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  • The China bull is out of the gate again [View news story]

    It's a bubble. They blow way the heck up, with no justification whatever, the bulls say "here is our story, it is so different this time", then they go splat. Same as ever. Just a little more so - old school crazy with full retail fanaticism and heartache by the end of it, due to masses of inexperienced players. Don't say you weren't warned.
    May 23, 2015. 11:37 AM | 3 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Strange Machinations [View article]
    Great Swami - not how I read it. Nobody fears not being repaid when they buy a German government bond. The rates just got crushed to near zero when people thought Greece would default and leave the Euro, and backed up when people thought they'd make the latest IMF payments and try to cut some sort of deal with the EU (again). Two reasons for the first part of that - because people expected short term turmoil and Bunds were a good place to hide, the instant that was expected to hit; and longer term because some people were (are) speculating that 10 years from now when they receive repayment, the currency the Germans are repaying in could be worth considerably more than a Euro. Because it might be a northern Euro by then, or weaker parts might have left the currency bloc, or similar.

    Currency speculative trading is about finding government guarantees of one kind or another that the market relies on and prices in as certain, that aren't actually certain. Then setting up "one way bets" that pay off large if those assumptions prove false, while the government guarantee prevents any loss if it doesn't wind up proving false. This can happen with currency pegs, or - the present case - with pairs of bonds issued by different governments in the same currency. Because sure they start in the same currency, but will they *end* in the same currency, years later when they mature? The issuing governments promise the bond buyers that the answer is "yes". But the issuing governments do not themselves know what they will actually be doing 5 or 10 years from now.

    So, case in point, a trader can go long a German bund and short say a Spanish one, of the same maturity, when the two are close in yield (both low). And on any doubt that the Spanish will stay in the Euro, the two will widen - and if they actually left it, the new Spanish currency would prove much, much weaker than the German one.

    When people are speculating on such things, the long side they all want to be in is the government issuer expected to be the strongest currency in the bloc if they ever broke up, or the least likely to leave the strongest side of whatever new groupings form. In Europe, that's German bunds. If anyone wants to take such a trade off, they have to sell their long side at the same time they cover their short on the other side - and the spreads spring back to closer together.

    All it was, in the most recent back up in yields, in my opinion...
    May 16, 2015. 10:19 AM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Strange Machinations [View article]

    The increase in rates recently started in German bunds and is entirely driven by the Greek crisis and speculation about its likely pending outcome. Not everything is about the US or a single latest GDP figure.
    May 15, 2015. 10:40 PM | 4 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • IMF Plays With Matches, Greece Gets Burned [View article]
    This is all tendentious nonsense, in my opinion. Yes the officials of Europe were most concerned with the rest of the world not losing a trillion dollars do Greek profligacy and stupidity. There is nothing even remotely out of line or ontoward about that objective. It is their actual mandate from their actual creators and the people and institutions they represent.

    The EU is not a charity. It does not deal with Greece on the principle that whatever is good for Greece, no matter what harm it does to the rest of the world, should be done. It deals with Greece at all only because Greek misbehavior created a danger to the legitimate interests of the rest of Europe. The Greeks willfully refusing to acknowledge this fact, their treating the rest of Europe as their own personal ATM, is the *entire* problem.

    If Greece ever paid any attention to the interests of Europeans outside Greece, this would all have been resolved long ago. They do not. They demand, they blame the rest of the world for caring about the interests of the rest of the world, instead of the interests of the Greeks, and pontificate about it to Greek voters and the press. Counting on reactions like this one, from others who have their own independent reasons for throwing brickbats at the same institutions. Which is nothing but empty demagoguery.

