGO</a>), and MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA Corp.) (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi' title='More opinion and analysis of MBI'>MBI</a>). FSA was purchased on July 1 of this year by Assured Guaranty Ltd., AG Corp&rsquo;s parent. The Moody&rsquo;s ratings for FSA and AG Corp. are under review for possible downgrade.</div><div> </div><div><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="398"><colgroup><col width="173"><col width="75" span="3"></colgroup><tr><td width="173" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating Agency</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">MBIA Corp.</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">S&amp;P</font></td><td><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">BB+</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Moody's</font></td><td><font size="2">Aa3</font></td><td><font size="2">Aa2</font></td><td><font size="2">B3</font></td></tr></table></div><div><br>FSA and AG Corp. will be discussed first. The following table, produced from the companies&rsquo; operating supplements, highlights the credit exposure by rating of each of these companies as of June 30, 2009. The ratings are internal, but they track closely with Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P ratings.<br><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="459"><colgroup><col width="159"><col width="75" span="4"></colgroup><tr><td width="159" height="17" align="17"><font size="2"> </font></td><td width="300" colspan="4"><font size="2">Net Par Exposure (dollars in billions)</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating</font></td><td><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td><font size="2">% of total</font></td><td><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td><font size="2">% of total</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">          71.6 </font></td><td><font size="2">17.2%</font></td><td><font size="2">          44.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA</font></td><td><font size="2">        144.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">          17.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">13.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A</font></td><td><font size="2">        144.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">          43.7 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.2%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB</font></td><td><font size="2">          41.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">9.9%</font></td><td><font size="2">          16.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">12.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Below investment grade</font></td><td><font size="2">        14.48 </font></td><td><font size="2">3.5%</font></td><td><font size="2">            6.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">4.9%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        415.8 </font></td><td><font size="2">100.0%</font></td><td><font size="2">        127.7 </font></td><td><font size="2">100.0%</font></td></tr></table><br>Net par exposure is the outstanding principal balance of amounts insured, less exposure ceded via reinsurance. The exposure transferred to reinsurers exposes FSA and AG Corp. exposure to reinsurer credit risk, but this is ignored for the purposes of this article.</div><div><br>Financial guarantors often refer to money available to absorb credit losses as &ldquo;claims paying resources.&rdquo; Claims paying resources are not quite as good as cash or risk free securities, because they include premium installments to be collected over a number of years, possibly after the funds are needed to pay losses. There is also a risk that future premiums turn out to be less than anticipated. For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that claims paying resources are as good as cash.</div><div><br>The table below outlines claims paying resources for these two companies.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="309"><colgroup><col width="159"><col width="75" span="2"></colgroup><tr><td width="159" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Billions of</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">% of net par</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">resources</font></td><td><font size="2">dollars</font></td><td><font size="2">exposure</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.28 </font></td><td><font size="2">1.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td><font size="2">          2.72 </font></td><td><font size="2">2.1%</font></td></tr></table><br>Under the assumption that future financial guaranty insurance writings will be adequate (but not more than adequate) to cover future operating expenses and credit risk on new policies, the tables above imply that $7.28 billion (1.7% of exposure) to fund losses is enough to boost the ratings of the $415.8 billion of credits insured by FSA to an S&amp;P rating of AAA and a Moody&rsquo;s rating of Aa3 Similarly, a $2.72 billion buffer (2.1% of exposure) is enough for a AAA S&amp;P rating and a Aa2 Moody&rsquo;s rating on the $127.7 billion of debt insured by AG Corp.</div><div><br>On the surface, this seems preposterous. Below investment grade exposure is twice claims paying resources for each company. Arguably, this might be enough to push the ratings below investment grade even if these credits were mostly rated BB (instead of CCC or lower), but the below investment grade credits are highly correlated and mostly at or near default.