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  • Apple (AAPL +3.2%) is reportedly offering $17B in its bond sale, making it the largest U.S. corporate debt deal ever. Bloomberg reports $5.5B in 10-year debt will be sold at just a 75bps premium to 10-year Treasury yields (currently at 1.68%). (previous: I, II) Update (3:47): The deal is official. Reuters: "The company is offering $1 billion of three-year floating-rate notes, $1.5 billion of three-year fixed-rate notes, $2 billion of five-year floating-rate notes, $4 billion of five-year fixed-rate notes, $5.5 billion of 10-year fixed-rate notes and $3 billion of 30-year fixed-rate notes." [View news story]
    repurchases of stock by issuers must be pursuant to Section 10(b)-18 limitations that limit the volume (no more than 25% of the Avearage Daily Trading Volume for past 4 weeks) that can be repurchased daily and otehr restrictions regarding purchase on "downticks" (or "upticks" I forget). Also have to be through one broker and can't buy at the open or last 10 minutes before the close. Highly prescribed so in general just buying as part of the "flow" of the market.
    May 1, 2013. 11:27 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • Apple (AAPL +3.2%) is reportedly offering $17B in its bond sale, making it the largest U.S. corporate debt deal ever. Bloomberg reports $5.5B in 10-year debt will be sold at just a 75bps premium to 10-year Treasury yields (currently at 1.68%). (previous: I, II) Update (3:47): The deal is official. Reuters: "The company is offering $1 billion of three-year floating-rate notes, $1.5 billion of three-year fixed-rate notes, $2 billion of five-year floating-rate notes, $4 billion of five-year fixed-rate notes, $5.5 billion of 10-year fixed-rate notes and $3 billion of 30-year fixed-rate notes." [View news story]
    this is a variation of Einhorn's "borrow to fund" -- only difference is using tax deductible debt instruments rather than perpetual preferred stock. use of proceeds, however rather than a ratable distribution, is instead used to claw back shares at attractive prices in order to accrete share value tax efficiently for those who dont want to sell. Glad that Einhorn was a protagonist/catalyst for more thoughtful captial allocation strategy by the company.
    Apr 30, 2013. 02:26 PM | 10 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Apple's Thinning Retail Margins Remain A Hurdle [View article]
    retail stores are a form of advertising as "brand ambassador" for the brand. Samsung trying to copy same with leveraging BestBuy's footprint but anyone that's gone to a BestBuy and its cluttered merchandising knows that is not going to create the same brand halo that Apple's stores do. I've gone into the Microsoft stores and its seems like it just tries too hard to copy Apple, but without the design panache that Apple exudes. The only thing fun about the Microsoft stores is that generally there are lots of teenagers playing the X-Box,...but then that sort of detracts from the buying experience (of course there wasn't much being bought or sold from the 3 times that I visited the Microsoft store --including at peak holiday season). Lookng at Apple retail store % margins is misguided -- that is incremental margin that other manufacturers give away to distribution, whereas Apple is capturing that incremental margin and concurrently promoting the Apple family of products for online store pull-through.
    Apr 30, 2013. 02:20 PM | 4 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Which Stock Would You Rather Own? [View article]
    Why does the stock of NFLX, or AMZN, or HLF, or any other company's stock have ANY relevance to BBRY's stock? It's good that you dont understand NFLX so hopefully you are neither long nor short. But your thoughts on NFLX, which someone may find trite for its lack of insight, may actually take away from your assessment of and your thoughts on BBRY. I am not sure how one stock trades is of any relevance to another. Both are in competitive businesses but with very different challenges. If the point is that if BBRY becomes successful to dominate its category and creates significant barriers to entry then its stock too can skyrocket to the moon (and may overshoot its fundamentals at any moment) and that you believe BBRY has all the ingredients in place to avoid the fate of Palm, Commodore, SEGA, Atari, or Handspring.

