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    <title>Alex Canahuate's Comments</title>
    <description>Alex Canahuate's Comments RSS Syndication from SeekingAlpha.com</description>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/user/5482271/comments</link>
    <item>
      <title>Japan's Economic Woes Are Good For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1126691/comments?source=feed#comment-14054751</link>
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      <content>
        <![CDATA[Yeah you raise a valid point; and frankly...it might come to that.  Hopefully not, but it will be an interesting year to say the least.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2013 13:42:28 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Yeah you raise a valid point; and frankly...it might come to that.  Hopefully not, but it will be an interesting year to say the least.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Japan's Economic Woes Are Good For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1126691/comments?source=feed#comment-14054311</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">14054311</guid>
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        <![CDATA[The BOJ's policy statement indicated that its new stimulus program, slated to commence in January 2014, will include 10 trillion yen worth of monthly purchases of T-Bills.  However, the problem with the BOJ printing yen to purchase foreign currencies is that countries don't want to be seen overtly depressing the value of their currency and get labeled a &quot;currency manipulator.&quot;  The phrase &quot;currency wars&quot; was used back in 2010 when the Fed initiated QE2 (Jim Rickards wrote a book on this very topic).  <br/><br/>Since it is generally accepted that a weaker currency is a boon for exporters, most industrialized nations want weak currencies as a means of exporting their way back to prosperity.  However, if everyone adopts these weak-currency policies you get an actual currency war, with tit-for-tat policy decisions as one nation adopts new measures in response to another nation's.  Already, certain individuals (like Jens Weidmann of the Bundesbank) are concerned Japan may be starting the next round of currency wars, and so with this in mind the Japanese have to be careful that their weak-yen policies don't raise the ire of the rest of the world.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2013 13:32:16 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The BOJ's policy statement indicated that its new stimulus program, slated to commence in January 2014, will include 10 trillion yen worth of monthly purchases of T-Bills.  However, the problem with the BOJ printing yen to purchase foreign currencies is that countries don't want to be seen overtly depressing the value of their currency and get labeled a &quot;currency manipulator.&quot;  The phrase &quot;currency wars&quot; was used back in 2010 when the Fed initiated QE2 (Jim Rickards wrote a book on this very topic).  <br/><br/>Since it is generally accepted that a weaker currency is a boon for exporters, most industrialized nations want weak currencies as a means of exporting their way back to prosperity.  However, if everyone adopts these weak-currency policies you get an actual currency war, with tit-for-tat policy decisions as one nation adopts new measures in response to another nation's.  Already, certain individuals (like Jens Weidmann of the Bundesbank) are concerned Japan may be starting the next round of currency wars, and so with this in mind the Japanese have to be careful that their weak-yen policies don't raise the ire of the rest of the world.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Japan's Economic Woes Are Good For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1126691/comments?source=feed#comment-14043641</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">14043641</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[You raise an interesting point, but the Japanese debt held domestically still constitutes an obligation of the government to pay the owner of the associated bond.  So whether the bond is held domestically or not, the Japanese government will have to pay interest on it and return the principal upon maturity.  That said, regardless of what debt metrics you use, I believe that Abe's weak-yen policies will continue out of necessity and this will erode the yen's status as a safe haven over time.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2013 09:47:01 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[You raise an interesting point, but the Japanese debt held domestically still constitutes an obligation of the government to pay the owner of the associated bond.  So whether the bond is held domestically or not, the Japanese government will have to pay interest on it and return the principal upon maturity.  That said, regardless of what debt metrics you use, I believe that Abe's weak-yen policies will continue out of necessity and this will erode the yen's status as a safe haven over time.  ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Japan's Economic Woes Are Good For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1126691/comments?source=feed#comment-14043231</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">14043231</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I certainly don't disagree with your statements pertaining to China.  However, the crux of the piece was to highlight that Japan's economic situation will precipitate protracted, weak-yen policies.  I believe this is bullish for gold because Japan's policy bias -- when it comes to yen valuation - will be detrimental to the currency's status as a safe haven.  2012 saw gold trade in tandem with risk assets while currencies like the dollar, franc, and yen continued to benefit from safe haven demand during bouts of risk aversion.  While I may not have articulated this as effectively as I had hoped, the implications of Japan's current policy skew will compromise the yen's allure as a safe haven.  As the economic tribulations facing these perceived safe haven currencies continue to pile up, gold should once again become a viable alternative.  Not necessarily as a short-term parking lot for sidelined cash, but as a medium-to-long term buy and hold as investors wait out the pervasive uncertainty.<br/><br/>The problem with gold as a safe haven is that the advent of ETPs and other paper gold products have introduced a high degree of institutional cash and the associated volatility into the gold market.  This price gyration will naturally cause investors to question the safety of allocating funds to gold amidst a flight to quality - especially with a brief time horizon.  From a short-term standpoint, I personally wouldn't recommend gold supplant a cash position, but if one expects to be out of the market for an extended period of time they may want to consider allocating a portion of those funds to gold.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2013 09:36:51 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I certainly don't disagree with your statements pertaining to China.  However, the crux of the piece was to highlight that Japan's economic situation will precipitate protracted, weak-yen policies.  I believe this is bullish for gold because Japan's policy bias -- when it comes to yen valuation - will be detrimental to the currency's status as a safe haven.  2012 saw gold trade in tandem with risk assets while currencies like the dollar, franc, and yen continued to benefit from safe haven demand during bouts of risk aversion.  While I may not have articulated this as effectively as I had hoped, the implications of Japan's current policy skew will compromise the yen's allure as a safe haven.  As the economic tribulations facing these perceived safe haven currencies continue to pile up, gold should once again become a viable alternative.  Not necessarily as a short-term parking lot for sidelined cash, but as a medium-to-long term buy and hold as investors wait out the pervasive uncertainty.<br/><br/>The problem with gold as a safe haven is that the advent of ETPs and other paper gold products have introduced a high degree of institutional cash and the associated volatility into the gold market.  This price gyration will naturally cause investors to question the safety of allocating funds to gold amidst a flight to quality - especially with a brief time horizon.  From a short-term standpoint, I personally wouldn't recommend gold supplant a cash position, but if one expects to be out of the market for an extended period of time they may want to consider allocating a portion of those funds to gold.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Europe's Fifth And Under-Publicized Bailout</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1107781/comments?source=feed#comment-13680441</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">13680441</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Great article, thanks for sharing.  Besides of course the political reluctance in Germany, the article points out another component that will become an significant obstacle which is Merkel's desire for IMF involvement; however, it seems IMF participation may only be predicated on a debt restructuring that Europe's policymakers promised would be a one-off case with Greece.  Throw in the Cypriot President's obstinacy when it comes to the privatization of state-owned assets and it seems we have the makings for a renewed risk-off environment as a Cypriot insolvency looms.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2013 09:25:37 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Great article, thanks for sharing.  Besides of course the political reluctance in Germany, the article points out another component that will become an significant obstacle which is Merkel's desire for IMF involvement; however, it seems IMF participation may only be predicated on a debt restructuring that Europe's policymakers promised would be a one-off case with Greece.  Throw in the Cypriot President's obstinacy when it comes to the privatization of state-owned assets and it seems we have the makings for a renewed risk-off environment as a Cypriot insolvency looms.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Impact Of A Proposed Tax Hike On India's Gold Imports</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1096061/comments?source=feed#comment-13391391</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">13391391</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I agree completely regarding your assessment about the varying shades of negative impact associated with a trade/current account deficit.  The IMF piece I link to in the article above goes on at length discussing the various ways one can measure/interpret current accounts.  <br/><br/>The points you make regarding imported gold are certainly accurate.  More importantly, with a huge swathe of India's population without access to banks or traditional financial services, what other option do they have?  This is a cultural reality that cannot be changed overnight via policy/tax manipulation.  <br/><br/>However, I can also appreciate the Indian government's interest in trying to utilize this ultimately unproductive hoard of gold under mattresses and in closets across India.  I cannot deny, as you said, that gold is an important store of wealth for Indian families - and to that effect, provides a liquid asset in times of need.  That said, the gold merely sitting, collecting dust, could be more productively utilized within the Indian financial system (assuming of course the infrastructure was in place to facilitate such - which at the moment it is not).  <br/><br/>So while I don't mean to submit that gold imports are bad, I will maintain that this capital allocated towards physically hoarded gold could be more productively utilized within the Indian economy if only the financial framework and cultural biases were appropriately positioned.<br/><br/>However, as I indicate in the piece, the Indian government is a long way from incorporating the necessary changes to wean its population off its dependence on gold.  As such, I personally don't anticipate any paradigm shifts in Indian gold demand in the short-to-medium term.  If anything, the Indian government will adopt import taxes and other myopic, short-term approaches to what will prove to be a protracted campaign against physical gold.<br/><br/>I don't disagree that India could penalize other imports, but no other import that I am aware of (besides oil) comes close to representing the percentage of the trade deficit that gold does.  And if the rupee slides lower and gold continues to move higher, gold imports as a percentage of India's trade deficit will continue to balloon.  Given the very real possibility of this development, the Indian government seems to be labeling gold as enemy number one and I doubt it can be persuaded to change course in favor of another policy crusade in the short-to-medium term (despite the cultural and structural obstacles that in my opinion will make the government's success near-impossible in that time frame).]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2013 09:47:31 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I agree completely regarding your assessment about the varying shades of negative impact associated with a trade/current account deficit.  The IMF piece I link to in the article above goes on at length discussing the various ways one can measure/interpret current accounts.  <br/><br/>The points you make regarding imported gold are certainly accurate.  More importantly, with a huge swathe of India's population without access to banks or traditional financial services, what other option do they have?  This is a cultural reality that cannot be changed overnight via policy/tax manipulation.  <br/><br/>However, I can also appreciate the Indian government's interest in trying to utilize this ultimately unproductive hoard of gold under mattresses and in closets across India.  I cannot deny, as you said, that gold is an important store of wealth for Indian families - and to that effect, provides a liquid asset in times of need.  That said, the gold merely sitting, collecting dust, could be more productively utilized within the Indian financial system (assuming of course the infrastructure was in place to facilitate such - which at the moment it is not).  <br/><br/>So while I don't mean to submit that gold imports are bad, I will maintain that this capital allocated towards physically hoarded gold could be more productively utilized within the Indian economy if only the financial framework and cultural biases were appropriately positioned.<br/><br/>However, as I indicate in the piece, the Indian government is a long way from incorporating the necessary changes to wean its population off its dependence on gold.  As such, I personally don't anticipate any paradigm shifts in Indian gold demand in the short-to-medium term.  If anything, the Indian government will adopt import taxes and other myopic, short-term approaches to what will prove to be a protracted campaign against physical gold.<br/><br/>I don't disagree that India could penalize other imports, but no other import that I am aware of (besides oil) comes close to representing the percentage of the trade deficit that gold does.  And if the rupee slides lower and gold continues to move higher, gold imports as a percentage of India's trade deficit will continue to balloon.  Given the very real possibility of this development, the Indian government seems to be labeling gold as enemy number one and I doubt it can be persuaded to change course in favor of another policy crusade in the short-to-medium term (despite the cultural and structural obstacles that in my opinion will make the government's success near-impossible in that time frame).]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fed Policy Meeting Minutes And A Gold Correction</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1095631/comments?source=feed#comment-13390361</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">13390361</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[While I agree that manipulating the overnight deposit rate lower is one of the few measures the Fed has left to try and coerce credit creation, the ECB adopted similar measures in July 2012 and the desired results never materialized.  