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  • NTELOS - Don't Fall For The Yield, Sprint Contract A Risk With 50% Downside Potential In Share Price And Dividend Cut Likely [View article]
    ALiveH. you are absolutely right, I am awful at predicting stock price evidently,.... at least at a spot in time. So probably better at assessing probability of industrial logic of the parties than how the stock market responds. I will still bet that the company will be much stronger a year from now and high likelihood of being valued substantially higher.

    Regarding the dividend I had agreed with author that you shouldn't be in stock for the dividend yield as that was less meaningful than the high beta binary outcome.

    The elimination of the dividend is a gift to the shorts as it gives them a chance to cover their position now that the short thesis is exhausted as the folks that were renting this stock for the dividend (for the wrong reason) will rotate out.

    I suspect that since the company now contractually committed to an aggressive capex build, and there's still the pending incentive auctions for the 600mhz spectrum in early 2015, the company should husband those resources. Plus, with the imminent commercial roll-out of the 4G fixed broadband with DISH on the 2.5ghz, it was never clear to me who was bearing the capital cost of each customer premise install (truck roll plus roof top install). That's one of those situations where the more successful you are, the more capital it consumes -- even though the CPE is success-based, it still is better to make sure that you are not constrained by capital (or take the risk that you will need to raise it) if you want to press on the accelerator. So I agree with the strategy of the company but I also agree with you that it will have short-term impact as the company's stock ownership rotates out from those that were visiting for the dividend to new holders who are interested in long-term growth and eventual strategic exit (who may have been scared off by the SNA overhang).
    May 23 10:10 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • NTELOS - Don't Fall For The Yield, Sprint Contract A Risk With 50% Downside Potential In Share Price And Dividend Cut Likely [View article]

    Wells Fargo calls this the "best possible outcome" that she could imagine for Ntelos. Exclusivity for both CDMA and LTE through 2022, plus Ntelos gets to use all of Sprint's 800mhz, 1.9ghz, and 2.5ghz (the latter is the EBS spectrum that Clearwire accumulated while Ntelos itself had the better BRS contiguous spectrum). So Ntelos traded off modestly lower rates in exchange for the use of Sprint's spectrum. That 800mhz is going to kick ass supplemented onto Ntelos network with vastly improved coverage and in-building penetration on the existing 1.9ghz cell site spacing. Ntelos will also immediately get the benefit of the Sprint's 1.9ghz since it is on the same band class as Ntelos' current CDMA network (meaning entire installed base of handsets can immediately access) and that extra pipe eliminates any capacity build requirement, letting Ntelos instead focus its capex $'s on its LTE over-build with 800mhz plus 2.5ghz. The additional 2.5ghz will also supplement Ntelos' 2.5ghz to let it fully pursue fixed wireless with Dish on TD-LTE that leverages the same network infrastructure.

    Win-Win for both parties. That idiott Dixon at FBR proven wrong again about "imminent" overbuild or "imminent" drastic haircut -- he had no clue about the network challenges of an overbuild. I am ROFLMAO. :-)
    May 22 09:59 AM | 3 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Netflix: Risk Is Increasing [View article]
    HBO, AMCN, Showtime all suggest 30%+ EBIT margins
    May 21 01:40 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Reports: Apple talking with Samsung, Ahrendts hatches big retail plans [View news story]
    I just ordered 2 iPod Touches for our 5 and 6 yo, including AppleCare. With personalization, will arrive in 3 days -- amazing logistics. So I just parted with $760. the design quality was superb and the features robust. for us this was to leverage the content in their iPad Air devices (Christmas upgrade from original iPad 2 and iPad with Retina) and to stop them from commandeering our smartphones (both Samsungs) at restaurants. My 6 yo knows which restaurants she prefers based upon whether they have public WiFi. So the iPod as a "starter iPhone without the cellular data plan" is a viable entry mobility device that keeps them in the Apple ecosystem (they also have iPads at school too as the school has migrated to heavy reliance on individualized education using iPad apps)

    Of course our spoiled kids are the exception and we are probably bad parents willing to indulge in such excess. Nevertheless, it does indicate that there is a strong recurring revenue stream -- even though we only buy new iPods once every 2-3 years, that Apple can continue to monetize. I am sure that when they get old enough, if laptops still exist, we will be buying them Mac Airs or whatever they are called in 10 years.

