Full index of posts »
StockTalks
-
ADY in same league as DGWIY.PK, take a look. Apr 8, 2011
-
Never a fan of NYG's work, DEER.OB no exception, these guys are known as scammsters in China PE community. Take a look at latest on ADY. Apr 8, 2011
-
Take a look at my instablog on ADY. Think CHBT.PK has fleas? A customer recently found maggots in ADY's infant formula product! Apr 8, 2011
Latest Comments
-
Value Investor Today on ADY: The Milk Has Gone Bad I've seen both sides of the argument. Yours is ...
Most Commented
- ADY: The Milk Has Gone Bad (1 Comment)
Instablogs are Seeking Alpha's free blogging platform customized for finance, with instant set up and exposure to millions of readers interested in the financial markets. Publish your own instablog in minutes.

















View chinadebunker's Instablogs on:
BORN: The Great VAT Disconnect
I pulled my BORN posting yesterday for personal reasons. To get in touch write me at chinadebunker@yahoo.com.
ADY: The Milk Has Gone Bad
chinadebunker@yahoo.com
Highlights
The situation is far worse than many envision…
Maggots in the Milk
ADY has misled investors with its claims of superior product quality
ADY has consistently defined its key advantage as offering superior quality product quality vs. other brands. Sourcing milk from Heilongjiang province, if you are to believe management’s claims, confers some advantage (although many dairy brands source there; including competitors such as Beiyinmei). Management describes in its filings its milk handling process which ensures quality and freshness. This is nothing more than a misdirection ploy directed as investors who don’t really have access to meaningful PRC market intelligence -- ADY has no operational results to tout, so it instead encourages the naïve to focus on its better milk and alleged market share.
But PRC Chinese media sources reveal a story starkly at odds with the official company line. ADY appears to be currently facing very serious product safety allegations:
Post-melamine scandal PRC consumers are extremely sensitive to product safety concerns, especially when it comes to their children. These Chinese language articles would seem to indicate ADY does not enjoy the sterling reputation and superior product that it claims, on the contrary. ADY faces serious quality issues and takes similar shortcuts as its maligned PRC competitors, which is why the domestic PRC infant formula marketplace is largely dominated by multinational brands (people of means actually import their formula from abroad, that’s the level of mistrust). According to PRC equity analysts (specifically Chinese language equity research by Sinolink Securites (国金证券所; a respected local shop who covers the dairy sector) ADY already ranks nearly dead last in the infant formula space -- there is little wonder why.
Substantial Difference between Official SAIC-Reported PRC Audit vs. SEC Reported Figures
Apologists will seek to explain away these differences by offering the standard litany of ill-informed defenses. Common sense explanations should readily address any extant differential. Should there exist any remaining and non-attributable difference, something is definitely wrong. Alternatively, apply some simple logic. On whom is the company more likely to pull a fast one on? The local SAIC and SAT, both of whom are intimately aware of the business, and in constant close-touch contact with it –or- the SEC and public investors, 8000 miles away, dimly aware of prevailing market/operating realities, relying chiefly upon disclosures and the diligence of auditors? Going one step further, cheating PRC authorities risks severe, proximate and immediate criminal consequences. An unfortunate, but common, view amongst a certain breed of the guys standing behind PRC-based USA-listed small and micro-cap stocks is simply: what can the SEC really do to me? As a practical matter this way of thinking is not too far off the mark, at least in so far as they are concerned. These are not generally individuals with any meaningful ties to the States, nor do they typically have any US-based assets which might be imperiled. In fact even if a judgment were entered against them in a DE or UT court, then what’s the worst they will face? It would certainly not have any effect in China. The reality is that most PRC residents could happily do without another trip to the USA and comfortably live out the rest of their lives in China (on your money).
To this section’s point: I have obtained copies of ADY’s 2008 and 2009 SAIC-filed audit reports. These were prepared by ADY’s PRC auditor, Anlian, and submitted to local authorities (under pain of, once again, criminal prosecution for willing misrepresentation). Here are some summary highlights; complete analysis will follow as soon as I have time:
Don’t take my word on any of this, here are the SAIC audit report filings, review with a Chinese speaker and form your own opinion: http://www.scribd.com/doc/52531161
I encourage those of you who would try to explain away the SAIC and SEC differentials to step back and critically examine at some Chinese companies whose SAIC and SEC accounts failed to reconcile. It is a star-studded cast: RINO, CCME, CEU, CBEH….need I go on?
