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    <title>Ashwin Bhagavatula's Comments</title>
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    <item>
      <title>Revisiting The Intrinsic Value Of Berkshire Hathaway</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/640291/comments?source=feed#comment-6317381</link>
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        <![CDATA[Bella34:<br/><br/>One strong reason why it would make sense to hold on to your Berkshire stakes is that they are trading not significantly above book value. As I tried to depict in my article above, intrisic value at this point is significantly above the current trading price. This has not happened very often in Berkshire's history. In fact, by Mr. Buffett's own admission, the shares of Berkshire were actually overvalued a few times in the past 10-15 years.<br/><br/>With prices this low, Berkshire now has a mandate to repurchase shares anytime they dip below 110% of book value. It's no coincidence that the shares are not falling below that line. For instance, the S&amp;P 500 almost hit its 5 year high on March 30th. It consequently dipped 6% in two months thanks to crises in the Euro zone, while Berkshire lost 1%. <br/><br/>Of course, repurchases are not guaranteed, especially if Berkshire finds other potential bargains that it needs to hoard cash for. That is a good situation to be in too, given their history of acquiring good businesses for a reasonable price.<br/><br/>From this point onwards, if book value rises about 8% y.o.y. on average, then the shares are very likely to follow suit, due mainly to said repurchases, and the unprecedented amount of cash and securities on the balance sheet.]]>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2012 15:45:28 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Bella34:<br/><br/>One strong reason why it would make sense to hold on to your Berkshire stakes is that they are trading not significantly above book value. As I tried to depict in my article above, intrisic value at this point is significantly above the current trading price. This has not happened very often in Berkshire's history. In fact, by Mr. Buffett's own admission, the shares of Berkshire were actually overvalued a few times in the past 10-15 years.<br/><br/>With prices this low, Berkshire now has a mandate to repurchase shares anytime they dip below 110% of book value. It's no coincidence that the shares are not falling below that line. For instance, the S&amp;P 500 almost hit its 5 year high on March 30th. It consequently dipped 6% in two months thanks to crises in the Euro zone, while Berkshire lost 1%. <br/><br/>Of course, repurchases are not guaranteed, especially if Berkshire finds other potential bargains that it needs to hoard cash for. That is a good situation to be in too, given their history of acquiring good businesses for a reasonable price.<br/><br/>From this point onwards, if book value rises about 8% y.o.y. on average, then the shares are very likely to follow suit, due mainly to said repurchases, and the unprecedented amount of cash and securities on the balance sheet.]]>
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    <item>
      <title>Revisiting The Intrinsic Value Of Berkshire Hathaway</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/640291/comments?source=feed#comment-6206981</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6206981</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I do not believe that Mr. Buffett's departure will have much influence on the stock price from now on. Let's assume Berkshire is left without the services of Mr. Buffett starting today, and no large acquisitions are made for a few years. How would the cash flows look five years out from now? Berkshire's cumulative free cash flow in the decade from 2002 to 2011 was about $84 billion. The next five years could easily top that, assuming a growth rate of 7% of current cash flows. All this without additional acquisitions.<br/><br/>Now as far as concerns over capital allocation abilities of a new CEO are concerned, it would be instructive to note that said free cash flows were not obtained by skimping on investments by any means. Both BNSF and MidAmerican, for example, are on track to spend record amounts this year, more than their competition. Otherwise, free cash flow for 2012 could easily top $18 billion from its current estimate of $15 billion. If this constant extra capital spending is what it takes to keep the subsidiaries happy after the departure of Mr. Buffett, so be it; It's already priced in.<br/><br/>The offshoot of this is Berkshire is very large now, and getting much larger in a hurry. The benefit of having an outstanding CEO at the helm is only marginal from hereon. And that's a good thing for shareholders.]]>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jun 2012 14:20:43 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I do not believe that Mr. Buffett's departure will have much influence on the stock price from now on. Let's assume Berkshire is left without the services of Mr. Buffett starting today, and no large acquisitions are made for a few years. How would the cash flows look five years out from now? Berkshire's cumulative free cash flow in the decade from 2002 to 2011 was about $84 billion. The next five years could easily top that, assuming a growth rate of 7% of current cash flows. All this without additional acquisitions.<br/><br/>Now as far as concerns over capital allocation abilities of a new CEO are concerned, it would be instructive to note that said free cash flows were not obtained by skimping on investments by any means. Both BNSF and MidAmerican, for example, are on track to spend record amounts this year, more than their competition. Otherwise, free cash flow for 2012 could easily top $18 billion from its current estimate of $15 billion. If this constant extra capital spending is what it takes to keep the subsidiaries happy after the departure of Mr. Buffett, so be it; It's already priced in.