    The IMF and the EU look to the interests of the IMF and the EU because that is their actual mandate. Legitimately so. If they put the interests of others higher, their creators would be entirely justified in abolishing them as harmful to their own interests. The "real solution" for Europe is to prevent the failures of Greece from causing material financial harm to the rest of Europe. As for solutions for Greece, the Greeks are welcome to look after that as best they can. If they want any help with it, they had better offer something. Besides endless abuse.
    May 12, 2015. 12:24 PM | 6 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Greece Wrestles With Itself [View article]
    "600 cleaning women in Varoufakis' finance ministry"

    They can cart off as nothing but trash all the fake drachmas lying around, and then dust the unused offices where austerity and competitiveness might have been planned. Seriously - hiring 600 people to clean finance ministry offices? That's their fiscal stimulus plan? That's what they want the rest of the world to support them defaulting on their sovereign debt to sustain?
    May 7, 2015. 06:11 PM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Why Are Interest Rates So Low, Part 4: Term Premiums [View article]
    "What was different this time is the fed came in and bailed out the bondholders at the expense of the taxpayer"

    Authorities intervene to support markets in the smash in every financial crisis, over the last 400 years and in every country and under every monetary regime. (See Charles Kindleberger for chapter and verse). As for "at the expense of the taxpayer", the US Treasury profited on its support actions in the crisis to the tune of $500 billion - so much for "expense".
    May 7, 2015. 11:06 AM | 4 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    "YOU define M1 and MZM as income velocity whereas I DID NOT"

    You printed charts that are mechanically the level of GDP divided by the M1 money stock and the MZM money stock respectively. That is an income velocity. That is what those charts are showing, what they are of. That you do not understand what they are or how they were created is not my problem. And no, they do not show how fast money is changing hands. They show GDP as a flow of money per unit time divided by a stock of money in existence as each of those time periods, producing a time series with the units of 1 over time.

    How fast money is actually changing hands, on the other hand, is what the FedWire series I posted actually shows. Granted, only those transactions cleared by FedWire, but since that is almost all transactions by volume (40 to 50 time GDP, for example), yes that shows how fast money is actually changing hands. And the income velocity series you posted have nothing to do with that. It is precisely your confusion (or perhaps, blurring for the reception of others) between these concepts that has required my string of posts to set the matter straight.

    Next you try to claim both that you are not of the crowd getting the fundamental call on inflation wrong, and then in the very next breath that "inflation is anything but tame". There is. No. Inflation. Grok please. Inflation has not been a serious economic problem in the United States since the early 1980s. At worst, we have had brief periods since when it hit 4% a year late in cycles, and it has persistently run 2-3% a year, falling over that entire stretch. Inflation in the last 10 years was lower than it was in the 10 before. It was lower in that 10 than in the 10 before that. We have had persistent, ongoing reductions in the rate of inflation, to very modest levels - barely detectable levels, even.

    And yes, we all understand that half the financial world predicted high inflation as a result of Fed policies since the 2008 crisis. Loudly, we heard you and them the first 1000 times. But everyone screaming so has been and remains utterly and completely wrong. Precisely this, is the reason we are even having this discussion - because all rational men can see this by now, but people stuck on their busted predictions from half a dozen years ago will not learn and digest it and move on.
    May 3, 2015. 08:46 PM | 5 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    Inflation is a fall in the exchange value of money. Not a change in the relative price of certain categories of assets, like stocks or long dated financial claims generally. The massive increase in the money supply has not resulted in inordinate price increases. Full stop. How it is calculated has nothing to do with it, and spin cannot save the miss, for all those who predicted that said increase in the (narrow) money supply must and would result in inordinate price increases. They were simply wrong. They were wrong because their theories are false. And they will say anything to avoid facing that patent fact.
    May 3, 2015. 08:36 PM | 5 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    "No one’s ever talked about Fed-wire transactions and gDp but you"

    People talk about "velocity" all the time, and they then talk about transactions, and they and their listeners assume that velocity means what the term was originally imagined as, an actual average turnover of money. They generally do not know that velocity in a monetary context typically has nothing to do with transactions whatsoever, and that there is no such common sense explanation or understanding behind it.

    It becomes necessary to point this out whenever we get speculation about how transactions, increasing or decreasing, are affecting this or that. In the case of the original article, supposedly affecting "velocity". Well, they aren't affecting velocity, in that way or any other. Transactions rise and fall for their own reasons - up sharply relative to GDP in the 2008 period, then down sharply to 2012, then up sharply again through mid 2014 e.g. - without leaving any equivalent casual imprint on any of - GDP, the price level, or "velocity".