I haven't checked the broader metrics for European credit creation recently, but in the immediate and intermediate aftermath of the ECB's deposit rate cut, the bank reserves that were pulled out of the ECB's overnight facility were simply reallocated to the ECB's current account.  So while the move did trigger some minor reallocation of bank reserves, the cash was merely shifted from one account to another - but still under the auspices of one of the ECB's deposit facilities.  Again, I have to check current bank cash balances with the ECB, but I imagine if the move had elicited more robust loan growth in the months following the decision, then media and policymakers alike would be trumpeting their success...which as of yet hasn't been the case.<br/><br/>While the Fed may ultimately decide to take similar action, personally I would expect the measure to have the same ineffectual results as the ECB's.  Besides the questionable success of a deposit rate cut, another major consideration of such a move is the effect it would have on U.S. based money markets.  Many of these funds are already having a very difficult time offering positive yields to investors, and a deposit rate cut would complicate those efforts.  If the Fed cuts deposit rates and US banks begin to move reserves away from the central bank, but do not use the funds to underwrite loans, most likely these banks will allocate the reserves to the very same securities preferred by money markets.  This development would pressure yields on these securities lower and exacerbate the challenge for money market funds to provide palatable returns to investors.<br/><br/>So while I agree that a deposit rate cut remains one of the few remaining policy tools at the Fed's disposal, I am not so confident they will utilize such a move in the short-term given these considerations.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2013 09:22:52 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[While I agree that manipulating the overnight deposit rate lower is one of the few measures the Fed has left to try and coerce credit creation, the ECB adopted similar measures in July 2012 and the desired results never materialized.  I haven't checked the broader metrics for European credit creation recently, but in the immediate and intermediate aftermath of the ECB's deposit rate cut, the bank reserves that were pulled out of the ECB's overnight facility were simply reallocated to the ECB's current account.  So while the move did trigger some minor reallocation of bank reserves, the cash was merely shifted from one account to another - but still under the auspices of one of the ECB's deposit facilities.  Again, I have to check current bank cash balances with the ECB, but I imagine if the move had elicited more robust loan growth in the months following the decision, then media and policymakers alike would be trumpeting their success...which as of yet hasn't been the case.<br/><br/>While the Fed may ultimately decide to take similar action, personally I would expect the measure to have the same ineffectual results as the ECB's.  Besides the questionable success of a deposit rate cut, another major consideration of such a move is the effect it would have on U.S. based money markets.  Many of these funds are already having a very difficult time offering positive yields to investors, and a deposit rate cut would complicate those efforts.  If the Fed cuts deposit rates and US banks begin to move reserves away from the central bank, but do not use the funds to underwrite loans, most likely these banks will allocate the reserves to the very same securities preferred by money markets.  This development would pressure yields on these securities lower and exacerbate the challenge for money market funds to provide palatable returns to investors.<br/><br/>So while I agree that a deposit rate cut remains one of the few remaining policy tools at the Fed's disposal, I am not so confident they will utilize such a move in the short-term given these considerations.  ]]>
      </description>
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    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12475451</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12475451</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Unfortunately, I don't know off hand the percentage of non-delivery vs. delivery ETFs; if I had to venture a guess I would say its probably evenly split 50/50 - or perhaps the percentage is skewed a little higher in favor of the delivery-capable ETFs.  While GLD has had an amazing degree of success, it seems the all the newly released ETFs have some mechanism in place for delivery.  That doesn't inherently mean the gold is there, but my guess would be that the delivery-purveying ETFs are in greater numbers.  In terms of dollars invested, I would assume the non-delivery ETFs are leading the pack.  However, I can't say anything for sure without doing further research.  <br/><br/>I can appreciate your point regarding gold prices being hindered by ETFs, but I do ultimately believe that investors will increasingly want to take direct delivery of their metal.  Whether its Enron, MF Global, LIBOR rigging, or any one of a number of instances in which the financial system has displayed its proclivity for institutional favoritism, I think retail investors will become increasingly fatigued with the financial complex as a whole.  This development would make direct ownership of unencumbered assets like gold increasingly attractive - rather than the proxy-ownership provided by ETFs, unallocated storage accounts, and the like.  Time will tell, but I think the second leg of the gold bull market will be driven by physical demand as investors seek shelter from the uncertainty pervasive in broader financial markets.  In our past conversations, we addressed that time conscientious investors prefer ETFs and similar vehicles, but I think a consistent erosion of investor confident in the financial system could reverse that preference.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2012 09:25:40 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Unfortunately, I don't know off hand the percentage of non-delivery vs. delivery ETFs; if I had to venture a guess I would say its probably evenly split 50/50 - or perhaps the percentage is skewed a little higher in favor of the delivery-capable ETFs.  While GLD has had an amazing degree of success, it seems the all the newly released ETFs have some mechanism in place for delivery.  That doesn't inherently mean the gold is there, but my guess would be that the delivery-purveying ETFs are in greater numbers.  In terms of dollars invested, I would assume the non-delivery ETFs are leading the pack.  However, I can't say anything for sure without doing further research.  <br/><br/>I can appreciate your point regarding gold prices being hindered by ETFs, but I do ultimately believe that investors will increasingly want to take direct delivery of their metal.  Whether its Enron, MF Global, LIBOR rigging, or any one of a number of instances in which the financial system has displayed its proclivity for institutional favoritism, I think retail investors will become increasingly fatigued with the financial complex as a whole.  This development would make direct ownership of unencumbered assets like gold increasingly attractive - rather than the proxy-ownership provided by ETFs, unallocated storage accounts, and the like.  Time will tell, but I think the second leg of the gold bull market will be driven by physical demand as investors seek shelter from the uncertainty pervasive in broader financial markets.  In our past conversations, we addressed that time conscientious investors prefer ETFs and similar vehicles, but I think a consistent erosion of investor confident in the financial system could reverse that preference.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12441131</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12441131</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Filipo,<br/><br/>you make an interesting allusion to the goldsmiths of the 17th century.  Mark Skousan's book &quot;The Economics of a Gold Standard&quot; does a good job of covering the development of the goldsmith services and its evolution towards fractional reserve banking and the fiat currency system.  The only difference is that many ETFs provide no delivery of any kind, so any concerns of a &quot;run&quot; are nonexistent.  Shareholders liquidating shares would simply mean a rebalancing of the ETFs outstanding metals contracts (if they are indeed operating in this fashion) as opposed to a more difficult re-orientation of physical supply.  So I can certainly appreciate your point and it's interesting to think about.  I have also read that certain ETF structures, like GLD, are designed to be difficult to audit.  This could facilitate whatever balance sheet chicanery they may or may not be perpetrating.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Dec 2012 10:24:50 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Filipo,<br/><br/>you make an interesting allusion to the goldsmiths of the 17th century.  Mark Skousan's book &quot;The Economics of a Gold Standard&quot; does a good job of covering the development of the goldsmith services and its evolution towards fractional reserve banking and the fiat currency system.  The only difference is that many ETFs provide no delivery of any kind, so any concerns of a &quot;run&quot; are nonexistent.  Shareholders liquidating shares would simply mean a rebalancing of the ETFs outstanding metals contracts (if they are indeed operating in this fashion) as opposed to a more difficult re-orientation of physical supply.  So I can certainly appreciate your point and it's interesting to think about.  I have also read that certain ETF structures, like GLD, are designed to be difficult to audit.  This could facilitate whatever balance sheet chicanery they may or may not be perpetrating.  ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Consumer Spending, Fed Policy And The Implications For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1050511/comments?source=feed#comment-12440561</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12440561</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[It's hard to say exactly how metals will respond.  Traditionally, as a safe haven asset, and historically being subject to an inverse correlation with the US dollar, one would expect higher metal prices in the aftermath and associated dollar weakness of the US going over the fiscal cliff.  Additionally, the economic contraction associated with the sequestration process would ensure Fed policy remains exceedingly loose, a positive for precious metals, as policymakers try to minimize the fallout.<br/><br/>however, 2012 has seen gold and other precious metals increasingly following the directional cues of risk assets, and as such we have frequently seen metal sell off amidst bouts of risk aversion.  If this paradigm is still the primary driver of metal prices in the short-term, we could easily see metals selling off with the broader risk complex following a US cliff dive.  However, even if this should be the case, I would imagine that metals would recover with a higher degree of resilience than equities and risk currencies following a cliff-driven correction - especially considering the low-rate and loose policy implications of going over the cliff.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Dec 2012 10:11:17 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[It's hard to say exactly how metals will respond.  Traditionally, as a safe haven asset, and historically being subject to an inverse correlation with the US dollar, one would expect higher metal prices in the aftermath and associated dollar weakness of the US going over the fiscal cliff.  Additionally, the economic contraction associated with the sequestration process would ensure Fed policy remains exceedingly loose, a positive for precious metals, as policymakers try to minimize the fallout.<br/><br/>however, 2012 has seen gold and other precious metals increasingly following the directional cues of risk assets, and as such we have frequently seen metal sell off amidst bouts of risk aversion.  If this paradigm is still the primary driver of metal prices in the short-term, we could easily see metals selling off with the broader risk complex following a US cliff dive.  However, even if this should be the case, I would imagine that metals would recover with a higher degree of resilience than equities and risk currencies following a cliff-driven correction - especially considering the low-rate and loose policy implications of going over the cliff.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12374571</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12374571</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[The problem the Indian government and RBI face with regards to fighting inflation is that they are reluctant to substantially hike interest rates amidst a broader global slowdown.  Emerging markets have to walk a fine line to balance slowing demand in their export destinations (i.e. US and Europe) and rising inflation as hot money from these low-rate environments (i.e. US and Europe again) are increasingly allocated towards higher yielding currencies and assets.  Although this dynamic is not nearly as pronounced now as it was in 2010 when countries like Brazil had to significantly raise taxes on gains realized by foreigners on Brazilian bonds. However, I agree with you that if the Indian government made combating inflation a priority, rather than protecting its export industries, they could create more substantive demand for the Rupee via domestic deposits.  Unfortunately, most emerging markets are stubbornly defending their export-oriented models rather than embracing domestic consumption (as was a main point made by this article).<br/><br/>If ETFs were not holding the metal, then your observations are certainly accurate.  And maybe current price action while ETF holdings are purportedly at highs does have some implications in this regard.  However, it seems unlikely that all the ETFs are playing the same game...and could get away with it...but either way I agree it is suspicious.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2012 15:09:20 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The problem the Indian government and RBI face with regards to fighting inflation is that they are reluctant to substantially hike interest rates amidst a broader global slowdown.  Emerging markets have to walk a fine line to balance slowing demand in their export destinations (i.e. US and Europe) and rising inflation as hot money from these low-rate environments (i.e. US and Europe again) are increasingly allocated towards higher yielding currencies and assets.  Although this dynamic is not nearly as pronounced now as it was in 2010 when countries like Brazil had to significantly raise taxes on gains realized by foreigners on Brazilian bonds. However, I agree with you that if the Indian government made combating inflation a priority, rather than protecting its export industries, they could create more substantive demand for the Rupee via domestic deposits.  Unfortunately, most emerging markets are stubbornly defending their export-oriented models rather than embracing domestic consumption (as was a main point made by this article).<br/><br/>If ETFs were not holding the metal, then your observations are certainly accurate.  And maybe current price action while ETF holdings are purportedly at highs does have some implications in this regard.  However, it seems unlikely that all the ETFs are playing the same game...and could get away with it...but either way I agree it is suspicious.  ]]>
      </description>
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    <item>