<br/><br/>The offshoot of this is Berkshire is very large now, and getting much larger in a hurry. The benefit of having an outstanding CEO at the helm is only marginal from hereon. And that's a good thing for shareholders.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Revisiting The Intrinsic Value Of Berkshire Hathaway</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/640291/comments?source=feed#comment-6165061</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6165061</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Good point about the importance of cash flows. I have been following Berkshire for long, but was never an investor until recently. Sometime over the past year or two, it finally transformed into a company having such diverse sources of cash flows that it would no longer require a person of extraordinary acumen to be running it.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jun 2012 12:45:38 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Good point about the importance of cash flows. I have been following Berkshire for long, but was never an investor until recently. Sometime over the past year or two, it finally transformed into a company having such diverse sources of cash flows that it would no longer require a person of extraordinary acumen to be running it.]]>
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    <item>
      <title>Revisiting The Intrinsic Value Of Berkshire Hathaway</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/640291/comments?source=feed#comment-6164651</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6164651</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Thanks Chris. Actually, I secretly wish Mr. Buffett hadn't put an explicit floor on the stock! Imagine having had the opportunity to buy these shares less than book value. Still, it appears to be quite a bargain at these prices.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jun 2012 12:37:43 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thanks Chris. Actually, I secretly wish Mr. Buffett hadn't put an explicit floor on the stock! Imagine having had the opportunity to buy these shares less than book value. Still, it appears to be quite a bargain at these prices.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Revisiting The Intrinsic Value Of Berkshire Hathaway</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/640291/comments?source=feed#comment-6163751</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6163751</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[The float is essentially the premiums that were collected over time (and subsequently invested in stocks and other securities), and the corresponding liabilities recognized on the balance sheet are Berkshire's educated guesses of the future payouts required in lieu of those premiums collected. Over time, if the actual liabilities pan out exactly as they had guessed, then the EPS number mentioned above will stay at that (plus the normal operating growth, of course). If they don't, then the EPS can swing either way to account for those deviations; In this article, I focused on large, negative swings that could potentially occur down the line, quantified those swings in dollar amounts, and deducted them from intrinsic value.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jun 2012 12:16:56 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The float is essentially the premiums that were collected over time (and subsequently invested in stocks and other securities), and the corresponding liabilities recognized on the balance sheet are Berkshire's educated guesses of the future payouts required in lieu of those premiums collected. Over time, if the actual liabilities pan out exactly as they had guessed, then the EPS number mentioned above will stay at that (plus the normal operating growth, of course). If they don't, then the EPS can swing either way to account for those deviations; In this article, I focused on large, negative swings that could potentially occur down the line, quantified those swings in dollar amounts, and deducted them from intrinsic value.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Three Reasons to Invest in Hansen Natural</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/163454/comments?source=feed#comment-693570</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">693570</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Before I respond any further, I think a full disclosure is in order, to provide some context: I am 100% invested in HANS. Also, I don't own anything else, including bonds.<br/><br/>Marc: <br/>Thanks for the welcome, and appreciate your view points. I have no strong proclivity towards having a highly focused portfolio at the expense of diversification, but it so happens that my investing philosophy precludes owning a large number of companies. I need to be able to understand a business, be able to price it, and make sure it is trading below that appraisal price at the time of my purchase. I have a morbid fear of going anywhere near a business that doesn't meet all three of those criteria.<br/><br/>And it so happens that in the small universe of businesses that I understand and can price (numbering about 25), only one is trading at a price that I like. For sure, risks abound, as with any company ('poortorich' highlighted a couple of risks pertinent to HANS in his comment above). My personal feeling is that the recession still has some steam left in it, so stocks may see another drop yet. Perhaps as much as 30% in Hansen's case. But unless I am convinced that the core business is suffering, I don't concern myself too much with the going price on any given day.