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    <title>Carl Dincesen's Comments</title>
    <description>Carl Dincesen's Comments RSS Syndication from SeekingAlpha.com</description>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/user/158409/comments</link>
    <item>
      <title>An EU Solution For Both The Short And Long Term</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/671381/comments?source=feed#comment-6728221</link>
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      <content>
        <![CDATA[Sorry, meant &quot;pariah&quot; nation not piranha.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sat, 23 Jun 2012 16:03:20 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Sorry, meant &quot;pariah&quot; nation not piranha.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An EU Solution For Both The Short And Long Term</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/671381/comments?source=feed#comment-6712751</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6712751</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[rtlayman <br/>Thanks for the thoughtful comment.  <br/>You ask “the” question, what if a nation just walked away from its obligations to the finance authority. Stated another way, will investors’ readily accept that risk.<br/>The consequences of walking from a “supra” finance union obligation would be more severe than if a nation simply abrogated its debts. Severe and justified would include this piranha nation being shut out of European banking and trade system. With other countries joining in as well because that kind of action threatens the stability of the world’s largest economy, the EU.<br/>You are not just stiffing investors, but also the referee and league or union. All other members of the league will punish that team. They have agreed to not play with the offending team until it meets all of its obligations to the finance authority for debt issued on its behalf. Could an EU state turn into a North Korea? Yes, but what are the odds.  <br/>Just as important is the fact that all member nations and investors come out ahead in the short and long term. <br/>A proposal like this in my opinion would have a positive impact on the value of the Euro and price of Greek, Spanish and Italian government bonds.<br/>No doubt, the rating agencies would slather the union’s finance authority bonds with triple-A ratings, in this rare case deserved. <br/>Probability is the measure of risk over time. Here is a link to a direct three-way comparison to Moody’s and S&amp;P long-term credit rating definitions. I think another solution for a different but related problem is obvious here:<br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/MD9jNY'>http://bit.ly/MD9jNY</a>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2012 21:39:45 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[rtlayman <br/>Thanks for the thoughtful comment.  <br/>You ask “the” question, what if a nation just walked away from its obligations to the finance authority. Stated another way, will investors’ readily accept that risk.<br/>The consequences of walking from a “supra” finance union obligation would be more severe than if a nation simply abrogated its debts. Severe and justified would include this piranha nation being shut out of European banking and trade system. With other countries joining in as well because that kind of action threatens the stability of the world’s largest economy, the EU.<br/>You are not just stiffing investors, but also the referee and league or union. All other members of the league will punish that team. They have agreed to not play with the offending team until it meets all of its obligations to the finance authority for debt issued on its behalf. Could an EU state turn into a North Korea? Yes, but what are the odds.  <br/>Just as important is the fact that all member nations and investors come out ahead in the short and long term. <br/>A proposal like this in my opinion would have a positive impact on the value of the Euro and price of Greek, Spanish and Italian government bonds.<br/>No doubt, the rating agencies would slather the union’s finance authority bonds with triple-A ratings, in this rare case deserved. <br/>Probability is the measure of risk over time. Here is a link to a direct three-way comparison to Moody’s and S&amp;P long-term credit rating definitions. I think another solution for a different but related problem is obvious here:<br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/MD9jNY'>http://bit.ly/MD9jNY</a>]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unemployment: History Suggests There's No Reason for Pessimism</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/285646/comments?source=feed#comment-1829580</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1829580</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[The only thing we know for sure about the future is history repeats itself.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2011 16:02:28 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The only thing we know for sure about the future is history repeats itself.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Playing Municipal Bonds</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/275188/comments?source=feed#comment-1743044</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1743044</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Jeffery,<br/>Intending to hold to maturity and that actually happening are two different things, but most are called or economically called prior to maturity.<br/><br/>Before investing a large sum in a particular municipal bond issuer, I would still want to know the price offered was fair value for the risk assumed. Essentially, how far away or how unlikely is default in the foresee able future. You do not get that from public rating agency ratings or reading their rating reports.<br/><br/>Thank you for bringing up the question. It’s an important point.<br/><br/>Carl]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jul 2011 23:57:29 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Jeffery,<br/>Intending to hold to maturity and that actually happening are two different things, but most are called or economically called prior to maturity.<br/><br/>Before investing a large sum in a particular municipal bond issuer, I would still want to know the price offered was fair value for the risk assumed. Essentially, how far away or how unlikely is default in the foresee able future. You do not get that from public rating agency ratings or reading their rating reports.<br/><br/>Thank you for bringing up the question. It’s an important point.