    Apple is not a consumer electronics company, it is a design and luxury branded experience and it engenders tremendous loyalty leveraging across multiple platforms. Given that their content are all tied to iCloud, it will be a tough habit to break,...and frankly, I am not sure why one needs to. So even without growth on the next product line extension, the existing Apple platforms will likely continue to extract high gross profit dollars from the installed base.
    May 19 07:16 PM | 7 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • WSJ: Democrat on FCC worried about Sprint, T-Mobile as independents [View news story]
    it's kind of obvious that King Wheeler is protecting his prior patrons (Comcast in cable, and T/VZ in wireless). Forcing 4 carriers in place is nothing but a duopoly protection policy. dont think of this as Sprint buying TMUSA; think it the other way where the rebel Legere at TMUSA is taking over Sprint. Masa Son's history is an attacker -- he knows nothing else. That's why he is frustrated with the management at Sprint and has turned over half of senior management already. Why the FCC or DOJ think that the tiger will change its stripes seems baffling. By blocking TMUSA-Sprint combination, all they are doing is coddling and protecting T and VZ.
    May 15 07:16 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • Apple Buying Beats - Method Behind The Madness [View article]
    LBP, I am not exactly sure your rationale of using off-shore cash is at all relevant. Beats Entertainment LLC is an US LLC entity. Using AAPL's off-shore cash that has yet to pay US corporate income tax in order to buy US securities (whether public or private) is considered a repatriation and therefore subject to an acceleration of US taxable income from foreign sourced earnings that previously enjoyed the tax deferral so long as it was invested off-shore. The US tax system is one of few that taxes global income based upon citizenship notwithstanding where the income is generated, and only allows a "loophole" of tax deferral so long as it is re-invested off-shore. Now does that seem like it keeps US companies competitive with its global competitors?

    So no free lunch on your Q# 2, and frankly it is irrelevant in this situation.
    May 13 10:54 AM | 3 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Apple reportedly drawn to Beats' streaming service; sell-side has its doubts [View news story]
    I am not sure that you can justify/rationalize by any act of stupidity that FB may or may not have done to justify this move. I am neither favorable nor negative -- I just know that I am ignorant.

    I think there seems to be many who think the Beats products are poor quality and overpriced -- I for one, applaud that "branding power". What do you think Louis Vuiton or Burberry are? Perhaps some would claim that those are at least "high quality" luxury goods. I guess the real issue is whether Apple should invest in an adjunct brand to its core "Apple" brand. I frankly dont know until we have a better view of the strategy, and so dont know why we wouldnt just wait to hear the strategy articulated.

    The other school of thought seems to suggest that the price paid is too high. Since doesn't report publicly and we have zero information as to how its financial performance would benefit from being under Apple's stewardship, again it seems that assessment is simply pre-mature. similarly the rumored price is compared with what Carlysle paid for a minority interest in past year -- but a strategic buyer is always able in theory to pay more because of the strategic synergies that it may enjoy that a financial investor may not.

    My conclusion is we don't know anything yet to have any informed opinion on price, on rationale, on strategic synergies, on financial performance,... and just about everything else. So take a chill pill and just wait rather than speculating. In the meantime, $3B is a gnat on an elephant's butt in the case of financial impact to AAPL.

    May 12 05:43 PM | 3 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • American Airlines Group: As The Integration Continues, Solid Upside Ahead [View article]
    Stifel initiated with a BUY this AM as well... I will plagiarize via copy and paste because I dont know how to link to it. Sorry. P.S. not my opinion, just sharing.

    Initiating Coverage of American Airlines with a Buy Rating, $45 Target Price
    American’s capacity discipline, focus on maximizing ROIC, and ability to return cash to shareholders fits our investment rationale and the characteristics we believe will determine to what extent airlines benefit from a valuation re-rating to levels more in line with their industrials peers and the S&P. Although American is in the early stages of what is likely to be a complex integration with US Airways, we believe several factors – which we detail in this report – exist that should reduce the degree of operational risk, particularly in 2015 when much of the “high-risk” initiatives are implemented. As a result, we view the expected ramp up in margins as revenue performance improves and American benefits from a meaningful cost advantage as sufficiently compelling to offset the integration risk.

