We are a holding company and through wholly owned subsidiaries we are the leading provider of private mortgage insurance in the United States. In 2009, our net premiums written exceeded $1.2 billion and our new insurance written was $19.9 billion. As of December 31, 2009, our insurance in force was $212.2 billion and our risk in force was $54.3 billion. For further information about our results of operations, see our consolidated financial statements in Item 8. As of December 31, 2009, our principal subsidiary, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (“MGIC”), was licensed in all 50 states of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam. Through December 31, 2009, MGIC wrote all of our new insurance throughout the United States. However, in 2010 MGIC Indemnity Corporation (“MIC”) is expected to begin writing new insurance in jurisdictions where MGIC does not meet minimum capital requirements and does not obtain a waiver of those requirements. For more information about the formation of MIC and our plans to utilize it to continue writing new insurance throughout the United States, see “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations — Overview — Capital” in Item 7. In addition to mortgage insurance on first liens, we, through our subsidiaries, provide lenders with various underwriting and other services and products related to home mortgage lending.
Overview of the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry
The private mortgage insurance industry was established in 1957 by MGIC to provide a private market alternative to federal government insurance programs. Private mortgage insurance covers losses from homeowner defaults on residential first mortgage loans, reducing and, in some instances, eliminating the loss to the insured institution if the homeowner defaults. Private mortgage insurance plays an important role in the housing finance system by expanding home ownership opportunities through helping people purchase homes with less than 20% down payments, especially first time homebuyers. In this annual report, we refer to loans with less than 20% down payments as “low down payment” mortgages or loans. During 2008 and 2009, approximately $193 billion and $82 billion, respectively, of mortgages were insured by private mortgage insurance companies.
Private mortgage insurance facilitates the sale of low down payment mortgages in the secondary mortgage market to the Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly known as Freddie Mac. In this annual report, we refer to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collectively as the “GSEs.” The GSEs purchase residential mortgages from mortgage lenders and investors as part of their governmental mandate to provide liquidity in the secondary mortgage market and we believe that the GSEs purchased over 50% of the mortgages underlying our flow new insurance written during the last five years. As a result, the private mortgage insurance industry in the U.S. is defined in part by the requirements and practices of the GSEs. These requirements and practices, as well as those of the federal regulators that oversee the GSEs and lenders, impact the operating results and financial performance of companies in the mortgage insurance industry. See the risk factor titled “Changes in the business practices of the GSEs, federal legislation that changes their charters or a restructuring of the GSEs could reduce our revenues or increase our losses.” in Item 1A. Private mortgage insurance also reduces the regulatory capital that depository institutions are required to hold against low down payment mortgages that they hold as assets.
The U.S. single-family residential mortgage market has historically experienced long-term growth, including an increase in mortgage debt outstanding every year between 1985, when MGIC began operations, and 2007. The rate of growth in U.S. residential mortgage debt was particularly strong from 2001 through 2006. In 2007, this growth rate began slowing and, since 2007, U.S. residential mortgage debt has decreased. During the last several years of this period of increased growth and continuing through 2007, the mortgage lending industry increasingly made home loans at higher loan-to-value ratios, to individuals with higher risk credit profiles and based on less documentation and verification of information regarding the borrower. Beginning in 2007, job creation slowed and the housing markets began slowing in certain areas, with declines in certain other areas. In 2008 and 2009, payroll employment in the U.S. decreased substantially and substantially all areas experienced home price declines. Together, these conditions resulted in significant adverse developments for us and our industry. After earning an average of approximately $580 million annually from 2004 through 2006 and earnings of $169 million in the first half of 2007, we had net losses of $1.670 billion for 2007, $525.4 million for 2008 and $1.322 billion for 2009. Beginning in 2008 and 2009, the insurer financial strength rating of MGIC was downgraded a number of times by all three rating agencies. See the risk factor titled “MGIC may not continue to meet the GSEs’ mortgage insurer eligibility requirements” in Item 1A.
