longk

The Economic Cost of the Military Industrial Complex

Chris B: insightful comments concerning the ROI of the 9/11 operation. The military (M) is simply one dimension of national power in the diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) model. Approaching issues of national policy from only one dimension is suboptimal.

Considering the Great Game as if players are identically motivated, unicultural, playing for the same purpose and even keeping score the same way is a recipe for disaster.

Treating policy goals as an endstate or a destination is to misunderstand the complex, dynamic and uncertain nature of the world.

The policy questions of what goals to pursue, the size of the committment in view of other competing options, considerations of risk and reward, the opinions of other players and observers, alignment with core values, all are important aspects of the same wicked problem, as well as the technical debate on how to achieve the stated goals. Sometimes you have to talk about just the individual components in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, but you have to remember that they have to be put back together and understood from a systems dynamics perspective as well.

I found your thoughts thoughtful and balanced, and am glad you took the time to write.


If interested in more dialogue in a different forum, my email is [e-mail]

cheers,
ken

The Economic Cost of the Military Industrial Complex

Jim: thank you very much for a thoughtful article. What you wrote is similar to lectures I give in this area when we are discussing Army and DoD Force Management at the US Army Command & General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth. I will probably have our Force Managment lesson author send you some form letter describing how we would use the article as a reading. The concepts of opportunity cost, and threat based force structure seem foreign to many people. The current DoD policy of "capabilities based" force structure is too easily co-opted into an open checkbook for unlimited technological solutions for mythical potential enemies, especially when linked with a tacit agreement to fund DoD at a fixed % of GDP as argued by our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You can heat the hogs of war drooling over that.
Force structure must meet the tests of suitable, feasible, acceptable. The current policy goals beg the question of feasibility.

I was pleased to see you quoting one of my heroes David Walker, one of the few adult commentators on the subject of our fiscal posture. His insights into the approaching trainwreck of unconstrained appetite in every dimension of federal spending are compelling.


I commend to you the book "Military Reform" by Winslow Wheeler and Lawrence Korb, James Fallows' National Defense, and Robert Coram's "Boyd", the biography of COL John Boyd. I am quite sure you have already seen the documentary "Why We Fight" which I think does a responsible job of laying out the 2d and 3d order effects of policy choices made without a clear grasp of long term strategy. It also references Ike in the opening moments.

One can concede that there are threats in the world without agreeing with the method, scope, and cost of the current response, and the 2d mortgage we have signed for future generations for our current foreign policy.

cheers,
Ken

Ken Long
Asst Professor
Department of Logistics & Resource Operations
US Army Command & General Staff College
US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

The Economic Cost of the Military Industrial Complex

Jim: I am trying to reach you for copyright permission to use this article in our curriculum at the Army Command & General Staff College. can u send me a note at [e-mail] please? thanks, ken long