    Capacity Discipline – Management believes that sub-GDP capacity growth is appropriate considering where airline returns currently are, but we believe a longer-term commitment exists as well. We believe this view, along with American’s margin potential, should contribute to ROIC in line or better than network peers.

    Margin Upside is Compelling – In our view, American’s 10%-15% labor cost advantage over its peers along with opportunities to improve revenue performance (network synergies and corporate revenue gains) could lead to American having the best operating margins amongst the network carriers within three years.

    Ahead of Schedule with Returning Cash – American’s balance sheet, specifically the $10 billion in cash, along with a healthy outlook for free cash flow generation, should allow it to begin returning cash to shareholders earlier on in the integration process than its peers – potentially later this year.

    Integration Risk is Manageable – We expect American’s integration to progress more smoothly than United's given the more conservative approach to IT systems migration American has chosen and a more favorable labor relations dynamic. As a result, we view American’s integration risk as manageable and suspect there is likely some upside potential to the synergy goals provided.

    Capex Plans are Suboptimal – American has a significantly higher capex profile over the next five years than its peers due to the age of its fleet, its desire to lower the fleet's age, and the over 500 mainline aircraft on order.

    Initiating Coverage with a Buy Rating – Our $45 target price is based on shares trading at roughly 8x our 2015 EPS estimate (untaxed) and 6x on an EV/EBITDAR (2015E) basis, both of which we believe are supported by relative valuation to the industry and the S&P, historical valuation analysis, and our DCF.
    Target Price Methodology/Risks

    Our $45 target price is based on shares trading at roughly 8x our 2015 EPS estimate of $6.00 (untaxed), which is a slight discount to our target multiple for Delta Air Lines, and 6x on an EV/EBITDAR (2015E) basis. We believe our multiples are supported by given a relative and historical valuation analysis to the airline industry and the S&P 500. In addition, our discount cash flow analysis supports our target price.

    Risks to Target Price
    If American is unable to realize the expected synergies from its merger with US Airways in the time frame it has provided or cannot meet certain milestones it has provided, its stock price would be negatively impacted, in our view. In addition, our broader investment rationale for the industry is that the top-quality airlines with strong margins, ROIC, and a focus on returning cash to shareholders should benefit from improving valuations relative to the S&P; however, if conditions in the industry change either from a competitive standpoint or otherwise, this multiple expansion would be less likely to occur.

    May 6 09:50 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Iron Mountain: REIT Conversion And Emerging Markets Fuel Upside Of 40% [View article]
    the problem with this investment is that it is a calculated risk of a coin flip on whether the REIT conversion will prevail (it has obviously taken a long time). the issue is whether steel racking counts as leasehold improvements (although I cant understand why the steel frames holding up billboards, such as recent lamar and CBS outdoor, or the thin shell structures on steel frames (racks?) of public storage, would both count but not for records storage). I personally take the long bet on this, because I think the stock is already priced in with REIT rejection given current stock price and yield, but it is nevertheless a "bet". upon conversion, it is a $40 stock going to $50 as its shareholder base turns to REIT holders and income funds.
    May 6 09:37 AM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • American Airlines Group: As The Integration Continues, Solid Upside Ahead [View article]
    I thank author for decent comp analysis as it was helpful for me to collect the information. I took a gut bet (back of the envelope) at $26/shr when it exited and now that it's grown to a more substantial position I've become more interested. I have three follow up questions for the author:

    1. you comped the AA cost structure against other majors but I was curious whether you had RASM comps too. Are there material differences in price yield depending upon route structure, or also impacted by load factor I guess, between the majors.

    2. I always questioned so-called revenue synergies in these combinations as it always implied taking share from others (from better ability to sell route combinations etc, although I thought code share was supposed to get nearly teh same benefit) since at the end of the day it wasn't clear that it wasn't a zero-sum game. So revenues synergies always seemed to me to be revenue "aspirations" so I am glad that they were underweight this in the estimate calculus for the POR. Do you have an opinion of how real revenue synergies are or where are the source for such?