<br/><br/>Carl]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Playing Municipal Bonds</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/275188/comments?source=feed#comment-1715717</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1715717</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[David,<br/><br/>Bondsonline providing access to rating agency reports is a significant development. I believe Fitch was the first to do it via press release. But I am not sure you get all of the information all of the time and because the bond issuers pay for the rating, they are not truly independent.<br/><br/>When I mentioned “independent expert credit advice,” I was referring to our company’s goal of bringing independent expert opinion to retail municipal bond investors. We are not there in terms of pricing yet, but are working on retail distribution through a brokerage firm.<br/><br/>I agree 100%; borrower funded credit rating agencies are here to stay. Thanks for sharing your thoughts,<br/>Carl]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sat, 18 Jun 2011 23:22:42 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[David,<br/><br/>Bondsonline providing access to rating agency reports is a significant development. I believe Fitch was the first to do it via press release. But I am not sure you get all of the information all of the time and because the bond issuers pay for the rating, they are not truly independent.<br/><br/>When I mentioned “independent expert credit advice,” I was referring to our company’s goal of bringing independent expert opinion to retail municipal bond investors. We are not there in terms of pricing yet, but are working on retail distribution through a brokerage firm.<br/><br/>I agree 100%; borrower funded credit rating agencies are here to stay. Thanks for sharing your thoughts,<br/>Carl]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Municipal Bonds: Woe Is Me</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/264645/comments?source=feed#comment-1611550</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1611550</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Thank You]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Apr 2011 17:34:22 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thank You]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Outlook for Municipal Bond Defaults &#8211; Settlement on Largest May Come Soon</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/218727/comments?source=feed#comment-1281908</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1281908</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Reply to boyson<br/><br/>Nearly all of the bonds carry insurance. I should have mentioned that. Some investors are being paid while some others are not depending on which insurer backed the bonds held.<br/>Insurance was necessary to induce providers of liquidity to stand behind the auctions as buyers of last resort. That obligation terminated when the bond insurers where downgraded.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 17:33:18 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Reply to boyson<br/><br/>Nearly all of the bonds carry insurance. I should have mentioned that. Some investors are being paid while some others are not depending on which insurer backed the bonds held.<br/>Insurance was necessary to induce providers of liquidity to stand behind the auctions as buyers of last resort. That obligation terminated when the bond insurers where downgraded.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Health Insurance Companies Part II: Can They Prosper in the Next Decade?</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/211315/comments?source=feed#comment-1081550</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1081550</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I believe the power of capitalism is sufficient to withstand price regulation by the government  when the service is essential and is delivered by the private sector. <br/><br/>Narrow mined conservatives and liberals should look closely at the Japanese healthcare system. It's existence and success is a reality that proves both political points of view are based on false assumptions. As for elected officials, what's going on with them is, for the most part, ugly. ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jun 2010 21:29:18 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I believe the power of capitalism is sufficient to withstand price regulation by the government  when the service is essential and is delivered by the private sector. <br/><br/>Narrow mined conservatives and liberals should look closely at the Japanese healthcare system. It's existence and success is a reality that proves both political points of view are based on false assumptions. As for elected officials, what's going on with them is, for the most part, ugly. ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Health Insurance Companies Part I: The Game Is Ending</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/202212/comments?source=feed#comment-1079759</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1079759</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[That opinion is the problem because it is what most people think. Insurers are the paymasters of healthcare, who gets what and how much. Ask your self a simple question. Who has control?. It is not providers. There are only two places they can get paid, private insurance and the government funded insurance programs. Private insurance reimbursements are always more generous because insurers get cost plus on whatever spending turns out to be. <br/><br/>You might need to put aside negative opinions about certain government actions to understand this. I have. Please read Part II and tell what you think about this.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2010 19:09:49 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[That opinion is the problem because it is what most people think. Insurers are the paymasters of healthcare, who gets what and how much. Ask your self a simple question. Who has control?. It is not providers. There are only two places they can get paid, private insurance and the government funded insurance programs. Private insurance reimbursements are always more generous because insurers get cost plus on whatever spending turns out to be. <br/><br/>You might need to put aside negative opinions about certain government actions to understand this. I have. Please read Part II and tell what you think about this.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Health Insurance Companies Part I: The Game Is Ending</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/202212/comments?source=feed#comment-1079750</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1079750</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[That's the problem because it is what most people think. Insurers are the paymasters of healthcare, who gets what and how much. Ask your self a simple question. Who has control?. It is not providers. There are only two places they can get paid, private insurance and the government funded insurance programs. Private insurance reimbursements are always more generous because insurers get cost plus on whatever spending turns out to be. <br/><br/>You might need to put aside negative opinions about certain government actions to understand this. I have. Please read Part II and tell what you think about this.