Beginning in late 2007, we implemented a series of changes to our underwriting guidelines that are designed to improve the credit risk profile of our new insurance written. The changes primarily affect borrowers who have multiple risk factors such as a high loan-to-value ratio, a lower FICO score and limited documentation or are financing a home in a market we categorize as higher risk and include the creation of two tiers of “restricted markets.” Our underwriting criteria for restricted markets do not allow insurance to be written on certain loans that could be insured if the property were located in an unrestricted market. Beginning in September 2009, we removed several markets from our restricted markets list and moved several other markets from our Tier Two restricted market list (for which our underwriting guidelines are most limiting) to our Tier One restricted market list.
Customers
Originators of residential mortgage loans such as savings institutions, commercial banks, mortgage brokers, credit unions, mortgage bankers and other lenders have historically determined the placement of mortgage insurance written on a flow basis and as a result are our customers. To obtain primary insurance from us written on a flow basis, a mortgage lender must first apply for and receive a mortgage guaranty master policy from us. Our top 10 customers, none of whom represented more than 10% of our consolidated revenues, generated 39.3% of our new insurance written on a flow basis in 2009, compared to 40.3% in 2008 and 43.0% in 2007. In the fourth quarter of 2009, Countrywide and an affiliate (“Countrywide”) commenced litigation against us as a result of its dissatisfaction with our rescissions practices shortly after it ceased doing business with us. See the risk factor titled “We are subject to the risk of private litigation and regulatory proceedings” in Item 1A as well as Item 3, “Legal Proceedings,” for more information about this litigation and the arbitration case we filed against Countrywide regarding rescissions. Countrywide and its Bank of America affiliates accounted for 12.0% of our flow new insurance written in 2008 and 8.3% of our new insurance written in the first three quarters of 2009. In addition, another customer with whom we still do business accounted for almost 14% of our flow new insurance written in 2009.
When writing insurance for Wall Street bulk transactions, we historically dealt primarily with securitizers of the loans or other owners of the loans, who considered whether credit enhancement provided through the structure of the securitization would eliminate or reduce the need for mortgage insurance.
Sales and Marketing and Competition
Sales and Marketing. We sell our insurance products through our own employees, located throughout all regions of the United States, Puerto Rico and Guam.
Competition. Our competition includes other mortgage insurers, governmental agencies and products designed to eliminate the need to purchase private mortgage insurance. For flow business, we and other private mortgage insurers compete directly with federal and state governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, principally the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) and, to a lesser degree, the Veterans Administration. These agencies sponsor government-backed mortgage insurance programs, which during 2009 and 2008 accounted for approximately 84.6% and 60.4%, respectively, of the total low down payment residential mortgages which were subject to governmental or private mortgage insurance, a substantial increase from approximately 22.7% in 2007, according to statistics reported by Inside Mortgage Finance. We believe the FHA, which until 2008 was not viewed by us as a significant competitor, accounted for the overwhelming majority of this increase in both 2008 and 2009.
Loans insured by the FHA cannot exceed maximum principal amounts which are determined by a percentage of the conforming loan limit. For loans originated in the first half of 2007, the maximum FHA loan amount for homes with one dwelling unit in “high cost” areas was as high as $362,790; this amount was temporarily increased to up to $729,750 in the most costly areas for loans originated in the second half of 2007 or during 2008. For loans originated in 2009 and 2010, this limit was lowered to $721,050 in Alaska and Hawaii and $625,500 in other states. Loans insured by the Veteran’s Administration do not have mandated maximum principal amounts but have maximum limits on the amount of the guaranty provided by the Veteran’s Administration to the lender. For loans closed on or after December 10, 2004, the maximum Veteran’s Administration guaranty is $156,375 in Alaska and Hawaii and $104,250 in other states.
In addition to competition from the FHA and the Veteran’s Administration, we and other private mortgage insurers face competition from state-supported mortgage insurance funds in several states,including California and New York. From time to time, other state legislatures and agencies consider expanding the authority of their state governments to insure residential mortgages.