    By the way I am long BBRY (only a nibble recently) because I agree with you that it has the attributes to avoid the outcomes of some of those other dearly departed, and because I see the stock as a levered option on only modest success given the cushion allowed by the recurring licensing income, even though declining, that BBRY enjoys from its BES platform. However, your comparison of the two took away from any thoughtful assessment you may contribute to the BBRY investment thesis, only IMO.
    Apr 28, 2013. 09:29 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • What Happens When There Is No Content For Netflix To License? [View article]
    Actually cable is a distributor of Netflix because cable operators are the providers of the broadband pipe, and Netflix is the single highest use case for upgrading to high speed broadband (and differentiating versus DSL). If Netflix actually drags in an up-charge for faster pipe that the cable guys are selling, that's far higher margin (90%+) to the cable guys than what they are getting as MVPD video distributor (~30% margin). The cable guys are actively promoting Netflix as the "killer app" for cable industry's better broadband product -- check out the super bowl ad by Time-Warner Cable that ends with ENJOY Netflix BETTER ...!

    The cable guys aren't worried about chord cutting (only newspaper reporters and bloggers are) and the cable industry will ultimately enbrace and become paid distributors and billing agents for Netflix programming network. Netflix doesn't compete against cable; Netflix is a subscription programming/curation network that competes against pay cable subscription services such as Showtime, Starz, Encore, and HBO (albeit without the late night fare of all those programming neteworks).

    ESPN is as worried about Netflix as it would any of the other pay cable subscription services -- actually HBO and Showtime have more sports content (boxing, UFC, sport-stalk) than Netflix does (which is "none" other that Rudy, Hoosiers, and The Replacements movies).

    I predict that you will see someone: maybe Charter, Cox, Brighthouse, or even TWC become a distributor of Netflix product (and get rev share as it is already the current case with Apple TV, which is like a virtual MVPD) within the next 18 months as just another premium pay network to ride on the cable operator's high margin fat pipe.

    I will agree with you that it's not rocket science and also people did discover eve nbefore rockets that the Earth wasn't flat.
    Apr 23, 2013. 04:45 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • What Happens When There Is No Content For Netflix To License? [View article]
    Well you are sadly mistaken if you think the Disney studio chief cares what his colleague at ESPN gets from his affiliate fees because it is not in the studio chief's budget. And you have no clue to even consider why ESPN, which is anchored around a linear product that is largely live broadcast content would have any relevance to the studio pay cable 1 monetization. Whethere the output deal appears on Starz, Showtime, or Netflix has no bearing on ESPN's product unless you are suggesting that ESPN-7 will be a new movie premium pay network?

    Similarly the ABC broadcast network has a different agenda relative to his first-run product and is the business unit responsible for Hulu. ESPN itself is trying to bypass the MVPD's. Disney does not care about the cable operators, Time-Warner doenst care about the cable operators (since it spun off TWC), Fox doesn't care about the cable operators, Viacom doesn't care about the cable operators, CBS doesn't care about the cable operators, maybe Comcast's cable unit cares about the MVPD biz but NBC Universal is running its business as best it can to maximize returns to the networks, studios, and its programming channels. Every single one of them sells content to digital delivery platforms -- they do that because that's where the audience is. The CW (CBS and TWX) was breakeven until its licensing deal with Netflix. Each of the televiison production studios are competing to be the produciton venue for Netflix's shows just like they do today to produce shows that may or may not broadcast on their own sister programming networks.

    You are sadly mistaken if you think Disney's CFO actually thinks that ESPN competes with Netflix or Hulu -- and further mistaken if you dont think that same CFO is not trying to figure out every single day how to recoup the margin leak that is being stripped by the MVPDs. And believe me the MVPD's hate ESPN the most because they have the least leverage against ESPN's aggressive tactics to extract value for its content (on the backs of the MVPD's margin in the cable operators view). Basically you can't get clear the difference between distributors (MVPD's, networks, theaters, EST, or physical media retailers) and content producers (studios, programmers, production houses).

    Of all the top media conglomerates, only one is long MVPD and that is Comcast, and the whole point of the Comcast-NBC Universal deal was for Comcast shareholders (I am one) to diversify away cash flow stream from distribution business. Fox sold DirecTV and Time-Warner spun off Time-Warner Cable. Get the picture yet. The next time you sit down for breakfast with Jay, ask him how's he looking forward to that $300MM a year in licensing revenue - twice what Starz could afford to pay. He'll even pick up the tab probably.
    Apr 23, 2013. 03:45 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • What Happens When There Is No Content For Netflix To License? [View article]
    OMG, just where the movie theatrical distribution business would be if the studio stopped selling them their content product......