      <title>Consumer Spending, Fed Policy And The Implications For Gold</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1050511/comments?source=feed#comment-12356171</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12356171</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I hesitate to make specific price prognostications due to the many ambiguous variables (especially any governmental response to gold prices in excess of $2,000/oz.).  However, the outlook for gold remains bright and the Fed will ensure it stays that way for the foreseeable future...<br/><br/>That said, I would say that if we saw $5,000/oz gold, such a move would very likely drag silver along for the ride.  Especially considering that the bulk of Americans have yet to take any position in precious metals - so if gold reaches $5,000 many of the middle-to-lower income investors that would eventually enter the market would probably prefer to purchase silver as the perception will be they're getting more &quot;bang for their buck.&quot;  <br/><br/>An additional consideration is that given the comparatively smaller volumes in the silver market, a large influx of capital could effect a more dramatic price spike than a similar cash inflow into the gold market.  Given that much of the upper echelon of investors have taken their positions (in gold, silver, and the like), the subsequent deluge of investment following a gold price surge of this magnitude would probably represent medium-to-small investors that can be reasonably expected to prefer silver.  So I would think its safe to say  that silver would benefit from such a parabolic rise in the gold price.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2012 09:24:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I hesitate to make specific price prognostications due to the many ambiguous variables (especially any governmental response to gold prices in excess of $2,000/oz.).  However, the outlook for gold remains bright and the Fed will ensure it stays that way for the foreseeable future...<br/><br/>That said, I would say that if we saw $5,000/oz gold, such a move would very likely drag silver along for the ride.  Especially considering that the bulk of Americans have yet to take any position in precious metals - so if gold reaches $5,000 many of the middle-to-lower income investors that would eventually enter the market would probably prefer to purchase silver as the perception will be they're getting more &quot;bang for their buck.&quot;  <br/><br/>An additional consideration is that given the comparatively smaller volumes in the silver market, a large influx of capital could effect a more dramatic price spike than a similar cash inflow into the gold market.  Given that much of the upper echelon of investors have taken their positions (in gold, silver, and the like), the subsequent deluge of investment following a gold price surge of this magnitude would probably represent medium-to-small investors that can be reasonably expected to prefer silver.  So I would think its safe to say  that silver would benefit from such a parabolic rise in the gold price.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12324581</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12324581</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[It will certainly be interesting to see the new Basel III requirements unfold as they are..slowly..Incorporated into global banking procedures.  <br/><br/>The gold confiscation exempted jewelry and &quot;collectible&quot; coins.  However, there wasn't an explicit definition as to what constituted collectibles so its kind of nebulous what coins slipped under the wire.  You're right about American jewelry generally having a lower gold content.  I would say 14 and 18 carats is the most common gold content in American Jewelry.  <br/><br/>Considering the dramatic slide the Rupee experienced against the dollar earlier this year, it makes sense that the Indian government wants to minimize gold ownership.  Instead of holding the bulk of their wealth in gold, if Indians held cash Rupees it would create demand for the currency and shore up its valuation relative to other currencies.<br/><br/>You're certainly not along regarding your suspicions about the ETFs.  I have read articles saying that the GLD prospectus specifically states it can substitute physical metal with paper contracts.  I haven't sifted through the legalese myself, so I can't say that I have personally seen such language in GLD's prospectus, but certainly speculation abounds regarding their purported gold holdings.  However, regardless of whether they're holding metal or not, the fact that investors have the perception that buying these shares is a de facto way of buying gold means that there is still substantial investor gold demand in the market.  contrary to what recent price action would lead one to believe...]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Dec 2012 12:56:44 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[It will certainly be interesting to see the new Basel III requirements unfold as they are..slowly..Incorporated into global banking procedures.  <br/><br/>The gold confiscation exempted jewelry and &quot;collectible&quot; coins.  However, there wasn't an explicit definition as to what constituted collectibles so its kind of nebulous what coins slipped under the wire.  You're right about American jewelry generally having a lower gold content.  I would say 14 and 18 carats is the most common gold content in American Jewelry.  <br/><br/>Considering the dramatic slide the Rupee experienced against the dollar earlier this year, it makes sense that the Indian government wants to minimize gold ownership.  Instead of holding the bulk of their wealth in gold, if Indians held cash Rupees it would create demand for the currency and shore up its valuation relative to other currencies.<br/><br/>You're certainly not along regarding your suspicions about the ETFs.  I have read articles saying that the GLD prospectus specifically states it can substitute physical metal with paper contracts.  I haven't sifted through the legalese myself, so I can't say that I have personally seen such language in GLD's prospectus, but certainly speculation abounds regarding their purported gold holdings.  However, regardless of whether they're holding metal or not, the fact that investors have the perception that buying these shares is a de facto way of buying gold means that there is still substantial investor gold demand in the market.  contrary to what recent price action would lead one to believe...]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12295661</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12295661</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[It will certainly be interesting to see how the implementation of Basel III plays out. It doesn't seem many believe it to be overly important - at least given the lack of media attention it has received. However, what I also meant regarding the new Basel III regulations is that I haven't seen any associated institution explicitly detail the fact that gold will be a tier 1 asset. have you? I have only seen these claims made in the newsletters and blogosphere.<br/><br/>With regards to Goldman Sachs' statements, I am constantly baffled by these analysts' decidedly oblivious approach to a healthier US economy. As I believe I have mentioned in past comments, the average maturity of total US debt is a mere 65 months or so. Literally trillions of dollars worth of debt will have to be rolled over in the next five years. Volcker-style rate hikes could have dire implications for the US' financing situation. Add this to the very real fact that we are at the end of a 30-year bull market in Treasuries and safe haven bonds, and the environment will be ripe for a bond selloff. If Treasury yields even go to their historical average (between 3-4% for the 10-year I believe), that would represent tens of billions (if not more) of dollars worth of additional debt servicing costs. As the percentage of tax revenues represented by debt servicing costs balloons, the US' borrower profile becomes increasingly unattractive adding additional upward pressure on Treasury yields. With this in mind, sluggish growth and a sustained low-rate environment are probably the best things for the US government as it (hopefully) determines a path to fiscal discipline and deficit/debt reduction. Considering all this, I don't necessarily think that a healthier US economy and rising interest rates would spell the end of the gold bull market.<br/><br/>I understand what you are saying regarding investors' sentiments not being dented by the 2011 correction in price, but you also have to realize that Americans were not allowed to own gold (with certain exemptions) between 1933-1975. We don't have the same cultural affinity for gold as many other cultures do. With this in mind, I don't think its unreasonable to think that investor confidence with regards to gold can be compromised by volatility and otherwise unexpected trading patterns. however you make a valid point regarding stocks and the fact that people keep coming back despite ever-rising volatility and uncertainty. Your similarly astute point regarding high gold price's enemy rings true, as many of my clients have espoused fears regarding &quot;getting in at the top.&quot; Other than a damaged confidence in gold's safe haven aspects, what other reasons would you speculate could cause the correlation between gold and risk assets we have seen in 2012 (with the exception of recent trading)?<br/><br/>I agree that the current weakness in gold price seems out of place, but now that we're below the psychologically important $1,700 mark, technical selling pressure could push us lower. If we see consecutive closes below $1,680, I don't think its unreasonable to expect gold back in the $1,550-$1,600 range. Time will tell, but I think technical weakness combined with growing risk aversion as the fiscal cliff approaches could ultimately be bearish for gold in the immediate short-term (although you would intuitively assume gold should benefit from the current environment...). what is also strange about the current weakness in gold is that it happens despite record ETF holdings...go figure...]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 05 Dec 2012 17:35:39 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[It will certainly be interesting to see how the implementation of Basel III plays out. It doesn't seem many believe it to be overly important - at least given the lack of media attention it has received. However, what I also meant regarding the new Basel III regulations is that I haven't seen any associated institution explicitly detail the fact that gold will be a tier 1 asset. have you? I have only seen these claims made in the newsletters and blogosphere.<br/><br/>With regards to Goldman Sachs' statements, I am constantly baffled by these analysts' decidedly oblivious approach to a healthier US economy. As I believe I have mentioned in past comments, the average maturity of total US debt is a mere 65 months or so. Literally trillions of dollars worth of debt will have to be rolled over in the next five years. Volcker-style rate hikes could have dire implications for the US' financing situation. Add this to the very real fact that we are at the end of a 30-year bull market in Treasuries and safe haven bonds, and the environment will be ripe for a bond selloff. If Treasury yields even go to their historical average (between 3-4% for the 10-year I believe), that would represent tens of billions (if not more) of dollars worth of additional debt servicing costs. As the percentage of tax revenues represented by debt servicing costs balloons, the US' borrower profile becomes increasingly unattractive adding additional upward pressure on Treasury yields. With this in mind, sluggish growth and a sustained low-rate environment are probably the best things for the US government as it (hopefully) determines a path to fiscal discipline and deficit/debt reduction. Considering all this, I don't necessarily think that a healthier US economy and rising interest rates would spell the end of the gold bull market.<br/><br/>I understand what you are saying regarding investors' sentiments not being dented by the 2011 correction in price, but you also have to realize that Americans were not allowed to own gold (with certain exemptions) between 1933-1975. We don't have the same cultural affinity for gold as many other cultures do. With this in mind, I don't think its unreasonable to think that investor confidence with regards to gold can be compromised by volatility and otherwise unexpected trading patterns. however you make a valid point regarding stocks and the fact that people keep coming back despite ever-rising volatility and uncertainty. Your similarly astute point regarding high gold price's enemy rings true, as many of my clients have espoused fears regarding &quot;getting in at the top.&quot; Other than a damaged confidence in gold's safe haven aspects, what other reasons would you speculate could cause the correlation between gold and risk assets we have seen in 2012 (with the exception of recent trading)?<br/><br/>I agree that the current weakness in gold price seems out of place, but now that we're below the psychologically important $1,700 mark, technical selling pressure could push us lower. If we see consecutive closes below $1,680, I don't think its unreasonable to expect gold back in the $1,550-$1,600 range. Time will tell, but I think technical weakness combined with growing risk aversion as the fiscal cliff approaches could ultimately be bearish for gold in the immediate short-term (although you would intuitively assume gold should benefit from the current environment...). what is also strange about the current weakness in gold is that it happens despite record ETF holdings...go figure...]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12269411</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12269411</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I appreciate your kind words.  It is utterly ridiculous for markets and euro sentiments to be cheered by the fact that Greece plans to buyback some of its bonds for 32-34% of their face value...any private creditor participants are probably only doing so for fear or receiving none of their money back down the road. In my opinion, a successful buyback program with full participation is actually an incredibly bearish development as it indicates that these participants would prefer to receive a little more than 30% of their money back rather than hold the bonds until maturity.  Such turnout at Greece's buyback gives a pretty clear view into the creditor sentiments regarding Greece's ability to stay above water.  If there was broader confidence that Greece can navigate the waters of borderline insolvency, I think that would result in low participation as creditors figured they would get the bulk of their funds back upon maturity of the bonds in question.  However, despite euphoria in the aftermath of the Greek announcement, it does appear the euro has met some solid resistance at 1.315 so it will be interesting to see if the &quot;positive&quot; sentiments regarding the success of Greece's upcoming bond buyback will give the euro strength to push past this level.<br/><br/>I hadn't seen the news about European banks trying to delay Basel III implementation, thanks for the link.  I have seen the seeking alpha article on Basel III allowing gold as tier one capital, and while I will admit I have not searched as thoroughly as possible, at first glance I could not find any content from the BIS, Basel Committee, or similar institution corroborating this development.  The only media outlets to pickup that story have been newsletters and gold bloggers...but I would love to see such a statement &quot;straight from the horses mouth.&quot;  <br/><br/>Assuming gold will indeed become categorized as tier one capital, I don't necessarily believe banks will be scrambling for the metal.  I do think that banks will more aggressively pursue metal deposit accounts because they can hypothecate and rehypothecate client metal.  That said, I don't know if banks would want their internal reserves held in gold given the inherent volatility in the gold market.  Substantial spikes and precipitous falls that gold prices are inclined to have would dramatically complicate maintaining a static balance of reserves.  While gold may not benefit from a deluge of new bank demand, gold will still benefit from this development given the additional credence it provides to the &quot;gold is money&quot; mantra.<br/><br/>I think you're right regarding the frustration of taxpayers being relatively incapable of stopping this progression of events given politicians' ability to scare them into thinking &quot;this is what's best.&quot;  That said, this creates an incredibly conducive environment for despots and demagogues.  