</div><div><br>Another way to evaluate the default risk on credits insured by the financial guarantors is to compare it with non-recourse debt issued by an investment fund that holds the assets insured by the financial guarantors. Assuming the fund holds equity capital equal to the financial guarantor&rsquo;s claims paying resources and the average rate on the investment fund&rsquo;s debt is the same as the rate earned on the fund&rsquo;s assets, the risk of default on the fund&rsquo;s borrowings should be very close to the risk that the financial guarantor defaults on insured obligations. The following table provides a simplified capital structure for two hypothetical investment funds that hold the bonds that FSA and AG Corp. insure, along with ratings that seem intuitively reasonable for different classes of debt issued by the funds.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="302"><colgroup><col width="152"><col width="75" span="2"></colgroup><tr><td width="152" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Capital</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Fund A</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Fund B</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">structure</font></td><td><font size="2">&#40;FSA&#41;</font></td><td><font size="2">(AG Corp.)</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA- rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">        364.5 </font></td><td><font size="2">        111.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          18.6 </font></td><td><font size="2">            5.9 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          12.9 </font></td><td><font size="2">            4.0 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          10.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">            3.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">&lt;BBB-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">            9.8 </font></td><td><font size="2">            3.1 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Equity</font></td><td><font size="2">            7.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">            2.7 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        423.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">        130.4 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA credit support</font></td><td><font size="2">          51.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">          16.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">12.1%</font></td><td><font size="2">12.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">% of debt rated AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">87.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">87.2%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB credit support</font></td><td><font size="2">          17.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">            5.9 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">4.0%</font></td><td><font size="2">4.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying resources</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.28 </font></td><td><font size="2">          2.72 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">1.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">2.1%</font></td></tr></table><br>Assuming these ratings are reasonably fair, this table implies that FSA and AG Corp. should be required to more than double their claims paying resources to justify BBB ratings. AAA ratings should require claims paying resources over six times as high as actual claims paying resources.</div><div><br>This oversimplified analysis does not consider the individual credits and the correlations between them. A more detailed analysis suggests more credit risk than this simplified analysis. Highly correlated mortgage-backed debt in or near default accounts for a high percentage of the below investment grade exposure for each company. In addition, a growing percentage of the remaining structured finance credits are facing increased stress, and insured municipal credits are facing budgetary challenges that are unprecedented in the past 70 years. Credit risk is highly correlated within each asset class, and is also correlated across asset classes. High mortgage defaults correlate with credit card defaults, and both correlate with municipal defaults, etc.</div><div><br>A strong case can be made that too much of the hypothetical investment funds&rsquo; debt is rated AAA (87.7% for FSA and 87.2% for AG Corp.), given the thin layer of equity capital (1.7% for FSA and 2.1% for AG Corp.) and relatively small percentage of AAA-rated assets. Some might also argue that more of the debt should be rated AAA. However, it is absurd that 98% should be rated AAA or AA, as implied by the S&amp;P and Moody&rsquo;s ratings.</div><div><br>MBIA Corp.&rsquo;s ratings are amenable to a more rudimentary analysis than FSA and AG Corp. with the help of the table below, created from MBIA&rsquo;s second quarter operating supplement.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="248"><colgroup><col width="173"><col width="75"></colgroup><tr><td width="173" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">MBIA Corp.</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">        109.5 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA</font></td><td><font size="2">          16.4 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A</font></td><td><font size="2">          25.8 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB</font></td><td><font size="2">          38.8 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Below investment grade</font></td><td><font size="2">          26.2 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        216.6 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying resources</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.78 </font></td></tr></table><br>Since June 30, additional insured credits have been downgraded, increasing the below investment grade exposure from $26.2 billion to over $30 billion. Of this $30 billion, over $20 billion is at or near default. Based on the below investment grade exposure alone, it is difficult to see how an investment grade rating can be justified without at least $20 billion of claims paying resources, or how a rating in the BB range is justifiable without at least $15 billion of claims paying resources. S&amp;P rated MBIA Corp. BBB until last week, when the rating was downgraded to BB+.