    ....but then how does the studio sell its movies?

    content, distribution, content, distribution, content, distribution, lets see who has the leverage -- maybe they both cant live without the other.

    you confuse the content owner's interest as alligned with that of the MVPD's in perpetuity. Each of Disney's ESPN via Watch ESPN, and Time -Warner's HBO via HBO Go are attempting to find alternatives to the gatekeeper role (and huge reveneu leakage) that cable operators currently extract. Disney went with Netflix rather than Starz for a longterm exclusive (probably until 2021 at minimum) during pay cable 1 window because it believed that Netflix was the best way to monetize its studio content. Similalry it chose to have an additional venue for its children's library product despite Disney having its own Disney Channel streaming service (but the latter was constrained by authentification requirements with MVPDs) because it wanted the broadest audience for its children content, both to monetize its distribution value, and to maximize the visibility of its various character franchises that are otherwise monetized (in Disney stores, via licensing, on broadway etc). This is in spite of the fact that Disney is part owner of Hulu while it owns zero ownership in Netflix.

    The point is that content owners will seek the most appropriate distribution that best support their strategies and what they feel will best monetize their assets -- for some, this would involve a partnership with Netflix either exclusively or on non-exclusive basis, depending upon the nature of the content.

    So the scenario that you paint of the content owners starving Netflix distribution in favor of protecting the MVPD's who they believe are arrogant monopoly gatekeepers who live off of the backs of the content owners is in a word, laughable. Streaming licensing revenues is what is making these guys' budgets and they will become increasingly addicted to that revenue stream. Like bees to honey or whores to money, the content owners will gravitate to distribution that makes money for them. End of story. If there is another venue with a bigger audience that can monetize better, than the hell with Netflix BUT until that happens, Netflix is becoming the dominant venue, and the leverage is shifting to distribution as there is no viable altrenative right now that can monetize certain content better than Netflix. You mainly think that distribution is commoditized. That window is clsoign or already closed, or rather the cost of entry is rapidly going higher. Where does a new SVOD get it s content? all themajor studios are locked up for long-term exclusives through 2018-2020 except Universal whose current deal with HBO doesnt expeir until 2016. Most of back seasons of serialized drama is now spoken for until 2015-2016 time frame. so the only point of entry is back catalog non-excluisve junk, unless you try to participate in the pay-per-view window, but that is non-exclusive distribution and only available on an agency model. So teh moat is getting wider dude.
    Apr 23, 2013. 09:55 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Not So Fast With The Countrywide Settlement [View article]
    In your prior post as well as others referencing Mark Palmer (BTIG analyst who is excellent advocate for MBIA long position) often equate the rep and warranty issue on BAC's private label exposure as identical to that beign adjudicated in MBIA and others. It is important to note that MBIA, and Assured and Syncora's judgements from Crotty and Rakof that favored the monolines were based upon the application of Insurance Law, and therefore while the issues are analogous, they are not necessarily identical between the private-label and monline put-back litigation.

    I frankly see the case for BAC's position on reps and warranties as being better in the private-label case, but nevertheless its ability to consummate the $8.5B settlement is largely dependent upon the Aritcle 77 review whether BNY as trustee acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in agreeing to the settlement on the trusts' behalf. The legal standard governing the trustee's action on behalf of the trusts' beneficiaries is untested -- I frankly question the trustees ability to take action if it were NOT requested to act by the minimum 25% of holders that govern all those truste indentures.

    However, where BAC is really playing with fire is to let Branston judge under New York law on "de facto merger" whether there is successor liability that would pierce the corporate veil of Countrywide. IMO, BAC is relying overly on California court ruling in its favor on successor liability that applied Delaware law, because the legal nexus of the California suit made sense to revert to Delaware. An unfavorable successor liability ruling by Branston in the BAC-MBIA litigation in New York state court would certainly be appealed by BAC if BAC loses but it creates a huge overhang that jeopardizes one of the fundamental premises relied upon by the BNY's trustee in the private-label settlement. I am certain that BAC is substantailly hedged (via its long position of MBIA CDS) against a rehabilitation event at MBIA Insurance so it may actually benefit from a regulatory takeover at MBIA Insurance, but what I dont understand is BAC's willingness to have a ruling by Branston on successor liability that risks jeopardizing the private label settlement. Although presumably it's to BAC's advantage to drive MBIA as close to the wall as possible, unwind its CDS position on MBIA, before then agreeing to settle the R&W put-back claims, which then largely benefits BAC itself given it is CDO coutnerparty that MBIA Insurance has wrapped.
    Apr 22, 2013. 07:37 PM | 4 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • A Clearwire Update: Bankruptcy And Default As Clearwire's Ace In The Hole [View article]
    GMAO .. that's guffawing.

