Bankrate Inc. Q2 2009 Earnings Call Transcript

| About: Bankrate Inc. (RATE)
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Bankrate Inc. (NYSE:RATE) Q2 2009 Earnings Call July 30, 2009 11:00 AM ET


Bruce Zanca - SVP, Chief Communications and Marketing Officer

Tom Evans - President and CEO

Ed DiMaria - SVP and CFO


Youssef Squali - Jefferies

Carter Malloy - Stephens Inc.

John Blackledge - Credit Suisse

Colin Gillis - Brigantine

Sameet Sinha - JMP Securities

Aaron Kessler - Kaufman Brothers


Good day, everyone, and welcome to the Bankrate Inc. second quarter 20009 conference call. Today's call is being recorded. At this time for opening remarks and introductions I would like to turn the conference over to Bruce Zanca. Please go ahead.

Bruce Zanca

Thanks for joining us on this conference call to report on Bankrate Incorporated’s second quarter 2009 financial results. With me here in our New York office is the Company's President and CEO, Tom Evans; and our Senior VP and Chief Financial Officer, Ed DiMaria.

Let me take a minute to go over the format on the end of the call for today. First, Tom will give us the results and color on the quarter. Ed will then give us some detail on our financial results and then we will have time to answer your questions about the quarter.

Please note that we will limit the scope of the q-and-a period to questions concerning our Q2 results. We won't be taking questions regarding the pending tender offer. We would however direct you to our recent filings with the SEC, particularly the Form 14-D9 which was filed earlier this week which we believe does a very thorough job of disclosing specific details.

Before we begin, let me take care of the legal prerequisites. Our lawyers have asked me to remind you that some of the statements made in this conference call, including those regarding the company's future prospects, constitute forward-looking statements within the meanings of the Securities Act of 1933 as amended in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

The company intends that these forward-looking statements may be subject to Safe Harbor created under the securities law. These forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance but are subject to uncertainties and factors relating to the company's operations and business environment, which may cause the company's actual results to be materially different from any future results.

We encourage you to read the section entitled Risk Factors in our Form 10-K and our other recent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. So that being taken care of, let me introduce you to Bankrate's President and CEO, Tom Evans. Tom.

Tom Evans

Thanks Chris. Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for joining us on our second quarter earnings call. As you know it has been an eventful time for the Company and we want to first give you a sense for the state of our business and then explain our thinking behind agreeing to the offer by Apex to take the Company private.

First, the Wall Street Journal headline on Monday of this week really did give context to the state of our end markets and put a fine point on our business in this current environment. Monday's headline read "loans shrink as fears linger".

The story said, lending continues to slow as banks and borrowers refrained from taking risks. The total amount of loans held by the 15 largest banks shrink by more than 2.8% in the second quarter and over half of the loan volume came from refinancing existing mortgages. It went on to say the numbers underscored two related trends weighing on the economy.

Financial institutions are clamping down on lending to conserve capital as a cushion against mounting loan losses, and low demand is falling as consumers trim spending to ride out the recession.

With that as a backdrop, let's tell you about our second quarter.

Revenue for the quarter was $31 million and declined by 23% as three of our four largest channels face a difficult economic environment. EBITDA for the quarter at $9.3 million was down 26% for the year prior and down 28% sequentially.

Ed will fill you in on some of the financial details, but let me walk everyone through our different business segments and the challenges they currently face. In the mortgage and loan sector it is obvious that the state of the economy and the increase in mortgage rates in the recent past has, as the Journal said, slowed lending and (inaudible) activity. Lenders are marketing, but it seems now that as mortgage rates have increased, consumers are waiting until rates become more attractive like they were 90 days ago. Consumers may still be looking, but with rates less attractive and with less lending activity going on, it's had a negative impact on our mortgage business.

In deposits, we have also seen a change in the market. With lending flows slowed, banks have stopped to reduce raising capital through consumer deposits. To be sure markets still exists, there are still banks offering attractive rates although not as attractive as they were and still consumers looking for a safe place for their money, but neither is it the volume that it had been.

In addition, banks have had a cheap source of capital through the government and consumers are being ever more cautious, again both having a negative impact on our deposit business.

I probably don't need to tell anyone that the environment for credit card business is challenging. Credit card issuers have seen a decline in consumer spending and an increase in customer delinquency rates.

Adding to that, the federal government's new legislation trying to protect consumers has made it more difficult for card issuers and more cautious about acquiring customers at this juncture. So that business, while still profitable and maintaining margins, is down dramatically at this particular time.

The business area that has been doing well is our insurance [lead-gen] segment. As the economy has declined, consumers are looking for ways to save money and are shopping their insurance policies more often. In an area like auto insurance, for example, consumers would typically be motivated to get a new policy when they bought a new car. Now many are shopping out of cycle and looking for ways to save money.

Additionally, insurance agents are being more aggressive in finding those consumers. So our agent base has been growing and our insurance business is doing well. We are pleased about that, but that has obviously been the exception rather than the rule.

So the question I'm sure many of you are asking is what changed and when did it change since we were cautiously optimistic just about 100 days ago? I can tell you that we were, we were more optimistic at the end of Q1 that the worst was over and then felt that we were seeing signs of improvement. The banking crisis and the resulting government intervention seemed to have stabilized the banking world and there were more of our customers gearing up to spend money and we were seeing an uptick in demand and display spending.

However as the second quarter progressed we saw that business deteriorate especially in the second half of May and in June. We saw, for example, the visit to click ratios on our rate tables declined even as traffic remained steady. Consumers were just slowing down their purchase activity and fewer and fewer financial commitments were being made.

I can tell you from our vantage point and from that of many of our customers that the money that supposedly had been poured into the banks to allow them to stimulate the economy by lending is not being, for the most part, lent out to consumers and small businesses. There continues to be a lack of capital flowing to the consumer and the hesitation on the part of the consumer and to commit.

There's still no securitization for example for jumbo loans and the consumer financial world seems even more paralyzed right now than it did 100 and 200 days ago.

So to sum it up, three of the four pillars of our business have and are currently facing pretty strong head winds and we really have no idea how long that environment may last. As a result, and in combination with our second quarter performance, it is likely that our stock would have taken a meaningful hit and with little visibility, it is impossible to tell how long we would be in that position.

Given that backdrop, given the economic environment and the lack of visibility, our Board felt that the situation and the position that the company would be in would have made it extremely difficult for us to manage and execute our business effectively, would have made competing for acquisitions much more difficult if not impossible and, lastly, could have made the task of retaining key employees more difficult. For those reasons and more, we believe that the right decision to our shareholders was to lock in a value at a premium now, rather than take our lumps and grind it out over the next several years, hoping to get back to that level at some point down the road. I can promise you that the Board's biggest concern was protecting shareholder value and we believe we did that by agreeing to the acquisition.

Our second concern is what would happen to the Company if we were treading water for six to 12 to 24 months if we waited for our business and our stock price to rebound. I am sure, based on having a lay of the competitive landscape, there are likely to be meaningful acquisition opportunities that will come about in the next six to 12 months that will be important if not critical to be able to be competitive for.

Having a source of capital to compete with will be an important ability to continue to build the business. Not being in a position to do so could have had a very negative impact on our competitive position. Trying to do that in an environment where capital is expensive and trying to do that with a depressed stock price would be a serious if not impossible challenge. So that is a little bit behind our thinking and with that I will turn it over to Ed to go through the quarter's financial results.

Ed DiMaria

Thanks Tom. Tom outlined the backdrop for the difficult second quarter as well as the topline results. I will now take you through the results in some more detail.

Revenues for the quarter were $31 million, off 23% from the prior quarter and off 19% from Q1 2009. Adjusted EBITDA came in at $9.4 million, off 26% from the $12.8 million we posted in Q2 2008. It was off 28% from the $13.1 million for Q1 2009.

Net income came in at $1.9 million or $0.10 per diluted share for Q2 2009 compared to $4.1 million or $0.21 per diluted share for Q2 2008. Excluding stock compensation net income came in at $3.7 million or $0.19 per diluted share in Q2 2009, compared to $6.5 million or $0.33 per diluted share in Q2 2008. Obviously a very tough quarter with us feeling the impact of the difficult environment in the financial sector across all of our major product categories as Tom pointed out, except insurance, which has held up well.

Looking at revenue in more detail, online revenues for Q2 2009 were $29 million, down $8.8 million or 23% from the $37.8 million reported in Q2 2008. The display in lead generation component of online revenue was $20.9 million for the quarter, down $6.2 million from the $27.1 million week posted in Q2 2008 and off $4.5 million from $25.4 million for Q1 2009.

The decline from Q2 2008 was driven by credit card; display advertising and Bankrate select mortgage lead generation revenue and this was partially offset by growth in the insurance business. The decline from Q1 2009 was driven by credit cards, Bankrate select and a seasonal decline in insurance lead generation that we expected.

The display business was essentially flat with Q1 2009 levels. The hyperlink business decreased by 24% during the quarter from $10.7 million in Q2 2008 to $8.1 million in Q2 2009. The decrease was driven by declines in both mortgage and deposit hyperlink advertising where we saw a drop in the consumer click through rates. We believe that the lower click through rates were the result of an assortment of factors, including the recent spike in mortgage rates, lower deposit rates and less hyperlink advertiser coverage on our tables.

Our print publishing and licensing revenue was $2 million for the quarter representing a decrease of 16% from the second quarter 2008 revenue of $2.4 million. Print revenues were up slightly over Q1 2009 levels.

Looking at margins, our overall gross margin percentage on revenue for the second quarter 2009, and this is excluding stock compensation expense, was 59.5% compared to 58.4% in the second quarter of 2008 and 61.9% in Q1 2009. The increase over Q2 2008 was driven by the revenue mix this year with a higher percentage of our business being driven by organic sources. The decrease from Q1 2009 was a result of the large drop in volume. Given the size of the volume decrease it did negatively affect margins.

The adjusted EBITDA margin for the quarter was 30% in Q2 2009 compared to 32% in Q1 2008, and 34% in Q1 2009. The decrease from last year as well as the first quarter was driven by less revenue and the associated negative leverage against our operating expenses.

Operating expenses on a non-GAAP basis for the quarter decreased from $16.7 million in Q2 2008 to $15.1 million in Q2 2009 and operating expenses were also down from the $15.6 million we posted for Q1 2009. The decrease from Q2 2008 was realized from a decrease of approximately $900,000 in marketing expenses and a reduction in general and administrative expenses of approximately $760,000 and that was primarily in compensation-related costs and lower accounting costs.

Other changes in operating expenses included a $1.1 million increase in amortization and depreciation, primarily as a result of the acquisitions we completed in the second half of 2008 and a $1 million decrease in stock compensation expense, resulting from certain awards becoming fully invested and awards that were forfeited during Q1 2009.

The decrease in operating expenses from Q1 2009 resulted from a combination of factors including lower sales expense on less revenue, lower marketing expenses and a large drop in general and administrative expense. These decreases were partially offset by an increase in stock compensation expense in Q2 over Q1.

Note again we had awards that were forfeited in Q1 and accumulative related expense for those awards was reversed in Q1, thus lowering the expense and we also had an increase in depreciation and amortization in Q2 over Q1 as a result of us launching the new website.

We ended the quarter with $55 million in cash and cash equivalents. We generated $8.5 million in cash flow from operations during the quarter and we used approximately $600,000 on capital expenditures. Okay with that, Tom will now wrap up and then we will take your questions. Tom?

Tom Evans

Again just wanted to just explain the status of the business and I think we have done so. So you know I'm happy to go right questions immediately. Okay. So thanks, Ed.

Question-and-Answer Session


(Operator Instructions) We will take our first question from Youssef Squali with Jefferies.

Youssef Squali - Jefferies

Thank you very much and Tom, congrats on the deal; a couple of quick ones. First on the deposit side, can you talk a little bit more about pricing, the pricing environment? Earlier this year, you had instituted about an 11% increase and basically through early second quarter, year-over-year was that you had not really seen any pushback. Is it really, mostly volume or are you seeing prices also being obviously coming under pressure to try and maintain volume? Secondarily, not going to ask questions on the deal, but one of the drivers arguably for the deal was, and this is something you just referred to, your ability to maybe do some M&A to position yourself right.

Can you talk about what it is that you're seeing? What is the M&A environment? Have the prices actually improved to a point where it makes you want to actually be more active right now? Thanks.

Tom Evans

Thanks Youssef. First about deposit pricing; honestly, we are not seeing or hearing from people that pricing is an issue. It really is all volume and you've got a couple of things that happen. As I said, there are fewer banks that are trying to raise deposit capital through consumers and the rates at which they are offering today are nowhere near as attractive as they were. So that's been a decline. But it is not the fact that we raised prices.

We are doing some work right now and have been through this year, working with a couple of those advertisers where we are having a window in the back end. I can tell you that the results from the consumers who are coming and are clicking and are making deposits are fantastic. When the value of the Bankrate consumer continues to be sort of second to none and we hear that time and time again.

So it is not a pricing issue. It really is the fact that it's a volume issue and if they are not loaning money at the front end of the store, they are not needing to take in capital at the back end.

In terms of the M&A activity, I don't know whether it's sort of a reconciliation of the current environment, but there's just more gearing up. There are more people that, whether it's sort of looking for a partner or looking for a safe home, looking to cash out now. But there's just more M&A activity now. I think and I believe there will be in the next as I said six to 12 months and so we want to be in a position to participate in there. Whether the prices are reasonable or more reasonable sort of remains to be seen. But I can tell you that at least some of the preliminary conversations and then things that I've heard of is people are no longer seeing visions of sugar plums as they were at one time and thinking about wacky multiples.

So we will see whether it plays out as we expect. But that's our thought now and, boy, to be out of that game for a period of time which I feel like if we had just put our heads down and decide to grind it out, I do think that we would be in a vulnerable position of not being able to access capital and not being able to participate for those things. We would really be in a position where we were kind of dead in the water for a period of time.

If you are a believer that, I think as we are and the Board is, at any time you're either moving ahead or you're falling behind. You are never staying the same. If you are in a position of treading water, waiting for the business to bounce back, and believe me, the business will bounce back, this is a good business. But I think that it just put us at a very difficult position and if we were treading water we were de facto falling behind. I just thought that that made us more vulnerable and it made the shareholder more vulnerable as a result. So that was the thinking behind that. But thank you.


Our next question comes from Carter Malloy with Stephens Incorporated.

Carter Malloy - Stephens Inc.

In your 14-D filing, I think you guys had detailed some of your management projections for the business, particularly on EBITDA; wondering what your growth assumptions are there and is that from increased traffic or pricing or total return on credit cards or are there some acquisition assumption in there. Just trying to get comfort on the aggressiveness or what appears to be aggressiveness of those projections.

Tom Evans

The projections did assume an improvement in the second half of the year. That was sort of the premise of the projections. Obviously, we have no visibility into that so we don't know whether or not that will actually hold out. But certainly that's the driving force behind the projections in the latter half of the year. There were no increases per se in the projections in pricing, so most of it was all driven by volume. We also assume that the credit card business would bounce back somewhat during the second half of the year.

We also assume that the display advertising business would have some improvement in it in the form of us being able to take the CPMs up from serving less, rental ads and moving that more to paid ads. So certainly there was definitely some optimism in the projections in the third and fourth quarter and again I'd just point out that visibility into those periods of time is very low.

Carter Malloy - Stephens Inc.

As we are well into our way into the third quarter here, is it safe to say that the 2Q was a trough quarter or have you seen any improvements off of kind of the May/June slowdown in your business?

Tom Evans

Way too early for us to tell whether the second quarter was a trough or not, I mean we have no idea at this point in time. We would expect July to be a little bit better than June anyway. We think July probably will be a little bit better than June, but we are not talking a major sort of difference between June and July that we can just point back and say, yes, second quarter was a trough.

Ed DiMaria

Yes, I think I need to put a finer point on what I had said. July has always been a better month than June. It's sort of shaping up, at this point there is no reason to project Q3 is going to be any better than Q2; impossible to tell.

Carter Malloy - Stephens Inc.

Okay and lastly just real quick, can I assume that credit card was the true trouble child of the quarter? I understand you nave weakness across your business.

Tom Evans

You know to be honest, mortgage was off, deposit was off. Deposit was off more than we would have thought and credit card was off. So it really was equal pain across the boards and clearly credit card is having the toughest time. But the other two were not exactly seashells from balloons, relative to how they performed in the past.

What we've seen is, as I mentioned in the remarks, visit to click ratio is down pretty much across the board. You know it's not a lack of traffic. It's not a lack of the visitors coming to the site. People are just not taking action. There's not attractive rates out there. It is a tough environment. Consumers are being more cautious. They are spending less. I mean you've heard some of the credit card company reports where they're saying same people are spending less. Not only fewer transactions, but they are spending less on a per unit basis. So it had an impact on three of the four major pillars of our business other than insurance.


Our next question comes from John Blackledge with Credit Suisse.

John Blackledge - Credit Suisse

Just a couple of items; I think I understand the rationale for the acquisition, but in my mind across your business, it feels like it is a timing-related thing. If you could just talk to you if you think there's any structural issues longer term with any of your business segments, to me, it doesn't feel that way.

It feels like your businesses are troughing given timing, hitting most of them all at once. But if you just talk to a little bit longer-term structural what you see is, if there are structural issues with the businesses. Then the one thing I didn't really understand is why is it easier to do M&A as a private company versus a public company? As a private company you guys are going to be able to lever up to do acquisitions. It would be easier, if you could just explain the rationale there? Thank you.

Tom Evans

Sure, couple of things. First of all, I don't think it's anything structural with the business. I do think it is the economic environment. I do think it is the impact of the economic environment has had on the consumer, has had on banks, has had on lenders, has had on credit card companies; and that I agree or appreciate the fact that this isn't a Bankrate-centric or a Bankrate-specific problem. All of those markets are challenged. We were much more optimistic 100 days ago, 200 days ago, but a turn in those markets, a turn in the economy, a turn in banks' business and in spending and things like that and, again, I will tell you if you go back and read the Journal story, the front page headline story from Monday in the Journal, it has gotten worse not better.

They're not lending, and if they are not lending they don't need to be taking in money. Credit card companies aren't looking for new customers. They are trying to find just sort of the right balance in their current portfolio, given the delinquency rate. So it is a tough environment and we think it's going to be tough for the near-term.

The fear of the fact that you are dead in the water, this is in a way a bittersweet situation for us. It is not structural, but if we are in the same boat for two, three, four or more quarters, stock prices hit, the world changes. People develop competitors, acquisitions are being made, people are getting stronger and if we are not able to compete, if we are not out there doing those things, we become in a worse position, not a better position. I am not a big believer in just because you bide your time and you wait it out, the world looks the same in 18 to 24 months as things return.

I think it is a competitive arena. If you are not building, if you are not improving, you are falling behind. What's easier about it, first of all, through a financial sponsor, there is access to capital. If we were, for example, to struggle for the next several quarters and the stock price was halved from where it was, that $24, all of a sudden, a $200 million acquisition becomes enormously expensive relative to, first of all, the $55 million in cash and I picked a number, a low teens stock price.

How do make an acquisition of that size? How do you compete? You can't do it. You can't borrow the money. You can't or it would be almost suicidal to be doing that kind of an acquisition with stock. So you watch these things go by the wayside and other people are building a business. You are missing assets that could help build a business while you are waiting for the sun to come back out. So I think it just makes it a much, much tougher environment in which to compete and grow and develop. So that's the thinking.


Hearing next from Colin Gillis with Brigantine.

Colin Gillis - Brigantine

What do you think is wrong with the lead gen market right now?

Tom Evans

Well, what a question. I don't think there is anything wrong with the lead gen market. I think there is a problem with the end markets. The lead gen market in insurance is terrific, but if you are talking about mortgage and you're talking about credit card, if you're trying to make the case that well this is really the lead gen, this is a bad business because of the current environment, I would argue with that. I don't think it's structural. I think it is economic. I think it's in end market related.

It would be hard pressed to say if the lead gen business were structured differently, or if it were a different model that the mortgage business, the lending business, the auto loan business would be in better shape.

I don't think it has anything to do with the business model of lead gen. I think it has everything to do with the end market. I mean banks are not lending money. I mean the journal story made it very clear. It's hard to get a refi. It's impossible to get a jumbo. There's no securitization market for jumbo loans. So, you have to find a bank that's willing to take that on their books.

And I've heard horror stories about the number of jumbos that are actually being locked and closed is miniscule compared to what it used to be. It's for people who are doing 50% loan-to-value. Where it used to be 80%, where that money used to be available, there was a securitization market.

So I mean it's no secret the credit card companies are working through their portfolios, trying to determine where the delinquency rates are going to shake out. Until all of that is worked out, I think the businesses, sort of the end markets are going to be challenged, which means that the businesses are challenged.

I do not think there is anything wrong with the lead gen business. I do think that there is going to be a flight to quality. I've always believed that, that's why we've always had the acquisitions that we've made, the incremental traffic that we developed. The Bankrate has always been and you've heard me say this before focused on jet fuel.

If you've got jet fuel, you are going to be able to sell it and you are going to be able to sell at the highest rate. If you're mixing that with a lot of swamp water, you have got trouble. We've always gone for the jet fuel and tried to avoid the swamp water.

I still think that's the game. Jet fuel is pretty tough right now. Swamp water is impossible to be selling. So I think our strategy is good. I think our position is good. Over time we will be okay, but I think the end markets are in dire trouble, I mean obviously.

Colin Gillis - Brigantine

That makes a lot of sense, I mean. In case this is the last public conference call I just want to say that you've run Bankrate as a best-of-breed company.

Tom Evans

I appreciate that. Thank you. That's nice of you to say. We are, as I said, it is a little bittersweet given the environment. And I think we've done as best we can and then I think our staff has done a great job in a very, very difficult environment. So thanks. I will pass those thoughts along.


Our next question comes from Sameet Sinha with JMP Securities.

Sameet Sinha - JMP Securities

Just a question on display advertising. Obviously, you said that that's stabilized you during the second quarter and maybe you're seeing some improvement going into the second half of the year. Can you talk about whether that was a secular change for the entire industry, or was it Bankrate-specific?

My second question as regards to your M&A strategy. Looking at portfolio, what are the missing pieces? What are some of these businesses that you could potentially acquire? Thank you.

Tom Evans

On display, display is probably the most schizophrenic and I think you are hearing this from other companies environment. We have seen some cases where we thought it was getting at the end of the first quarter, beginning of the second quarter. We thought it was improving.

We have seen some people coming back in again. It's not a pricing issue. If you've got premium inventory, people are interested in that. It's just the volume. There's not as much volume as there was. So it's been sporadic with some players, but it does feel like it's getting slightly better.

We do feel like display has bottomed out, but again hard to know. I think some of that may be the fact that Bankrate's got. Even in an environment Sameet where you can't sell an all-day or a subprime loan. The fact that Bankrate has the prime consumer, the guy with the high FICO score, the guy whose loan amount is normally most higher than average. Those people are targeting the Bankrate consumer in this environment, but it is still tough. I mean it is still a tough environment.

As for M&A, listen we are not going to do something that is far afield. We are not going to do. Our intent has always been to build up to satisfy the needs and interests of the Bankrate consumer. Those tend to be for personal financial products, and that will continue to be where our focus is, going forward.


Our next question comes from Aaron Kessler from Kaufman.

Aaron Kessler - Kaufman Brothers

I have a couple questions. One on the outlook, I think on the 14D, it looks like you are projecting as the caller before about $64 million EBITDA, up from about $48 million. So that suggests obviously an improvement in the demand outlook.

Just want to reconcile that with common sense, this could go on for a while. Is that just the kind of thing you're a little cautiously optimistic or are you starting to see any signs of improvement? Then just by the end market maybe if you could just take credit card deposit or mortgage, is there any one area you feel more confident may recover faster than other? Thank you.

Ed DiMaria

I'll take the first part. I mean as I mentioned in the earlier question, the projections were based on the assumption that there was improvement starting in the second half of 2009. Of course that would carry into 2010, which is the reason why you see that uptick in EBITDA.

So do we have any real solid evidence or support to be able to say that those things are achievable? No. We don't have any evidence whatsoever. Those are projections. We have very little visibility into the third or fourth quarter for that matter, much less 2010.

So certainly, I think if the end market as Tom is pointing out dramatically improved and improved very quickly, perhaps we would be able to achieve those types of numbers, but we would have to see improvement and thus far we haven't seen that.

Aaron Kessler - Kaufman Brothers

Were the sequential change in the revenues much more from the conversion side as opposed to advertisers pulling back?

Tom Evans

No. CTR or?

Aaron Kessler - Kaufman Brothers

Yes, exactly.

Tom Evans

It's tough to tell exactly what is the reason, but we think as I pointed out in my prepared remarks it's a combination of factors. We have seen less demand on the hyperlinked tables. Certainly with less choices on the part of the consumer, you are naturally going to have a lower click through rate, but we also think that the environment is also influencing consumer behavior with lower deposit rates and recently as I pointed out in my prepared remarks with the spike in mortgage rates. So there's a number of contributing factors and we can't certainly be able to put our finger on exactly what it is, but certainly they all have a hand in it.

While I think that looks like that's all the questions that are queued up. So listen I have just been sort of summarizing. Thanks everybody for attending. We do want to thank our Board for their steady guidance of the company and to all of our employees for their superb work and diligence in a tough environment.

Additionally, I want to thank the investors and analysts who have been following the company for the past several years. We have appreciated your interest, and at times, your support, but always felt like we got a fair shake. We hope along the way that we were able to be helpful to you in trying to understand our business and explain it as best we could. So thanks everyone and hope to see you again.


Once again, ladies and gentlemen, this does conclude today's conference call. We thank you for your participation.

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