Closed-End Funds On Sale Bring Dividend Yield On 2x Leveraged High Yield ETN To 20.1%
Summary
- The current discount to book value for CEFL is near the highest ever, which makes this a possible buying opportunity.
- Return of capital is a consideration in high yield closed-end funds and is a factor in all of the 2x Leveraged High Yield ETNs.
- The major determinant for the outlook for 2x Leveraged ETNs will be the Federal Reserve's actions.
Outlook For CEFL, Reasons to Buy and Reasons for Caution
The recent market declines have made all of the 2x Leveraged High Yield ETNs more attractive for those seeking to maximize current yield, as their yields are now higher due to their lower prices. Most investors would not consider UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA:CEFL) a particularly good instrument to hedge against or take advantage of a sharply rising equities market. However, for a portfolio that is constrained to only buy securities with current yields above 15%, CEFL is one of the only games in town. The recent price decline has brought the CEFL dividend yield on an annualized monthly compounded basis to 20.1%. Another reason to consider CEFL is that the average discount to book value for the components of the ISE High Income™ Index (YLDA) upon which CEFL is based was 12.25% using data available as of November 30, 2018. I compute the average discount to book value of the CEFL components periodically. One problem is that the annual rebalancing of the index, where the components can be changed significantly, makes comparison with earlier values for the discounts to book value less useful. However, even with that caveat, a major driver of the price movements for CEFL and the closed-end funds in the index has been the discounts to book value.
The highest average discount to book value I computed for the high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL and its unleveraged version, the YieldShares High Income ETF (YYY), was 13.8% on September 18, 2015. The lowest was 6.9% on July 28, 2016. Over that 0.86 year period, buying on September 18, 2015 and selling on July 28, 2016, the annualized gain including reinvesting dividends for CEFL was 31.74%. The best time to buy high dividend closed-end funds usually has been when the discounts to book value have been the largest.
On January 22, 2018, the average discount to book value of the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL and YYY are based was 8.55%. Using data available as of December 22, 2017, the average discount to book value of the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprised the old index was 7.06%.
A substantial portion of the relative price fluctuation in CEFL has been due to changes in the discount to book value. The latest 12.25% average discount to book value of closed-end funds that make up the current CEFL index, is closer to the higher end of its range. That could suggest a buying opportunity.
A reason for caution, at times, has been that some of the dividends paid by the components of CEFL include return of capital. Because of significant changes in the composition of the index, comparisons of the proportion of the dividends from return of capital to previous levels may not be very meaningful. Additionally, some of the monthly data used to calculate return of capital are just estimates subject to revision. Using data available as of October 31, 2018, indicated that 16.3% of the CEFL dividend consisted of return of capital. Using data available as of November 27, 2018 indicated that only 11.1% of the CEFL dividend consisted of return of capital. My calculation using available data as of December 28, 2016, before the 2017 rebalancing indicated that 17% of the CEFL dividend consisted of return of capital. This could be a cause for optimism, or just a blip in the unreliable data.
When considering yields on 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL, there is another separate factor that could be considered return of capital, that is becoming more significant as the Federal Reserve increases short-term interest rates. An investment in CEFL is functionally the equivalent of buying the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL is based, in a brokerage account using 50% margin. Thus, the value of that hypothetical margin account and the value of CEFL would be expected to move either up or down twice the amount that an unleveraged account holding the same 30 closed-end funds, moved on a percentage basis.
In both the margin account and CEFL, there is interest expense. In the margin account, the brokerage firm charges interest on the margin loan that is used to finance the 50% leverage. In CEFL there is an imputed interest fee, called a financing expense, that is based on 3-month LIBOR now 2.73%. The financing expense is 3-month LIBOR + 0.40%. This is currently 2.73% + 0.4% = 3.13%.
For most retail investors the interest on margin loans charged by brokerage firms is far higher than the imputed financing expense in CEFL. For example, Fidelity now charges accounts with less than a margin balance of $25,000, an interest rate of 9.575%. The rate varies with changes in market interest rates and accounts with higher outstanding margin balances pay less on a sliding scale. For accounts with outstanding margin balances over $1,000,000, the current Fidelity rate is 5.250%. TD Ameritrade charges 10.5% on accounts with less than $10,000, charges 10.25% on accounts with $10,000 - $24,999 and 7.75% on accounts with outstanding margin balances over $1,000,000.