    Verizon matched the implied EV per mhz-pop offered by Dish but did so on the less attractive EBS spectrum (that Dish proposed to leave in the Comapny for his back-end offer) and presented a structure that Sprint may actually not mind as it lets Sprint off the hook for having to cash out the public at this time, which was its and Softbank's original strategy -- read the proxy. The other strategic investors were willing to sell to Sprint so long as they got what McCaw got at $2.97/shr equivalent. It was CLWR BOD that insisted on a deal that allowed the public minority investors to tag along with the SIGs in their sale to Sprint. Whether the public minority votes for it or not, Sprint will purchase the shares held by the strategics (and therefore all the control shares) along with exchanging the exchangable debt and end up with up to 70% of the Company (depending upon how much of the debt CLWR draws). It just might be the price to pay if in order for Sprint to approve the assignment of some of the leased EBS spectrum to Verizon from CLWR, CLWR is required to draw the rest of the note and commit to the accelerated build.
    Apr 16, 2013. 08:16 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • A Clearwire Update: Bankruptcy And Default As Clearwire's Ace In The Hole [View article]
    Maybe it's because Verizon is not offering to take the nearly $5B in debt, and the operating burn asosicated with the exisitng WiMax network, or all the employees and their salaries and severance, as well as other contractual commitments. The gross price offered is BEFORE reducing the price by the present value (using Verizon's discount rate?) of future spectrum lease obligations (and renewals) for the EBS spectrum ("which can be substantial" according to the CLWR's proxy filing). Verizon seemingly learned from the Dish asset strip deal structure (and why that structure cant get done) and instead offered to pay only for an assignemnt of the leased spectrum. This in effect a paid up front assignemnt of the leases -- it's not clear that technically leasing spectrum or an assignment thereof requires FCC approval as there were various rulemakings perviously to allow spectrum leasing (partly to allow the major carriers participate in the auctions by leasing from a "small business bidder" with bidding credits that were imposed by Congress). So this may be able to be accomplsihed with almost immediate effect.

    Sprint may actually not object to that construct, as it will take the CLWR default card off the table, let the public minority shareholders vote down the cash merger so that Sprint doesnt have to buy out the public (at least not now, but wait until the standstill expires), and then use Verizon's cash to pay down expensive CLWR debt, as well as to fund some of CLWR's hot spot network to be built for its sole customer Sprint, and then further cement the demand and ecosystem for TDD-LTE infrastructure and devices if Verizon has a vest interest in that 2.5ghz spectrum band.
    Apr 16, 2013. 08:01 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • A Clearwire Update: Bankruptcy And Default As Clearwire's Ace In The Hole [View article]
    In a bankruptcy, it is not clear (sic) that a 353 auction would necessarily be pursued; in fact it is highly improbable since it wont have th esupport of either the board or the impaired calss of stakeholders (equity). In a chapter 7 liquidation, the assets are liquidated for the benefit of creditors and stakeholders.

    In chapter 11, the debtor attempts to reorganize to get teh best outcome to the impaired stakeholder class, and any Plan of Reorganization requires approval of 2/3 in absolute votes (i.e. Sprint) and 50% in numerosity of that class. 353 sales are only pursued when the debtor is in need of liquidity and cannot otherwise protect value.

