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ronh
25 Comments
Harley's Beat: Was High Crude the Buffer?
1. their inability to sell the financing paper has meant that they are financing the majority of their bikes and taking back the paper on to their balance sheet. They are holding 3.8B of finance receivables on their balance sheet, and increase of 600M qoq.
2. The default rate on that paper, according to the cc was about 5%, and the ltv is very high (quite a bit of no down payment financing). They are at risk for large write offs down the road if the resale value of the bikes doesn't hold up and if their default rate spike at all. Big bikes are a luxury item for most people, and the default rates and resale value of the boat market would indicate that their are major risks in this regard for HOG.
HOG's balance sheet now has 3.8B of total financing receivables for bikes, not including their inventory financing to dealers, on total assets of 6.8B.
Investors in HOG need to appreciate that they are buying a finance company as well as a motorcycle company.
Big Three Automakers: Recapitalization or Bankruptcy?
Chap 11 is almost inevitable for GM, in my view.
Jim Chanos: A Short Seller Speaks
When it Comes to Growth, Try Concor Tech
The growth referred to in the artice during the last year is mostly from an acquisition, and not organic. In fact, the 10Q of CNQR reveals that CNQR and Gelco (the company it acquired as of October 1st 2007 for 168M in cash) did pro forma combined revenue of 43M in the first q of last year. This quarter, the combined company did 50.8M. The real combined growth of the company is 16%, and not 44% as you suggest.
As for EPS growth, not hard to show big percentage gains off of miniscule numbers. Actual EPS for the quarter was 8c, which is identical to that number for last quarter (ie, no growth in eps in the last 6 months since the acquisition). Extapolating that rate of earnings out for the year, gives you .32c.
In fact, the companies guidance is for 53M in revenues (ie flat) for next q, and 211M (ie flat) for the year. The companies own guidance for eps, is 29c for this year.
At current share price levels (about 38/share), you are paying about 125 x earnings, for a company with revenue of growth that is expected to be 10-20% at best. In addition, note that the company has been using its cash to buy back its stock and support the value. In and of itself, this would not necessarily be a source of concern for a well capitalized company whose management viewed their stock as undervalued, but last quarter they spent 30M of their cash buying back stock, while depleting their cash resources to 17M. Seems very questionable to me.
This is one of the most egregiously overpriced stocks on the market today.
Homebuilder ETF Rises Despite More Bad Housing News
I beleive many of these HB stocks will not survive.
Question for discussion, which one of them is most likely to default. My premlinary thought is CTX. Lots of land inventory in terrible markets, and 60% leverage on the balance sheet. Other thoughts?
GM about to Throw away More Money
GM about to Throw away More Money
Bill Gross: If Housing Prices Decline Further, So Does the Economy
Nobody should expect to get rich off their home appreciation. There are no guarantees of real estate appreciation. Some people are learning that lesson now.
In the end, there is a loss to be taken. The loss should be taken by those who gambled and lost, and not the taxpayers.
Shorting the Homebuilders as Their Stocks Surge
Those homebuilders that survive will be great buys one day, but there is no reason to buy them yet.
Downey Financial's Problems Run Deep
worth noting that their balance sheet is much probably much weaker than they are prepared to admit. As per their last 10Q, they had about 12.5B in loans held for investment. Of those, 76% were negative amortization, and 19% were interest only. 95% of their loans did not have any principal repayments.
As you point out, many of their loans are ARMs and most have not yet reset.
They have a great majority of their loans in California, which is the worst performing state in the country.
Their loans represent about 77% loan to value, according to their last 10Q, but that was based on original values at the time of the loans, and appraised values for lending purposes.
On any foreclosed loans, they will have very significant costs to realize, including real estate commisions, legals, repairs, and foregone interest. These costs would likely represent, on average, between 7-10% of realized values.
So, if we take a real estate market that is off by, conservatively 5-10%, add costs to liquidate of 7-10%, add in loans to value on inflated appraisals at 77%, we have a recipe for disaster.
Their total equity (before this quarters losses) is 1.4B. That represents only 11.5% of their loan portfolio. This company is in deep trouble. The loan loss reserve issue will be a huge one for the auditors when it comes time to signing off on their books for the 10K.
The truly remarkable thing about this company, is that there has not yet been a run on the bank.