H. Michael Arguello_'s Comments H. Michael Arguello_'s Comments RSS Syndication from SeekingAlpha.com http://seekingalpha.comuser/176462/comments 10 Contrarian Reasons for a Bottom http://seekingalpha.com/article/109632-10-contrarian-reasons-for-a-bottom?source=feed#comment-324138 324138
It is interesting that the way the DOW is constructed is price sensitive; a change in the value of XOM is far more potent than a greater move in % in BAC. Energy is the last man standing sector wise but energy's base is getting whacked due to weak demand. Margins are built on top of commodity prices (if it costs me x dollars, I charge 125% x sale price; a decline in x means a decline the 25% that is my profit margin) and with energy prices tumbling so far so fast - watch out the Q4 on energy. THAT will lead us to the bottom imo.

Wall St. bought into the lows of 2001 b/c thats when tech bottomed for the most part - 02 was when the effects finally spread out into the broader market. Same thing; financials ahve been nuked, and as the former heavyweights in the various indexes their demise has caused a great deal of the collapse in index valuations. Now the broade rmarket is starting to feel the impact.

I see Q4/Q1-09 earnings being the bottom as investors across the board get a taste and run for cover, one of these two seasons. Just my $0.02]]>
Mon, 08 Dec 2008 16:51:30 -0500
It is interesting that the way the DOW is constructed is price sensitive; a change in the value of XOM is far more potent than a greater move in % in BAC. Energy is the last man standing sector wise but energy's base is getting whacked due to weak demand. Margins are built on top of commodity prices (if it costs me x dollars, I charge 125% x sale price; a decline in x means a decline the 25% that is my profit margin) and with energy prices tumbling so far so fast - watch out the Q4 on energy. THAT will lead us to the bottom imo.

Wall St. bought into the lows of 2001 b/c thats when tech bottomed for the most part - 02 was when the effects finally spread out into the broader market. Same thing; financials ahve been nuked, and as the former heavyweights in the various indexes their demise has caused a great deal of the collapse in index valuations. Now the broade rmarket is starting to feel the impact.

I see Q4/Q1-09 earnings being the bottom as investors across the board get a taste and run for cover, one of these two seasons. Just my $0.02]]>
Follow the Mutual Funds: Solar Is Bottoming http://seekingalpha.com/article/108497-follow-the-mutual-funds-solar-is-bottoming?source=feed#comment-319203 319203
The frustrating part is that this has happened before, in the late 70s/early 80s. We NEED solar to mature but the economics of it simply will not hold up. I see Obama keeping the solars on life support, but I dont think he will be able to convince customers to buy solar without credit given how cheap oil is. The weaker players will go under. Stronger players like FSLR will hopefully survive and when the economy turns around, be there to siphon off oil demand. Here is to hoping.

I do think FSLR will survive so I like that recommendation, I dont care for the weaker solar players. A long FSLR/short SPWRA might be an interesitng position.

No positions in Solar at the moment. ]]>
Tue, 02 Dec 2008 16:27:29 -0500
The frustrating part is that this has happened before, in the late 70s/early 80s. We NEED solar to mature but the economics of it simply will not hold up. I see Obama keeping the solars on life support, but I dont think he will be able to convince customers to buy solar without credit given how cheap oil is. The weaker players will go under. Stronger players like FSLR will hopefully survive and when the economy turns around, be there to siphon off oil demand. Here is to hoping.

I do think FSLR will survive so I like that recommendation, I dont care for the weaker solar players. A long FSLR/short SPWRA might be an interesitng position.

No positions in Solar at the moment. ]]>
Harvard's Portfolio: Top-Heavy in International ETFs http://seekingalpha.com/article/108809-harvard-s-portfolio-top-heavy-in-international-etfs?source=feed#comment-319160 319160
I think you will see a nasty crisis hit emerging markets very shortly. You have major patron states in the developing world about to crash and when they do, they will take their client states down with them. For example, Iran, Venezeula and Russia. With oil under $75/bbl, both have precarious finances. The Russian markets have all but collapsed without high priced oil (and the the war in Georgia); a default by Russia, looking increasingly likely, would send ripple effects as debt underwritten/backed/su... by Russia would also suffer. That extends out beyond just Russia as Russia has been using its commodities might as part of its foreign policy these last few years.