    3. Lastly, your basic valuation thesis seems to be a relative value trade. In other words how do I know that the other comps are not over-valued? Or are you suggesting a pair trade?

    I had always previously hated the airline business. High fixed costs (due to capital intensity), and high labor and fuel cost (commodity risk) dependent, and perishable inventory that gave customers pricing power.... oh and combined with high financial leverage,... and did I mention hyper competitive intensity? However, the industry consolidation and the elimination of capacity, along with seemingly aligned management strategies seem to have changed some of the industry dynamics. I swear that they are now all acting like coordinated oligopolists that seem to walk in lockstep trying to find the next fee opportunity (all hidden price increases) and I don't notice the aggressive price competition that we all seem to remember. Load factors seem sky hi as I would be lucky to get the bathroom seat. What's your perspective on the revenue side for the airline sector? Is this a temporary pause in competitive intensity or is there something structural that has changed and which will enjoy sustained permanence?

    Thanks again for your analysis.
    Apr 29 10:34 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • NTELOS - Don't Fall For The Yield, Sprint Contract A Risk With 50% Downside Potential In Share Price And Dividend Cut Likely [View article]
    Author actually has done decent analysis alhtough some items he is guessing at and he doesnt need to.

    1. his assumption of 31% operating COS (cash only) is too light to compare what is relatively low density rural mountainous market against Sprint's national network. there is a direct proxy in looking at the finanicals of Sprint Affiliate Shentel that is in adjacent territory to NTLS.

    2. Shentel's cash operating COS is 40% (which better reflects operating cost in similar region to Ntelos), plus D&A is 15%, where the D&A is for depreciation of network capex and amortizaton of spectrum licenses; so the apple to apple comparison is 55% to 60%

    3. You didn't need to do high school algebra to guess at the local gross margin -- just read the SNA contract that is on file. Sprint pays 60% of its national average revenue yield for both voice and data for "home" customers and 90% of same for "travel". This way, as Sprint's national (including heavy user metropolitan customers) subs drive down average revenue yield per minute or per GB, then NTLS unit prices have to drop as well.

    4. The contract is designed to assure Sprint 40% gross margins at the local subs, and to make sure it is not upside down on "travel" usage -- the 60% guaranteed COS (which ratchets down as sprint drops its prices to compete) is not very different than Shentel's all-in cost of around 55% COS for similar geography.

    5. By the way, in case you were wondering, Sprint actually makes money on the "travel" minutes since it has reciprocal rates for NTLS' roaming. In other words, Sprint gets to use its national network to service roaming NTLS customers and use that unit cost to off-set roaming usage on NTLS' network.

    6. so when you look at the outflows to NTLS, you need to recognize that a significant portion of the usage paid to NTLS is grossed up from the travel as there are reciprocal payments to Sprint at the same rate that gets netted.

    7. in addition your sub count is light. Shentel has same 2M covered pop footprint with 350K+ subs; I believe that NTLS footprint is higher and closer to 400K; plus the heavy college density brings in gypsy population (Sprint customers from out of region) that hang around 9 months out of the year. NTLS has greater network density than Shentel (just count the cell sites) because it can leverage the network sharing economics of two customer bases on one network, and so it is more dense in order to realize the capacity, but it gets better coverage as a collateral benefit. Therefore all your math based upon singular assumption of 300K is totally different when you use 350K subs (like Shentel for same covered pop with Sprint branded distribution) or the 400K that I believe to be the case. The reason that Sprint branded distribution (including Virgin, Assurance, and Boost sub-brands) is greater in these markets is because neither Metro PCS or Cricket (which either each or together can secure up to 12% combined market share of the market) is not prevalent in these markets.

    6. the dispute arose principally from the calculation average revenue yield for data usage and whether it made sense to include WiMax (Clearwire's network) or now LTE in the calculation of data revenue yield (obviously would drive it dramatically lower since such throughput encourages consumption while no additional revenue given Sprint's "unlimited" pricing model) versus sticking with CDMA EV-DO (3G) only. The SNA contract is explicitly only for CDMA network so NTLS was probably in the right, but practically, the data usage goes across all platforms, so Sprint was probably more "right" in a practical sense -- in any case the parties settled and agreed to move forward.