Greece's Golden Dawn is just one of a number of emerging nationalist parties across Europe that are realizing better and better turnouts at parliamentary votes...Golden Dawn's success, and the success of sympathetic parties, almost forced a Greek default when Greece's parliament could not form a coalition government.  As things get worse...what happens when this style of party is capable of forming its own majority?<br/><br/>I agree that historically gold and dollar moved inversely as one was a hedge against the other.  That said, I think we are slowly moving away from that dynamic and don't know when we can expect a more traditional inverse trading pattern between the two.  In the advent of Greek concerns in 2010, we saw strong gold and strong dollar as a result of safe haven demand.  However, the rally and subsequent fall in gold prices we saw in 2011 seems to have dented many investors' perceptions regarding gold as a safe haven.  Increasingly, gold moves to the ebb and flow of the broader risk asset complex.  However, as ridiculous as it is given the fiscal concerns in the U.S., I think we will see strong dollar/strong gold again as European concerns take center stage (assuming US politicians can just kick the fiscal can down the road - and as we have seen...that's about the only thing they are good for).]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 05 Dec 2012 09:11:54 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I appreciate your kind words.  It is utterly ridiculous for markets and euro sentiments to be cheered by the fact that Greece plans to buyback some of its bonds for 32-34% of their face value...any private creditor participants are probably only doing so for fear or receiving none of their money back down the road. In my opinion, a successful buyback program with full participation is actually an incredibly bearish development as it indicates that these participants would prefer to receive a little more than 30% of their money back rather than hold the bonds until maturity.  Such turnout at Greece's buyback gives a pretty clear view into the creditor sentiments regarding Greece's ability to stay above water.  If there was broader confidence that Greece can navigate the waters of borderline insolvency, I think that would result in low participation as creditors figured they would get the bulk of their funds back upon maturity of the bonds in question.  However, despite euphoria in the aftermath of the Greek announcement, it does appear the euro has met some solid resistance at 1.315 so it will be interesting to see if the &quot;positive&quot; sentiments regarding the success of Greece's upcoming bond buyback will give the euro strength to push past this level.<br/><br/>I hadn't seen the news about European banks trying to delay Basel III implementation, thanks for the link.  I have seen the seeking alpha article on Basel III allowing gold as tier one capital, and while I will admit I have not searched as thoroughly as possible, at first glance I could not find any content from the BIS, Basel Committee, or similar institution corroborating this development.  The only media outlets to pickup that story have been newsletters and gold bloggers...but I would love to see such a statement &quot;straight from the horses mouth.&quot;  <br/><br/>Assuming gold will indeed become categorized as tier one capital, I don't necessarily believe banks will be scrambling for the metal.  I do think that banks will more aggressively pursue metal deposit accounts because they can hypothecate and rehypothecate client metal.  That said, I don't know if banks would want their internal reserves held in gold given the inherent volatility in the gold market.  Substantial spikes and precipitous falls that gold prices are inclined to have would dramatically complicate maintaining a static balance of reserves.  While gold may not benefit from a deluge of new bank demand, gold will still benefit from this development given the additional credence it provides to the &quot;gold is money&quot; mantra.<br/><br/>I think you're right regarding the frustration of taxpayers being relatively incapable of stopping this progression of events given politicians' ability to scare them into thinking &quot;this is what's best.&quot;  That said, this creates an incredibly conducive environment for despots and demagogues.  Greece's Golden Dawn is just one of a number of emerging nationalist parties across Europe that are realizing better and better turnouts at parliamentary votes...Golden Dawn's success, and the success of sympathetic parties, almost forced a Greek default when Greece's parliament could not form a coalition government.  As things get worse...what happens when this style of party is capable of forming its own majority?<br/><br/>I agree that historically gold and dollar moved inversely as one was a hedge against the other.  That said, I think we are slowly moving away from that dynamic and don't know when we can expect a more traditional inverse trading pattern between the two.  In the advent of Greek concerns in 2010, we saw strong gold and strong dollar as a result of safe haven demand.  However, the rally and subsequent fall in gold prices we saw in 2011 seems to have dented many investors' perceptions regarding gold as a safe haven.  Increasingly, gold moves to the ebb and flow of the broader risk asset complex.  However, as ridiculous as it is given the fiscal concerns in the U.S., I think we will see strong dollar/strong gold again as European concerns take center stage (assuming US politicians can just kick the fiscal can down the road - and as we have seen...that's about the only thing they are good for).]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12229951</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12229951</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[No problem at all.  I couldn't agree more with your observations regarding Greece and more specifically the misallocation of funds to an unproductive economy.  The austerity/bailout route has arguably failed, with Greece's debt/GDP ratio actually growing as a result of the economic contractions associated with austerity.  It seems now that the reworked plan for Greece targets a debt/GDP ratio of 124% by 2020.  I have to do some research, but I seem to recall the coerced restructuring of Greek debt that took place a while back (in which private creditors took a 60-70% haircut) was supposed to bring Greece's debt/GDP ratio to 120%...as mentioned earlier, I guess the economic contraction due to austerity measures made that impossible.<br/><br/>Again, I have to do the research, but I am fairly confident that the terms of Ireland and Portugal's bailouts dictates a return to normal funding operations for both countries in 2013.  Given ongoing Greek concerns and broader risk aversion, this return to markets may not be feasible.  Time will tell, but if these nations are similarly subjected to unsustainable high funding costs, a second bailout for each will probably be required.  <br/><br/>Combine this with the recent credit rating downgrade of the ESM and EFSF and we're looking at an increasingly untenable situation.  And as you aptly pointed out, the misallocation of funds is not doing anything to help the &quot;stronger&quot; northern economies; with Germany releasing a string of increasingly disconcerting economic metrics that all point towards a recession.  How many quarters of recession can taxpayers in Germany, Holland, Finland, Austria, etc. withstand before they start clamoring for an end to the bailouts?<br/><br/>All things considered, it is still hard to say for sure how things will play out - especially within the context of gold.  At least in US dollar terms, gold price action in 2012 was highly correlated with similar moves in the risk asset complex.  Given this consideration, should further Euro Zone instability cause a broader selloff in financial markets, we could ultimately see gold come down along with most other assets (the US dollar, among other safe haven currencies, would probably be a top performer).    This situation could look very similar to 2008 when the metals space experienced substantial losses along with equities; the difference, however, is that metals bounced back following the collapse with a much higher degree of resilience.<br/><br/>However, a major distinction between now and then is that a possible collapse - or some other euro-oriented tribulation - could precipitate a wave of Europeans purchasing gold as the nature of the crisis will be the solvency of the monetary union.  Simply going to cash, as is the common methodology, would not be a viable solution in this instance.  This reality could potentially support gold despite a widespread selloff in most asset classes that may have normally included gold. ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Dec 2012 09:45:54 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[No problem at all.  I couldn't agree more with your observations regarding Greece and more specifically the misallocation of funds to an unproductive economy.  The austerity/bailout route has arguably failed, with Greece's debt/GDP ratio actually growing as a result of the economic contractions associated with austerity.  It seems now that the reworked plan for Greece targets a debt/GDP ratio of 124% by 2020.  I have to do some research, but I seem to recall the coerced restructuring of Greek debt that took place a while back (in which private creditors took a 60-70% haircut) was supposed to bring Greece's debt/GDP ratio to 120%...as mentioned earlier, I guess the economic contraction due to austerity measures made that impossible.<br/><br/>Again, I have to do the research, but I am fairly confident that the terms of Ireland and Portugal's bailouts dictates a return to normal funding operations for both countries in 2013.  Given ongoing Greek concerns and broader risk aversion, this return to markets may not be feasible.  Time will tell, but if these nations are similarly subjected to unsustainable high funding costs, a second bailout for each will probably be required.  <br/><br/>Combine this with the recent credit rating downgrade of the ESM and EFSF and we're looking at an increasingly untenable situation.  And as you aptly pointed out, the misallocation of funds is not doing anything to help the &quot;stronger&quot; northern economies; with Germany releasing a string of increasingly disconcerting economic metrics that all point towards a recession.  How many quarters of recession can taxpayers in Germany, Holland, Finland, Austria, etc. withstand before they start clamoring for an end to the bailouts?<br/><br/>All things considered, it is still hard to say for sure how things will play out - especially within the context of gold.  At least in US dollar terms, gold price action in 2012 was highly correlated with similar moves in the risk asset complex.  Given this consideration, should further Euro Zone instability cause a broader selloff in financial markets, we could ultimately see gold come down along with most other assets (the US dollar, among other safe haven currencies, would probably be a top performer).    This situation could look very similar to 2008 when the metals space experienced substantial losses along with equities; the difference, however, is that metals bounced back following the collapse with a much higher degree of resilience.<br/><br/>However, a major distinction between now and then is that a possible collapse - or some other euro-oriented tribulation - could precipitate a wave of Europeans purchasing gold as the nature of the crisis will be the solvency of the monetary union.  Simply going to cash, as is the common methodology, would not be a viable solution in this instance.  This reality could potentially support gold despite a widespread selloff in most asset classes that may have normally included gold. ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12193761</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12193761</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for sharing this article.  While mr. van Eeden makes an articulate argument, the reality is that perception is everything - if broader markets anticipate higher inflation, despite the current reality, prices will manifest as a result of this anticipation.  Inflation rates have certainly remained muted as the result of widespread deleveraging.  In most of the graphs provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (<a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/WDRBOn'>http://bit.ly/WDRBOn</a>) detailing Americans' indebtedness in relation to income, almost all the metrics highlight a preference for paying down debts as opposed to consumption.    Similarly, the velocity of money as detailed by a number of different metrics at the St. Louis Fed's site (<a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/VqDhNC'>http://bit.ly/VqDhNC</a>) are at record lows.  This sluggish flow of cash through the US economy vindicates Mr. van Eeden's arguments about muted inflation but does not necessarily mean that inflationary concerns are unfounded.<br/><br/>Mr. van Eeden indicates that the Fed can destroy the newly printed dollars by selling balance sheet assets back into the market - however, there is a very real restriction the Fed will have to consider.  We are invariably at the end of a 30 year bull market in safe haven bonds, namely Treasuries.  As Treasuries comprise a significant portion of the Fed's balance sheet, substantive Fed divestment from this particular asset could be a possible catalyst for other investors to similarly exit the position.  With the US government's funding picture less-than-favorable (with an average maturity on outstanding marketable debt approximately 65 months), it has a staggering amount of debt to roll over in the next 5 years.  It is unlikely that the Fed would take any action to precipitate a Treasury selloff and subject the US government to increasingly unsustainable borrowing costs.<br/><br/>That said, as he indicated 2013 will probably also be characterized by investor risk aversion.  With this in mind, Treasuries may enjoy sufficient demand as a result to allow the Fed the opportunity to divest some of its Treasury positions to help &quot;destroy&quot; newly printed dollars in an effort to mitigate any rising inflationary pressures we might experience down the road.  Ultimately, the Fed's ability to stem inflation via balance sheet divestment rests on the broader Treasury demand present in the market at the time inflation starts to become a greater concern.  <br/><br/>The other traditional measure to combat inflation is raising interest rates.  However, given the slow pace of the US recovery, the Fed will probably be reluctant to hike interest rates in advance of a more substantive US recovery.  As such, the environment - from both an interest rate and future Treasury demand standpoint - presents pertinent risks to the Fed's capacity to combat rising inflation.  I believe one could argue much of gold's current valuation accounts for these very real considerations when it comes time for the Fed to deliberate policy tightening.<br/><br/>Outside of any inflationary concerns, I would also argue that US citizens still have reasons to own gold.  The reality is that the entire financial system has consistently given the retail investor base reason for discontent.  Between high-frequency trading and associated market volatility, massive bank losses on exotic investments, and institutional collusion as evidenced LIBOR rigging, have given regular investors countless reasons to distrust the traditional financial complex and prefer to have a least a portion of their portfolios exposed to an asset unencumbered by the pervasive counter-party risk that characterizes conventional investments.  Sovereign indebtedness and untenable solvency similarly provide legitimate and observable reasons for US citizens to continue demanding gold.<br/><br/>By many standard metrics, one could argue gold is overvalued.  However, there are many concerns prevalent in the world economy that may not be easy to quantify but exist none-the-less that will continue to erode investor confidence in the traditional investment complex.  The resulting reallocation of capital that ensues will result in large sums of money being re-directed to unconventional investments; it is not unreasonable to think one such investment will be gold. ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2012 10:05:25 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for sharing this article.  