<br/><br/>THofler:<br/>The beverage business is not incredibly complicated. For instance, a typical 16 year-old has a better shot at comprehending Hansen's 10k report versus that of American Express. Moreover, people are creatures of habit, so if they have consumed about three billion cans of Hansen's energy drinks in the past three years, I am loath to think that this is a fleeting phenomenon. Will this ever be as big as Coca Cola? I am willing to stick my neck out and confidently say no. But do I need it to be as big as Coke to make money? No, again.<br/><br/>Ricard:<br/>True, now that I think about it, Apple has had to cut prices on at least some models. I stand corrected. Although, most of those discounts happen to be offered for products that are on their last legs in the product life cycle, as newer models are introduced. But still, I have to agree with your assessment that pricing power is a somewhat tricky metric to be measured, and my treatment of that in the above article is somewhat informal.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2009 20:59:11 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Before I respond any further, I think a full disclosure is in order, to provide some context: I am 100% invested in HANS. Also, I don't own anything else, including bonds.<br/><br/>Marc: <br/>Thanks for the welcome, and appreciate your view points. I have no strong proclivity towards having a highly focused portfolio at the expense of diversification, but it so happens that my investing philosophy precludes owning a large number of companies. I need to be able to understand a business, be able to price it, and make sure it is trading below that appraisal price at the time of my purchase. I have a morbid fear of going anywhere near a business that doesn't meet all three of those criteria.<br/><br/>And it so happens that in the small universe of businesses that I understand and can price (numbering about 25), only one is trading at a price that I like. For sure, risks abound, as with any company ('poortorich' highlighted a couple of risks pertinent to HANS in his comment above). My personal feeling is that the recession still has some steam left in it, so stocks may see another drop yet. Perhaps as much as 30% in Hansen's case. But unless I am convinced that the core business is suffering, I don't concern myself too much with the going price on any given day.<br/><br/>THofler:<br/>The beverage business is not incredibly complicated. For instance, a typical 16 year-old has a better shot at comprehending Hansen's 10k report versus that of American Express. Moreover, people are creatures of habit, so if they have consumed about three billion cans of Hansen's energy drinks in the past three years, I am loath to think that this is a fleeting phenomenon. Will this ever be as big as Coca Cola? I am willing to stick my neck out and confidently say no. But do I need it to be as big as Coke to make money? No, again.<br/><br/>Ricard:<br/>True, now that I think about it, Apple has had to cut prices on at least some models. I stand corrected. Although, most of those discounts happen to be offered for products that are on their last legs in the product life cycle, as newer models are introduced. But still, I have to agree with your assessment that pricing power is a somewhat tricky metric to be measured, and my treatment of that in the above article is somewhat informal.]]>
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    <item>
      <title>4 Reasons for VMware Not to Fear Microsoft</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/58825/comments?source=feed#comment-108374</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">108374</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[David, <br/><br/>Sure, no one is writing off VMWare yet. Most people agree that it will continue to be the leader of the pack in the virtualization space for at least a few years.<br/><br/>That said, I am not sure if it is a good buy at the current price ($80.5 on Jan 4, 2008), even though it has fallen close to 35% from its peak. Its traling 12-month P/E is about a 100, and it is hard to argue that there is a lot of upside left. Not many companies with $30 billion market-caps go for those P/Es (and sustain them over 2-3 years).<br/><br/>Consider this: The most optimistic estimates have VMWare growing earnings at about 70% in FY08, and 50% in FY09. At a stock price of $100, VMWare in Jan-2010 will be commanding a P/E of 50, when presumably the competition would have gotten at least some of their game together.<br/><br/>My gut says that 50 P/E is about the limit that VMWare will hit over the next 2-3 years. Unless, of course, they can continue to grow 70% a few years into the future, which I strongly doubt.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sat, 05 Jan 2008 00:24:34 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[David, <br/><br/>Sure, no one is writing off VMWare yet. Most people agree that it will continue to be the leader of the pack in the virtualization space for at least a few years.<br/><br/>That said, I am not sure if it is a good buy at the current price ($80.5 on Jan 4, 2008), even though it has fallen close to 35% from its peak. Its traling 12-month P/E is about a 100, and it is hard to argue that there is a lot of upside left. Not many companies with $30 billion market-caps go for those P/Es (and sustain them over 2-3 years).<br/><br/>Consider this: The most optimistic estimates have VMWare growing earnings at about 70% in FY08, and 50% in FY09. At a stock price of $100, VMWare in Jan-2010 will be commanding a P/E of 50, when presumably the competition would have gotten at least some of their game together.<br/><br/>My gut says that 50 P/E is about the limit that VMWare will hit over the next 2-3 years. Unless, of course, they can continue to grow 70% a few years into the future, which I strongly doubt.]]>
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