Venezuela actively backs Bolivia and Ecuador's govts (financially) as well; with oil prices so low, the higher cost producers like Venezuela will be pushed to the brink. That will take down Hugos friends (its already in process). Iran is very similar, supporting Syria and a few others with its oil wealth.

The prospect of having multiple defaults throughout the emerging world all happen at the same time is like 1997 on steroids (which began when Russia defaulted on its debt, coming soon to a theatre near you!). You will see a currency crisis; the current downturn in EM currencies is nothing, it is simply an unwinding of their appreication during the last 24 months due to the commodities boom.

With re: the invincible Chiense dragon, I think you will see red ink for the first time in China. Their economy is heavily dependent on exports - the US has no manufacturing base since China makes it all for us. When you see retailers hurt - you are seeing the Chinese hurt, it just takes an extra quarter for it to filter through due to the intermediation of the retail industry. Blend in a Chinese asset bubble popping, specifically in real estate and stocks (already in progress) and you have a nasty recipe for a downturn. I have family who are importers of goods from China, one just got back from a trip to his suppliers there. Apparently, its alreayd starting to get ugly with huge layoffs and many firms simply shutting down.

I have no positions either way at the moment although I am contemplating a position in a short EM ETF. The overall picture is really bleak for the EMs - the only BRIC nation I would even dream of investing in right now would be Brazil, altho I am more inclined to short them all. Best of luck to all, if you are going long EMs, be prepared to sit tight for a decade or two. ]]>
Tue, 02 Dec 2008 15:32:35 -0500
I think you will see a nasty crisis hit emerging markets very shortly. You have major patron states in the developing world about to crash and when they do, they will take their client states down with them. For example, Iran, Venezeula and Russia. With oil under $75/bbl, both have precarious finances. The Russian markets have all but collapsed without high priced oil (and the the war in Georgia); a default by Russia, looking increasingly likely, would send ripple effects as debt underwritten/backed/su... by Russia would also suffer. That extends out beyond just Russia as Russia has been using its commodities might as part of its foreign policy these last few years.

Venezuela actively backs Bolivia and Ecuador's govts (financially) as well; with oil prices so low, the higher cost producers like Venezuela will be pushed to the brink. That will take down Hugos friends (its already in process). Iran is very similar, supporting Syria and a few others with its oil wealth.

The prospect of having multiple defaults throughout the emerging world all happen at the same time is like 1997 on steroids (which began when Russia defaulted on its debt, coming soon to a theatre near you!). You will see a currency crisis; the current downturn in EM currencies is nothing, it is simply an unwinding of their appreication during the last 24 months due to the commodities boom.

With re: the invincible Chiense dragon, I think you will see red ink for the first time in China. Their economy is heavily dependent on exports - the US has no manufacturing base since China makes it all for us. When you see retailers hurt - you are seeing the Chinese hurt, it just takes an extra quarter for it to filter through due to the intermediation of the retail industry. Blend in a Chinese asset bubble popping, specifically in real estate and stocks (already in progress) and you have a nasty recipe for a downturn. I have family who are importers of goods from China, one just got back from a trip to his suppliers there. Apparently, its alreayd starting to get ugly with huge layoffs and many firms simply shutting down.