Sequoia: A Bad Deal from the Beginning
A brief summary of the history
ADY’s sordid past is something of an open secret amongst China-specialist investors (not USA-based arm chair analysts, nor University of Southeastern Iowa college finance majors popping off – people who actually have some idea of what they are talking about). Several major funds evaluated the opportunity back around the time of Sequoia’s investment -- all passed. Feedback from those involved is uniformly negative. The common refrain: ‘revenue fabrication’ which extended to ‘both quality and volume’. Rumor has is that Sequoia realized the books were cooked only shortly after making their investment, and began looking for the door. The quick investmentàredemption fact pattern (which is not at all Sequoia’s modus operandii for its China portfolio) seems congruent with such an account.
The real story behind Sequoia’s apparent misstep is clear enough in hindsight. Around the time of the melamine scandal ADY held what appeared to be an enviable position: it had maintained a secure product supply chain and was thus, in theory, poised to achieve substantial market share gains by exploiting upon the missteps of its larger and better financed competitors. Instead of capitalizing upon the mistakes of its competitors and extending its own brand, poaching share, going up market, etc. ADY instead opted for an easier route. Rather than spend money on branding/marketing/distribution it ADY elected to sell product to Hangzhou-based Beingmate (贝因美). For those of you unfamiliar with Beijngmate, they are the major player in PRC baby food and, now, infant formula (ranked amongst the top-3 of all local/international brands by Sinolink Securites in a 2.2011 dairy industry coverage piece); they operate baby/infant-focused retail shops all over China and offer a full line of own-branded kids clothing, nutrition products, et cetera all things baby. Just last month, March 2011, the CSRC approved Beijngmate to raise 1.8bb RMB in an A-share share offering. The IPO should happen quite soon.
It would appear that Sequoia drank the ADY kool-aid and based its investment consideration around some mistaken idea of the business. In their defense, post-melamine scandal ADY seemed ideally situated, growth in its own-branded product sales via capturing share from other local players should have been a no-brainer and would likely yield lasting advantage/gains. In retrospect it is now clear that Sequoia vastly over-estimated the worth of ADY’s business by probably failing to understand the true nature of revenues. Contract manufacturing generally help build a franchise. In failing to extend its own brand when the opportunity presented itself ADY had effectively mortgaged its own future. With myopic focus on juicing numbers (via OEM manufacture) ADY traded future growth for a nominally high multiple fund raise. Along with this raise came unrealistic performance targets and onerous terms, thus locking ADY into a short-term strategy and wasting its temporary advantage in pursuit of ratchet targets. Squandering its ‘safe producer’ status, ADY’s managers effectively catapulted Beingmate into the big leagues and set into motion the competitive forces which now conspire to destroy the company – namely, Beingmate. The reported YoY 2009-->2010 revenue decline points to the beginning of the end.
Companies get involved in RTOs for all sorts of reasons; in China these typically follow a set pattern. Owners/managers with little financial sophistication (i.e. no concept of what a warrant is) are duped into a no-fuss IPO by sweet talking local hustlers. USA-based ‘China expert’ ‘bankers’ (who don’t understand the concept, let alone the practice, of due diligence) aid and abet fundraising by foisting shares off upon unsuspecting retail investors and the occasional ill-informed institution, who, not themselves entirely innocent, often assume they’ll just flip out on the ensuing run up. When you come right down to it, multiple parties are complicit and all guilty of adopting a ‘greater fool’ investment approach (i.e. there will always be some sucker dumber than me). The ADY case is unique only in that is was able to lure major institutions into the game, each conferring additional legitimacy to and further perpetuating a broken business model.
Sequoia probably based its investment consideration on some mistaken assumptions around ADY’s growth prospects and sustainability. But, in point of fact, with their investment structured as it was, the relative health/success of the underlying business did not really matter. Sequoia’s $63mm was injected as ‘temporary equity’ (whatever that means), under what amounts to a sort of ‘heads we win, tails you lose’ arrangement which is actually a convertible bond not ‘temporary equity’. More than an innocent misnomer, this sleight of accounting hand allowed the company to maintain a seemingly healthy balance sheet while continuing to invest in foolish projects -- in effect sowing the seeds of its eventual demise. To be clear, the $63mm ‘temporary equity’ investment was and is debt, and it should have been accounted for as such from the beginning.
Contrary to ADY’s claims that the Sequoia redemption will improve its capital structure, theses payouts, should they proceed as agreed, will very likely set ADY into a ‘death spiral’ (decreasing investment, decreasing advertising = decreasing sales, diminished distribution; compounded and accelerated by competitors ramping up). It seems that at this point ADY’s last remaining chance of survival would be to re-visit the Sequoia agreement and seek to modify its terms to effect some sort of debtà equity swap -- otherwise these four quarterly payouts totaling 65mm USD will surely kill the business. At this point the decreasing stock price and deteriorating operating and market fundamentals all but rule out any sort of PIPE or ‘replacement’ convertible bond, so forget that.
Competition Stiff and Only Getting Stiffer
The impact of Beijngmate’s impending IPO should not to be underestimated. After deployed the billions raised will substantially compound ADY’s already existing disadvantages of small scale, lack of brand equity and inadequate advertising spend. In addition to Beingmate, others are entering the fray. Rumor has it that a another major operator in northern China is about to close a major multi-hundred mm USD round anchored by a major bulge investment bank’s private equity outfit.
When you come right down to it Fast Moving Consumer Goods is a money game – it’s all about advertising. P&G, Nestle et al. succeed not only by offering superior product, but by outspending any emerging competitors by a substantial margin (or, more correctly, % of revenue). It requires significant capital to create a leading consumer goods brand, and substantial continued investment to maintain it. Only the most well run and best capitalized companies stand any chance of success. With the major multi-nationals and gigantic PRC dairies actively pursuing ADY’s core market how does the company stand a chance? Already the self-perpetuating cycle of marketing spendàshare increaseàprofit increaseàincreased marketing spend has relegated ADY to also-ran status. ADY does not have the investment dollars to compete, and thus its share/revenues/profitability will likely continue to erode.
Ask your PRC friends about the many of the famous brands they grew up with which have now all but disappeared. Well-funded household brands get wiped out in China a matter of a few years by free spending marketing-savvy multi-nationals and aggressive local FMCG players. What takes 20 years to unfold in America transpires in less than 2 in China. How can a minor player with a barely established brand and virtually no advertising budget compete?
ADY is Worth Liquidation Value at Best, 10% of Zero is Still Zero
Given its long history of negative cash flow, it is clear that ADY’s brand and distribution is not creating any value for shareholders -- the only real value should theoretically be found in its hard assets. If you take the SEC financials to be true, then the equity value of the company at December 31, 2010 was $162 million. Subtract from this $65 million for Sequoia, you get to a valuation of $97 million, which would equate to $4.35 per share if you assume the assets are worth full value and/or are actually there. However, the company’s history of goodwill impairments and loss on disposal of biological assets would indicate that its assets are carried above their actual value. The company states in its 2010 10-K, “Substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern could affect our relationships with suppliers or customers. In accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the US, our balance sheet generally states the book value of our assets, which does not necessarily represent the value that could be realized from the assets if we could not continue as a going concern.” In liquidation it is nearly certain that the assets of the company would obviously command far lower than book value.
Going one step further: the above scenario only roughly describes an idealized USA-type wind-up works and assumes the SEC accounts are true – both big assumptions. In China bankruptcies tend to more of a free for all slug fest, and the SEC accounts would not be at all relevant. Should ADY enter judicial administration (as per PRC bankruptcy law, there is no Chapter 11-type option) the starting point for the appraisal/audit of the company would be the latest PRC-audited SAIC-submitted accounts (as these generally, according to my experience the administrator often finds these to be overstates). The eventual asset auction value will be at likely a 20-30% discount to an already haircut SAIC accounts book net asset value. You do the math, it’s far darker than the SEC accounts scenario as far as common holders would be concerned.
More problematic for common equity holders, PRC bankruptcies follow a common pattern. Management sees the end in sight before minority equity holders or creditors. They typically begin blowing money out the door and/or establishing friends/cronies as ‘creditors’. At some point when the company defaults on a principal/interest/other payment (whether real or fictitious), then the bank/’creditor’ immediately secures a court-endorsed charge over all of the assets (even if the claim only accounts for a small portion of the frozen assets; relatively simple to do). The local government will quickly (through the local court) appoint a bankruptcy management team to ‘work out’ the situation (read: take over the business before management strips the remaining assets and they are left facing hundreds of angry workers). A feeding frenzy ensues amongst local players, connected-guys, real estate speculators, competitors, et al., even the Non-Bank Financial Institution arm of the local government often gets in on the game (which never makes for a fair outcome, as these guys effectively control the local court) -- and all jockey for position. Eventually what remains of the assets gets sold in a rigged auction, first workers/employees claims, then secured credits, then unsecured claims are settled – equity holders are, in the vast majority of cases, left with absolutely nothing. This whole process will, mind you, likely take two+ years if all goes smoothly, much longer if there are problems (as there often are). I have witnessed this process from both sides of the table. It always ends tears for minority equity holders. Interestingly and tellingly, it is often original majority equity holders who end up (through an ‘unrelated’ proxy of course) back in control of the business they ran into the ground. These are China rules.
On a separate but equally critical point, ADY shareholders should not overestimate the generosity of PRC banks. They are only generous with state owned enterprises, and even these not as much lately. All other companies risk immediate acceleration of debts if a single payment is missed, or if the bank manager doesn’t like the way things smell – it does not matter what the loan agreement says. Based on consultations with senior officials in PRC banks it seems highly questionable as to whether or not ADY will be able to extend/roll over its existing credit facilities going forward. In other words the bottom could fall out of this business very quickly.
Summary
What’s Next