Solid article. Before my trading I was a full time real estate appraiser (for approx 20 years) and I saw SO much stupid inflation of homes where people were refinancing every 10 months. They were using their homes as an ATM machine. It will take much more time to work through the excess.
Barron's Interview: Six Winners No Matter Where We Go From Here [View article]
This is a good article and odds are the upside is larger than the downside. This is more for the previous comment (mr Ponzi) - your post which illuminates your thinking to me is a solid contrarian indicator. The more people out there who think like you, the better prospects for the market.
The ~0% average return for hedge funds return for the first 6 months of 2008 should be considered pretty darn good, considering what the market has done. IMO, RELATIVE performance is what matters, not ABSOLUTE.
Is the Structural Bear Market Nearing Its End? [View article]
My guess is the market bottom will be in 2008, perhaps even in the rear view mirror. Support for this positions rests on the idea that even though consumers have been beaten down, the SP500 companies balance sheets are quite strong (excluding financials), and earnings aren't that bad. Other support comes from the extreme bearishness present on the street. A great contrary indicator.
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Been a fan of WB for a little while. Grown to appreciate his way of thinking. I was kinda the opposite back in 1999 when investing in say Commerce One. As a slightly humourous aside, my buddy sent me a fake email just yesterday. I didn't know it was fake because he did a pretty good job of disguising himself. Later in morning I called him up and said "You'll NEVER guess who emailed me." To which he replied "Warren Buffett?" I am still laughing about it.
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In agreement with Tom here. By the time the "all clear" is announced you will have missed a 30% move. Banks right now are like insurance companies during a disaster. Historically, it's been a good bet to go long insurance companies during a disaster because the increase in future premiums collected will more than make up for the disaster cost. Borrowers, from now on, will be paying through the nose compared to lending rates of 2 years ago. And do you think banks are making any risky loans right now?
Remember, the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. Funny 3com is mentioned as perhaps the most textbook case of irrational pricing. On March 2, 2000, 3Com sold 5 percent of its stake in Palm to the public through an IPO for Palm. Pending IRS approval, 3Com planned to spin off its remaining shares of Palm to 3Com's shareholders before the end of the year. 3Com shareholders would receive about 1.5 shares of Palm for every share of 3Com that they owned, thus the price of 3Com should have been 1.5 times that of Palm. Investors could therefore buy shares of Palm directly or by buying shares embedded within shares of 3Com. Given 3Com's other profitable business assets, it was expected that 3Com's price would also be well above 1.5 times that of Palm.
The day before the Palm IPO, the price of 3Com closed at $104.13 per share. After the first day of trading, Palm closed at $95.06 per share, implying that the price of 3Com should have jumped to at least $145. Instead, 3Com fell to $81.81.
The day after the IPO, the mispricing of Palm was noted by the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. The nature of the mispricing was easy to see, yet it persisted for months.
In cases of equity carve-outs, a negative "stub value" indicates an extreme case of mispricing. The stub value represents the implied stand-alone value of the parent company's assets without the subsidiary, a projection of what the company will be worth after it distributes these shares.
In the case of Palm and 3Com, after the first day of trading, the stub value of 3Com, representing all non-Palm assets and businesses, was estimated to be negative $63, a total of negative $22 billion. Since stock prices can never fall below zero, a negative stub value is highly unusual.
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On March 2, 2000, 3Com sold 5 percent of its stake in Palm to the public through an IPO for Palm. Pending IRS approval, 3Com planned to spin off its remaining shares of Palm to 3Com's shareholders before the end of the year. 3Com shareholders would receive about 1.5 shares of Palm for every share of 3Com that they owned, thus the price of 3Com should have been 1.5 times that of Palm. Investors could therefore buy shares of Palm directly or by buying shares embedded within shares of 3Com. Given 3Com's other profitable business assets, it was expected that 3Com's price would also be well above 1.5 times that of Palm.
The day before the Palm IPO, the price of 3Com closed at $104.13 per share. After the first day of trading, Palm closed at $95.06 per share, implying that the price of 3Com should have jumped to at least $145. Instead, 3Com fell to $81.81.
The day after the IPO, the mispricing of Palm was noted by the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. The nature of the mispricing was easy to see, yet it persisted for months.
In cases of equity carve-outs, a negative "stub value" indicates an extreme case of mispricing. The stub value represents the implied stand-alone value of the parent company's assets without the subsidiary, a projection of what the company will be worth after it distributes these shares.
In the case of Palm and 3Com, after the first day of trading, the stub value of 3Com, representing all non-Palm assets and businesses, was estimated to be negative $63, a total of negative $22 billion. Since stock prices can never fall below zero, a negative stub value is highly unusual.