I have no positions either way at the moment although I am contemplating a position in a short EM ETF. The overall picture is really bleak for the EMs - the only BRIC nation I would even dream of investing in right now would be Brazil, altho I am more inclined to short them all. Best of luck to all, if you are going long EMs, be prepared to sit tight for a decade or two. ]]>
The Trouble with Recession Averages http://seekingalpha.com/article/108808-the-trouble-with-recession-averages?source=feed#comment-319145 319145
Mind you it can cause some short term severe pain as in the hyperinflation of the 70s, but it can wipe out the value of debt which, with the exception of TIPS, are generally not inflation indexed. Question is, who gets to be the new Paul Volcker lol since Paul is joining the inflation team. There are no easy answers, but given a choice between a depression, a period of hyperinflation to wipe out the value of debt, or a massive default and shattering of all faith ind ebt forever, I choose hyperinflation. Granted, I am a net debtor at this stage of my life lol, so works for me!]]>
Tue, 02 Dec 2008 15:06:59 -0500
Mind you it can cause some short term severe pain as in the hyperinflation of the 70s, but it can wipe out the value of debt which, with the exception of TIPS, are generally not inflation indexed. Question is, who gets to be the new Paul Volcker lol since Paul is joining the inflation team. There are no easy answers, but given a choice between a depression, a period of hyperinflation to wipe out the value of debt, or a massive default and shattering of all faith ind ebt forever, I choose hyperinflation. Granted, I am a net debtor at this stage of my life lol, so works for me!]]>
Has Hank Paulson Been a Good Treasury Secretary? http://seekingalpha.com/article/107939-has-hank-paulson-been-a-good-treasury-secretary?source=feed#comment-314820 314820
We will not begin to improve until Paulson is replaced. I dont know if Geithner will be a great Tres Sec or not; but the bar is so low from Paulson that he will look like a great Tres Sec regardless. ]]>
Tue, 25 Nov 2008 13:55:16 -0500
We will not begin to improve until Paulson is replaced. I dont know if Geithner will be a great Tres Sec or not; but the bar is so low from Paulson that he will look like a great Tres Sec regardless. ]]>
Combating Cascading Short Spirals http://seekingalpha.com/article/99647-combating-cascading-short-spirals?source=feed#comment-284207 284207
Turkeyeys, I agree that a short circuit breaker by itself is insufficient. However with realtime short information being made available, special situation funds could take out short attacks. If the shorts stop at 19% per day, a daily basis is more than enough time for Spec Sit funds to do their homework. The problem right now, in my opinion, is that the current time window the shorts have been using to overload the system with sell orders is too short of a time to research a company and go the opposite way. The bear raiders have the advantage in that they know how many fiat shares they are creating whereas long investors are flying blind on the fiat float.

Once a company has collapsed more than 25% in share price in one day it begins the downward spiral of downgrades and panic amongst investors and creditors.

Short selling has its uses in the market, but the current abuses on the Street require a response. The uptick rule would be nice but truth of the matter is, modern buy and sell programs can easily get around it by using computers to trigger minor upticks with a buy prior to large sell orders.]]>
Thu, 16 Oct 2008 23:29:06 -0400
Turkeyeys, I agree that a short circuit breaker by itself is insufficient. However with realtime short information being made available, special situation funds could take out short attacks. If the shorts stop at 19% per day, a daily basis is more than enough time for Spec Sit funds to do their homework. The problem right now, in my opinion, is that the current time window the shorts have been using to overload the system with sell orders is too short of a time to research a company and go the opposite way. The bear raiders have the advantage in that they know how many fiat shares they are creating whereas long investors are flying blind on the fiat float.

Once a company has collapsed more than 25% in share price in one day it begins the downward spiral of downgrades and panic amongst investors and creditors.

Short selling has its uses in the market, but the current abuses on the Street require a response. The uptick rule would be nice but truth of the matter is, modern buy and sell programs can easily get around it by using computers to trigger minor upticks with a buy prior to large sell orders.]]>
Mortgage Delinquencies Continue to Climb, Watch Out for Other Loans http://seekingalpha.com/article/96967-mortgage-delinquencies-continue-to-climb-watch-out-for-other-loans?source=feed#comment-263010 263010
Only 1in7 were able to understand the concept of a negative amortization loan tied to a variable rate structure and the financial explosion that would occur in a rising rate/depreciating market. To be fair, I got the impression many didnt give a damn beyond the commission and simply didnt want to learn. Still, having World Savings reps running around with their claims that their u/w models had been backtested thru the Great Depression did not help. ]]>
Tue, 23 Sep 2008 20:24:24 -0400
Only 1in7 were able to understand the concept of a negative amortization loan tied to a variable rate structure and the financial explosion that would occur in a rising rate/depreciating market. To be fair, I got the impression many didnt give a damn beyond the commission and simply didnt want to learn. Still, having World Savings reps running around with their claims that their u/w models had been backtested thru the Great Depression did not help. ]]>
Is AIG a Buy Following the Government Bailout? http://seekingalpha.com/article/95992-is-aig-a-buy-following-the-government-bailout?source=feed#comment-257568 257568
The situation is that the government has loaned up to $85 billion to AIG via a credit facility for up to two years. In exchange, the debt must be repaid from asset sales and carries an 11% interest rate. In addition, the government demanded extra compensation in the form of warrants that grant a near 80% stake in the company. The point of the warrants is to discourage other companies from trying to use Uncle Sam's credit; its a punitive measure to push private market participants back into the private market unless there really is no other way.

On the flip side, I do believe AIG is solvent, simply not liquid. As a result, the loan will allow them the time ot liquidate in an orderly process. In the end shareholders will get some renumeration, but I do not know what will be left after the asset sales - no one does until the bidding begins.