Private mortgage insurers are also subject to competition from the GSEs to the extent that they are compensated for assuming default risk that would otherwise be insured by the private mortgage insurance industry. For a number of years, the GSEs have had programs under which on certain loans lenders could choose a mortgage insurance coverage percentage that was only the minimum required by their charters, with the GSEs paying a lower price for these loans (“charter coverage”). The GSEs have also had programs under which on certain loans they would accept a level of mortgage insurance above the requirements of their charters but below their standard coverage without any decrease in the purchase price they would pay for these loans (“reduced coverage”). Effective January 1, 2010, Fannie Mae broadly expanded the types of loans eligible for charter coverage. Fannie Mae has also announced that it would eliminate its reduced coverage program in the second quarter of 2010. In recent years, a majority of our volume has been on loans with GSE standard coverage, a substantial portion of our volume has been on loans with reduced coverage, and a minor portion of our volume has been on loans with charter coverage. We charge higher premium rates for higher coverages. To the extent lenders selling loans to Fannie Mae choose charter coverage for loans that we insure, our revenues would be reduced and we could experience other adverse effects. See “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations — Overview — Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac” for a discussion about the risk that private mortgage insurance will not remain a significant credit enhancement for low down payment single family mortgages and “Changes in the business practices of the GSEs, federal legislation that changes their charters or a restructuring of the GSEs could reduce our revenues or increase our losses.” in Item 1A for a discussion of how potential changes in the GSEs’ business practices could affect us.
The capital markets and their participants have historically competed with mortgage insurers by offering alternative products and services and may further develop as competitors to private mortgage insurers in ways we cannot predict. Competition from such alternative products and services was substantial prior to 2007 but declined materially in late 2007 and their presence was insignificant in 2008 and 2009.
Prior to 2008, we and other mortgage insurers also competed with transactions structured to avoid mortgage insurance on low down payment mortgage loans. These transactions include self-insuring, and “80-10-10” and similar loans (generally referred to as “piggyback loans”), which are loans comprised of both a first and a second mortgage (for example, an 80% loan-to-value ratio first mortgage and a 10% loan-to-value ratio second mortgage), with the loan-to-value ratio of the first mortgage below what investors require for mortgage insurance, compared to a loan in which the first mortgage covers the entire borrowed amount (which in the preceding example would be a 90% loan-to-value ratio mortgage). Competition from piggyback structures was substantial prior to 2007 but declined materially later in 2007 and declined further in 2008 and remained low in 2009.
The U.S. private mortgage insurance industry currently consists of seven active mortgage insurers and their affiliates and one new entrant that has said it will begin to write new business in the second quarter of 2010. One of the seven is a joint venture in which another mortgage insurer participates, another is, according to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission as of February 20, 2010, our largest shareholder and the new entrant reported that one of its investors is JPMorgan Chase, which is one of our customers. The names of these mortgage insurers can be found in “Competition or changes in our relationships with our customers could reduce our revenues or increase our losses” in Item 1A. In 2008, a mortgage insurer ceased writing new insurance and placed its existing book of business in run-off. According to Inside Mortgage Finance, which obtains its data from reports provided by us and other mortgage insurers that are to be prepared on the same basis as the reports by insurers to the trade association for the private mortgage insurance industry, for more than ten years, we have been the largest private mortgage insurer based on new primary insurance written, with a market share of 26.0% in 2009, 24.5% in 2008, 21.3% in 2007, 21.6% in 2006 and 22.9% in 2005, and at December 31, 2009, we alsohad the largest book of direct primary insurance in force. For more than five years, these reports do not include as “primary mortgage insurance” insurance on certain loans classified by us as primary insurance, such as loans insured through bulk transactions that already had mortgage insurance placed on the loans at origination.
The private mortgage insurance industry is highly competitive. We believe that we currently compete with other private mortgage insurers based on customer relationships, name recognition, reputation, the ancillary products and services provided to lenders (including contract underwriting services), the strength of management teams and field organizations, the depths of databases covering insured loans and the effective use of technology and innovation in the delivery and servicing of insurance products. Our relationships with our customers could be adversely affected by a variety of factors, including rescission of loans that affect the customer and our decision to discontinue ceding new business under excess of loss captive reinsurance programs. In the fourth quarter of 2009, Countrywide commenced litigation against us as a result of its dissatisfaction with our rescissions practices shortly after it ceased doing business with us. See the risk factor titled “We are subject to the risk of private litigation and regulatory proceedings” in Item 1A as well as Item 3, “Legal Proceedings,” for more information about this litigation and the arbitration case we filed against Countrywide regarding rescissions. Information about some of the other factors that can affect a mortgage insurer’s relationship with its customers can be found at “Competition or changes in our relationships with our customers could reduce our revenues or increase our losses” in Item 1A. Several private mortgage insurers compete based on the types of captive mortgage reinsurance that they offer.