    The author is absolutely correct in his calculation of the math -- NTLS would be hurt upon non-renewal or drastic reduction in rates, but the author has zero judgment as to how probable that is. It will take 2 years at a minimum, to 4 years in reality for Sprint to overbuild a network with the comparable density of coverage and arrange fiber or DM backhaul to support the current bandwidth requirements. Forget about the idiott analyst Dixon at FBR, 800mhz is not the solution because probably only 1/3 to half of Sprint's current installed base have 800 capable handsets (but these will eventually turn over) but more importantly Sprint only has 1 CDMA carrier devoted to CDMA voice (1.25mhz x 1.25mhz) in order to maintain 10 mhz (5x5) in reserve to deploy LTE-A on 800mhz. In other words, while 800 gives great coverage in these regions, Sprint doesnt have enough to serve the capacity that it needs to support this customer base without employing 1900mhz, which means it needs essentially a similar cell site footprint in order to get comparable network quality as NTLS's network.

    It simply makes no sense to bear the execution risk of such an overbuild in mountainous terrain that took NTLS 15 years to season that network, when the fundamental analysis of the "make vs rent" is not as far off when you actually include the capital cost in the analysis and understand the cost of the region, and that the gross payments grossly overstate the payment because you have to understand there is flow going the other direction. If sprint was going to roam on Verizon in this instance (the only guy with CDMA except a couple of areas where USM has 800mhz CDMA footprint), it's costs would 3 times what NTLS is charging. So the only solution is a lengthy and operationally challenging overbuild -- if Sprint was going to do that, it really should have started that aggressively in January this year, the earliest when it was allowed to initiate overbuild on CDMA, because it will take every moment of the remaining term plus the 18 month extension to buid this overlay network -- oh by the way while it is building this out and wants to use the NTLS network, it needs to pay for both since there is minimum $9M/mo toll for the SNA.

    So this stock is not for the feint of heart, and author is absolutely correct, the dividend yield is high and one shouldn't invest because of the dividend because there is high beta in terms of the outcome. however, it would be insane to short this stock (like the 4.5M that is short), because the stock can double on an SNA resolution. Now somebody may determine it is a "coin flip" because the outcomes are binary, or he doesn't have sufficient industry knowledge to assess the probability of each outcome, so he should avoid taking a position. However, don't be deluded to think the author's solid financial analysis of the potential economic outcome in the case of haircut or termination of the SNA, means his assessment (from the tone of his implied orientation and his statements seeming not to know that Sprint has no other viable network solution in this footprint) of the probability of the different outcomes is anything close to on point.

    So just my two cents worth and IMO, dont believe either the bull or bear case because it is better for you to simply avoid such a binary outcome if you dont have the ability to do deep enough due diligence to make an informed bet (and it is a bet due to the binary outcome).
    Apr 26 03:48 PM | 6 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Netflix Earnings Preview: Euphoria Of Q4 2013 To Subside In Q1 2014 [View article]
    Disney also has billions of off balance sheet liabilities because it has to spend billions annually to produce and underwrite move production. oh it's not disclosed on the balance sheet, nor is it even a contractual commitment yet -- of course it will have to spend it in order to have a slate of movies to show in theaters in 2017.

    But netflix has "committed" to pay Disney for exclusive rights its studio output for 2017. but it's not on the balance sheet yet disclosed as a contractual commitment. it is not on the balance sheet because neither the asset (the film rights when it is actually available to be shown) nor the liability can be capitalized yet according to GAAP. But isn't Netflix committed -- yes that is why it is disclosed as a contractual commitment, but it isn't allowed to be capitalized until the film is available to stream. What you say, what happens if Disney doesn't deliver the films -- well netflix's commitment to pay is only contingent on Disney's actually delivering films and the price per film is adjusted depending upon its box office performance. But surely Disney will deliver the films since that's what is its business. Yep that's true.

    Oh by the way, Disney hasn't even decided what films to release that year yet. No it hasn't even committed to which films but have several projects in development for 2015 and 2016, and maybe some of those will slip to 2017. so does the fact that Disney promised to deliver minimum of a certain number of films for release in 2017 to be streamed and guaranteed certain box office results, so is that a liability on its balance sheet. are you crazy, dont you know accounting, it's not a commitment until it contracts with writers, producers, directors, and actors, and projects have different milestones and canceled all the time.

