Founder and a managing director of DreamTigerEquities (www.dreamtigerco.com), a New York based merchant banking and advisory firm specializing in Emerging Media and related Technologies & Services. Active in corporate finance and M&A in the media and telecom sectors since 1994.... More
AOL (”Aol.“) is doing some interesting new things these days. Even its rebranding is interesting, although seemingly insignificant. The company’s strategic (re)focusing and the cost (re)structure that is underway, will in the months and presumably years ahead (re)define AOL as a next generation content platform. The parentheticals are meant to imply that there was little by way of focus, structure, or definition in the first place, and the current (re)position is thus a big deal indeed, even if for no other reason. But there are other reasons, as AOL will now not be an ISP, not a search engine, not any of the activities and categories in which it ranks third or fourth or more distantly behind. And if the new look is any indication, there will be something in this content platform for every taste and every demographic. In short, AOL is turning itself into a light-weight moving target, and its new brand video is worth a thousand words.
Although there have been critics and skeptics in abundance as the company was making its case on the PR circuit in the past week, I think AOL could be onto something truly important. The very lightness of its approach is in my opinion massive. Continuing where I left off in my previous post, what I believe AOL is largely up to is a “deleveraging” of its business or, as it were, an easing of the load. In a more dynamic and volatile environment than was the case in the company’s (first) prime, some years ago, this new approach is logical.
What I am referring to, of course, is not financial leverage, but leverage in the sense of legacy infrastructure, systems, and business models that had all run their course and become dated and a hindrance to AOL’s advancement. The ISP business is a depleting asset – although amazingly enough there are still customers out there who are paying for email service – and the search business is really an afterthought in the midst of all the Google vs. Bing rigmarole. Yet both of these products, and others, are just significant enough to have defined AOL as something with really no future. Forgetting the cost aspect of such businesses, the definitional weight alone had to be shed.
On another level, the new content strategy itself and the way in which AOL plans to undertake this single focus, speak to a new method based on flexibility, market-response, and – this is key – variable cost. The system will be a sort of lead generation business, substantially driven by robotic web-scouring for subjects of interest in search queries and related traffic patterns, and the doling out of assignments to freelance writers who will then be payed through a share of the ad revenue generated. In essence, writers will be given leads, and will be paid like salespeople on commission, for closing the deal. Fixed editorial costs are thus converted to a variable expense, and the financial risk is split between the sales platform and the sales person… which is to say, offloaded.
If this strategy were an investment, it would be something like a hedge. No editorial position to speak of, but strictly a response to market interests. No payments to writers, other than strictly based on economic merit. The media company thus becomes a clearing house in essence, a research platform that matches up supply and demand for content, and keeps a revenue slice for its brand, franchise, and back-office systems. If this company were a Wall Street firm, it would be a broker.
And here’s the clinching irony: if the strategy works and the cash flows, a business as described can take on financial leverage. The equity return benefits of doing so are well known.
The first part of this article will seem a little dated, but bear with me, it leads up to a new point.
Leverage has always played a big role in the media business, sometimes well and sometimes not so much. When media was a relatively stable enterprise, for those lucky few with a protected franchise such as radio or television assets, cable systems, or established newspaper or magazine titles, financial leverage was an effective way to boost equity returns in a limited-growth environment of recurring and predictable cash flow. Those days of “high finance” are far behind us, and limited growth for some of the referenced sectors would be a pleasant daydream to say the least. Where growth is occurring, on the Internet side of the competitive landscape, profits are either still too thin or unreliable to support any kind of financial leverage, and even the largest and more formidable competitors in the field were either not offered or never felt inclined to take on fixed financial liabilities.
And rightly so. With great liability, after all, comes great responsibility, of which media titans such as ClearChannel Communications, the Tribune Company, and Sirius XM Satellite Radio, have served us as perennial reminders. Which is to say, the cushion for any profit erosion diminishes as debt service obligations rise, and the media sector these days is nothing if not volatile. So much so, it seems, that limiting financial leverage is not enough, according to certain perspectives, as even more drastic forms of liability management are being considered.
Two blog articles caught my attention in the past few days, both of which speak to this issue, directly or less so. In Product design debt versus Technical debt, the author (a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and VC), suggests that web design and technology used by digital media companies are a form of “debt,” in the sense that these can, like any form of leverage, constrain the business when the environment turns in a negative direction. In a sector based on the wisdom of “deploy early and often, fail fast, ship and iterate, etc.,” such “debt” may be a detriment and a limiting factor to successful operation. Like financial leverage, it needs to be carefully monitored, perhaps outright avoided, and like any legacy system that can turn into a burden, should be cut loose (i.e. repaid) on a dime.
The other article, unlike the first, actually deals with real financial issues and financial leverage, although it brings to the forefront the limiting and debt-like aspects of equity capital – that’s right, equity capital – in a similar environment of early and frequent deployment, rapid failure, and iteration. In Winner’s Curse: Why Losing A B-School Biz Plan Competition Is Better Than Winning, the argument is made that capital infusions into start-ups are more often than not premature, and can actually constrain business flexibility and progress. “The hottest startup methodologies of today, built around ideas fostered by Y-Combinator and TechStars emphasize giving startups almost no money and encouraging them to get a product to market as quickly as possible in order to get real world validation.” [My emphasis added.]