    It is quite important that people understand just how vacuous and tautological all talk of "velocity" is, in a monetary economics context. That it has no mechanical interpretation; that it is not saying anything nor reflecting anything about the actual volume of financial system turnover; that all speculation about a supposedly separate "circulation" within the financial system only, and any supposed effects of that on other macro variables, is so much utter rot pulled out of the speaker's hat, with no factual basis whatever.

    If we were not entertained with such imaginings it would not be necessary to point this out. We could leave "income velocity" as the pure fudge factor, tautology accounting entry that it is and always has been. Whenever anyone tries to connect it to anything causal, mechanical, observable, or real, on the other hand (i.e. when they try to connect it to "transactions"), it is necessary to point out that those claims are false and no such relations exist.
    May 3, 2015. 08:34 PM | 5 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • This Is Why You Are Diversifying Wrong [View article]
    giorgiolb- pardon, but the other fellow only specified there are two stocks, he never said that is all there is or that there isn't also money or other assets etc. I understood him fine, and there isn't anything impossible in his idealized scenario.
    May 3, 2015. 08:24 PM | 3 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    Latest comment - "I never claimed an impact on income velocity."

    Original article - "...demonstrating a reverse velocity relationship with the rise in type (2) transactions." - right next to a chart of the income velocity of M1 and MZM.

    Black and white contradiction.

    "income + or - is a byproduct of most transactions"

    Completely false. Most transactions do not result in an income. That is kind of why transactions are 50 times the scale of actual income. Income is produced when the total value of all the items that exist after the transaction, in the hands of their new owners and at prices they willingly paid to own them, exceeds the total value of all the same items as they existed before the transaction, in the hands of their previous owners.

    What is produced by transactions is a cash flow. If the items traded are valued equally, a cash flow produces no income.

    Some not very rigorous economists, generations ago, when good observation of all of these things was hard, adopted a simplified view of what they thought of as a vertical chain of production. From raw material extraction through manufacturing and transportation to retail trade into final consumption, they saw value being added along that path. They knew they could not accurately track all of the increases in value of each of the items being traded through that whole path, and they sought to simplify their problem. They thought of the final sales coming out the consumer end, and the zero or near zero value they supposed lay at the origin of the path. And they figured they could just put the amount paid at the end for the value added throughout the entire chain. That final selling price would reflect only some income to the retailer - who had to pay for the finished goods he sold. But they figured that whatever wasn't income to him would be income to a higher tier manufacturer or transporter or raw materials outfit, until all of it was accounted for without remainder.

    They still have the problem that total of *transactions* through that path is not the final sales bit, and varies depending on the number of links along the way, and how many of those links take the form of arms-length transactions cleared by money payment, compared to the number occurring inside vertically integrated firms. But they figured that average path length would probably remain fairly stable or change only slowly, with large changes in business organization or significant changes in production technology and the like.

    This then suggested to them two distinct ways to measure value added. One, rigorously exclude everything but final consumer sales to avoid double counting. Two, add up all money payments but divide by some (at first unknown) typical path length. The problem with the first method is that it ignores important business expansion effects and activities above the final stage of consumer demand, only registering their impact later when consumer sales are affected. Also, there isn't truly any clear line between a final sale and one that isn't final. The problem with the second was first, to estimate the path length reasonably accurately, and then that it could and did change, independent of changes in income.

    All of those notions arose before we had the better accounting systems for these things, and the superior economic understanding, that we have today. They led too many economist in the period from the end of the 19th century to about the middle of the 20th, to conflate sales with income and both with transactions. Sure the transaction isn't income to the parties immediately involved, was the thinking, but it was income to someone higher up an imagined chain of production terminating in raw materials of zero or near zero exchange value.

    They had another motive. They wanted to apply various accounting identities to macroeconomic reasoning - payments equaling receipts and so forth. And those identities apply to transactions, as cash flows. They do not apply to incomes as changes in value of the items traded, nor to changes in balance sheet values independent of any transactions ever taking place.

    The problem, then, is that this idealization is completely false. Cash flows not being incomes and even incomes traced through transactions not being the only cause of changes in wealth, we cannot tell what is happening to a society's wealth or to its income by staring at measures of its transactions forever. A stock investor could not tell the results of a company's operations for the shareholders with only that company's cash flow statement. He needs all three sheets (and for the company accountants to use them all correctly and report everything honestly etc).