While mr. van Eeden makes an articulate argument, the reality is that perception is everything - if broader markets anticipate higher inflation, despite the current reality, prices will manifest as a result of this anticipation.  Inflation rates have certainly remained muted as the result of widespread deleveraging.  In most of the graphs provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (<a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/WDRBOn'>http://bit.ly/WDRBOn</a>) detailing Americans' indebtedness in relation to income, almost all the metrics highlight a preference for paying down debts as opposed to consumption.    Similarly, the velocity of money as detailed by a number of different metrics at the St. Louis Fed's site (<a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://bit.ly/VqDhNC'>http://bit.ly/VqDhNC</a>) are at record lows.  This sluggish flow of cash through the US economy vindicates Mr. van Eeden's arguments about muted inflation but does not necessarily mean that inflationary concerns are unfounded.<br/><br/>Mr. van Eeden indicates that the Fed can destroy the newly printed dollars by selling balance sheet assets back into the market - however, there is a very real restriction the Fed will have to consider.  We are invariably at the end of a 30 year bull market in safe haven bonds, namely Treasuries.  As Treasuries comprise a significant portion of the Fed's balance sheet, substantive Fed divestment from this particular asset could be a possible catalyst for other investors to similarly exit the position.  With the US government's funding picture less-than-favorable (with an average maturity on outstanding marketable debt approximately 65 months), it has a staggering amount of debt to roll over in the next 5 years.  It is unlikely that the Fed would take any action to precipitate a Treasury selloff and subject the US government to increasingly unsustainable borrowing costs.<br/><br/>That said, as he indicated 2013 will probably also be characterized by investor risk aversion.  With this in mind, Treasuries may enjoy sufficient demand as a result to allow the Fed the opportunity to divest some of its Treasury positions to help &quot;destroy&quot; newly printed dollars in an effort to mitigate any rising inflationary pressures we might experience down the road.  Ultimately, the Fed's ability to stem inflation via balance sheet divestment rests on the broader Treasury demand present in the market at the time inflation starts to become a greater concern.  <br/><br/>The other traditional measure to combat inflation is raising interest rates.  However, given the slow pace of the US recovery, the Fed will probably be reluctant to hike interest rates in advance of a more substantive US recovery.  As such, the environment - from both an interest rate and future Treasury demand standpoint - presents pertinent risks to the Fed's capacity to combat rising inflation.  I believe one could argue much of gold's current valuation accounts for these very real considerations when it comes time for the Fed to deliberate policy tightening.<br/><br/>Outside of any inflationary concerns, I would also argue that US citizens still have reasons to own gold.  The reality is that the entire financial system has consistently given the retail investor base reason for discontent.  Between high-frequency trading and associated market volatility, massive bank losses on exotic investments, and institutional collusion as evidenced LIBOR rigging, have given regular investors countless reasons to distrust the traditional financial complex and prefer to have a least a portion of their portfolios exposed to an asset unencumbered by the pervasive counter-party risk that characterizes conventional investments.  Sovereign indebtedness and untenable solvency similarly provide legitimate and observable reasons for US citizens to continue demanding gold.<br/><br/>By many standard metrics, one could argue gold is overvalued.  However, there are many concerns prevalent in the world economy that may not be easy to quantify but exist none-the-less that will continue to erode investor confidence in the traditional investment complex.  The resulting reallocation of capital that ensues will result in large sums of money being re-directed to unconventional investments; it is not unreasonable to think one such investment will be gold. ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12069111</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12069111</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I am inclined to agree with your sentiments regarding the mainstream media. The link below to a Business Insider mentions curious COMEX trade that may have precipitated yesterday's fall in gold prices: <br/><br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://read.bi/V8bQ5I'>http://read.bi/V8bQ5I</a><br/><br/>However the link below to an article by the Associated Press, then picked up by the Washington Post references the price fall but makes no mention of COMEX trade:<br/><br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://wapo.st/Rl3Suk'>http://wapo.st/Rl3Suk</a><br/><br/>By no means conclusive, but this disparity in coverage does speak to the dynamic you reference in your comment.  Unfortunately I don't have time to troll the other mainstream media outlet at this point to see if they similarly avoided the topic of COMEX positions, but if I had to speculate I would imagine they are similarly devoid of this content.<br/><br/>With regards to your situation, I couldn't agree more and would certainly be in similar positions.  That said, I would also be interested to hear your take on the Norwegian kroner and Swedish krona.  My FX trades have benefited immensely from the flow of euro deposits to these currencies.  I would imagine they could provide an attractive option for diversification that can help mitigate your overall exposure to gold or any other concentrated positions you may have.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Nov 2012 09:51:37 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I am inclined to agree with your sentiments regarding the mainstream media. The link below to a Business Insider mentions curious COMEX trade that may have precipitated yesterday's fall in gold prices: <br/><br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://read.bi/V8bQ5I'>http://read.bi/V8bQ5I</a><br/><br/>However the link below to an article by the Associated Press, then picked up by the Washington Post references the price fall but makes no mention of COMEX trade:<br/><br/><a rel='nofollow' target='_blank' href='http://wapo.st/Rl3Suk'>http://wapo.st/Rl3Suk</a><br/><br/>By no means conclusive, but this disparity in coverage does speak to the dynamic you reference in your comment.  Unfortunately I don't have time to troll the other mainstream media outlet at this point to see if they similarly avoided the topic of COMEX positions, but if I had to speculate I would imagine they are similarly devoid of this content.<br/><br/>With regards to your situation, I couldn't agree more and would certainly be in similar positions.  That said, I would also be interested to hear your take on the Norwegian kroner and Swedish krona.  My FX trades have benefited immensely from the flow of euro deposits to these currencies.  I would imagine they could provide an attractive option for diversification that can help mitigate your overall exposure to gold or any other concentrated positions you may have.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12046221</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12046221</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[You make a good point regarding GATA, but I also think you hit on the crux of the issue regarding the nonexistent price reaction: mainstream media did not pickup the story.  And as you indicated, despite its 11-year bull market, gold is still relatively in the shadows in most financial circles.  However, things are changing.  Where once Bloomberg never  discussed gold, now you can see gold prices scrolling along the marquee with oil and the major stock indices.  Where once asset managers dismissed gold as a barbarous relic on CNBC, they are increasingly advocating at least a portion of one's portfolio be dedicated to gold.  I wouldn't say we're there yet, but I do believe gold is making its way into the spotlight.<br/><br/>That said, mainstream media (especially in the US) is dominated by a few conglomerates and if - for whatever reason - they do not want to propagate investments in gold, they can influence their programming accordingly.<br/><br/>With regards to the tax considerations, I couldn't agree with you more.  I just wish the U.S. had such favorable tax treatment when it comes to gold.  Here, ownership is quickly losing any anonymity it once had and any profits are subject to a higher tax rate than with stocks (gold is subject to a 28% capital gains rate while stocks are subject to a long-term capital gains rate of 15%...although all this could change depending on how the fiscal cliff is handled).<br/><br/>Given the nature of your financial environment, and your propensity to prefer gold, you are in a different situation than me.  I can completely understand why you would be profit-oriented if gold represents a more significant portion of your portfolio.  And I agree regarding human nature and the desire for profits...it does take some discipline to detach yourself but it is easier for me because gold only represents a small allocation within my portfolio.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2012 15:10:11 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[You make a good point regarding GATA, but I also think you hit on the crux of the issue regarding the nonexistent price reaction: mainstream media did not pickup the story.  And as you indicated, despite its 11-year bull market, gold is still relatively in the shadows in most financial circles.  However, things are changing.  Where once Bloomberg never  discussed gold, now you can see gold prices scrolling along the marquee with oil and the major stock indices.  Where once asset managers dismissed gold as a barbarous relic on CNBC, they are increasingly advocating at least a portion of one's portfolio be dedicated to gold.  I wouldn't say we're there yet, but I do believe gold is making its way into the spotlight.<br/><br/>That said, mainstream media (especially in the US) is dominated by a few conglomerates and if - for whatever reason - they do not want to propagate investments in gold, they can influence their programming accordingly.<br/><br/>With regards to the tax considerations, I couldn't agree with you more.  I just wish the U.S. had such favorable tax treatment when it comes to gold.  Here, ownership is quickly losing any anonymity it once had and any profits are subject to a higher tax rate than with stocks (gold is subject to a 28% capital gains rate while stocks are subject to a long-term capital gains rate of 15%...although all this could change depending on how the fiscal cliff is handled).<br/><br/>Given the nature of your financial environment, and your propensity to prefer gold, you are in a different situation than me.  I can completely understand why you would be profit-oriented if gold represents a more significant portion of your portfolio.  And I agree regarding human nature and the desire for profits...it does take some discipline to detach yourself but it is easier for me because gold only represents a small allocation within my portfolio.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12031501</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12031501</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[you make very logical conclusions, especially regarding the differences between gold and silver.  I also can't disagree with your observations regarding the change in Western sentiments regarding the preferred methods of gold ownership.  Western Europe and most definitely in the U.S., we have become a time conscientious society - we want things fast and cheap.  With this in mind, the preference for ETFs and similar gold-backed paper products is plain to see.  <br/><br/>However, the real question is: in the advent of concerns regarding availability, will these people begin trying to take delivery?  while I can't disagree that there is a new social paradigm favoring electronically owned gold - I still think there would be a panic if word got out these institutions didn't own what they said.  <br/><br/>I think the major consideration in this vein is will delivery delays, outlandish premiums, and any other prohibitive measures taken by depositories be sufficient to waylay individuals looking to take delivery of their gold.  Under normal circumstance, you are definitely right in that ETFs and their ilk provide powerful features of persuasion to keep people from wanting their gold.  But if the general public increasingly hears of fraudulent storage practices and nonexistent gold piles, I don't know if its safe to assume people will benignly accept that their metal is safe.  I think everyone will increasingly clamor for delivery and this wave of abrupt physical demand could be sufficient to topple the &quot;house of cards.&quot;<br/><br/>However, for this to take place there has to be a catalyst that precipitates the surge in physical demand.  I don't know what that would be, and it might never occur.  If that's the case, than I would agree with you that Westerners will probably remain content with their paper-backed metal holdings.<br/><br/>Outside of any possible supply squeezes, I believe the most likely scenario to unfold that could push gold higher despite would-be manipulators' best efforts are rising mining costs as you mentioned earlier.<br/><br/>However, to discuss the matter within a different context - the motivations behind someone's investments in gold can also change the approach.  Personally, I allocate a percentage of my portfolio to gold as a core holding - insurance against the worst case scenarios (and of course continued monetary debasement of the fiat currencies).  I don't purchase gold for speculative or profit-oriented reasons.  My speculative positions in metals (and they're small because I prefer to speculate in the FX markets) are in platinum and palladium.  I like silver as well, and it has an allocation in my portfolio also similar to that of platinum/palladium.  But the point I am trying to make is that depending on the nature of your gold purchases, it may not matter if the price rises or falls.  This sounds contrary to what you would expect to see in an investment forum, but I believe that gold can play a role in one's portfolio above and beyond being a profit center.<br/><br/>I very much appreciate your comments.  This type of back and forth is the best way to formulate and vet ideas.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2012 09:18:05 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[you make very logical conclusions, especially regarding the differences between gold and silver.  I also can't disagree with your observations regarding the change in Western sentiments regarding the preferred methods of gold ownership.  Western Europe and most definitely in the U.S., we have become a time conscientious society - we want things fast and cheap.  With this in mind, the preference for ETFs and similar gold-backed paper products is plain to see.  <br/><br/>However, the real question is: in the advent of concerns regarding availability, will these people begin trying to take delivery?  while I can't disagree that there is a new social paradigm favoring electronically owned gold - I still think there would be a panic if word got out these institutions didn't own what they said.  <br/><br/>I think the major consideration in this vein is will delivery delays, outlandish premiums, and any other prohibitive measures taken by depositories be sufficient to waylay individuals looking to take delivery of their gold.  Under normal circumstance, you are definitely right in that ETFs and their ilk provide powerful features of persuasion to keep people from wanting their gold.  But if the general public increasingly hears of fraudulent storage practices and nonexistent gold piles, I don't know if its safe to assume people will benignly accept that their metal is safe.  I think everyone will increasingly clamor for delivery and this wave of abrupt physical demand could be sufficient to topple the &quot;house of cards.