What both of these articles have in common is not only a focus on flexibility and speed in today’s digital media environment, but a clear sense that positives can quickly turn into huge negatives in an atmosphere of rapid change. A proprietary technology becomes legacy infrastructure in an era of innovation and new market entrants. A great web design is prone to become dated when customers are finding new alternatives and snazzy new features on the Internet every day. A capital infusion can prove to be as limiting in some cases as too much debt in others, if the result is taking the enterprise too firmly down a wrong path.
With a redefinition of media, it seems, there is also a redefinition of leverage underway, and this term is taking on an added element of downside when sector volatility runs high. The news about AOL’s abandonment of infrastructure-heavy businesses, and its focus on a particularly flexible and market-reactive content operation, was news about a leverage reduction strategy, and will be the subject of another article. This was by way of background.
The debate about net neutrality – which is really about telecom service charges for media content – is not about any kind of neutrality, but about content value. The media business model, in an environment of fragmentation, saturation, and universal access, has been based on traffic acquisition rather than revenue growth – the expectation being that traffic will eventually lead to revenue alternatives in advertising, data mining, and subscriptions. But these revenue alternatives have been inconsistent, slow to develop, and concentrated on a few, while traffic acquisition is an ongoing expense for everyone. So, as the sector revenue line remains weak, the cost items take on increased importance and even urgency. On a certain level – much less extreme – the “neutrality” discussion is thus not devoid of its financial “bailout” motifs… although nobody previously thought to refer to such things as, say, Wall Street neutrality, for example.
Mind you, this is not to pass judgment on either the pros or the cons of net neutrality, particularly in the context described. It is by no means a given that content value should not be preserved, even if by artificial means, even if the problem has been self-inflicted in a race to build traffic by offering the most product to the most users at the most free of charge terms. Because there is a social benefit which should not be overlooked, and we have no choice but to judge the whole grab-bag on its aggregate merits. For who can really draw the line accurately between the benefit of an AP news story and a Perez Hilton gossip column, or the first and 10 millionth iPhone app?
In the meantime, the telecom service providers have real costs and capital expenditures to finance, and with all this “neutrality” talk they should probably not look to their customer base for support. And what then? Should the telecom service providers seek out their own set of subsidies from their suppliers in turn? Since everybody up and down the value chain is getting used to receiving product for free, maybe the telcos should get free electricity? Free fiber-lines and routers? I exaggerate in order to make a point, as I am not unaware of the healthy profit generated by these companies, which are not in need of bailout money.
Still, is the argument then that the burden should be carried by those who can afford it best? Because if so, there are also a few companies on the other side of the bargaining table who could probably afford to pony up: Google (advertising revenue model that works well), Facebook (ad and data mining revenues increasingly working), and Apple (a variant on the subscription model that seems lucrative enough), to name a core group. I recall, however, some political argument along similar lines a while back, with some plumber guy on one side and wealth spreading palaver on the other. That was different.
As in any case should be obvious, the issues are complex, and there is no easy fix to a fundamental economic problem: bridging the gap between price and value through artificial means. In the case of Wall Street, the markets seem to have been saved, depending on how you define that, by massive capital infusions to fill the value void left in the wake of collapsing liquidity. The long term consequences remain to be seen. In the case of media, value pressure from a broken revenue model may be addressed by an artificial cost structure, as described.
But if market forces in the end prevail, that is, if nature prevails over artifice, then the more lasting solution to the media conundrum will be a consolidation between content, distribution, and infrastructure. The expected union of NBC-Universal and Comcast may be a sign of trends to follow.
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A light-weight moving target that can borrow
Although there have been critics and skeptics in abundance as the company was making its case on the PR circuit in the past week, I think AOL could be onto something truly important. The very lightness of its approach is in my opinion massive. Continuing where I left off in my previous post, what I believe AOL is largely up to is a “deleveraging” of its business or, as it were, an easing of the load. In a more dynamic and volatile environment than was the case in the company’s (first) prime, some years ago, this new approach is logical.
What I am referring to, of course, is not financial leverage, but leverage in the sense of legacy infrastructure, systems, and business models that had all run their course and become dated and a hindrance to AOL’s advancement. The ISP business is a depleting asset – although amazingly enough there are still customers out there who are paying for email service – and the search business is really an afterthought in the midst of all the Google vs. Bing rigmarole. Yet both of these products, and others, are just significant enough to have defined AOL as something with really no future. Forgetting the cost aspect of such businesses, the definitional weight alone had to be shed.
On another level, the new content strategy itself and the way in which AOL plans to undertake this single focus, speak to a new method based on flexibility, market-response, and – this is key – variable cost. The system will be a sort of lead generation business, substantially driven by robotic web-scouring for subjects of interest in search queries and related traffic patterns, and the doling out of assignments to freelance writers who will then be payed through a share of the ad revenue generated. In essence, writers will be given leads, and will be paid like salespeople on commission, for closing the deal. Fixed editorial costs are thus converted to a variable expense, and the financial risk is split between the sales platform and the sales person… which is to say, offloaded.
If this strategy were an investment, it would be something like a hedge. No editorial position to speak of, but strictly a response to market interests. No payments to writers, other than strictly based on economic merit. The media company thus becomes a clearing house in essence, a research platform that matches up supply and demand for content, and keeps a revenue slice for its brand, franchise, and back-office systems. If this company were a Wall Street firm, it would be a broker.
And here’s the clinching irony: if the strategy works and the cash flows, a business as described can take on financial leverage. The equity return benefits of doing so are well known.
Disclosure: No positions.
New meaning of leverage in a new sector
Disclosure: No positions
Not price, but value: a discussion (Part 2)
Disclosure: No positions.