    And economist cannot tell what is happening in the economy just by looking at transactions, either. We have elaborate procedures to determine GDP precisely because we must separate out the true value added from the economic activity occurring in a given window of time, from all of the other transactions that do not create income, that also occur in that period of time.

    While some economists (mostly Keynesians) were having those issues, another set (early monetarists, notably Fisher) were trying to understand the activity of the economy by engineering analogies. Just as engineers must distinguish stocks and flows and changes in rates, economists must distinguish between wealth and income and growth rates - that was the underlying thought. So he (and his school) sought to borrow terms from engineering, and to apply the same sorts of "units analysis" common in that field, to economics. This is the proximate origin of the term "velocity" and the attempt to describe monetary economics using it.

    Fisher thought there was some basically fixed gearing between the stock of money and the transactions it could clear, and between those cleared transactions and national income. He expected nominal income to move one to one with the quantity of money, as a result. He recognized that only part of that would reflect actual change in real income - and deduced that the rest would be reflected in changes in the average price level. In his own later terms, he began with the assumption that velocity would be a constant.

    When it wasn't - which he quickly noticed with the index number techniques he pioneered - he immunized his previous predictions against any possible future falsification by evidence, using the "velocity" concept. Whenever the money stock and nominal income do *not* move together, he said, it means "velocity" has changed. (The reality is they simply don't move together and velocity is always changing - mathematically equivalent statements, the former with real content and the latter obscuring that content).

    In the current period, since the 2008 financial crisis, what we have seen is a large increase in the stock of narrow money, a modest increase in real incomes throughout a slow recovery, and practically no change in the price level (very slow rate of inflation). Many monetarists, and their populist epigones in the financial press and in politics, predicted instead a rapidly rising price level in response to the enlarged money supply. They were hopelessly and completely wrong in that concrete prediction. At bottom, the reason they were wrong is that their entire theory is false. It does not understand monetary economics. It is a gross simplification that stems from mistaking one factor influencing the exchange value of money - its supply - with everything determining it, and much else besides. It puts far too much emphasis on the quantity of money and not nearly enough on everything else.

    This miss creates a burning need among the partisans of that view, in all its different flavors, and at every level of sophistication from professional economist to market pundit to populist Fed-basher or hawker of gold coins. That burning needs is - find something, anything, to explain why we got the call hopelessly wrong, without admitting that our theory is busted. If the explanation can be tied however tenuously to any hint of malfeasance or manipulation or anything that our populist audiences are predisposed to fear or to hate, so much the better. Preferably something slightly more believable than a hidden conspiracy of lizard men from alien stars supposedly manipulating international finance.

    Which gives us articles like this one. All the money "should" have goosed the nominal economy, and prices would soon have followed, if it weren't for that dastardly Wall Street and those dastardly bankers with their speculation and derivatives. The money that was supposed to cause inflation and make the nominal price of my gold coins go up, has instead just circulated around financial markets, goosed stock prices, and helped the lizard men pile up bigger piles of racing ticket stubs on side bets and stuff. This is then dressed up in the confused language of past pseudoscience as "increasing financial transactions caused a drop in velocity".

    But we can see the transactions series. It increases in 2008 before the financial crisis gets going, and stays elevated through its heights. Then in craters, it isn't increasing. Transactions to GDP falls from 52.5 down to 37, into 2012, with the money supply much larger but no sign of inflation whatsoever. Then, from mid 2012 to mid 2014, transactions soar again, back to 50 times GDP. The Fed is completing and then *ending* its QEs - there is tons of narrow money, but its rate of change drops off at the end of that period. Transactions to GDP remain high.

    Meanwhile, over on the actual measured income velocity chart - spurious as any connection between it and transactions actually is - it collapses much sooner and keeps going down. Which is just a mathematical way of recording the fact that the (narrow, especially) money supply was increasing strongly while GDP was sluggish.