Historically, the industry has competed for business written through the flow channel principally on the basis of programs involving captive mortgage reinsurance, agency pool insurance, and other similar structures involving lenders; the provision of contract underwriting and related fee-based services to lenders; financial strength as it is perceived by persons making or influencing the selection of a mortgage insurer; the provision of other products and services that meet lender needs for risk management, affordable housing, loss mitigation, capital markets and training support; and the effective use of technology and innovation in the delivery and servicing of insurance products. We believe competition for Wall Street bulk business was based principally on the premium rate and the portion of loans submitted for insurance that the insurers were willing to insure.
The complaint in the RESPA litigation described in “- Pool Insurance” alleged, among other things, that captive mortgage reinsurance, agency pool insurance, and contract underwriting we provided violated RESPA.
Certain private mortgage insurers compete for flow business by offering lower premium rates than other companies, including us, either in general or with respect to particular customers or classes of business. On a case-by-case basis, we will adjust premium rates, generally depending on the risk characteristics, loss performance or class of business of the loans to be insured, or the costs associated with doing such business.
The mortgage insurance industry historically viewed a financial strength rating of Aa3/AA- as critical to writing new business. At the time that this annual report was finalized, the financial strength of MGIC, our principal mortgage insurance subsidiary, was rated Ba3 by Moody’s Investors Service (the outlook for this rating is negative) and B+ by Standard & Poor’s Rating Services (the outlook for this rating is negative). In January 2010, at our request, Fitch Ratings withdrew its ratings of MGIC. MGIC could be further downgraded by either or both of these rating agencies. As a result of MGIC’s financial strength rating being below Aa3/AA-, it is operating with each GSE as an eligible insurer under a remediation plan. For further information about the importance of MGIC’s ratings, see our Risk Factor titled “MGIC may not continue to meet the GSEs’ mortgage insurer eligibility requirements” in Item 1A. In assigning financial strength ratings, in addition to considering the adequacy of the mortgage insurer’s capital to withstand very high claim scenarios under assumptions determined by the rating agency, we believe rating agencies review a mortgage insurer’s historical and projected operating performance, franchise risk, business outlook, competitive position, management, corporate strategy, and other factors. The rating agency issuing the financial strength rating can withdraw or change its rating at any time.
Contract Underwriting and Related Services
We perform contract underwriting services for lenders in which we judge whether the data relating to the borrower and the loan contained in the lender’s mortgage loan application file comply with the lender’s loan underwriting guidelines. We also provide an interface to submit data to the automated underwriting systems of the GSEs, which independently judge the data. These services are provided for loans that require private mortgage insurance as well as for loans that do not require private mortgage insurance. A material portion of our new insurance written through the flow channel in recent years involved loans for which we provided contract underwriting services. The complaint in the RESPA litigation described in “- Pool Insurance” alleged, among other things, that the pricing of contract underwriting provided by us violated RESPA.
Under our contract underwriting agreements, we may be required to provide certain remedies to our customers if certain standards relating to the quality of our underwriting work are not met. The cost of remedies provided by us to customers for failing to meet these standards has not been material to our financial position or results of operations for the years ended December 31, 2009, 2008 and 2007. However, a generally positive economic environment for residential real estate that continued until approximately 2007 may have mitigated the effect of some of these costs, and claims for remedies may be made a number of years after the underwriting work was performed. A material portion of our new insurance written through the flow channel in recent years involved loans for which we provided contract underwriting services. We believe the rescission of mortgage insurance coverage on loans on which we also provided contract underwriting services may make a claim for a contract underwriting remedy more likely to occur. In the second half of 2009, we experienced an increase in claims for contract underwriting remedies, which may continue. Hence, there can be no assurance that contract underwriting remedies will not be material in the future.
In February 2008, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae informed us and the rest of our industry that they were reviewing all mortgage insurers’ business justifications for activities, such as contract underwriting services, that have the potential for creating non-insurance related contingent liabilities. We are uncertain of the status of these reviews.