    If I were Sprint, I would supply the DIP financing which will give it the attributes of control, offer a cash payout to bondholders at par, and roll the equity (all the equity) in place but flush all the governance attributes. Maybe even do a backstopped rights offering to raise another $2B of equity to pay down the debt further, while simultaneously offering to cash out those who do not want to or cannot kee up with the rights offering.
    Apr 16, 2013. 12:35 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • A Clearwire Update: Bankruptcy And Default As Clearwire's Ace In The Hole [View article]
    this would be interesting bankruptcy case where the equity holders will control. debtholders who are not impaired dont even have a vote -- a plan that cashes out the debt at 100% of par plus accrued isn't even voted upon by the creditor class. if none of the creditor classes are impaired then you are left with the vote of more junior classes of cap structure in order to confirm a plan of reorganization - which means 2/3 of the common equity class and 50% in numerosity, which actually may be a lower effective voting threshhold for Sprint than the current merger vote.

    I agree with the author that a bankruptcy filing in effect throws away the Company's existing governance structure and the question is whether the debtor can pursue 353 asset dispositions over the objections of the equity class (which is controlled by Sprint under a bnakruptcy las context). I am not as convinced that will in fact be the case where Sprint loses more control in bnakruptcy court then currently as the author posits. The CLWR board of directors would still be in possession of exercising exclusive control as "debtor in procession" with an exclusive right to present plan of reorganization, and its fiduciary responsibility at that point in bankruptcy court (assuming that the creditors are unimpaired) would be to ALL members of impaired equity class, not just the public minority holders.

    I can imagine a POR whereby all the debt is made-whole and cashed out (so they don't vote) and is funded instead by an underwritten equity offering, backstopped by Sprint, whereby the shareholders would "pay to play". Now that would be interesting.
    Apr 14, 2013. 03:39 PM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Clearwire (CLWR) receives yet another alternative financing proposal from a money manager. Hedge fund Aurelius Capital is offering Clearwire $80M in convertible debt financing as a replacement for the funds it's receiving from Sprint (S). Last week, Crest Financial offered Clearwire $240M in convertible debt financing. Though taking Sprint's money and still officially supporting its $2.97/share buyout offer, Clearwire still hasn't made a final decision on Dish Network's $3.30/share bid. [View news story]
    Remember that Clearwire was the entity that McCaw bought that was an equipment manufacturer that made "pre-WiMax" infrastructure, as the WiMax standard was still being developed back in the late 90's and early this century. The principal difference in the "old Clearwire" was that it was targeted primarily at a fixed wireless broadband opprtunity as a means to replace DSL while Nextel envisioned Xohm as a mobile service (thus increasing dramatically the capital intensity of the business model). At the end of the day the sugar daddies (Intel, GOOG, etc) were primarily interested in a mobile strategy so Clearwire's strategy evolved to that which it could raise strategic capital with.

    It is all moot at this point, a lot of "could of, should of". At this juncture, only thing matters is whether the minority shareholders will vote for the merger after CLWR misses the June 1st coupon and goes into its 30 day grace period. Assuming that the minority shareholders reject the merger and Sprint then purchases the Strategic Investor Group's ramining stakes, it then comes to whether Sprint provides additional funds to let Clearwire make the coupon by July 1st (and how dilutive that will be) in order to prevent the BK filing that Clearwire is threatening Sprint with.
    Apr 14, 2013. 10:45 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • On April 8, Clearwire (CLWR) received an offer from a "strategic buyer" to buy spectrum leases "generally located in large markets that cover approximately 5 billion MHz-POP" for a price of $1B-$1.5B, less the present value of the leases. Clearwire, which made the disclosure in a new 14A, says it will evaluate the offer. The disclosure comes on a day when Bloomberg reports Dish Network, whose $3.30/share offer for Clearwire remains outstanding, approached Deutsche Telekom about possibly merging with T-Mobile USA. CLWR +2.5% AH to $3.34. [View news story]
    jim,....ahem. $1.25B divided by 5B mhz-Pops is......$0.25/mhz-Pop. don't know how that affects your analysis and investment thesis.

    i wonder how the "present value" of the lease obligations will be 15% discount rate or at 5% discout rate, and what the assumed lease renew rate is.

