Investment Bank Crisis: The Greatest Show on Earth [View article]
Poking around for recent commentary on capital reserve ratios, and ended up on Andy's article. I'm in accord: leverage is the fundamental issue (as it has been in past crises).
I have a simple idea:
* If you are a bank, broker/dealer, or insurance company, in ANY part of your operations, and * If your GAAP reported gross revenues are greater than US$50 billion, * Then, your company, as a whole, must adhere to Basel II capital reserve requirements.
Note: Obviously, the exposure from 'new' instruments, like CDS and future alternatives, must be included.
Comment: Sufficient minimum capital requirements, and appropriate reporting, will, at least, give the marketplace the time necessary to see the deterioration in fundamental leverage and safety margins (invisible hand). Thus, 30:1 at Lehman, and g*d-knows-what at AIG, would be visible in adverse markets, as opposed to landing like a bomb out of nowhere.
2nd comment: If you actually look at market value D/E ratios for major public companies in the US and Europe (sorry, not familiar enough with Asia), Basel II would not be overly restrictive by any means.
But it would put a lid on speculative overexposure.
-RLP
(btw, I come from commercial real estate... we know ALL about over leverage!!!)
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Poking around for recent commentary on capital reserve ratios, and ended up on Andy's article. I'm in accord: leverage is the fundamental issue (as it has been in past crises).
Sep 19 22:04 pm
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All Comments by rpodos »Investment Bank Crisis: The Greatest Show on Earth [View article]
I have a simple idea:
* If you are a bank, broker/dealer, or insurance company, in ANY part of your operations, and
* If your GAAP reported gross revenues are greater than US$50 billion,
* Then, your company, as a whole, must adhere to Basel II capital reserve requirements.
Note: Obviously, the exposure from 'new' instruments, like CDS and future alternatives, must be included.
Comment: Sufficient minimum capital requirements, and appropriate reporting, will, at least, give the marketplace the time necessary to see the deterioration in fundamental leverage and safety margins (invisible hand). Thus, 30:1 at Lehman, and g*d-knows-what at AIG, would be visible in adverse markets, as opposed to landing like a bomb out of nowhere.
2nd comment: If you actually look at market value D/E ratios for major public companies in the US and Europe (sorry, not familiar enough with Asia), Basel II would not be overly restrictive by any means.
But it would put a lid on speculative overexposure.
-RLP
(btw, I come from commercial real estate... we know ALL about over leverage!!!)