&quot;<br/><br/>However, for this to take place there has to be a catalyst that precipitates the surge in physical demand.  I don't know what that would be, and it might never occur.  If that's the case, than I would agree with you that Westerners will probably remain content with their paper-backed metal holdings.<br/><br/>Outside of any possible supply squeezes, I believe the most likely scenario to unfold that could push gold higher despite would-be manipulators' best efforts are rising mining costs as you mentioned earlier.<br/><br/>However, to discuss the matter within a different context - the motivations behind someone's investments in gold can also change the approach.  Personally, I allocate a percentage of my portfolio to gold as a core holding - insurance against the worst case scenarios (and of course continued monetary debasement of the fiat currencies).  I don't purchase gold for speculative or profit-oriented reasons.  My speculative positions in metals (and they're small because I prefer to speculate in the FX markets) are in platinum and palladium.  I like silver as well, and it has an allocation in my portfolio also similar to that of platinum/palladium.  But the point I am trying to make is that depending on the nature of your gold purchases, it may not matter if the price rises or falls.  This sounds contrary to what you would expect to see in an investment forum, but I believe that gold can play a role in one's portfolio above and beyond being a profit center.<br/><br/>I very much appreciate your comments.  This type of back and forth is the best way to formulate and vet ideas.  ]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12014711</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12014711</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Well put.  You make a valid argument and I agree with your points but there are a few additional considerations.  Whether a supply shortage is real or perceived, it can have dramatic implications for prices despite the measures you indicate the manipulators could employ.  Silver prices in the late 70's spiked in large part due to the Hunt brothers taking delivery of contracts that are generally never exercised.  Whether or not they could actually have &quot;collapsed the silver market&quot; was not nearly as important as the perception people had that it was possible.<br/><br/>If there is any concern about availability, people will begin trying to take delivery of the huge amounts of gold stored on behalf of clients by innumerable banks, depositories, and the like.  Delayed delivery, excessive fees, or any other measures to inhibit people's ability to take delivery of gold would cause a media frenzy.  Assuming people begin to snatch up whatever available physical supply is left, dealers and wholesalers will have to raise premiums out of necessity as opposed to some collusion with manipulators.  Inexorably rising premiums on physical metal would provide yet another stark example of a disconnect between the paper price of gold and the cost for the real thing.  Even if spot prices do not move dramatically as a result of this, people's end cost to purchase physical gold will.  Once traders and regular speculators catch wind of this, they will go long gold and the cost to any manipulators would correspondingly rise.  Perhaps they could hold back the tide by taking ever-larger short positions, but it would be hard for them to reconcile the uncharacteristically high premiums for physical metal.  So long as this is the case, speculators/investors going long gold will have reason to remain bullish on the price outlook, giving them the confidence to sustain their positions even while gold prices do not shoot higher right away.  While this isn't ironclad evidence that the market will pursue its &quot;natural progression,&quot; I would maintain that a supply shortage would pose greater problems to any would-be manipulators than you indicate.  <br/><br/>I think your observation regarding mine production costs is especially astute.  This dynamic plays into a broader theme I would submit as a reason for the market's natural progression to play out: inflation, or at the very least, concerns of impending inflation.  Oil prices, labor costs, and a host of other mine expenses will continue to rise despite an obstinately static gold price.  Irrespective of the huge volumes of fiat money being printed, rising oil prices will be an immutable product of burgeoning middle class populations in the emerging economies.  Whether its 5 years or 25 years from now, oil and broader energy consumption has to grow.  Ultimately, would-be manipulators would have to depress the price of all mine input costs to accomplish their goals in perpetuity.  <br/><br/>While price pressures remain muted as consumers globally prefer to deleverage and save, central banks are still printing inordinate amounts of money.  If we ever break out of the doldrums and experience a legitimate global economic recovery, all that hoarded cash will begin to flow through the world's economy at ever-rising velocities.  While Bernanke and his ilk maintain that they can withdraw the excess liquidity from the economy, we are in the proverbial uncharted waters.  The measures the Fed have taken -  like the Bank of Japan and similar entities - are truly unprecedented.  Their espoused ability to keep a lid on price pressures is based in economic theory, but has not been tested in practice on the scale that would be necessary.  As such, ongoing inflationary concerns could similarly complicate any price manipulation going forward.  It will be hard to depress the price of an asset when there's suddenly larger and ever-rising quantities of money chasing a finite supply of said asset.<br/><br/>I don't mean to imply that you're wrong, or that outright and protracted manipulation is impossible, because who's to say how things will develop going forward.  There are just too many variables  to consider -  many of which we don't recognize until after the fact.  However, certain dynamics at play do warrant attention and could aid the market in finding equilibrium; despite the best attempts by those who may (or may not) prefer otherwise.  I guess we'll see for sure as time passes...but it is definitely worthwhile to consider both sides of the coin in the meantime.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2012 18:00:33 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Well put.  You make a valid argument and I agree with your points but there are a few additional considerations.  Whether a supply shortage is real or perceived, it can have dramatic implications for prices despite the measures you indicate the manipulators could employ.  Silver prices in the late 70's spiked in large part due to the Hunt brothers taking delivery of contracts that are generally never exercised.  Whether or not they could actually have &quot;collapsed the silver market&quot; was not nearly as important as the perception people had that it was possible.<br/><br/>If there is any concern about availability, people will begin trying to take delivery of the huge amounts of gold stored on behalf of clients by innumerable banks, depositories, and the like.  Delayed delivery, excessive fees, or any other measures to inhibit people's ability to take delivery of gold would cause a media frenzy.  Assuming people begin to snatch up whatever available physical supply is left, dealers and wholesalers will have to raise premiums out of necessity as opposed to some collusion with manipulators.  Inexorably rising premiums on physical metal would provide yet another stark example of a disconnect between the paper price of gold and the cost for the real thing.  Even if spot prices do not move dramatically as a result of this, people's end cost to purchase physical gold will.  Once traders and regular speculators catch wind of this, they will go long gold and the cost to any manipulators would correspondingly rise.  Perhaps they could hold back the tide by taking ever-larger short positions, but it would be hard for them to reconcile the uncharacteristically high premiums for physical metal.  So long as this is the case, speculators/investors going long gold will have reason to remain bullish on the price outlook, giving them the confidence to sustain their positions even while gold prices do not shoot higher right away.  While this isn't ironclad evidence that the market will pursue its &quot;natural progression,&quot; I would maintain that a supply shortage would pose greater problems to any would-be manipulators than you indicate.  <br/><br/>I think your observation regarding mine production costs is especially astute.  This dynamic plays into a broader theme I would submit as a reason for the market's natural progression to play out: inflation, or at the very least, concerns of impending inflation.  Oil prices, labor costs, and a host of other mine expenses will continue to rise despite an obstinately static gold price.  Irrespective of the huge volumes of fiat money being printed, rising oil prices will be an immutable product of burgeoning middle class populations in the emerging economies.  Whether its 5 years or 25 years from now, oil and broader energy consumption has to grow.  Ultimately, would-be manipulators would have to depress the price of all mine input costs to accomplish their goals in perpetuity.  <br/><br/>While price pressures remain muted as consumers globally prefer to deleverage and save, central banks are still printing inordinate amounts of money.  If we ever break out of the doldrums and experience a legitimate global economic recovery, all that hoarded cash will begin to flow through the world's economy at ever-rising velocities.  While Bernanke and his ilk maintain that they can withdraw the excess liquidity from the economy, we are in the proverbial uncharted waters.  The measures the Fed have taken -  like the Bank of Japan and similar entities - are truly unprecedented.  Their espoused ability to keep a lid on price pressures is based in economic theory, but has not been tested in practice on the scale that would be necessary.  As such, ongoing inflationary concerns could similarly complicate any price manipulation going forward.  It will be hard to depress the price of an asset when there's suddenly larger and ever-rising quantities of money chasing a finite supply of said asset.<br/><br/>I don't mean to imply that you're wrong, or that outright and protracted manipulation is impossible, because who's to say how things will develop going forward.  There are just too many variables  to consider -  many of which we don't recognize until after the fact.  However, certain dynamics at play do warrant attention and could aid the market in finding equilibrium; despite the best attempts by those who may (or may not) prefer otherwise.  I guess we'll see for sure as time passes...but it is definitely worthwhile to consider both sides of the coin in the meantime.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-12000051</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">12000051</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[Filipo, thanks for providing that link.  It was an interesting read.  I am familiar with Andrew Maguire and have the email thread he forwarded to GATA regarding his communications with the CFTC about price manipulation.<br/><br/>Unfortunately, the ability of traders to use complex investment strategies has surpassed regulators' ability to monitor them.  that being said, I think we could spend all day deliberating the various methods in which institutional investors can manipulate asset prices.  <br/><br/>In the end, if you are purchasing metal for the right, long-term reasons, any price manipulation that may be taking place can only help you.  If there is no manipulation - then no harm, no foul.  If there is manipulation, then you and I are afforded an artificially low (and attractive) entry price for our metal purchases.  ultimately, it will be the short-term speculative metal traders that are hurt by manipulation; but those who purchase metal for the long-run will probably not be unduly inconvenienced by whatever institutional chicanery is at play because the market's natural progression will win out in the end.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2012 12:27:36 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Filipo, thanks for providing that link.  It was an interesting read.  I am familiar with Andrew Maguire and have the email thread he forwarded to GATA regarding his communications with the CFTC about price manipulation.<br/><br/>Unfortunately, the ability of traders to use complex investment strategies has surpassed regulators' ability to monitor them.  that being said, I think we could spend all day deliberating the various methods in which institutional investors can manipulate asset prices.  <br/><br/>In the end, if you are purchasing metal for the right, long-term reasons, any price manipulation that may be taking place can only help you.  If there is no manipulation - then no harm, no foul.  If there is manipulation, then you and I are afforded an artificially low (and attractive) entry price for our metal purchases.  ultimately, it will be the short-term speculative metal traders that are hurt by manipulation; but those who purchase metal for the long-run will probably not be unduly inconvenienced by whatever institutional chicanery is at play because the market's natural progression will win out in the end.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gold Confiscation - An Unlikely Scenario</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1023541/comments?source=feed#comment-11955001</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11955001</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[No problem on either count.  The oversight was inexcusable so I certainly cannot begrudge you the comment - the sentence has since been adjusted.  I appreciate you raising the issue.  <br/><br/>However, I would say that the crux of the statement regarding the dangers of an erosion of confidence in the dollar and in Treasuries is a legitimate concern.  While the Treasury bull market may yet have some room to run, I think most can agree we are at the tail end and the risks of an emerging bear market in bonds is real. Even though the interest rate policies across the developed world will probably remain static for the foreseeable future, which will delay the immutable development of a bond bear market, the risk of a Treasury exodus is real.  European debt concerns will similarly delay this eventuality, but yield starved investors cannot be overly enamored of their Treasury positions given the negative real interest rates realized on many of these securities.  While this reality may not directly or immediately influence the argument regarding confiscation, it is safe to assume that the government will be reluctant to adopt any policies/measures that could compromise Treasury demand.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:14:01 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[No problem on either count.  The oversight was inexcusable so I certainly cannot begrudge you the comment - the sentence has since been adjusted.  I appreciate you raising the issue.  <br/><br/>However, I would say that the crux of the statement regarding the dangers of an erosion of confidence in the dollar and in Treasuries is a legitimate concern.  While the Treasury bull market may yet have some room to run, I think most can agree we are at the tail end and the risks of an emerging bear market in bonds is real. Even though the interest rate policies across the developed world will probably remain static for the foreseeable future, which will delay the immutable development of a bond bear market, the risk of a Treasury exodus is real.  European debt concerns will similarly delay this eventuality, but yield starved investors cannot be overly enamored of their Treasury positions given the negative real interest rates realized on many of these securities.  While this reality may not directly or immediately influence the argument regarding confiscation, it is safe to assume that the government will be reluctant to adopt any policies/measures that could compromise Treasury demand.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gold Confiscation - An Unlikely Scenario</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1023541/comments?source=feed#comment-11946921</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11946921</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[I appreciate the comment.  