    Why didn't my gold go up? That is what they are actually asking. And the actual answer is simply this - because the demand for money increased before the Fed added the new supply. That supply was actually wanted, and therefore it was readily absorbed at basically unchanged values for each unit of that money. The real value of the whole money supply has increased by trillions. A significantly larger portion of the whole wealth of the country is today held in money form, than before the financial crisis (when a lot of it was instead in dodgy bonds and asset backed commercial paper and such, that evaporated on the crisis).

    Yes the supply of money increased. But the value of money did not decrease as a result. The reason why is simple - the value of money is the result of 2 forces not one, and demand moves as much as supply does. The safety demand for money is much higher after the experience of 2008-2009 than it was before that event. The Fed was adding money for a reason, not in a vacuum. It was paying attention to the actual price level and could see that the amount it was adding was not crashing the value of each dollar. In short, it knew what it was doing, and its bashers did not and do not understand *any of this* a tenth as well as they think they do.

    So when someone comes along and tells you that financial transactions increasing has lowered velocity and that is why the Fed's supposedly ruinous inflationary policy hasn't resulted in the long awaited inflation, don't believe a word of it. Don't believe their cries of "soon, soon". Don't accept their excuses and their hand waving. Demand to see the measure of the transactions they say are increasing - and do not accept a chart of the SP500 as "proof" that they have done so. Demand actual reasoning on the supposed casual link between that entirely alleged change and its supposed consequence.

    Think it through for yourself, and ask, is it even plausible on its face that "increasing transactions caused a drop in velocity"? Ask yourself, what possible real content could the notion "velocity" actually have, if that statement were true?

    Here is what you should be looking for, instead, from anyone from that whole camp of investment pundits or commentators. "Hey, I predicted high inflation from the Fed's actions, and there isn't any. I was flat wrong. I really need to go to school again and find out why, how I missed so important a signal. Is there anyone around here who got that call right, saw the balance of factors completely and accurately, and knew that the Fed's easy money policy was not dangerous and would work and wouldn't crash the dollar or cause high inflation? What did they know ahead of time that I missed? Where can I learn the right framework to get these calls correct the next time?" That would be the honest and appropriate reaction to getting the call on inflation wrong, not dodgy talk of separate financial circulation and "velocity" and handwaving.

    Don't hold your breath.
    May 2, 2015. 03:19 PM | 6 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    "these transactions are useless as a proxy for GDP, income or inflation."

    Indeed, precisely because they actually are *transactions*, and transactions are not income etc. You can plainly see in the series at my link that there are large upticks in total transactions from the recession lows through 2012 - and one can also see large increases from the pre-recession levels to the late 2008 and early 2009 financial crisis, which saw large increases in specifically financial transaction volumes. But those transaction volumes were not associated with GDP changes etc.

    Since your article directly made claims about a supposed relationship between financial transactions and a monetary velocity, it is rather important that (1) nothing in your original was actually about transactions, whereas the data I cite actually is about those transactions and (2) those transactions don't have anything directly to do with GDP, and therefore they also don't have anything directly to do with "income velocity". Since your article was making a claim about a supposed impact of financial circulation on that velocity - and there isn't any, and they all have nothing to do with each other - that is kind of an important omission.

    And no, as a purely factual matter, it is untrue that SA editors have removed any of my comments.

    As for what we actually learn from the plain empirical fact that we can measure transactions, and we can measure income, and we can measure monetary aggregates, and we can measure the price level - and that we see all are quite independent and each varies in is own ways that differ from each of the others - what that tells us is that transactions volumes do not cause changes in the price level, and transactions are not incomes, and changes in incomes are not caused by changes in the money supply, etc, right round the entire cartesian product of these separate measures. They are fundamentally different things and they are not casually linked with any stable "gearing", according to any necessity, economic or mechanical, theoretical or empirical.

    Those who understand each, empirically and theoretically, carefully distinguish among them. Those who do not write flip and inaccurate things like "increasing transactions have caused a fall in velocity" and think it tells us something meaningful.

    You are certainly free to hypothesize about relationships between actual transactions and any of the other items. But when they aren't there, and when you haven't even noticed that they aren't there, and when the reason you haven't is that you haven't even seen actual transactions and need to have the data pointed out to you - then it becomes necessary for your readers to provide the context and corrections that will enable other SA readers to understand how basely your claims based on such evidence or reasoning, actually are.

