A Strong U.S. Dollar Isn't in Anyone's Best Interest [View article]
"If a country is spending recklessly and overstimulating the world economy, it gets punished with reduced export demand, the result of a strong currency. If a country is saving heavily and thereby facilitating investment throughout the world, it gets rewarded with increased export demand, the result of a weak currency."
Not what actually happened. You miss a few points in forex history. The $ dropped as the US bubble economy crested until July 08 as fear drove the $ up. I sold a large pile of euros and bought euro puts in 7/08 because the euro was in a commodity boom-inflation fear driven bubble. Post Lehman, the euro crashed from $1.60 to $1.28/euro in the biggest short term move in postwar forex history, in exactly the inversion your scenario outlined above. Flight to safe haven currencies from a stock market and commodity crash drove demand to $ as institutions with toxic liabilities in $ had to buy $ to cover.
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"If a country is spending recklessly and overstimulating the world economy, it gets punished with reduced export demand, the result of a strong currency. If a country is saving heavily and thereby facilitating investment throughout the world, it gets rewarded with increased export demand, the result of a weak currency."
Apr 04 15:26 pm
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All Comments by turnkeusa »A Strong U.S. Dollar Isn't in Anyone's Best Interest [View article]
Not what actually happened. You miss a few points in forex history. The $ dropped as the US bubble economy crested until July 08 as fear drove the $ up. I sold a large pile of euros and bought euro puts in 7/08 because the euro was in a commodity boom-inflation fear driven bubble. Post Lehman, the euro crashed from $1.60 to $1.28/euro in the biggest short term move in postwar forex history, in exactly the inversion your scenario outlined above. Flight to safe haven currencies from a stock market and commodity crash drove demand to $ as institutions with toxic liabilities in $ had to buy $ to cover.