</div><div><br>If S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings of the financial guarantors are as preposterous as they seem, then the agency is likely to face continued credibility damage, opening the door for other competitors to gain market share and push profit margins below the monopolistic levels where they have been for most of the past five years. Readers who believe that there is some reasonable basis for the S&amp;P or Moody&rsquo;s ratings of FSA or AG Corp. or the S&amp;P ratings of MBIA Corp. are encouraged to present their arguments.<br><em><strong><br>Disclosure:  Short MHP, AGO, MBI</strong></em></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2009 05:32:43 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Mark Alexander</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Mark Alexander submits:</strong><div>Moody&rsquo;s (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco' title='More opinion and analysis of MCO'>MCO</a>) and Standard and Poor&rsquo;s (S&amp;P), the nation&rsquo;s largest Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, have faced a barrage of recent criticism over their ratings of structured finance assets. Continued criticism over past rating mishaps and reduced structured finance revenues are likely to pose the most significant challenges over the next year. However, it is interesting to consider whether the recent criticism has motivated Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P to provide competent and honest ratings. This will be done in two separate articles focused on two areas that have revealed major problems &ndash; ratings for residential mortgage backed securities &#40;RMBS&#41; and financial guarantors.</div><div><br>This article (Part 1) deals with financial guarantor ratings, which remain more troublesome than RMBS ratings. It suggests that Moody&rsquo;s recent ratings are not as unrealistic as Standard and Poor&rsquo;s ratings, some of which appear to be based on incompetence, fraud, or some combination of the two.</div><div><br>The table below outlines current ratings for three financial guarantors, Financial Security Assurance &#40;FSA&#41;, Assured Guaranty Corporation (AG Corp.) (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago' title='More opinion and analysis of AGO'>AGO</a>), and MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA Corp.) (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi' title='More opinion and analysis of MBI'>MBI</a>). FSA was purchased on July 1 of this year by Assured Guaranty Ltd., AG Corp&rsquo;s parent. The Moody&rsquo;s ratings for FSA and AG Corp. are under review for possible downgrade.</div><div> </div><div><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="398"><colgroup><col width="173"><col width="75" span="3"></colgroup><tr><td width="173" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating Agency</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">MBIA Corp.</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">S&amp;P</font></td><td><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">BB+</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Moody's</font></td><td><font size="2">Aa3</font></td><td><font size="2">Aa2</font></td><td><font size="2">B3</font></td></tr></table></div><div><br>FSA and AG Corp. will be discussed first. The following table, produced from the companies&rsquo; operating supplements, highlights the credit exposure by rating of each of these companies as of June 30, 2009. The ratings are internal, but they track closely with Moody&rsquo;s and S&amp;P ratings.<br><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="459"><colgroup><col width="159"><col width="75" span="4"></colgroup><tr><td width="159" height="17" align="17"><font size="2"> </font></td><td width="300" colspan="4"><font size="2">Net Par Exposure (dollars in billions)</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating</font></td><td><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td><font size="2">% of total</font></td><td><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td><font size="2">% of total</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">          71.6 </font></td><td><font size="2">17.2%</font></td><td><font size="2">          44.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA</font></td><td><font size="2">        144.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">          17.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">13.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A</font></td><td><font size="2">        144.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">          43.7 </font></td><td><font size="2">34.2%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB</font></td><td><font size="2">          41.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">9.9%</font></td><td><font size="2">          16.2 </font></td><td><font size="2">12.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Below investment grade</font></td><td><font size="2">        14.48 </font></td><td><font size="2">3.5%</font></td><td><font size="2">            6.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">4.9%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        415.8 </font></td><td><font size="2">100.0%</font></td><td><font size="2">        127.7 </font></td><td><font size="2">100.0%</font></td></tr></table><br>Net par exposure is the outstanding principal balance of amounts insured, less exposure ceded via reinsurance. The exposure transferred to reinsurers exposes FSA and AG Corp. exposure to reinsurer credit risk, but this is ignored for the purposes of this article.</div><div><br>Financial guarantors often refer to money available to absorb credit losses as &ldquo;claims paying resources.