    The real interesting issue is that this is a "strategic" that is willing to deal with hold-up risk on the back-end of spectrum licensees so that rules out any of the big guys such as Verizon (plus in the context of this disclosure in the proxy statement, the other strategics such as AT&T and T-Mobile were already code-named as Party B and Party A in the proxy so it would have to be someone new). Furthermore it is someone that wants to get in cheap by taking some of the theoretically riskier spectrum (with built-in financing from the lease payments to deduct from value) but also a player that is interested primarily in the major markets. DirecTV maybe,...or who,...obviously someone willing to jump into the fray of a takeover controversy - which rules out most major large companies. Maybe Morgna O'Brien (the original founder of Fleet Call, nee Nextel) at Cyren Communications for his public safety play? I'm stumped.
    Apr 14, 2013. 10:12 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Clearwire (CLWR) receives yet another alternative financing proposal from a money manager. Hedge fund Aurelius Capital is offering Clearwire $80M in convertible debt financing as a replacement for the funds it's receiving from Sprint (S). Last week, Crest Financial offered Clearwire $240M in convertible debt financing. Though taking Sprint's money and still officially supporting its $2.97/share buyout offer, Clearwire still hasn't made a final decision on Dish Network's $3.30/share bid. [View news story]
    I agree that a squeeze-out merger under Delaware law requires "fair value" but that is for court to decide what meets fiduciary standard. But that same fiduciary standard resulted in an unanimous vote of the existing Clearwire board including the independent and disinterested directors that formed the Special Committee to support merger. I was simply addressing the poster's somewhat emotional sentiment that "Sprint will never be able to buy the minority shareholders' shares" and pointing out that is not necessarily the case. The poster was simply imposing his own assessment of value as the criteria for "fair value" -- the CLWR board had fairness opinions from each of Centerview and Evercore that would say otherwise. I'm not necessarily disagreeing with him on value, only whether a minority shareholder will have a say if he is the "last one standing"

    A CLWR shareholder is welcomed to his own opinion on fair value but as the proxy statement spells out in excruciating detail: (1) the CLWR business model of a carrier's carrier on a usage-based model is flawed as over 3 years CLWR wasn't able to attract any other customer to that model besides Sprint, (2) a large majority of major carriers did not have interest in CLWR's spectrum, and (3) of the ones with strategic interest, their preference was to cherry pick the spectrum (i.e. strip off spectrum assets) rather than BUY the company encumbered with the legacy network. Unfortunately the shareholders own the company behind the bondholders (who are sucking out $500M+ a year in debt service) and tower and spectrum leaseholders. From the proxy statement, you can review the analysis that selling off the spectrum, ostensibly at a higher $/mhz-pop still leaves a company with worse NPV given the debt and operating expense burden - - the point being that CLWR is worth more "dead" as an asset play than alive as an operating business because its existing operations is economically dilutive on value and whoever takes that on is taking the burden off of CLWR shareholders hands. So breaking apart the furniture in order to throw the pieces into the fireplace to keep the house warm for a few more nights doesn't solve the underlying issue. I own the bonds so I believe in the spectrum asset value (at least where the bonds are well covered) but the equity is a levered option that is NOT a play on asset value but rather it is a play on whether Son (not Sprint) will be a chump - - it is a speculative risk-arb bet on the tactical aspect of M&A under Delaware law (which at least you seem equipped to assess). There would be no way that Son would have rolled over like DT-whimp just did with Metro partly because Sprint already controls (in the form of negative control) CLWR, and party because DT was more desperate. As the proxy statement pointed out, Sprint stated it has "no interest or intention to sell" its CLWR equity stake, nor would it be willing to accommodate any changes in the governance that will dilute its control -- so this is the ultimate poison pill as no one else can buy into the company. Read the proxy carefully -- Sprint, and really Softbank, initially wanted to buy out ONLY the strategic investors -- it was CLWR's board and Stanton that convinced Sprint and Softbank to take out the whole company so that the public minority could tag along with the premium. If the minority shareholders vote it down (which seems likely given where the stock is currently trading), then Sprint/Softbank will end up exactly where they originally wanted, which was to only pay a premium to the strategic investors and to leave the public hanging until the trading lock-ups expire on November 28, 2013. This is all laid out in the proxy statement -- read it carefully as the intent of the parties are plainly spelled out. All I can say is be careful what you wish for. The best bet is to buy the bonds when CLWR decides to miss the June 1st coupon -- that's the asset play.
    Apr 13, 2013. 10:45 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment