Don’t need to know who I am. My identity will remain anonymous. I am well educated in Economics and Finance, and I have extensive global work experience in Asia, Europe, and North America. My overall purpose for this blog is to cut through the BS, and provide an independent, unbiased, and... More
TheconstructionindustryhasplayeddecisiveroleinthegrandplantopushtheChineseeconomyforward. Inthepast30yearstherehasbeenunabatedconstructionofnewresidentialbuildings, officetowers, highways, bridges, railways, andfactories. However, thereisnowenoughoverbuiltinChinatomakeaneasystatisticaleye-ballobservationthatsupplygrosslyoverrepresentsutilizeddemand. Infact, itisbecomingquiteclearthatmuchofthecurrentconstructionwillneverseethedaywhenitisused. Therearemanyresidentialunitsinthecityperipheriesthathavebeenunoccupiedformorethanadecade. ThiscanbeverifiedbywalkinginalmostanycityinChinaandcountingthenumberofapartmentswithoutlightson (atnight) orwithoutairconditionerunitsinstalled. ThenewofficetowersinCentralBusinessDistrictofBeijing, Chongqing, orevenShanghaiarealsovastlyunder-occupied. Forexample, perhapsmore than 50%oftheofficetowerspaceinBeijingdoesn’thaveoccupyingtenants. Andwhilecityroadsarecloggedwithtraffic, newtollhighwaysareajoytoridebecausetheyarealmostwithoutcars. Newairportsandotherrecentinfrastructureprojectsarevastlyunderused. Aswell, itisdocumentedthatmanufacturingcapacityinChinaiswellaheadofitselfandalreadyhasenoughovercapacityinmanyindustries (i.e., PVsolarpanels,shipbuilding) toeasilysupplyanysubstantialgrowthfromaworldeconomicrecovery (thatseemsnowtobeadistantlikelihood). YetallthisbegsthequestionastowhydevelopersandmanufacturersalloverChinacontinuetobuildandconstructevenmore? FixedinvestmentaccountsformorethanhalfoftheoverallGDPgrowthinChinaand consumptionaccountsforonlyabout34% oftheoverallGDP (Y = C + I + G + NX). ThismeansthatconsumptionasapercentageofoverallGDPcontinuestosteadilydecline (it was about 55% in the early-1980s and 37% in 2008).
Consumptiondependsfartoomuchonthepurchasesfromasmallricheliteclassconcentratedallwithintheurbancities, andnotnearlyenoughonamiddleclass. ThemiddleclassinChinaremainsrelativelydiminutive, andundersized, anditisdoubtfulthatitwillsignificantlygrowunderthecurrentscenario (ofcorruptionfavoringtheelite; amisallocationofcapitalresources; subduedservicesector; uncertaintyaboutpeoples' financialneedsforthefuture; andalackofwhite-collarjobsforrecentuniversitygraduates - all of which will be discussed later). Anditis even more unrealistictobelieveinthenearfuturethatthemigrantworking-classwillbeaddedtothemiddleclass, orthosewhoremaininthesmallercitiesandtheruralregionswillbeliftedoutofgrindingpoverty.
Let’sbeginbydispellingsomeofthecommonreasonsgiven. SomepeoplehavearguedthatChinesepeopleareparticularlyadeptatsavingtheirincomeoveranextendedtimeusingdiscretionaryincomethatisoftenunderreportedfortaxavoidancereasonsinthegreymarket. Andwhilethisreasonispartlytrue, thisstillmeansthattheaveragecitizeninChinawouldhaveneededtosavemorethanhalftheirincomeforthelast20yearssolelyforthepurposeofbeingabletoputdownthefirstpayment (atleast30% required) onalease (for70years) fortheirnewproperty. Thisreasonneglectstoaccountforthefactthatincomesaremuchhighertodaythan20yearsago, andthatmanypeopleinChinaarealsosavingfortheirownchild’seducation, andtheneedtoputtheirownmoneyasideforunplannedsicknessandtheirretirement. AbetterprovidedreasongivenbyArthur Kroeber,aBeijingconsultant, arguesthatlotsofpeopleinthemajorcitiesalreadyhadproperty (priortothesharppropertypriceincreases), andwerethenbetterpositionedtotradeupdespiteincomebeinginsufficienttosupporttheoverdonepropertyprices. Butthemainproblemwiththisargumentisthatitstilldoesn’texplainwhysomanyofthepropertiesremainempty - manyoftheresidentialunitshavebeenleftunoccupiedformanyyears. Amorelikely, andthoroughexplanationisthatwithoutapropertytaxandwithfewalternativeinvestments, therichinvestorsaremotivatedtostockpileapartmentsonanassumptionthatpropertypriceswillcontinuetogoup. Iftheseresidentialunitshaven’tbeenrentedoutforincome (whichismostlythecase), thentheycanonlygiveapositivereturntotheinvestoronthenotionthatthenextbuyerwillpaymore. However, becausethepricesarewellbeyondthehouseholdincomesthatfirsttimebuyerswilleverbeabletoafford, theresidentialpropertiesarebeingtradedamongtheserichinvestors (whoareoftenthepropertydevelopmentcompaniesthemselves) onthepremiseofcontinuingtofindanotherinvestortopayanevenhigherprice. Thisleavesanyoneinthemiddleclass that are withoutpropertyoutofthemarket. TheonlyreasonableconclusionisthatthisisnothingotherthanaPonzischeme, inwhichsomeoneinthegameofmusicalchairswillbeleftwithoutaseat. Thefamousshort-seller, James Chanoshasdescribeditas ‘atreadmilltohell’ and ‘DubaiX1,000’ forjustifiedreasons.
ExportDependence
China’sgrowthhasandwillstillbeforsometimecoupledtotheexportsector. China’slaborforceandeconomicstrength arelargelydependentonbeinganintermediaryforfinalprocessinginavaluechain. Chinaimportssemi-processedproductsfromneighboringcountries (i.e., Japan, SouthKorea, andTaiwan) andexportsfinalassembledproductsaroundtheworld, withthedominantmarketsintheUnitedStates, theEU, andneighboringAsiancountries. However, these markets have reached near import/consumption saturation in the current economic cycle, and with weak growth are unlikely to substantially increase their purchases in the near future. This leaves China in a quandary as to how to maintain current levels of economic growth from something that will no longer work like it did for the past 30 years. Thus, to summarize, the Chinese economy is far too dependent on fixed investments and a flawed export model that have squeezed consumers out of the market. The government despite saying the opposite are clinging even harder to supporting more investment and exports. This is causing the imbalances to get larger. This then leads us to the next part of the series on how this is unsustainable.
It could be easy to forgive the general public for being unaware that China's economy is unbalanced and unsustainable. Besides the stakeholders (media and the investment institutions) telling us positive hype, the Chinese central government and its leaders covet at every possible opportunity the chance to look unparalleled in the world. This is played out in events like Beijing Olympics, Shanghai Expo, and, Guangzhou Asian Games. The Chinese government showcases the very best that central planning can buy (no matter the cost). For the business visitor or the dignitary it is routine to have lavish banquets be bestowed on them at almost every opportune moment. However, what high-roll spending and over-the-top events do is to create a facade. Because behind the illusion of grandeur on display when either hosting world events or built to awe those coming on a quick stop-over business or holiday excursions to the major cities and package tourist destinations, is shrouded the rest of the nation and people being subjected to environmental degradation; ravaged of resources; and often ignored or neglected, at least until a major tragedy occurs (i.e., earthquake destruction of shoddy constructed schools in rural Sichuan). The current arrangement arguably necessitates maintaining a hierarchy class structure of rule where the state-directed media try to control the minds; the military force protects the most privileged; Hukou tries to keep the unwelcome out of sight and out of mind; and the jobs in factories and construction offer the underclass hope. It is system that has, with a certain acknowledgement, worked well for economic growth in the past 30 years, but it is not suitable for directing a large economy entering the next economic phase that needs to nurture independent business decision-making for selling to a middle class that needs to continue to grow.
TheseriesbeginsbybreakingdownthemisconceptionsthatmanyinthepublichaveabouttheChinagrowthstory, beforeoutliningtheevidenceabouttheunbalancedeconomy, andgivingamoreintimatediscussionaboutwhytheChinesegrowthlevelsareunsustainable. Thisisfollowedupbylookingat broader concerns, before addressing the howandwhystakeholdershavebeenanintricatepartofspinningthiswebofmisinformedhype. And finally, as a conclusion to this series,itisimportanttolookat whataretheimplicationsofhowChina's slow down (or hard landing) could playout on the world economic stage inthe foreseeable future (i.e., commodities).
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Being Misled about China (Part 2): Unbalanced Growth
The construction industry has played decisive role in the grand plan to push the Chinese economy forward. In the past 30 years there has been unabated construction of new residential buildings, office towers, highways, bridges, railways, and factories. However, there is now enough overbuilt in China to make an easy statistical eye-ball observation that supply grossly over represents utilized demand. In fact, it is becoming quite clear that much of the current construction will never see the day when it is used. There are many residential units in the city peripheries that have been unoccupied for more than a decade. This can be verified by walking in almost any city in China and counting the number of apartments without lights on (at night) or without air conditioner units installed. The new office towers in Central Business District of Beijing, Chongqing, or even Shanghai are also vastly under-occupied. For example, perhaps more than 50% of the office tower space in Beijing doesn’t have occupying tenants. And while city roads are clogged with traffic, new toll highways are a joy to ride because they are almost without cars. New airports and other recent infrastructure projects are vastly underused. As well, it is documented that manufacturing capacity in China is well ahead of itself and already has enough overcapacity in many industries (i.e., PV solar panels, shipbuilding) to easily supply any substantial growth from a world economic recovery (that seems now to be a distant likelihood). Yet all this begs the question as to why developers and manufacturers all over China continue to build and construct even more? Fixed investment accounts for more than half of the overall GDP growth in China and consumption accounts for only about 34% of the overall GDP (Y = C + I + G + NX). This means that consumption as a percentage of overall GDP continues to steadily decline (it was about 55% in the early-1980s and 37% in 2008).
Consumption depends far too much on the purchases from a small rich elite class concentrated all within the urban cities, and not nearly enough on a middle class. The middle class in China remains relatively diminutive, and undersized, and it is doubtful that it will significantly grow under the current scenario (of corruption favoring the elite; a misallocation of capital resources; subdued service sector; uncertainty about peoples' financial needs for the future; and a lack of white-collar jobs for recent university graduates - all of which will be discussed later). And it is even more unrealistic to believe in the near future that the migrant working-class will be added to the middle class, or those who remain in the smaller cities and the rural regions will be lifted out of grinding poverty.
China’s growth has and will still be for some time coupled to the export sector. China’s labor force and economic strength are largely dependent on being an intermediary for final processing in a value chain. China imports semi-processed products from neighboring countries (i.e., Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and exports final assembled products around the world, with the dominant markets in the United States, the EU, and neighboring Asian countries. However, these markets have reached near import/consumption saturation in the current economic cycle, and with weak growth are unlikely to substantially increase their purchases in the near future. This leaves China in a quandary as to how to maintain current levels of economic growth from something that will no longer work like it did for the past 30 years.
Thus, to summarize, the Chinese economy is far too dependent on fixed investments and a flawed export model that have squeezed consumers out of the market. The government despite saying the opposite are clinging even harder to supporting more investment and exports. This is causing the imbalances to get larger. This then leads us to the next part of the series on how this is unsustainable.
Being Misled about China (Part 1): Common Misconceptions
Being Misled about China (Introduction)
The series begins by breaking down the misconceptions that many in the public have about the China growth story, before outlining the evidence about the unbalanced economy, and giving a more intimate discussion about why the Chinese growth levels are unsustainable. This is followed up by looking at broader concerns, before addressing the how and why stakeholders have been an intricate part of spinning this web of misinformed hype. And finally, as a conclusion to this series, it is important to look at what are the implications of how China's slow down (or hard landing) could play out on the world economic stage in the foreseeable future (i.e., commodities).