With regards to IRAs and 401K's, they are conceivably regarded by the government as a rainy day fund.  As I have pointed out in different comment threads, an understated yet very real concern is the refinancing risk that faces the US government going forward.  With an average maturity on its total outstanding marketable debt of approximately 65 months (a little over 5 years), the US government has trillions worth of debt coming due in the short-to-medium term and as such is incredibly susceptible to rising interest rates - hence the Fed holding interest rates at record lows for the foreseeable future (using a convenient scapegoat of unemployment as the rationale...).  Should investors demand rising yields on US Treasury issuance, the cost of servicing our debt would spiral to represent an unsustainable percentage of annual tax receipts.  Assuming we saw a collapse in investor demand for Treasuries (for any one of a multitude of reasons), to sustain the government's deficit spending, newly issued debt would either need to be monetized via more quantitative easing, or the government will have to utilize an until-now untapped cash reserve (i.e. retirement funds).  I am certainly no fear monger and don't purport that such distasteful measures are on the immediate docket, but I do think you made an astute point regarding a tempting cash pile that becomes ever-more tantalizing to an increasingly indebted government.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 25 Nov 2012 20:52:34 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I appreciate the comment.  With regards to IRAs and 401K's, they are conceivably regarded by the government as a rainy day fund.  As I have pointed out in different comment threads, an understated yet very real concern is the refinancing risk that faces the US government going forward.  With an average maturity on its total outstanding marketable debt of approximately 65 months (a little over 5 years), the US government has trillions worth of debt coming due in the short-to-medium term and as such is incredibly susceptible to rising interest rates - hence the Fed holding interest rates at record lows for the foreseeable future (using a convenient scapegoat of unemployment as the rationale...).  Should investors demand rising yields on US Treasury issuance, the cost of servicing our debt would spiral to represent an unsustainable percentage of annual tax receipts.  Assuming we saw a collapse in investor demand for Treasuries (for any one of a multitude of reasons), to sustain the government's deficit spending, newly issued debt would either need to be monetized via more quantitative easing, or the government will have to utilize an until-now untapped cash reserve (i.e. retirement funds).  I am certainly no fear monger and don't purport that such distasteful measures are on the immediate docket, but I do think you made an astute point regarding a tempting cash pile that becomes ever-more tantalizing to an increasingly indebted government.]]>
      </description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gold Confiscation - An Unlikely Scenario</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1023541/comments?source=feed#comment-11946621</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11946621</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[You raise a very valid point.  Within the context of a global reserve currency - or some other manifestation of an SDR - prohibitions on speculative positions in gold is very reasonable to expect (assuming gold plays a role in the SDR's valuation).  That said, political machinations regarding a confiscation of personally held bullion would not necessarily fall under the auspices of broader prohibitive measures regarding speculative gold investments.<br/><br/>Another consideration regarding the introduction of some global reserve currency is the time frame in which such structural changes could be effected.  Europe's monetary union took a decade of deliberation before its inception.  How long can we expect similar proceedings to take on a global scale?<br/><br/>Even if we assume a global reserve currency is &quot;in the works,&quot; the infrastructural and procedural requirements necessary to allow a global adoption of a new currency are staggering.  Not to mention the fact that the dollar is used in the preponderance of global transactions, and commandeers the lion's share of business and national reserves, the extrication of the global economy from dollar-dependence is not realistic in the short-term.  That being said, the long-term trajectory of the dollar is disconcertingly established to the downside, which could inevitably necessitate the very measures you cite.  Case in point, the bilateral agreements many countries, namely China, have negotiated to allow for cross border transactions to be settled in domestic currencies without need to use the dollar.<br/><br/>I don't disagree with your statements, but I do believe the very real dynamics you describe can be interpreted in a slightly different context - at least in the short-to-medium term.<br/><br/>As you indicate, the fact that China is the world's largest gold producer and simultaneously the second largest gold importer (and is positioned to outstrip India as early as this year or next) speaks to a well-established policy regarding its reserves management.  This reality is a stark example of a broader trend in emerging market central banks - which represent the majority of substantive central bank gold purchases in recent years.  <br/><br/>If we can accept that the observable change in net central bank gold demand - from multiple decades of net liquidations to the current dynamic of net purchases - is driven by the central banks in emerging markets, it is also safe to assume that said demand could simply be a product of reserve diversification and a prudent reallocation of dollar-heavy portfolios.  <br/><br/>You're absolutely right that central bank gold demand augurs certain trends in these banks' policy skew.  However, considering the fact that most purchases are done by central banks with significantly smaller gold positions (relative to gold's percentage of overall reserve allocation) than their counterparts in the developed world, it is not unreasonable to think these acquisitions were completed to accomplish much-needed diversification rather than surreptitious maneuvering for an imminent introduction of a new global currency (which ultimately could be, or even likely will be, the case further down the road).<br/><br/>The true motivation of the piece was to dispel the pervasive concerns regarding a &quot;re-imagined&quot; FDR confiscation. Confiscation via regulation - especially in the speculative realm - is perfectly feasible.  In that vein, unfavorable tax treatment and a larger degree of oversight in general could similarly be utilized to decrease gold's allure as a core/insurance investment.  However, these plausible scenarios do not necessarily jive with the fear of an imminent grab of all physical bullion in the U.S.  ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 25 Nov 2012 20:36:09 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[You raise a very valid point.  Within the context of a global reserve currency - or some other manifestation of an SDR - prohibitions on speculative positions in gold is very reasonable to expect (assuming gold plays a role in the SDR's valuation).  That said, political machinations regarding a confiscation of personally held bullion would not necessarily fall under the auspices of broader prohibitive measures regarding speculative gold investments.<br/><br/>Another consideration regarding the introduction of some global reserve currency is the time frame in which such structural changes could be effected.  Europe's monetary union took a decade of deliberation before its inception.  How long can we expect similar proceedings to take on a global scale?<br/><br/>Even if we assume a global reserve currency is &quot;in the works,&quot; the infrastructural and procedural requirements necessary to allow a global adoption of a new currency are staggering.  Not to mention the fact that the dollar is used in the preponderance of global transactions, and commandeers the lion's share of business and national reserves, the extrication of the global economy from dollar-dependence is not realistic in the short-term.  That being said, the long-term trajectory of the dollar is disconcertingly established to the downside, which could inevitably necessitate the very measures you cite.  Case in point, the bilateral agreements many countries, namely China, have negotiated to allow for cross border transactions to be settled in domestic currencies without need to use the dollar.<br/><br/>I don't disagree with your statements, but I do believe the very real dynamics you describe can be interpreted in a slightly different context - at least in the short-to-medium term.<br/><br/>As you indicate, the fact that China is the world's largest gold producer and simultaneously the second largest gold importer (and is positioned to outstrip India as early as this year or next) speaks to a well-established policy regarding its reserves management.  This reality is a stark example of a broader trend in emerging market central banks - which represent the majority of substantive central bank gold purchases in recent years.  <br/><br/>If we can accept that the observable change in net central bank gold demand - from multiple decades of net liquidations to the current dynamic of net purchases - is driven by the central banks in emerging markets, it is also safe to assume that said demand could simply be a product of reserve diversification and a prudent reallocation of dollar-heavy portfolios.  <br/><br/>You're absolutely right that central bank gold demand augurs certain trends in these banks' policy skew.  However, considering the fact that most purchases are done by central banks with significantly smaller gold positions (relative to gold's percentage of overall reserve allocation) than their counterparts in the developed world, it is not unreasonable to think these acquisitions were completed to accomplish much-needed diversification rather than surreptitious maneuvering for an imminent introduction of a new global currency (which ultimately could be, or even likely will be, the case further down the road).<br/><br/>The true motivation of the piece was to dispel the pervasive concerns regarding a &quot;re-imagined&quot; FDR confiscation. Confiscation via regulation - especially in the speculative realm - is perfectly feasible.  In that vein, unfavorable tax treatment and a larger degree of oversight in general could similarly be utilized to decrease gold's allure as a core/insurance investment.  However, these plausible scenarios do not necessarily jive with the fear of an imminent grab of all physical bullion in the U.S.  ]]>
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      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-11821531</link>
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        <![CDATA[Yeah no problem at all.  I don't think your impression is irrational in the least.  China especially is notorious for doctoring its economic figures.  A healthy skepticism is necessary this day in age.<br/><br/>That said, as gold becomes increasingly publicized and ETFs and similar vehicles provide global investors with unprecedented access to the gold market, volatility and news-driven price action will only increase.  Whatever the reasons, short-term downside movement in price does not detract from the set of entrenched fundamentals you listed.]]>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Nov 2012 15:42:24 -0500</pubDate>
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        <![CDATA[Yeah no problem at all.  I don't think your impression is irrational in the least.  China especially is notorious for doctoring its economic figures.  A healthy skepticism is necessary this day in age.<br/><br/>That said, as gold becomes increasingly publicized and ETFs and similar vehicles provide global investors with unprecedented access to the gold market, volatility and news-driven price action will only increase.  Whatever the reasons, short-term downside movement in price does not detract from the set of entrenched fundamentals you listed.]]>
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      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-11782191</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11782191</guid>
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        <![CDATA[I agree completely with regards to your espoused nail in the coffin.  However, something we cannot overlook is that the US government has a vested interest in a low-rate environment going forward.  Regardless of economic performance and what's &quot;best&quot; for our economy, the US government is subject to substantial refinancing risk.  With the average maturity on outstanding marketable US debt at around 65 months (a little over 5 years), the US has a tremendous amount of debt that comes due in the near future.  As a result of this, rising interest rates could be especially detrimental for the US funding picture as the cost to service our staggering debt load starts to balloon with rising interest rates.  <br/><br/>As the percentage of total tax receipts allocated to merely servicing our debt grows, the government's borrower profile will be increasingly unattractive.  Combine this with the reality that we are at the end of a multi-decade bull market in Treasuries (among other bonds) and the propensity of global investors to stampede the exits, and one can reasonably submit that rising interest rates represent one of the major risks facing the US government going forward.<br/><br/>That said, I certainly agree with your statements - to include the solid technical foundation for the silver/oil consolidation argument.  Additionally, rising tensions in the Israel-Palestine conflict - not to mention the progress the Iranians have made in uranium enrichment - means there is substantial geopolitical risk that could push oil and gold higher (which can generally be expected to pull silver along for the ride) despite the possibility for a wider risk-off correction in most major asset classes.  <br/><br/>Interesting and scary times we're living in... ]]>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:22:58 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[I agree completely with regards to your espoused nail in the coffin.  However, something we cannot overlook is that the US government has a vested interest in a low-rate environment going forward.  Regardless of economic performance and what's &quot;best&quot; for our economy, the US government is subject to substantial refinancing risk.  With the average maturity on outstanding marketable US debt at around 65 months (a little over 5 years), the US has a tremendous amount of debt that comes due in the near future.  As a result of this, rising interest rates could be especially detrimental for the US funding picture as the cost to service our staggering debt load starts to balloon with rising interest rates.  <br/><br/>As the percentage of total tax receipts allocated to merely servicing our debt grows, the government's borrower profile will be increasingly unattractive.  Combine this with the reality that we are at the end of a multi-decade bull market in Treasuries (among other bonds) and the propensity of global investors to stampede the exits, and one can reasonably submit that rising interest rates represent one of the major risks facing the US government going forward.<br/><br/>That said, I certainly agree with your statements - to include the solid technical foundation for the silver/oil consolidation argument.  Additionally, rising tensions in the Israel-Palestine conflict - not to mention the progress the Iranians have made in uranium enrichment - means there is substantial geopolitical risk that could push oil and gold higher (which can generally be expected to pull silver along for the ride) despite the possibility for a wider risk-off correction in most major asset classes.  <br/><br/>Interesting and scary times we're living in... ]]>
      </description>
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      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-11779001</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11779001</guid>