In addition to the interest on margin loans changed by brokerage firms, there would usually be commissions and fees on the transactions associated with buying the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL is based, and possibly rebalancing transactions to maintain the 50% leverage or changes in the index. In addition to the implicit financing expense based on 3-month LIBOR, CEFL has a 0.50% annual tracking fee. In both the margin account and CEFL, the fees and expense reduce the total return to the investor. However, in the margin account, interest expenses and other fees are broken out in the account statement. In funds like YYY, the fees and expenses reduce the income paid in dividends. For 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL, the interest and tracking fees reduce the net indicative (asset) value.
To the extent that the dividends paid by 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL, are higher than they would be if the interest and tracking fees were taken from the dividend, the dividend could be considered to include a return of capital. This is separate and distinct from any return of capital associated with some of closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL is based. This factor was relatively very small when 3-month LIBOR was only 0.25% from 2010 through 2015. However, with 3-month LIBOR now at 2.73%, it is more significant. For example, the CEFL dividend yield on an annualized monthly compounded basis is now 20.1%, based on my projection of the December 2018 CEFL monthly dividend of $0.2219. That calculation is based on a projected annual CEFL dividend of $2.456. Adding the financing expense of 3.13% to the 0.50% annual tracking fee brings total expenses including interest to 3.63%. If that was taken out of the dividends rather than the net indicative value, the projected annual CEFL dividend would be $1.974 and the annualized monthly compounded basis would be 15.9%. The total return would be the same. However, for those who have 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL, in taxable accounts, you would be paying taxes on higher dividends, that would be the case if the expenses and fees were taken out of the dividends rather than the net indicative value. The lower capital gains or larger capital losses, for tax purposes, from taking the expenses and fees from net indicative value, would usually not offset the higher taxes on the dividends.
The treatment of interest expense is now more significant for 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL because of the higher short-term interest rates resulting from the tightening by the Federal Reserve. That is not the main reason that the major determinant for the outlook for 2x Leveraged ETNs will be the Federal Reserve's actions. This is discussed in the recent article: The Federal Reserve Holds The Key To The Outlook For The 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETNs. That article describes how almost all political policy news and economic variables such as unemployment, inflation and growth are now important for the outlook for 2x Leveraged ETNs, mainly to the extent that they can influence decisions and actions by the Federal Reserve. Making the situation even more uncertain, it is not clear how the Federal Reserve would react to a number of specific events. For example, a surge in inflation resulting from increased tariffs could cause the Federal Reserve to be more aggressive in raising rates. Alternately, a surge in inflation resulting from those tariffs could cause the Federal Reserve to consider that surge in inflation to be a one-time event, and not raise rates.
The extent to which the Federal Reserve has taken on even more importance for financial markets than usual was seen when Chairman Powell's words that rates were near the neutral range prompted a huge rally in the stocks and bonds. That caused some to say that the Federal Reserve is now a bigger issue for the markets than trade policy on a day-to-day basis.
Is The Rationale For My Investment In 2x leveraged High-Yield ETNs Still Intact?
Five years ago in July 2013, I laid out my economics-based rationale for investing in the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2X Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (MORL) and mREITs in A Depression With Benefits: The Macro Case For mREITs, which set forth the premise that overinvestment caused by tax policy is the primary driver of the business cycle and that the inequality resulting from the then existent tax code made me a buyer of MORL. That article included in part:
...In free-market capitalism, capital generates income for the owners of the capital which in turn is used to create additional capital. This is very good. Sometimes, it can be actually too good. As capital continues to accumulate, its owners find it more and more difficult to deploy it efficiently. The business sector generally must interact with the household sector by selling goods and services or lending to them. When capital accumulates too rapidly, the productive capacity of the business sector can outpace the ability of the household sector to absorb the increasing production.