&rdquo; Claims paying resources are not quite as good as cash or risk free securities, because they include premium installments to be collected over a number of years, possibly after the funds are needed to pay losses. There is also a risk that future premiums turn out to be less than anticipated. For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that claims paying resources are as good as cash.</div><div><br>The table below outlines claims paying resources for these two companies.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="309"><colgroup><col width="159"><col width="75" span="2"></colgroup><tr><td width="159" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Billions of</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">% of net par</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">resources</font></td><td><font size="2">dollars</font></td><td><font size="2">exposure</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">FSA</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.28 </font></td><td><font size="2">1.7%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AG Corp.</font></td><td><font size="2">          2.72 </font></td><td><font size="2">2.1%</font></td></tr></table><br>Under the assumption that future financial guaranty insurance writings will be adequate (but not more than adequate) to cover future operating expenses and credit risk on new policies, the tables above imply that $7.28 billion (1.7% of exposure) to fund losses is enough to boost the ratings of the $415.8 billion of credits insured by FSA to an S&amp;P rating of AAA and a Moody&rsquo;s rating of Aa3 Similarly, a $2.72 billion buffer (2.1% of exposure) is enough for a AAA S&amp;P rating and a Aa2 Moody&rsquo;s rating on the $127.7 billion of debt insured by AG Corp.</div><div><br>On the surface, this seems preposterous. Below investment grade exposure is twice claims paying resources for each company. Arguably, this might be enough to push the ratings below investment grade even if these credits were mostly rated BB (instead of CCC or lower), but the below investment grade credits are highly correlated and mostly at or near default.</div><div><br>Another way to evaluate the default risk on credits insured by the financial guarantors is to compare it with non-recourse debt issued by an investment fund that holds the assets insured by the financial guarantors. Assuming the fund holds equity capital equal to the financial guarantor&rsquo;s claims paying resources and the average rate on the investment fund&rsquo;s debt is the same as the rate earned on the fund&rsquo;s assets, the risk of default on the fund&rsquo;s borrowings should be very close to the risk that the financial guarantor defaults on insured obligations. The following table provides a simplified capital structure for two hypothetical investment funds that hold the bonds that FSA and AG Corp. insure, along with ratings that seem intuitively reasonable for different classes of debt issued by the funds.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="302"><colgroup><col width="152"><col width="75" span="2"></colgroup><tr><td width="152" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Capital</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Fund A</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">Fund B</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">structure</font></td><td><font size="2">&#40;FSA&#41;</font></td><td><font size="2">(AG Corp.)</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA- rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">        364.5 </font></td><td><font size="2">        111.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          18.6 </font></td><td><font size="2">            5.9 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          12.9 </font></td><td><font size="2">            4.0 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">          10.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">            3.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">&lt;BBB-rated debt</font></td><td><font size="2">            9.8 </font></td><td><font size="2">            3.1 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Equity</font></td><td><font size="2">            7.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">            2.7 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        423.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">        130.4 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA credit support</font></td><td><font size="2">          51.3 </font></td><td><font size="2">          16.3 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">12.1%</font></td><td><font size="2">12.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">% of debt rated AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">87.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">87.2%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB credit support</font></td><td><font size="2">          17.1 </font></td><td><font size="2">            5.9 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">4.0%</font></td><td><font size="2">4.5%</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying resources</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.28 </font></td><td><font size="2">          2.72 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">As % of total exposure</font></td><td><font size="2">1.7%</font></td><td><font size="2">2.1%</font></td></tr></table><br>Assuming these ratings are reasonably fair, this table implies that FSA and AG Corp. should be required to more than double their claims paying resources to justify BBB ratings. AAA ratings should require claims paying resources over six times as high as actual claims paying resources.