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        <![CDATA[No problem, and you raise a great point with regards to supply.  From a gold standpoint, current valuations are almost entirely dependent on the continuity of investment demand.  Rising gold surpluses and slowing demand from the traditional sources (industry, jewelry, etc.) mean gold prices are increasingly reliant on investment demand.  For reasons intermittently discussed throughout this comment thread, investment demand has some strong underlying investment fundamentals - however, a collapse in gold investment demand would depress prices substantially (until prices were low enough to increase demand from more conventional sources).<br/><br/>That being said, as you point out, much of the growth in gold production is in emerging economies.  Oftentimes mining sectors in these regions are incredibly susceptible to short-term squeezes in credit availability.  As lending to companies operating in these regions is done so judiciously, any shocks to the global financial system could cause an abrupt evaporation of the short maturity debt instruments that many of these companies rely on for financing.  Should this occur, the capital intensive mining operations in these regions could realize production stoppages until access to financing returns.<br/><br/>Silver on the other hand is largely produced as a byproduct of base metal mines.  So stalling global growth and falling base metal prices could precipitate a rash of base metal mine closings as mining companies wait for prices to stabilize.  The result is dwindling silver production despite static, or rising silver investment demand.<br/><br/>Central banks certainly are the shadow figures in the gold market.  While many gold bugs argue that the major shift in central bank gold reserve management (i.e. the end of multiple decades of net  liquidations and the beginning of a new era of net purchases by central banks - mainly led by emerging markets) will remain a major factor underlying gold prices going forward.  While there is some merit to this argument, especially since many central bank reserves are unduly exposed to the dollar so it makes sense that many will begin diversifying, you raise a very good point regarding possible liquidations by indebted European central banks.  Should these entities sell large quantities of gold into a market lacking sufficient demand to absorb the influx of supply, prices will move lower.<br/><br/>With this in mind, central bank operations could feasibly act to support or depress gold prices in short order depending on how these European central banks proceed.   However, institutional gold sales do not always have to pressure prices lower.  If one of the European central banks drops gold tonnage onto the market, and it is immediately snapped up by another central bank or similar institution (i.e. when the IMF sold 200+ tons in 2010, the Indian central bank purchased the majority of it immediately and prices shot significantly higher), we could actually see a rally in prices because an immediate purchase following the liquidation indicates the purchaser believes gold is still a good value at the prevailing levels.<br/><br/> ]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 15:06:53 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[No problem, and you raise a great point with regards to supply.  From a gold standpoint, current valuations are almost entirely dependent on the continuity of investment demand.  Rising gold surpluses and slowing demand from the traditional sources (industry, jewelry, etc.) mean gold prices are increasingly reliant on investment demand.  For reasons intermittently discussed throughout this comment thread, investment demand has some strong underlying investment fundamentals - however, a collapse in gold investment demand would depress prices substantially (until prices were low enough to increase demand from more conventional sources).<br/><br/>That being said, as you point out, much of the growth in gold production is in emerging economies.  Oftentimes mining sectors in these regions are incredibly susceptible to short-term squeezes in credit availability.  As lending to companies operating in these regions is done so judiciously, any shocks to the global financial system could cause an abrupt evaporation of the short maturity debt instruments that many of these companies rely on for financing.  Should this occur, the capital intensive mining operations in these regions could realize production stoppages until access to financing returns.<br/><br/>Silver on the other hand is largely produced as a byproduct of base metal mines.  So stalling global growth and falling base metal prices could precipitate a rash of base metal mine closings as mining companies wait for prices to stabilize.  The result is dwindling silver production despite static, or rising silver investment demand.<br/><br/>Central banks certainly are the shadow figures in the gold market.  While many gold bugs argue that the major shift in central bank gold reserve management (i.e. the end of multiple decades of net  liquidations and the beginning of a new era of net purchases by central banks - mainly led by emerging markets) will remain a major factor underlying gold prices going forward.  While there is some merit to this argument, especially since many central bank reserves are unduly exposed to the dollar so it makes sense that many will begin diversifying, you raise a very good point regarding possible liquidations by indebted European central banks.  Should these entities sell large quantities of gold into a market lacking sufficient demand to absorb the influx of supply, prices will move lower.<br/><br/>With this in mind, central bank operations could feasibly act to support or depress gold prices in short order depending on how these European central banks proceed.   However, institutional gold sales do not always have to pressure prices lower.  If one of the European central banks drops gold tonnage onto the market, and it is immediately snapped up by another central bank or similar institution (i.e. when the IMF sold 200+ tons in 2010, the Indian central bank purchased the majority of it immediately and prices shot significantly higher), we could actually see a rally in prices because an immediate purchase following the liquidation indicates the purchaser believes gold is still a good value at the prevailing levels.<br/><br/> ]]>
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      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-11764651</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11764651</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Filipo,<br/><br/>Many individuals have espoused the inevitable rise in precious metal prices as a result of a supply squeeze in the physical precious metals markets.  The catalyst for this squeeze would be a broader market realization that there are more outstanding paper contracts purportedly backed by metals than there is physical metal available.  If there is indeed a disparity between physical supply and the shadow supply represented by paper contracts, and more importantly, this became a generally accepted reality, then prices could rise despite a large number of short positions.<br/><br/>Many imagine a situation reminiscent of the silver market in the late 70's when the Hunt brothers influenced a major rally in silver prices as they began to exercise silver contracts and started taking delivery of the metal by the tractor trailer.  More important than the truth of whether or not the Hunt brothers could precipitate a &quot;collapse&quot; of the paper silver market was the perception that they could.  Ultimately, everything comes down to how the general populace will interpret and subsequently respond to a disconnect in the physical and paper markets.<br/><br/>Within the context of the situation you have witnessed in your physical metals market, you are certainly correct that institutional and speculative shorts in the paper markets could depress the price despite an ever-rising physical demand base.  That being said, this dynamic is only sustainable so long as the general public accepts that nothing is out of the ordinary.  The current delay you are experiencing could certainly speak to a very real shortage in available metal for delivery - but until a substantive portion of market participants acknowledge the existence of this supply-side shortage, the delays you are experiencing will probably not affect a material change in prices.  So long as people are patient and accept without question the rising wait times for delivery, the delays you are experiencing will probably go largely unnoticed.<br/><br/>Here, in the U.S., physical metal is still available for delivery in a timely fashion so I would say that the supply/demand component of the European metals market is probably distorted on account of the ongoing debt concerns and associated demand for physical metal.  However, this dynamic alone is probably not enough to elicit a substantial price rise (as you indicated).<br/><br/>Perhaps if European metals options were being increasingly exercised, or large institutions like the Bundesbank were unable to take delivery of their gold upon request, we might see a rise in prices as a knee jerk response to perceived supply concerns.  Until the European delivery delays manifest in more markets, or for some reason cause people to question the availability of physical supply, your delays will probably continue without exerting significant influence on global prices.<br/><br/>With this in mind, if the global economic situation deteriorates at a parabolic rate, before there is a more widespread cognizance of supply concerns, then you could be quite right that the &quot;insurance&quot; component of precious metals will not become evident until after the fact.  It all comes down to how investors around the world interpret a situation - as opposed to the actual facts of the matter.]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 09:57:49 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Filipo,<br/><br/>Many individuals have espoused the inevitable rise in precious metal prices as a result of a supply squeeze in the physical precious metals markets.  The catalyst for this squeeze would be a broader market realization that there are more outstanding paper contracts purportedly backed by metals than there is physical metal available.  If there is indeed a disparity between physical supply and the shadow supply represented by paper contracts, and more importantly, this became a generally accepted reality, then prices could rise despite a large number of short positions.<br/><br/>Many imagine a situation reminiscent of the silver market in the late 70's when the Hunt brothers influenced a major rally in silver prices as they began to exercise silver contracts and started taking delivery of the metal by the tractor trailer.  More important than the truth of whether or not the Hunt brothers could precipitate a &quot;collapse&quot; of the paper silver market was the perception that they could.  Ultimately, everything comes down to how the general populace will interpret and subsequently respond to a disconnect in the physical and paper markets.<br/><br/>Within the context of the situation you have witnessed in your physical metals market, you are certainly correct that institutional and speculative shorts in the paper markets could depress the price despite an ever-rising physical demand base.  That being said, this dynamic is only sustainable so long as the general public accepts that nothing is out of the ordinary.  The current delay you are experiencing could certainly speak to a very real shortage in available metal for delivery - but until a substantive portion of market participants acknowledge the existence of this supply-side shortage, the delays you are experiencing will probably not affect a material change in prices.  So long as people are patient and accept without question the rising wait times for delivery, the delays you are experiencing will probably go largely unnoticed.<br/><br/>Here, in the U.S., physical metal is still available for delivery in a timely fashion so I would say that the supply/demand component of the European metals market is probably distorted on account of the ongoing debt concerns and associated demand for physical metal.  However, this dynamic alone is probably not enough to elicit a substantial price rise (as you indicated).<br/><br/>Perhaps if European metals options were being increasingly exercised, or large institutions like the Bundesbank were unable to take delivery of their gold upon request, we might see a rise in prices as a knee jerk response to perceived supply concerns.  Until the European delivery delays manifest in more markets, or for some reason cause people to question the availability of physical supply, your delays will probably continue without exerting significant influence on global prices.<br/><br/>With this in mind, if the global economic situation deteriorates at a parabolic rate, before there is a more widespread cognizance of supply concerns, then you could be quite right that the &quot;insurance&quot; component of precious metals will not become evident until after the fact.  It all comes down to how investors around the world interpret a situation - as opposed to the actual facts of the matter.]]>
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      <title>Recent Chinese And Japanese Economic Data And The Implications For Precious Metals</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/1013141/comments?source=feed#comment-11697111</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11697111</guid>
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        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I couldn't agree more.  Investor indecision is going to be the enemy of most asset classes.<br/><br/>Gold's recent correlation with risk assets is a transient dynamic in my opinion.  Many investors tried to jump on the gravy train in 2011 when gold rallied from the $1500s to over $1900.  However, when the inevitable correction came, many people who purchased gold for the wrong reasons became distrustful of the &quot;safe haven&quot; qualities provided by gold.  But the fact remains that assets immune from the counter-party risk that characterizes most conventional investments will be increasingly attractive going forward.<br/><br/>Who can say when investors will be re-enamored of gold and the broader metals complex, but in my opinion it is just a matter of time.  Especially with the Fed and other central banks promising record low interest rates for the foreseeable future, the opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing assets like gold will remain depressed.  This reality, combined with the uncertainty and political/economic tension cited by filipo above will ultimately form the core argument advocating at least a portion of everyone's portfolio be invested in precious metals.]]>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:02:03 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Thanks for your comment.  I couldn't agree more.  Investor indecision is going to be the enemy of most asset classes.<br/><br/>Gold's recent correlation with risk assets is a transient dynamic in my opinion.  Many investors tried to jump on the gravy train in 2011 when gold rallied from the $1500s to over $1900.  However, when the inevitable correction came, many people who purchased gold for the wrong reasons became distrustful of the &quot;safe haven&quot; qualities provided by gold.  But the fact remains that assets immune from the counter-party risk that characterizes most conventional investments will be increasingly attractive going forward.<br/><br/>Who can say when investors will be re-enamored of gold and the broader metals complex, but in my opinion it is just a matter of time.  Especially with the Fed and other central banks promising record low interest rates for the foreseeable future, the opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing assets like gold will remain depressed.  This reality, combined with the uncertainty and political/economic tension cited by filipo above will ultimately form the core argument advocating at least a portion of everyone's portfolio be invested in precious metals.]]>
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