The capitalists, or if you prefer, job creators use their increasing wealth and income to reinvest, thus increasing the productive capacity of the business they own. They also lend their accumulated wealth to other business as well as other entities after they have exhausted opportunities within business they own. As they seek to deploy ever more capital, excess factories, housing and shopping centers are built and more and more dubious loans are made. This is overinvestment...
... The Revenue acts of 1926 and 1928 worked exactly as the Republican Congresses that pushed them through promised. The dramatic reductions in taxes on the upper income brackets and estates of the wealthy did indeed result in increases in savings and investment. However, overinvestment (by 1929 there were over 600 automobile manufacturing companies in the USA) caused the depression that made the rich, and most everyone else, ultimately much poorer...
Since 1969, there has been a tremendous shift in the tax burdens away from the rich on onto the middle class. Corporate income tax receipts, whose incidence falls entirely on the owners of corporations, were 4% of GDP then and are now less than 1%. During that same period, payroll tax rates as percent of GDP have increased dramatically. The overinvestment problem caused by the reduction in taxes on the wealthy is exacerbated by the increased tax burden on the middle class. While overinvestment creates more factories, housing and shopping centers, higher payroll taxes reduce the purchasing power of middle-class consumers...
In 2013, the recovery from the financial crisis that began in 2007 was well underway. Many were forecasting that higher interest rates were imminent. My view was that interest rates would stay lower for longer. The was based in part on my view that the Federal Reserve was not artificially depressing short terms risk-free interest rates but rather was prevent them from declining even more. In 2013, I said in Federal Reserve Actually Propping Up Interest Rates: What This Means For mREITs:
...Most investors now believe three things about the Federal Reserve, money and interest rates. They think that the Federal Reserve is artificially depressing rates below what would be a "normal" level. They believe that in the process of doing so the Federal Reserve has enormously increased the supply of money and they believe that the USA is on a fiat money system.
All three of those beliefs are incorrect...
I updated that article on August 23, 2018, with: Federal Reserve Actually Propping Up Interest Rates: What This Means For mREITs: An Update which presented new evidence supporting my original conclusions that the Federal Reserve has been and still is keeping interest rates higher than what a free market in risk-free short-term fixed-income securities would be.
The relationship between interest rates and the Federal budget deficit has been a matter of concern for many decades. Clearly, borrowing by the US Treasury to finance the deficit tends to put upward pressure on interest rates. A related risk occurs when the Federal Reserve acts to punish what it perceives as bad government policy, by raising rates. From the late 1970s until, arguably 2007, the Federal Reserve at times, used monetary policy to dissuade politicians from what the Federal Reserve considers profligate fiscal policy. The term "bond market vigilantes" referred to financial market participants who voted with their money against the inflationary impacts of government deficits by selling treasury securities. However, it was usually the Federal Reserve that took on the major role of punishing politicians when it considered fiscal policy too inflationary.
My theories regarding monetary policy and the impact on the business cycle resulting from the shift in the tax burden away from the rich and onto the middle class, are the basis for my investment strategy as much now as they were five years ago. Certainly, an overinvestment induced recession caused by the reduction in taxes on the wealthy and exacerbated by the increased tax burden on the some in the middle class has become much more, sooner than later likely as a result of the 2017 tax bill. Thus, a booming stock market rally could benefit CEFL which has components that hold equity-like junk bonds. However. it could hasten the ultimate recession and ideal environment for very interest sensitive securities such as MORL. This was a rationale for including CEFL in a portfolio along with MORL. The mREIT-based portion of that portfolio now includes in addition to MORL: Credit Suisse X-Links Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (NYSEARCA: REML) and for new purchases, the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2X Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN Series B (MRRL) which is essentially identical in all economic respects to MORL. For the reasons new purchases usually should be MRRL rather than MORL see: Sell MORL, Buy MRRL.
Analysis Of The December 2018 CEFL Dividend Projection
While typically called dividends, the monthly payments from CEFL are technically distributions of interest payments on the ETN note based on the dividends paid by the underlying closed-end funds that comprise the index, pursuant to the terms of the indenture. All but three of the CEFL components pay monthly dividends. ClearBridge Energy (CEM) and Liberty All Star Equity Fund (USA pay quarterly, but have November 2018 ex-dates. Thus, they will be included in the CEFL December 2018 dividend projection. Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Domestic Debt Fund (EDD) is the only quarterly component that will not be included in the CEFL December 2018 dividend projection.