</div><div><br>This oversimplified analysis does not consider the individual credits and the correlations between them. A more detailed analysis suggests more credit risk than this simplified analysis. Highly correlated mortgage-backed debt in or near default accounts for a high percentage of the below investment grade exposure for each company. In addition, a growing percentage of the remaining structured finance credits are facing increased stress, and insured municipal credits are facing budgetary challenges that are unprecedented in the past 70 years. Credit risk is highly correlated within each asset class, and is also correlated across asset classes. High mortgage defaults correlate with credit card defaults, and both correlate with municipal defaults, etc.</div><div><br>A strong case can be made that too much of the hypothetical investment funds&rsquo; debt is rated AAA (87.7% for FSA and 87.2% for AG Corp.), given the thin layer of equity capital (1.7% for FSA and 2.1% for AG Corp.) and relatively small percentage of AAA-rated assets. Some might also argue that more of the debt should be rated AAA. However, it is absurd that 98% should be rated AAA or AA, as implied by the S&amp;P and Moody&rsquo;s ratings.</div><div><br>MBIA Corp.&rsquo;s ratings are amenable to a more rudimentary analysis than FSA and AG Corp. with the help of the table below, created from MBIA&rsquo;s second quarter operating supplement.</div><div><br><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="248"><colgroup><col width="173"><col width="75"></colgroup><tr><td width="173" height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Rating</font></td><td width="75"><font size="2">MBIA Corp.</font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AAA</font></td><td><font size="2">        109.5 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">AA</font></td><td><font size="2">          16.4 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">A</font></td><td><font size="2">          25.8 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">BBB</font></td><td><font size="2">          38.8 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Below investment grade</font></td><td><font size="2">          26.2 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Total</font></td><td><font size="2">        216.6 </font></td></tr><tr><td height="17" align="17"><font size="2">Claims paying resources</font></td><td><font size="2">          7.78 </font></td></tr></table><br>Since June 30, additional insured credits have been downgraded, increasing the below investment grade exposure from $26.2 billion to over $30 billion. Of this $30 billion, over $20 billion is at or near default. Based on the below investment grade exposure alone, it is difficult to see how an investment grade rating can be justified without at least $20 billion of claims paying resources, or how a rating in the BB range is justifiable without at least $15 billion of claims paying resources. S&amp;P rated MBIA Corp. BBB until last week, when the rating was downgraded to BB+.</div><div><br>If S&amp;P&rsquo;s ratings of the financial guarantors are as preposterous as they seem, then the agency is likely to face continued credibility damage, opening the door for other competitors to gain market share and push profit margins below the monopolistic levels where they have been for most of the past five years. Readers who believe that there is some reasonable basis for the S&amp;P or Moody&rsquo;s ratings of FSA or AG Corp. or the S&amp;P ratings of MBIA Corp. are encouraged to present their arguments.<br><em><strong><br>Disclosure:  Short MHP, AGO, MBI</strong></em></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/165236-have-moodys-and-s-p-seen-the-light-part-1?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ago">AGO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mbi">MBI</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mco">MCO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mhp">MHP</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/mark-alexander">Mark Alexander</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>15 High Dividend Stocks: Are These Yields Sustainable?</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/164925-15-high-dividend-stocks-are-these-yields-sustainable?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">164925</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><em>By Hao Jin</em></p><p>One of the most popular ways for investors to select stocks is to focus on companies with long track records of increasing dividends. On Feb 27, 2009, General Electric (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ge' title='More opinion and analysis of GE'>GE</a>), once the most prominent dividend aristocrat, cut its dividend 68%, the first time since 1938.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2009 03:04:41 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>myWealth.com</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href="http://www.mywealth.com/">Sean Hyman</a> submits:</strong><p><em>By Hao Jin</em></p><p>One of the most popular ways for investors to select stocks is to focus on companies with long track records of increasing dividends. On Feb 27, 2009, General Electric (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ge' title='More opinion and analysis of GE'>GE</a>), once the most prominent dividend aristocrat, cut its dividend 68%, the first time since 1938.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/164925-15-high-dividend-stocks-are-these-yields-sustainable?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bmo">BMO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cm">CM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ctl">CTL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/fnm">FNM</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/fre">FRE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ge">GE</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/hcbk">HCBK</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mat">MAT</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mfa">MFA</category>
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