Recently I have worked on a number of financing for mid-market fintech companies that had substantial EBITDA and profitability, but the bulk of their assets were intangible. When many banks and financiers looked at these businesses, they wanted to write-down the intangible assets to get to a tangible asset figure. Well, in doing so, you often ended up with negative tangible assets and therefore, on this basis, the ROE was negative. The result of the write down of the intangibles was clearly producing accounting nonsense and misleading investor information.
This might be all well and good if it was just an isolated problem, but in fact as we enter the tech age, IP is becoming one of the most dominant items on many company’s balance sheets – not to mention Amazon (AMZN), Google (GOOGL), Twitter (TWTR), pharma cos and increasingly many other sectors where technology or biotechnology is becoming a key driver of value. We are dealing here with the very essence of the valuation of innovation, one of the key drivers of value in our modern economies.
It, in other words, is just another step in the economic revolution that I wrote about in one of my previous Seeking Alpha articles on the need for a new macro-economic and investment textbook (see: Fed Policy - Does The Tech Age Indicate It's Time To Re-Write The Whole Economic Textbook?). It is a part of the work of the think tank maxos.ai and other academic finance writers (Sullivan P. 2000, Scicluna 2002, et al), as well as noted economists at MIT such as McAfee and Brynjolfsson. But the problem is just no longer an academic one as it was 10+ years ago. The prevalence of IP in our corporate balance sheets is now so significant that both macro-economic policy making and investment analysis is simply misleading in many cases unless there are real attempts to capitalize IP. Every investor needs to focus on this issue now.
The accounting profession has also been grappling with the problem in a limited fashion and FAS 141 and 142 do, for example, make real steps toward trying to address the problem. FAS 141 insists on the breakdown of “goodwill” in a merger into its IP components, while FAS 142 stopped the unrealistic amortization of goodwill. However, accountants given that they intrinsically want to record historic facts (whereas IP value if based on future performance), are probably not the ones who are going to crack this problem wide open.
How adequately to capitalize IP with its intrinsically futuristic and volatile value is an extremely difficult problem. But I think the central difficulty many academics and the accounting professionals have is that they are seeking a one fits all solution. This is just not available. Instead, one has to treat the valuation and capitalization of IP on a bespoke, case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the IP, the scenario under which the intangible arises, the sector and the extent of assumptions needed in a given case. In other words, IP can be treated in a range of ways depending on the circumstances:
Other methodologies may abound, and the trick may be to triangulate between these methods as in any good company valuation. Either way, for the investors, this can no longer wait. It is no longer a theoretical matter. Vast amount of value will simply not be captured (and is not being captured) in investment analysis and in our macro-economic records (e.g. of GDP) unless we start very seriously finding ways of valuing and recording IP going forward.
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