Though it has been touched on obliquely elsewhere, there has been a "multiplier effect" in the impact of CDS that were essentially "insurance." That is, that much of the exposure came about by selling to parties who had "no insurable interest;" particularly when the "premiums" were low.
Sellers of latter day forms of CDS (where actually there was no true "swap" of "my risk for your risk," resulting in a comparative risk exchange) were "betting" with a third party against the "death" of a specific party with no requirement that the insured had any relation that might result in a loss from that "death."
When epidemics began, the costs of "deaths" went far beyond the losses payable to those who incurred actual losses.
What to Buy and Why: Barron's 2009 Roundtable, Part II [View article]
Why AIG Was in the CDS Business [View article]
Sellers of latter day forms of CDS (where actually there was no true "swap" of "my risk for your risk," resulting in a comparative risk exchange) were "betting" with a third party against the "death" of a specific party with no requirement that the insured had any relation that might result in a loss from that "death."
When epidemics began, the costs of "deaths" went far beyond the losses payable to those who incurred actual losses.
Wall Street Breakfast: Must-Know News [View article]
However, there are some in Congress who are looking for ways to return to that condition.
Vote early and often (changing each time) in November.
How to Trade This 'Bear' Market - Barron's [View article]
Note the following quoted from the above:
"Losses may be mitigated by hedging, but it's hard to know if and how much the firms hedged their positions."
How about with whom? Who, and importantly WHAT, are the counterparties?