The company is too much of a conglomerate to figure out what it will fetch, although history tells us that large conglomerates tend to bring more in pieces than as a whole (see Ma Bell/AT&T+Baby Bells for example). ]]>
Wed, 17 Sep 2008 22:04:55 -0400
The situation is that the government has loaned up to $85 billion to AIG via a credit facility for up to two years. In exchange, the debt must be repaid from asset sales and carries an 11% interest rate. In addition, the government demanded extra compensation in the form of warrants that grant a near 80% stake in the company. The point of the warrants is to discourage other companies from trying to use Uncle Sam's credit; its a punitive measure to push private market participants back into the private market unless there really is no other way.

On the flip side, I do believe AIG is solvent, simply not liquid. As a result, the loan will allow them the time ot liquidate in an orderly process. In the end shareholders will get some renumeration, but I do not know what will be left after the asset sales - no one does until the bidding begins.

The company is too much of a conglomerate to figure out what it will fetch, although history tells us that large conglomerates tend to bring more in pieces than as a whole (see Ma Bell/AT&T+Baby Bells for example). ]]>
Countrywide: Potential Short Squeeze in the Offing http://seekingalpha.com/article/82184-countrywide-potential-short-squeeze-in-the-offing?source=feed#comment-190344 190344
I believe (based on nothing but my own speculation) that most of the current CFC shorts are shorts betting against the deal going through. Shorting Bank of America, even with Countrywide's liabilities, is a very different venture than shorting CFC. Shorting a stock with a 9.5% dividend yield (as of Friday close), strong balance sheet, a large unrealized gain on an investment (the China Construction bank options and existing shares, currently have a net gain of approx. $27 billion) etc. is a nasty prospect. If CFC is not taken over by BAC, there is the prospect of a bankruptcy and that would make every short’s day. With BAC, no analyst I am aware of is forecasting the company goes out of business – as such, your potential gains are capped at some point and your potential liability is extremely high as the stock has the ability to appreciate a great deal form its current levels.

It does not help that at current prices, shorts are facing a ~ 6% squeeze immediately upon the transfer of the position. ALSO, the way the BAC deal is structured, at .1822 shares of BAC for each share of CFC, all non-integer quantities are being paid out in cash. So if you have 1,000 CFC shares, you get 182 shares of BAC and .2 x Price of BAC in cash (about $5.42 at Fridays closing price).

Plain English, shorts have to pay out the equivalent in shares of BAC AND a small amount in cash. It’s very similar to holding a short position through a dividend. This is assuming your broker allows you to hold through the acquisition (not all brokers do; retail brokerages in particular tend to place more restrictions on such events). Regarding trading at a higher price than the acquisition, it has occurred several times since this deal was announced. It would not surprise me one bit to see it re-occur, albeit briefly, in the current circumstances.

Anyways this scenario is POSSIBLE, and it appears to be developing. CFC shares, on a % basis, held up far better than BAC shares during Friday’s market and indeed, throughout much of last week. That indicates to me some shorts may be starting to cover and that is exactly how short covering rallies begin.

All in all, I felt it was worth discussing. Thank you for reading.
]]>
Sun, 22 Jun 2008 15:35:51 -0400
I believe (based on nothing but my own speculation) that most of the current CFC shorts are shorts betting against the deal going through. Shorting Bank of America, even with Countrywide's liabilities, is a very different venture than shorting CFC. Shorting a stock with a 9.5% dividend yield (as of Friday close), strong balance sheet, a large unrealized gain on an investment (the China Construction bank options and existing shares, currently have a net gain of approx. $27 billion) etc. is a nasty prospect. If CFC is not taken over by BAC, there is the prospect of a bankruptcy and that would make every short’s day. With BAC, no analyst I am aware of is forecasting the company goes out of business – as such, your potential gains are capped at some point and your potential liability is extremely high as the stock has the ability to appreciate a great deal form its current levels.

It does not help that at current prices, shorts are facing a ~ 6% squeeze immediately upon the transfer of the position. ALSO, the way the BAC deal is structured, at .1822 shares of BAC for each share of CFC, all non-integer quantities are being paid out in cash. So if you have 1,000 CFC shares, you get 182 shares of BAC and .2 x Price of BAC in cash (about $5.42 at Fridays closing price).

