FIG trader_

Is Berkshire Hathaway Now a Bargain?

Well, after trouncing his peers (all financials, GE, whomever) in 2006/2007, the geniuses claim to know what "fair value" is on this stock. An even more ludicrous proposition, given the close to $20 billion put to work in acquisitions in the last twelve months or so. A 1 billion plus temporary write down of a credit derivative?? peanuts relative to capital base, and the 10's of billions written off by peers. Given that it is a credit bet, I know where I would put my money. This is a damn cottage industry. One can look at the % declines over the last twenty years, and see how many times it was 20% or greater, and how many years it took to get back to breakeven (in the stock price). Only once was the decline greater (80k to 40K approximately). This is the last time, an institutional money manager has the chance to actually capture real value here buying today taking advantage of "market dislocation" (flight to quality exiting) and seeing todays acquisitions flourish in the next five years to ten years before he croaks. The large institutions that haven't owned the stock should be embarrassed not having owned this for the last five years. Doug Kass has probably covered already

Berkshire Hathaway Appears Undervalued

great, all your numbers suggesting its NPV or intrinsic value are 140 to 180K are as well thought through as is the suggestion that hedge funds will through as the analysis of hedge funds trying to break this up to break it up. When in 2050? Lets see, dozens of family run companies have jumped through hoops to get Buffett to buy their company, and somehow, the board (stuffed with Buffetts friends family and loyalists), are going going to let a few vultures pick a way at it, when they don;t want to be sold to somebody else, and the owners themselves are quite happy where they

Comparison to Berkshire Hathaway Shows Sears Has Hope

If by imagination you mean that anyone with decent track record in early years can be compared with Buffett, than by golly, add any of 1000 PM's or private equity managers to your analysis. Good luck. I guess you can claim credit for having imagination, and waste your time. I will be happy to not be part of that club of imaginative types. The presumption is that Lampert (or any of 1000 others) has either the ability or inclination to buy insurance assets, and run the business properly. For those in the know, there are companies that could potentially be in that circle of champions. LUK, MKL, FFH in ten or twenty years; some insurers, some not. The non-insurers have no float to invest but great investment track records; the insurers have great track records, but few non financial assets. MKL in particular is viewed as a potential peer, and has some 20 years track record, with no non financial assets to support investment (BV) growth. Tom Gaynor, the manager, has done remarkable thing from small base. How is SHLD, anything comparable again????

Comparison to Berkshire Hathaway Shows Sears Has Hope

You still miss the point, and misunderstand Buffett and methods available to him; While I have no opinion on Ed Lampert or SHLD, BRKA, and its earlier years had insurance operations (besides just stock holdings in GEICO; 50% pre acquisition) with available float for investing. Its the earlier stock performance that gave him capital available to continue investing; Free cash from any operations, as good as it may be can't drive the kind of performance that GEICO, especially in mature business. Likewise; SHLD, if it is growing fast, it would more than likely be reinvesting Capex in expansion; Where is capital available for building huge private equity portfolio; Sorry, you have to go back and learn the basics of Buffettology

Comparison to Berkshire Hathaway Shows Sears Has Hope

I don't get it. What do two personalities and two "stock performances" have to do with two companies that are as different as night and day? BRKA is a portfolio of companies and investable "float" form insurance. SHLD is a retailer, with some RealEstate assets? Tell me I missed something.

Why Volatility and Beta Matter

You seem to be looking for data to fit the theory. Price data used to calculate beta (Bloomberg data for example) goes back only five years. Turnover of average portfolio is probably somewhere between 3 and 5, probably materially lower for high beta tech and growth portfolios. Buffett's holding periods is minimum decade, in most cases substantially more (major holdings AXP, KO, WFC,). I can't imagine what assumptions you use to get his portfolio to fit your model. It makes no sense. Sure volatility and beta matter..............., especially for young turks and masters of Universe types, 2 and 20 crowd who play that game for that bonus every quarter, and sell it to the even more ignorant pension funds. But as history and WEB proves (and you don't); long term consistent returns (on capital and equity) will produce better results. The voting and weighing machine analogy is most appropriate here

Markel More Berkshire-like Than Ever

It still doesn't make it "More Berkshhire like than ever"

Markel More Berkshire-like Than Ever

One ought to be more cautious when writing about one's stock recommendations publicly without doing a bit more due dilligence. And readers should also be cautious when the bullish tone surfacing from every corner of the investment scene gets so effusive about MKL, especially after having already risen so extraordinarily (10 to 15 fold over 20 years). Besides thes exceptional performance, stock picking abilities, and "insurance exposure" , its similarities to BRKA end pretty much there, not withstanding the moniker "Baby Berkshire" (otherwise just say its a good insurance underwriter). As the author should make himself aware of, the company doesn't have any "private equity" (i,e, it doesn't own non-insurance businesses that provide cash to the parent). Since Berkshire owns so much of it, where do you find comparability? I'm confdent Gaynor and Markel brothers would agree with WEB when he says "I wouldn' buy our own stock at this price (check for buybacks going forward, doubt you'll see many)

Foreign Investing and Diversification Lessons From Berkshire Hathaway

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Foreign Investing and Diversification Lessons From Berkshire Hathaway

Since the claim is that he is/was the greatest asset allocator ( and I agree its true up until late Nineties), it should be fair to look back and examine why he underperformed (relative to broader measures for markets and earnings). I'm not trying to pick on him, just setting the record stright since often his record goes unexamined (or poorly examined). To end the discussion I'll use his terms to examine his "core holding" $ base assets and focus on "margin of safety". By all measures, there was little margin of safety for the dollar in the late Nineties, as repeated ad nauseum by the # 1 economist Stephen Roach (and aware to any one else that opened their eyes). It is almsot 50% down from highs (versus euro, we are really not referring to emerging markets at all as you suggest), and as he himself admits now, seems in trouble (longer term) unless something is done to drastically reduce twin deficits. Why he didn't act sooner can only be answered by him.

Foreign Investing and Diversification Lessons From Berkshire Hathaway

I won't argue whether he does/did (and will do) a good (in fact great job), but only the point of diversification (and non $ earnings sources). By currency, the $ is overrepresented substantially relative to the US economy's representation globally. Even if one assumes he is "talking" to US based shareholders who save, spend, invest in $. For the most part BRKA investors (mostly wealthy individuals and institutions who don't ever selll the stock) would have benefited more in the last ten years by a more diversified earninngs and balance sheet. Cheers

Foreign Investing and Diversification Lessons From Berkshire Hathaway

With all due respect Mr Considine, the last thing that can be said is that his highness was on the ball with regard to international diversification (please read other comments in seekingalpha. $ sourced earnings are still poorly represented even after adjusting for equity holdings and recent investments) In fact, you misrepresent his views on diversifcation generally. He most certainly does not view portfolio diversification (by sector or industry) as important, and has always insisted on concentrating on areas where he has a "competency" (i.e. insurance/financial services). As far as industry representation he "missed" the drug industry surge through the end of the 90's and "avoided" (rightly or wrongly) technology, telecomm, for decades. He only recently started investing in energy. As far as investing i "stable and well regulated" countries, he is tacitly admitting that the US (net borrower) is mortgaging its future. If he would have acted accordingly (to his stated concerns about the $ and deficits) ten years ago, BRKA would be much higher. Give credit where credit is due, but certainly not where it is not due.

Monte Carlo Analysis of Major Berkshire Hathaway Holdings

Monte Carlo Simulation sounds like a NASCAR video game. Sorry couldn't help it, but with BRKA. It seems such mathematical applications for BRKA would not be in the tradition of his highness, and more than likely is counterproductive. If you wanted to do an analysis of equity holdings, look at top 5 holdings (more than 75% of total), look at his own comments or take out the Ouiji Board. KO; assume he wished he had sold (perhaps bought Pepsi instead in 1998 (do a comp). But as Jim Grant said (to whom would he sell). He will get 4% to 5% volume growth, plus 3%+ dividend (through eternity). AXP he won't care if he gets 5% annually from here for ten years; he's already done so well; same same with WFC. PG will be big winner (JNJ too) as they diaper up China and India. That will get the 10% annual returns on stocks.

Berkshire Hathaway Rescues 34,000 Lloyd's Names In "Win-Win" Situation for Everyone

The Berkshire deal, though barely discussed is reminiscent of General Re deal. He is getting the equivalent of $8.7 billion in assets (reserves) to be put into piggy bank. I haven't seen books, but they are probably Pound-denominated securities (bonds). In one full swoop, he now has diversified his fixed income position without rattling the gilt credit markets. He probably made reasonable guesses on payments/existing liabilities but has reduced his overall business risk. General Re was proven ultimately to be bad business decision though smart attempt to swap BRKA stock in exchange for fixed bonds. BRKA would probably be at 120,000 absent the General Re deal