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12 Comments
Bill Gross: Politicking for His Own Bailout
In the short term, perhaps the hombuiders will rally as market participants believe that liquidity will return to the mortgage market. I would short any strength take your pick of names or use the XHB. The government simply won't have the capacity to reflate the market. All Paulson et. al. are trying to do here is to stabilize home prices. What will probably happen is that home prices will find a bottom but transaction volume will decline and inventories will remain high as the market won't clear due to a wide bid/ask spread and a general lack of creditworthy buyers. After a bailout, I doubt regulators will permit the wide range of "affordability products" to be offered again by banks. Banks will probably be weak too as they continue to be hobbled by a lack of capital and a trouble loan book. It will take some time for potential homebuyers to repair their balances to the point where they can afford 10% down on a Southern California or Northeastern U.S. home.
Asset prices (stocks, bonds, real estate) need to decline for equilibrium to be restored to the market. The government can't keep asset prices at their high water mark through manipulation of short term interest rates. The phantom wealth created by Greenspan is gone! Somebody had to lose the money, it is now just a process of realizing all those unrealized losses. The result will reveal itself in one of two forms, losses at financial institutions as debtors default or long term diminished capacity of debtors/average Americans to consume and invest either because they are debtors who have overpriced assets or they are investors who will never be able to realize the phantom gains. I don't think PIMCO will ever be able to monetize all of its overvalued bonds. Great paper profits and a nice bonus for Bill Gross as the government keeps rates low. Watch out when they lose control.
4 Tidbits from Third Avenue Value Fund's Q3 Letter
The Hedge Fund Hustle
If trading is so bad, why do we have markets that are open all day and night. Why not just have one price for all trades done on a given day? High frequency traders provide liquidity, to the venerable (sarcasm intended) long only managers, long term investors and all the other constituencies that claim to suffer from excessive trading and volatility. Buy and Hold Long only is a completely mediocore strategy. When you benchmark against annual returns of an index long only is fine. If you were to benchmark against some other measure of maximum potential return in the market, hypothetically say the absolute value of the whole years daily market changes, long only looks pathetic. Theorectically a trader could go long or short the S&P 500 (a popular benchmark) at the end of every day, analogous to betting red or black on roulette. The maximum return if you are right every day dwarfs anything produced by a long only manager. Oh and you can make money in an up market, a down market, and a flat market. The stock market isn't an odds based game like roulette where you can caluculate your expected return. There is information available which allows investors who gather and correctly analyze the information the opportunity to gain an advantage. Market participants who either don't gather the information or don't correctly analyze it and trade/invest accordingly get "fleeced" by those who do. You wouldn't gamble in a casino without knowing the rules of the game, it is no different in trading markets, just that the game is more complex.
No systematic risk comes from trading firms, whether they are hedge funds, prop desks, entering the public markets and providing liquidity. Systematic risk is introduced when someone decides to lend the traders and investors too much money, i.e. LTCM, the mortgage brokers, FNM, FRE etc. The biggest systematic risk in the market right now is derivatives trading. Which is why Bear was bailed out. The large banks seem to think that they should provide nearly limitless capital to investment funds to make bets in the CDS market. The banks and insurance companies also seem to think the counterparties in the CDS market have the creditworthiness to back all the CDS written. This is the same fallacy that lend to the problems with MBIA and Ambac et. al. That is the real potential problem.
Sears Faces Risk If Economy Doesn't Improve
Senator Schumer's Careless Remarks Result in IndyMac's Early Demise
Many Banks Will Eventually Fail
Who's to Blame for IndyMac's Failure?
A few key indicators of a general lack of soundeness. 1) Common stock trading at a significant discount to book value, less than 80%. In general, a declining stock price is an indicator of default. See work by Moodys-KMV 2) NPAs non-performing assets greater than 5%. High levels of NPAs are a good indication that the bank is either a poor underwriter or has taken undue risk with your money 3) lack of cash earnings. Neg-am and the use of interest reserves in construction lending may overstate real earnings, as the loans typically don't default until the neg-am reaches its maximum and the loan recasts.
Schumer was not wrong. The regulators who have been applying traditional measures of solvency to non-traditional loan products are completely at fault and completely incompetent. I have no doubt there will be many more seizures to come out of the Alt-A, option ARM and construction lending crowd. Wall St. recognized this a year ago. Too bad Schumer is just waking up now and the cost to the taxpayer goes up every day these banks are allowed to stay in business throwing good money after bad in the hopes of some miraculous recovery in the housing market. And no the run on the bank didn't kill IndyMac just hastened the inevitable failure.
5 Steps For Saving Fannie
The solution is to let them fail and end sudsidized loans for housing. But the politicians want to continue to give away money to buy votes. After all if you own a house, you are unlikely to move to another congressional district. Let them fail. Let the bond holders take a hiarcut. Unfortunately, I am sure our government willpay bondholders 100 cents on the dollar, but hopefully over 10 or 20 years in that perverse government accounting way that ignores the time value of money.
Back to the solution. The first American dream most people have is owning a car. Ford and GM found a way to finance that purchase without the government. I'm sure homebuilders and banks can find a solution (or commit thier own capital) without the assistance of Senators Schumer and Dodd and their misguided housing bill.
Countrywide: Potential Short Squeeze in the Offing
Downey's Aversion to Home Equity, Construction Lending: Key to Its Survival
Just a few comments on DSL. NPAs are over 13%. LTVs listed are at orgination, so the portfolio would have a much higher current LTV ratio if the V portion was marked to market. Therefore loss severity is poised to increase. Run some scenarios at different severity ratios and determine if the current provision for loan loss is adequate. If not, which I don't think it is, you need to make a reduction in book value. Provision probably needs to more than double to just to cover current NPAs, then make some provision for future deliquencies. There goes some more book value. Then there is the farce of negative amortization. Subtract that accumlated neg. am. interest of $375 million from book value (not to double count with the general provision for loan loss) put this in the specific loan provision bucket rather than the general provision. As soon as these loans recast to fully amortizing, the borrower who couldn't pay even the interest only portion certainly won't be able to cover interest plus amortization of principle. The company is never going to collect that inerest which has been added to book value through earnings. These two adjustments alone get you to a current mid twenties book value. Properly reserved then the book value is is the mid to high teens. Then apply a discount and maybe the stock looks cheap at $4. The problem is pretty soon you run out of regulatory capital and there goes the only "asset" the company has (the deposit base) as the FDIC gets another bank to take over the deposit liability. Finally if you really think this company could survive, look at the on going business, no bank is going to be able to originate exotic products for the foreseeable future so normalized origination volumes will never recover (forget about trough origination volumes). As the performing loans run off so will interest income decline so even if the company could survive a significant discount to book value would be warranted. Cramer missed the complete change in the business model of these formerly conservative lenders, which is why he hasn't said a word about them.
No Uptick Rule: A Convenient Scapegoat?
Regional Banks: Too Small to NOT Fail