Plain English, shorts have to pay out the equivalent in shares of BAC AND a small amount in cash. It’s very similar to holding a short position through a dividend. This is assuming your broker allows you to hold through the acquisition (not all brokers do; retail brokerages in particular tend to place more restrictions on such events). Regarding trading at a higher price than the acquisition, it has occurred several times since this deal was announced. It would not surprise me one bit to see it re-occur, albeit briefly, in the current circumstances.

Anyways this scenario is POSSIBLE, and it appears to be developing. CFC shares, on a % basis, held up far better than BAC shares during Friday’s market and indeed, throughout much of last week. That indicates to me some shorts may be starting to cover and that is exactly how short covering rallies begin.

All in all, I felt it was worth discussing. Thank you for reading.
]]>
Another Gift from the FASB http://seekingalpha.com/article/71778-another-gift-from-the-fasb?source=feed#comment-148687 148687
Sorry, but the figures the banks have written down are not even the bulk of the delinquencies. The majority of subprime ARM resets occurred in Oct 07 and will go thru 6/08. This is fairly well documented. It also takes about 6 months from a reset before a borrower is even classified in default (3mo before borrower cannot keep treading water and 90 days past due before bank starts becoming aggressive and marks it down). In some banks cases, like Wachovia, they are refusing to count anything under 180 days as a write-down (a recent article pointed out they had 5.1 billion in loans that were 120-179 days past due they were refusing to write down). This is in comparison to the 1.1 billion or so they have written down.

The numbers and timing of current defaulted loans are PRE-BULGE of the distribution of ARM resets; throw in some creative accounting (Wachovia may not count the loan as in default on its books, but it seems to count it as a default on credit reports and court actions - dbl standard there) and fact of the matter is, the major banks have alot more to come.

Too many people are trying to dismiss the recession/bear market and say it’s over. FYI, the S&L crisis of the 80s took years to work out and it took the major banks about 6 quarters of heavy losses to swallow - and that was with partners who had balance sheets (albeit light ones) to help shoulder the load of holding bad paper on your bal. The current model, next to none of the major originators had any amount of capital worth mentioning in their capital structure.

In short, the banks have alot more write downs, the bulk is to come and is not behind us, and there is no one else to dump it on. Confidence is a key piece of the US banking system and I certainly understand the govt's and the exec's attempts to build it back up. But until they come clean, they will not have it. The losses will have to be written off eventually - else we really risk becoming like the Japanese during the 90s (big banks refusing to write off loans, govt bailouts, no growth and possibly even deflation, near zero interest rates, etc.)

Hmmm, kinda sounds like what we are doing now. ]]>
Thu, 10 Apr 2008 22:42:06 -0400
Sorry, but the figures the banks have written down are not even the bulk of the delinquencies. The majority of subprime ARM resets occurred in Oct 07 and will go thru 6/08. This is fairly well documented. It also takes about 6 months from a reset before a borrower is even classified in default (3mo before borrower cannot keep treading water and 90 days past due before bank starts becoming aggressive and marks it down). In some banks cases, like Wachovia, they are refusing to count anything under 180 days as a write-down (a recent article pointed out they had 5.1 billion in loans that were 120-179 days past due they were refusing to write down). This is in comparison to the 1.1 billion or so they have written down.

The numbers and timing of current defaulted loans are PRE-BULGE of the distribution of ARM resets; throw in some creative accounting (Wachovia may not count the loan as in default on its books, but it seems to count it as a default on credit reports and court actions - dbl standard there) and fact of the matter is, the major banks have alot more to come.

Too many people are trying to dismiss the recession/bear market and say it’s over. FYI, the S&L crisis of the 80s took years to work out and it took the major banks about 6 quarters of heavy losses to swallow - and that was with partners who had balance sheets (albeit light ones) to help shoulder the load of holding bad paper on your bal. The current model, next to none of the major originators had any amount of capital worth mentioning in their capital structure.

In short, the banks have alot more write downs, the bulk is to come and is not behind us, and there is no one else to dump it on. Confidence is a key piece of the US banking system and I certainly understand the govt's and the exec's attempts to build it back up. But until they come clean, they will not have it. The losses will have to be written off eventually - else we really risk becoming like the Japanese during the 90s (big banks refusing to write off loans, govt bailouts, no growth and possibly even deflation, near zero interest rates, etc.)

Hmmm, kinda sounds like what we are doing now. ]]>