    I hope this helps.
    May 1, 2015. 07:29 PM | 5 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    Salmo - show me GDP in this data.

    You can't. It is actual transactions - not a transactions based GDP measure, but the actual transactions (most of them), and it moves quite independent of GDP, while also completely dwarfing GDP in scale. Did GDP jump 17.5% in March 2015? It did not. Is GDP $74.6 trillion per month? It is not. Transactions are not income.
    May 1, 2015. 10:54 AM | 4 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Exxon's Q1 beats expectations, buoyed by refining [View news story]
    Trikes is right. The beat is marginal vs expectations of getting crushed. They did get crushed, they just did a decent job weathering it. Revenue down 37% year over year and exploration and production net income off 63% year over year shows that huge price moves against them will slash their earnings. Higher refining income softened the blow, but the gain there was only a fifth the size of the loss on the upstream E&P results. There are two real stories here - (1) lower prices will smash their top and bottom lines both and have done so, (2) they executed well in the face of that, cutting their costs by a third. (2) is about as good as one could expect from a major integrated oil in a horrible environment, but it doesn't change that environment.
    Apr 30, 2015. 02:40 PM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • The Transactional Velocity Effect Of Speculation And Financialism [View article]
    Tack - yes velocity is useless. It is actually worse than useless (aka pernicious, of negative utility), in that it hides a fundamental "miss" in common monetary theories, and smuggles off into implicit assumptions about a tautology everything those theories are trying to say about the demand for money, and then get wrong.

    But even worse, you write the version with T for transactions, and transactions are not what monetary velocities reported are actually calculated from. They are calculated from incomes, and incomes are not transactions. The economists involved do distinguish between "transactions velocity" and "income velocity", and we can even measure the former. But it is 40 to 50 times the scale of income, and moves in its own ways for its own reasons, so they all actually use income velocity instead. Income velocity, though, is the pure tautology version with no mechanical interpretation whatever. Still people chart it and refer to it, and then give us articles like this one, in which they speculate about transactions (financial system ones, at that) and their relation to "velocity", when those transactions have no direct relationship even to the income that is the actual numerator of the time series they are plotting divided by the monetary aggregates.

    The whole thing is the worst possible morass of pseudoscience and insulating a failed theory against empirical falsification, a welter of confusion and sloppy thinking, devoid of economic principle. Hiding in a pretense of mechanical analogy and pretended definitional rigor, which is entirely specious, and exists only to sever contact with reality on the one hand, and the main body of economic theory on the other.

    Money is a good, it has a demand, that demand is just as essential to the determination of its exchange value as demand is for any other good, the supply of money alone does not determine its exchange value, therefore changes in its supply do not determine changes in its exchange value all by their lonesome, the demand for money is not a constant. Those are the sound economic statements in the matter, and they amount to saying that of course "income velocity" can change, because it is merely a mathematical way of recording the patent theoretical and empirical fact that the exchange value of money is not controlled by the supply of money, alone.

    In which, transactions have precisely nothing to do with it. The value of money is a function of the demand for it, and the demand for money is not transactions, or measured by transactions, or solely due to transactions. The demand for money is the willingness to part with other valuable goods in order to obtain and to hold money. It is a subjective marginal preference like all other demand for any scarce good. It has no purely mechanical interpretation, in terms of flows, that is technically required or stable in any sense. As soon as this is recognized, all talk of velocity falls to the ground.

    We can still retain the core truths of monetarist economics, that the first partial of the value of money moves with the change in the quantity of money, just as the price of anything moves with its supply. Just - not *only* with its supply. All other things are not always equal, and there is another dimension just as important as the supply, with its own first partial effect on the value of money - the demand for money.

    That puts monetary economics right back where it belongs, within ordinary economics of anything of value. And reveals the excessive focus on the supply of money only, as supposedly determining this that or the other, as a clear falsehood and simple mistake. Virtually every economic or financial measure is the resultant of multiple force and dimensions of variation. Isolating only one of them and pretending that it causes the others is purely myopic and is just wrong.
    Apr 30, 2015. 02:17 PM | 7 Likes Like |Link to Comment