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2010 19:03:12 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[That's the problem because it is what most people think. Insurers are the paymasters of healthcare, who gets what and how much. Ask your self a simple question. Who has control?. It is not providers. There are only two places they can get paid, private insurance and the government funded insurance programs. Private insurance reimbursements are always more generous because insurers get cost plus on whatever spending turns out to be. <br/><br/>You might need to put aside negative opinions about certain government actions to understand this. I have. Please read Part II and tell what you think about this.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Health Insurance Companies Part I: The Game Is Ending</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/202212/comments?source=feed#comment-1079713</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1079713</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Can't argue with the second paragraph. Part II is out.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2010 18:25:15 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Can't argue with the second paragraph. Part II is out.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Health Insurance Companies Part I: The Game Is Ending</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/202212/comments?source=feed#comment-1011533</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">1011533</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I suppose that you could evaluate what a four percent margin would be worth on a stagnant or slow growth revenue base.  <br/><br/>State regulators limit margins, not spending, to 4%, give, or take 100 basis points. Appling that margin to the sum of reimbursements paid plus operating expenditures equals annual earnings. ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2010 20:38:57 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I suppose that you could evaluate what a four percent margin would be worth on a stagnant or slow growth revenue base.  <br/><br/>State regulators limit margins, not spending, to 4%, give, or take 100 basis points. Appling that margin to the sum of reimbursements paid plus operating expenditures equals annual earnings. ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>California: A Bigger Credit Risk Than Kazakhstan</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/191314/comments?source=feed#comment-920836</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">920836</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[California and New York pay more because income is higher and income tax rates are progressive. It is just amatter of how the numbers are packaged.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2010 19:24:39 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[California and New York pay more because income is higher and income tax rates are progressive. It is just amatter of how the numbers are packaged.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>California: A Bigger Credit Risk Than Kazakhstan</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/191314/comments?source=feed#comment-920769</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">920769</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I said in my comment California reports to no one, I should have said public employee unions.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2010 18:30:46 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I said in my comment California reports to no one, I should have said public employee unions.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>California: A Bigger Credit Risk Than Kazakhstan</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/191314/comments?source=feed#comment-918969</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">918969</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Greece reports to the European Union. California reports to no one.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 17:39:26 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Greece reports to the European Union. California reports to no one.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Municipal Bonds: Time for a Closer Look</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/127953/comments?source=feed#comment-442613</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">442613</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[E J Boyson<br/>Appreciate the complement.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2009 13:20:43 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[E J Boyson<br/>Appreciate the complement.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Encouraging News on Subprime Mortgage Delinquency Roll Rates</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/78394/comments?source=feed#comment-172895</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">172895</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[A glimmer of hope? If it changes your analysis, please post results from the full April 24 trustee/servicer reports. Recovery or loss severity rate is more than important and I don't whether or to what degree it correlates to dollar inflows and roll rates.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 May 2008 16:53:56 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[A glimmer of hope? If it changes your analysis, please post results from the full April 24 trustee/servicer reports. Recovery or loss severity rate is more than important and I don't whether or to what degree it correlates to dollar inflows and roll rates.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>U.S. Housing: The Big Picture by the Numbers</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/70241/comments?source=feed#comment-149963</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">149963</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[In reply to user Dilbert. Appreciate the comment.  No doubt you know your local market, but what has and continues to be happening locally for you is not at odds with the parameters of median new home sale price declines in the West Region discussed in the above article. That is because the Price to Income Gap, being based on median home value in the Region, is itself a median Gap or middle value with half being higher and half being lower. The Gap, no doubt, varies in each State in the Region and more so within the hundreds of local real estate markets in the California. ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 16:42:46 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[In reply to user Dilbert. Appreciate the comment.  No doubt you know your local market, but what has and continues to be happening locally for you is not at odds with the parameters of median new home sale price declines in the West Region discussed in the above article. That is because the Price to Income Gap, being based on median home value in the Region, is itself a median Gap or middle value with half being higher and half being lower. The Gap, no doubt, varies in each State in the Region and more so within the hundreds of local real estate markets in the California. ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>U.S. Housing: The Big Picture by the Numbers</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/70241/comments?source=feed#comment-136120</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">136120</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[In reply to user 169490, it is true that base year relationships can change results but not by statistically significant amounts over the long term because, in this case, the underlying compared values historically exhibit low and similar degrees of volatility in terms of year over year percent change. Importantly and to your point, base year 1976 and the years preceding and following it were unremarkable in all four Regions. I would be happy to share the data with you. Email cdincesen@insuredaaabo...]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2008 14:46:27 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[In reply to user 169490, it is true that base year relationships can change results but not by statistically significant amounts over the long term because, in this case, the underlying compared values historically exhibit low and similar degrees of volatility in terms of year over year percent change. Importantly and to your point, base year 1976 and the years preceding and following it were unremarkable in all four Regions. I would be happy to share the data with you. Email cdincesen@insuredaaabo...]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ambac, MBIA Are Still Shorts Amidst This Wink-and-Nod</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/66485/comments?source=feed#comment-120374</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">120374</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Some facts the &quot;experts&quot; miss: Ambac and MBIA insured bonds never in their history traded equal to natural triple A bonds. They always traded at double A levels in both the tax exempt and taxible markets, ask any trader. The holding companies have never been rated triple A. The stress case scenarios that the rating agencies use are in fact depression (1930's style) scenarios. Simple put, at any point in time a triple A financial guaranty insurer must have minimum capital equal to 100% of depression losses at a 99.9% probability with an extra 20-30% capital cushion thrown in for good measure. No one who understands the business has ever suggested that the insurer would necessarily maintain a triple A rating during or after a depression. <br/><br/>Credit ratings are simply an informed opinion as to the likelihood of getting paid in full on time in a very stressed environment with triple A's the most likely survivors. Read the rating agency credit rating definitions, and then read the raters' rating methodologies for financial guarantee insurers. Default assumptions for categories of risk can change but the fundamental approach has remained the same for more than 30 years.<br/><br/>The unprecedented speed and magnitude of home price declines in certain housing markets is a natural result of the unprecedented speed and magnitude of the immediately preceding price appreciation that was fueled in large part by the collapse of mortgage under writing standards beginning in 2004. Those depreciating markets are well on there way to reaching price levels consistent with current personal income levels which is and always has been the fundamental driver of residential real estate values. There will be blood but the patient will recover faster than many think unless we have a depression in which case I would rather be holding Ambac or MBIA insured debt than uninsured A rated debt. Is that not the fundamental reason why investors have been giving up a little yield in exchange for insurance protection during the last 34 years?<br/>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:50:33 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Some facts the &quot;experts&quot; miss: Ambac and MBIA insured bonds never in their history traded equal to natural triple A bonds. They always traded at double A levels in both the tax exempt and taxible markets, ask any trader. The holding companies have never been rated triple A. The stress case scenarios that the rating agencies use are in fact depression (1930's style) scenarios. Simple put, at any point in time a triple A financial guaranty insurer must have minimum capital equal to 100% of depression losses at a 99.9% probability with an extra 20-30% capital cushion thrown in for good measure. No one who understands the business has ever suggested that the insurer would necessarily maintain a triple A rating during or after a depression. <br/><br/>Credit ratings are simply an informed opinion as to the likelihood of getting paid in full on time in a very stressed environment with triple A's the most likely survivors. Read the rating agency credit rating definitions, and then read the raters' rating methodologies for financial guarantee insurers. Default assumptions for categories of risk can change but the fundamental approach has remained the same for more than 30 years.<br/><br/>The unprecedented speed and magnitude of home price declines in certain housing markets is a natural result of the unprecedented speed and magnitude of the immediately preceding price appreciation that was fueled in large part by the collapse of mortgage under writing standards beginning in 2004. Those depreciating markets are well on there way to reaching price levels consistent with current personal income levels which is and always has been the fundamental driver of residential real estate values. There will be blood but the patient will recover faster than many think unless we have a depression in which case I would rather be holding Ambac or MBIA insured debt than uninsured A rated debt. Is that not the fundamental reason why investors have been giving up a little yield in exchange for insurance protection during the last 34 years?<br/>]]>
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