    Wait so disney has promised a certain number of films and fully expects to eventually spend billions to produce and promote these releases but none of this is no balance sheet as a liability even though we know it will spend billions each year. of course not it is not capitalized as a liability when it is a commitment -- that's contractual commitment; once they spend the money then it is capitalized as an asset and if they borrowed to fund it then it is matched with a liability.

    So a commitment by netflix to pay for output that the disney Studio hasnt even thought of yet and contingent entirely on Disney delivering the product with price adjustments depending upon the film's popularity --- now why is that supposed to be on the balance sheet again, when the film rights to a movie that hasnt been thought of, hasn't been made, and hasnt been released, and isn't available for streaming-- why should it be capitalized today. Oh you want the liability on the balance sheet but not the asset. I guess these folks never did pass that accounting class.
    Apr 18 08:55 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Netflix Is Still Wildly Undervalued [View article]
    "Competition and the realities of the video programming business will permanently clamp margins and significantly slow the growth."

    "Will this happen to all companies in the space or just Netflix?"

    HBO has 35%+ EBIT margins and spends 40%+ of its annual content budget on originals, and the remaining on licensed spend (both pay cable 1 window from Warner, Universal, Fox, as well as catalog fare from these and other studios, plus specials such as sports and its late-night mature content).

    so other than the good cocktail hour soundbite about the "realities of the video programming business"m what is it about those "realities" that destine it to low margins while everyone in hollywood that ever pitched programming network business models all think 30%+ margins are the norm.

    I will say something controversial: all programming content (except iconic children's programming that has constant audience replenishment) goes DOWN in licensing value over time. This is because the economic utility value of each piece of content once it has been viewed is of lesser value thereater. You can look at the value of licensing for any property: Sex in the City, or Seinfeld, in syndication 10 yrs ago commanded a lot more per broadcast than it does today because the content is no longer as fresh.

    Where content prices that are going up is on FRESH content (that includes live sports, but that content has instant obsolesence) which is driven by competition. Either studios or production houses competing for the next hot property - be it directors, screenwriter, story, or actor. However, the guy with more distribution power can always win. Thus a Disney Studios can always outbid a movie project than FilmDistrict or other independents can. Same with the serial drama segment in television.

    On the licensing front, each serial dramatic series (like new release movies) has the greatest audience appeal and licensing value on its first release (exclusive is now the paradigm) and the property diminishes in value over time and eventually is priced as "filler" (like the WalMart $1 DVD bin) when it is non-eclusive catalog fare.

    So it is comical that the outrageous statements by prognosticators such as Pachter fool that loudly proclaim "content prices are going up because the content owners will dictate prices" -- wrong competition from bidders dictates prices, and those with the largest ability to monetize can pay the most. And content prices for each specific property actually continually goes down over time. Content SPEND at Hulu, Amazon, and Netflix are going up is because they are buying MORE content rather than the same content having price increases. However, the quality of content spend may also move to higher-value (i.e. higher priced content) in order to generate increased audience appeal. For example, Hulu may fill its catalog with independent foreign films and some catalog fare from A&E on the mystery of Mayan calendars or ancient visits by aliens, but when it cna afford to as its subscriber base expands, it will clearly redeploy that spend into content that has more audience appeal, which will be higher priced per hour. So it's not that the History Channel's catalog is going up in price, it's because Hulu choses to divert more budget to higher value content.
    Mar 5 10:08 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • WSJ: SoftBank's Son to mount PR campaign for Sprint/T-Mobile deal [View news story]
    So DOJ and FCC will be put in the place of protecting the VZ-T duopoly?

    SB can easily preserve the "uncarrier persona" of the attacker by making the long-haired Legere the surviving CEO and the TMUS management team the primary surviving mgmt team -- Seattle will be easier to commute from Japan anyway, and 2 timezones closer.
    Mar 4 11:16 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Big day for monolines after MBIA and Ambac results [View news story]
    when there is improved visibility on Detroit (status of GO obligations whether it is considered unsecured) and incremental clarity on Puerto Rico. No hurry for rating agencies to act.
    Mar 4 08:26 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment