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  • Peabody Energy - When False Perceptions Become Reality [View article]
    Why do you think the bond market is pricing in nearly a 100% chance of default and negligible recovery on their unsecured notes? As you know, they're currently trading in the .15-.18 on the $ range with YTM of almost 80% on the nearest maturity (yield curve inverted). I'm just curious why you think that everyone else (not just the Goldman guy) is getting this so wrong, and you're right?

    It seems like the only irrationality here is that the market is assigning $240M in value through the common equity. Personally wouldn't touch those unsecured notes with asbestos mittens....
    Nov 2, 2015. 09:28 AM | 7 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Basic Energy Services misses by $0.08, beats on revenue [View news story]
    CC highlights...

    So, including seasonality, it looks like Q4 is going to really suck--12-15% decline in revs, but they're hopeful for 1Q 2016.

    They think they can stay cash flow positive for an extended period so long as things don't get much worse.

    Capital structure and liquidity look solid through 2016; after this, they'd look to take on more secured debt (and prime the Notes).

    I still think they survive the cycle, but time will tell...

    Unsecured notes at 40, figuring in two years of coupons, gets you 3 times your money if they make it to the other side.
    Oct 23, 2015. 10:09 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Basic Energy Services misses by $0.08, beats on revenue [View news story]
    Bonds are down a couple of points. I was hoping for better numbers, actually, but it's not truly horrific. Adding back in the $140M for Depreciation and the Goodwill impairment, they were roughly break-even on cash flow, and they covered their interest expense.

    Assuming that they need $68M per year to cover the debt service, and they have $170M or so in liquidity currently, they can ride this out another two or three years before needing to make adjustments to their capital structure.

    Big question: is this as bad as it gets, or will there be further erosion of their revenues?
    Oct 23, 2015. 08:49 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Basic Energy Services +10% as Wunderlich upgrades to Hold [View news story]
    Please--no acquisitions or additional debt!

    If these guys can just sit tight and avoid doing something stupid, they stand a pretty good chance of surviving the cycle. Why not buy back some of the unsecured notes at .40 on the $ and 25% YTM?

    Looking at re-establishing a position in the 2022 notes after flipping earlier in the year...
    Oct 19, 2015. 06:33 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Linn Energy Debt Is Oversold: Long Senior Unsecured Because It Is Likely Below Recovery Value [View article]
    I'm not saying that they're destined to end up in BK, and I wholeheartedly agree with their "current strategy." I own a small amount of the notes myself.

    But once the hedges roll off, will they have enough cash flow to keep buying up notes while keeping the lights running with maintenance capex? And even in your best-case scenario, which assumes there remains sufficient collateral to get a secured loan, the unsecureds get primed.

    There's a reason these are trading at .30. Not for the faint of heart, or the retail folks on SA asking in this thread how you buy a bond...
    Oct 19, 2015. 10:13 AM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Linn Energy Debt Is Oversold: Long Senior Unsecured Because It Is Likely Below Recovery Value [View article]
    Good thesis, and I currently own a small position in these (traded in and out a few times now).

    But there are substantial risks you don't mention. First, the senior unsecured are CURRENTLY the fulcrum security, but unless I'm mistaken, there's nothing that prevents them from taking on new secured 2nd or 3rd liens in front of these, pushing them out of the money. That's the next logical step in their cycle of distress, which is why these are trading in the 30s. Second, you assume the asset values are realizable, whereas it's by no means certain that they'd realize those values at current (or future) distressed prices in a liquidation.

    These are bastard securities one way or another. EITHER they're collateral good (which means there's still value that can be hocked with new secured liens, and these will get primed momentarily), OR the assets have lost such value that they won't be able to take on any further secured debt at at price, and thus roll them when they come due. Absent a major and imminent recovery in oil prices, it's one or the other.

    Caveat Emptor--this is deep distressed investing!
    Oct 15, 2015. 11:33 AM | 7 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Miller Energy files for Chapter 11 in deal with Apollo, Highbridge [View news story]
    Ok, so maybe there will be some scrap warrants thrown to the Prefholders as a sweetener--options to put up more NEW cash to capture some of the future upside. But your original investment is gone, poof. You also have to realize that Apollo is stipulating a lowball valuation precisely to make it seem like the Prefs are out of the money. If the enterprise were valued higher in the BK, prefholders could well be entitled to a real recovery. But the only way that is going to happen is if Prefholders pony up for legal rep, organize a committee, and contest the pre-pack plan. Collective action problem 101...

    Also, it'ill be interesting to see how the unsecured creditors behave. You can bet that they're already organizing a committee and planning to sit at the table. They're ahead of you (prefs) in line, so if they get screwed, you will too...
    Oct 6, 2015. 10:40 AM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • One Way To Value Miller Energy Preferred D Shares (MILL -PD) -Potential For Up To 700% In Gains [View instapost]
    Bummer folks, and my sincere condolences. This one has been quite a roller coaster to follow, and maybe the story isn't over yet.

    It's not really an "offer," it's a pre-packaged bankruptcy petition with the option for a mgmt committee to seek a better deal on the side (an upside call currently out of the money with the Apollo deal on the table).

    Just glancing *quickly* at the petition and the DIP financing, the plea is that the 2nd lien is impaired, meaning that Apollo claims the company is worth less than the outstanding 2nd lien, and thus Apollo gets to take 100% of the equity in the Newco for themselves. Under this baseline scenario, the preferred and common equity holders get wiped out--or are offered some token warrants as a sweetener not to raise a fuss in court. As an impaired class, the preferred and common equity holders would ordinarily be "deemed to reject," meaning that they don't get to vote on the restructuring.

    NB: it's in Apollo's interests to low-ball this valuation so as to be able to keep 100% of the company for themselves.

    Where might the Pref holders come into the equation? One of two scenarios, as I read it. (a) the company mgmt committee is able to put together a better outside offer than the DIP financing and the pre-packaged deal with Apollo. It would seem that mgmt is heavily incentivized to try to secure something better from an arm's length lender, although the fact that they weren't able to do so before declaring makes this a longshot (though it looks like they were forced to file to get ahead of an invol filing by creditors...). (b) the option available to any of you pref holders, individually or collectively, to form a Pref committee, seek legal representation in AK, and mount a challenge to the valuation Apollo is assigning to the whole shebang. They're trying to push this through quickly, so even token legal resistance would likely give you bargaining leverage for a slice of the Newco, especially if the spitball valuations folks were throwing around earlier can be made to stick. Absent the formation of a Pref committee, and some legal push-back to argue that Apollo's 2nd lien isn't impaired and there's value left down through the unsecured creditors and Prefs, it looks like Apollo will walk off with the whole corpse.

    On warrants: let's assume they do throw some in to purchase equity in the Newco to sweeten the deal and give the insiders who got wiped a chance to buy back in. Would it be wise to exercise these? Maybe, depending on the value they're assigning to the company. Assume that Apollo's is truly a *lowball* valuation. The bull thesis was that the prefs were money good. The purely rational thing to do would be to exercise the warrants and buy into the Newco at the depressed valuation. You're buying X% of the company at, say, .7X. If you believe in the company (I don't) and think they can make money with their debt burden reduced (they can't), then the smart trade (assuming a lowball valuation and a perfectly rational market) may be to throw more good money after bad. The very same lowball valuation by which Apollo is trying to screw you makes exercising the warrants, potentially, a good deal.
    Oct 5, 2015. 06:50 PM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • Will Puerto Rico Sales Tax Bonds And PREPA 'Securitization' Be Subordinated To GOs? [View article]
    Assuming all the conditions for the deal are satisfied (e.g. the insurers sign off, and the ratings agencies play nice), it will be an interesting exercise in chicken/ game theory to see what percentage of PREPA holders outside the Ad Hoc group will tender.

    I'm on the fence based on what they've shown so far. Assuming there's a discernible group that materializes to organize a holdout effort (and thus I can free-ride, LOL), I actually like the chances of a legal challenge to PREPA's fabricated claims of insolvency. They've set the threshold pretty high in terms of % that needs to tender, so you wonder if they wouldn't just consider paying the holdouts as a necess cost of the deal. The likely threat will be that they try to stiff completely the holdouts, and there will be ugly litigation, but I'm not sure that 100% recovery isn't at least a possible scenario. Absent more conclusive info, my gut says tender some at 85, bank a decent profit on stuff I bought in the 50s, and hold on to some for a wild ride....

    Totally agree with the author on how stupid and self-defeating this default gambit was. After gaining market access with those GOs--ugly but it worked--they managed, with horrific advice, to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
    Sep 10, 2015. 03:47 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • BreitBurn Energy Partners Maintains Its Distribution - For Now [View article]
    Nice article, Casey, and agree with you 100%.

    As for these comments:

    Ok, so they're not Linn, management is seasoned, we all believe the oil market is going to turn, Pickens is a genius, kumbaya, yada, yada, yada...

    That all may be true (or not) but it's completely *irrelevant* to the question of whether they cut the dist to buy back debt.

    This is capital allocation 101. They can earn .50 on every $ they divert to buying back notes. That's an instant, risk-free, 50% return on investment that de-leverages them in the event that oil prices don't rebound and gives them a leg up on the debt wall that's coming up. There is nothing--I repeat nothing--they could do with a $ right now that is more accretive to enterprise value than buying back those notes.
    Aug 26, 2015. 01:22 PM | Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • A Bullish Development For Western Asset Mortgage Capital [View article]
    Both--as must be the case once you get beyond some tipping point and people have to start selling things. First you sell what you want to sell, and then you start selling anything and everything indiscriminately. Or the margin clerks start selling it for you, and they're not typically too price sensitive.

    Take Dell Computer (247025AE9)--a yieldy, decent high-mid BB junk credit, seemingly unconnected to energy or commodities. Over the past month it's off 3-5 points in price, and 50bps in yield, recently trading 3 points below par.

    For a while the HY market looked like it could hive this thing off as an "oil-related" (then suddenly "commodity-related") phenomenon. That was my feel for things back in Dec/Jan. People were dumping crappy E&P and oil services paper, but everything else seemed solid. But the way this market is driven by ETFs, the unavoidable effect of someone slamming JNK or HYG (even if it's only to hedge some illiquid paper that they don't want to be forced to sell at the wrong moment) is to broaden the price declines and spread them across all the underlying components.

    Question isn't with contagion in HY, but whether forced selling will bleed over into credit sensitive mbs, or even more illiquid stuff like cmbs mez or whole loans. I'm not predicting a disaster comparable to what we've seen in energy, but it's also hard to imagine them swimming upstream against a larger credit selloff. Still, even a 3-5 point move can sting when you've got something leveraged a couple of turns.
    Aug 25, 2015. 12:12 PM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • A Bullish Development For Western Asset Mortgage Capital [View article]
    Whenever things are happening in the market that I don't understand, I get to the sidelines (cash). As tempting as bargains might seem in mreit-land, and with similar 20% flash crashes in FI HY Cefs, I'm gonna pass until there's a decisive momentum shift in high yield.

    Putting aside all the insane vol in equities, something's not right. HY credit (JNK or HYG) has been in a steady bleed downward for more than a year, and looks like it may have briefly taken out 2011 lows yesterday while now trading back near 2010 levels. Commodities are trading near decade lows. Most alarming to me, rather than soaring the way it should have--and confirming the longstanding inverse relationship between equity vol and the long bond rate--TSY 10 and 30Y had horrible days yesterday relative to what one might have expected. Whatever flight to safety bid should have been there disappeared as someone big was obviously (forced) dumping TSY into the carnage.

    I usually believe in mean reversion, but when you get market moves this extreme, there has to be more collateral damage somewhere.
    Aug 25, 2015. 09:33 AM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • The #1 Stock In The World [View article]
    Egads, rough day for vol sellers!

    Today might be one of those days to initiate a starter position.
    Aug 24, 2015. 02:34 PM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment
  • A Bullish Development For Western Asset Mortgage Capital [View article]
    Kudos to anyone who managed to grab some during the flash crash sale this AM. Definitionally, something is better when it's cheaper, and this is starting to look good at lower prices. But at the risk of repeating myself (endlessly!), I worry less about how these guys are navigating their rate exposure and more about what's happening to their credit exposure. The CT Ave risk-sharing and other credit sensitive stuff have been bouncing around like crazy--not the sort of vol paper you want to have leveraged. HY credit is positively sick and vomiting in the streets, and the worry has got to be that at some point this begins to affect credit sensitive mbs prices....
    Aug 24, 2015. 02:15 PM | 2 Likes Like |Link to Comment
  • BreitBurn Energy Partners' Lifeline Just Got A Bit Shorter [View article]
    "issuing more units (in exchange for debt)"

    You think I jest, but *if* they continue down this spiral of distress (not saying they will, but one can't rule it out, esp. if oil prices stay low for another 18 months), they will inevitably offer to exchange deeply distressed debt for more dilutive equity. That's the next logical step in the distressed playbook. I certainly don't hope they end up there, nor am I predicting it, but that is a worst case scenario that's very much on the table.

    As of now, mgmt is still in denial about their level of distress. Nothing that higher oil prices can't resolve, they're telling themselves. Hunker down, keep paying the dist, and maybe things will correct in 6 mos. And maybe they'll be right. But there's a big discrepancy between what the bond markets are saying they're worth (with a 40% haircut through the unsecured bonds) and the $500m of market value optionality that the equity market cap is implying. This discrepancy will eventually be resolved in one of two ways. Either the bonds will go back to par, or the remaining equity will disappear.
    Aug 20, 2015. 04:50 PM | 1 Like Like |Link to Comment