Publicliterature.org

What Does a Bonus Really Cost?

I don't think you would like the outcome of following your logic. So, since most of these banks are insolvent, shouldn't all the bonuses be clawed back since they ended up losing the "game" at the end of the day? Banking is a "team" sport, and if your "team" loses, like most US banks and investment companies, why should the "team" receive ANY bonus. I think there are plenty of individuals that will play less risky, make less returns in the short term but not blow up the entire system during the process. These are the people that should have been hired to begin with. I wouldn't really argue that any single institution including GS or JPM did well.

Nationalizing Bank Losses

I think there is a basic assumption that is wrong. Banks simply DO NOT have additional capital to lend. Any excess will easily go to loan losses as a result of the home price decline. Yes, this does further exacerbate the problem because they are now hurting the private sector for leveraged companies. But, telling a bank to lend more is like telling someone to eat all the rations on a raft lost at sea!

So, the domino has fallen from the house price bubble, to the banks residential real estate portfolio, to the private sector businesses. If we don't stop it, it will domino into hitting the commercial loans then back the banks balance sheets and certainly cripple the banks in a Depression style insolvency.

I think the core issue needs to be addressed, but this is actually a bit hard to identify (esp. for the government). The core issue is that our financial system is flawed and that our model allows, perhaps encourages, executives to take on excessive risk for excessive short term return and compensation. Trusting a banker to act for the greater good, is a little naive on Greenspan's part.

I think the best idea I've finally heard suggested is increasing capital requirements on a sliding scale based on profits. A variation of this was suggested at Davos. This stifles excessive growth and could well prevent bubbles. Bubbles are the banks worst enemies and the regulation needs to be put in place to prevent it in the real estate sector at least.

Now, the only way to fix the system is to capitalize the banks, stop the job losses, and smooth the home prices at the same time. Easier said than done, especially while not inflating one's currency like Argentina.

On Jan 31 01:08 PM johnny g wrote:

> I have an idea that can help resolve the problems facing both our
> economy and financial industry. Front lines reports from academia,
> government, and the media explain in good measure that banking industries
> uncertainties and fears regarding asset viability on their own and
> others balance sheets have created immovable road blocks to reasonable
> distribution and capital access.
>
> The idea seeks to collapse the period of time to which a more predictable
> and reliable flow of capital through our system can be arrive at;
> it cannot in and of itself resolve all systemic problems. The limited
> and uncertain access to capital has in large measure hobbled our
> collective economic system; interested parties to productive assets
> have been beset by a vicious cycle of pessimism and diminishing valuations,
> many times leading to a complete loss to owners and counter parties.
> The recommendation is designed to impose upon the banking system
> requirements to fully deploy their capital, with the aim of arresting
> this downward cycle and arriving at the nexus where collateral valuations
> are affirmed and once again become a measure of strength and not
> weakness.
>
> The basic tool and in this solution is taxation. A new piece of legislation
> is to be formed in which banks are taxed when not meeting the required
> leveraging minimums, and somehow rewarded when they demonstrate full
> leveraging deployment. Despite the cajoling of the Feds and Treasury
> after massive capital injections and asset swaps, the banking industries
> collective uncertainties are preventing their raison d'être, banks
> continue to under deploy and hoard capital, this is where we are
> collectively bogging down.
>
> As commercial banks comply with new leveraging requirements, they
> deploy capital to the most favorable credit risk. A new competitive
> lending environment will spring forth; banks will compete with other
> banks to actively seek out the best risk reward borrowers for their
> offerings, or be subject to this new Federal tax or penalty. This
> new velocity of money will energize our economy, restore asset predictability
> and grow balance sheet valuations without further deficit spending.
>
>
> This novel catalyst along with other primers will reduce the distance
> and time that the wheels of Capitalism need to travel before growth
> and optimism is restored; preventing unneeded failures, losses, and
> human hardship due to degrading asset valuations and capital deprivation.
>
>
> Let the chip fall where they may there after. A forced renew will
> have begun.