USA normally would have an October 2018 ex-date. Thus, it would normally contribute to the November 2018 CEFL dividend, not the December dividend. In previous years, its third quarter dividends had October ex-dates. However, because it conducted a rights offering, the 2018 USA third quarter dividend will have a November ex-date. USA has the second largest weight in the index upon which CEFL is based. The change to a November ex-date reduced the November 2018 CEFL dividend and increased the December 2018 CEFL dividend by $0.0337. That takes into account the reduction in the USA dividend to $0.16 from the $0.17 dividend paid in the prior 2018 quarter. From the data in the table below, I calculated a projection for the December 2018 monthly CEFL dividend of $0.2219. The table shows the ticker, name, weight, dividend, ex-date, price NAV and contribution to the dividend for the CEFL components that will contribute to the December 2018 CEFL dividend.
Conclusions And Recommendations
Including CEFL in my portfolio of 2x leveraged high-yield ETNs as a diversifier has been relatively expensive when compared to what my total returns would have been if I had held only MORL as compared to a mixture of MORL and CEFL. I have also used the UBS ETRACS 2xLeveraged Long Wells Fargo Business Development Company ETN (BDCL) as a diversifier for my MORL holdings.
From the inception of CEFL on January 7, 2014, when CEFL closed at $27.03 to the closing price of $13.60 on November 30, 2018, the total return on CEFL was 18.29%, assuming reinvestment of dividends. Over that 4.9-year holding period, this was an average annual total return of 3.49%. Those who bought CEFL at the initial offering price of $25 on January 7, 2014 did somewhat better, with a total return of 27.9%. In contrast, over the same period based on the MORL's closing price on January 7, 2014, of $19.95 and the closing price of $14.73 on November 30, 2018, the total return on MORL was 109.85%, again assuming reinvestment of dividends. Over the 4.9-year holding period, that was an average annual total return on MORL of 16.34%.
I have also used BDCL as a diversifier for my MORL, MRRL and REML holdings. That has turned out even worse, relative to simply holding only MORL. Using the 4.9-year holding period BDCL had a total return based on the closing price on January 7, 2014, of $29.83 and the closing price of $14.04 on November 30, 2018, of 6.98%, again assuming reinvestment of dividends. Over the 4.9-year holding period, that was an average annual total return on BDCL of only 1.39%.
Stocks and fixed-income securities, in a sense, compete for shares of investors' portfolios. A decline in the equity market can cause some investors to rebalance their portfolios to shift out of fixed-income securities into stocks. Likewise, a decline in the fixed-income market can cause some investors to rebalance their portfolio and shift out of stocks into fixed-income securities.
As was seen recently when both stocks and bonds did better as perceptions arose that the Federal Reserve may be less inclined to tighten much further, Federal Reserve ease can boost all financial markets simultaneously. The interaction between President Trump's willingness to overtly criticize the action of the Federal Reserve and how Chairman Powell might react to that creates additional uncertainty. One bullish scenario is that Chairman Powell might take a more dovish stance, and even not hike rates in December 2018, so as to not give President Trump an excuse to blame the Federal Reserve if the economy weakens. That would be particularly good for of 2X leveraged high yield ETNs.
I am still cautiously bullish on CEFL as a diversifier for my holdings of 2X leveraged high yield ETNs that are based on mREITs. CEFL is one of the few instruments that provide a very high yield and some ability to benefit from a rising stock market. However, policy risks that have arisen as a result of the 2016 election are now becoming more pronounced.
The uncertainty of possible impacts from possible protectionism, federal budget deficits, possible overheating in the economy and monetary policy suggests large fat-tail risks in both directions in the equity market and fixed-income markets. This would lead investors who have a significant portion of their portfolios in CEFL to consider adding MORL, MRRL or REML to hedge against the risk of much weaker economic growth.
This would enable them to maintain the income in the high teens that CEFL now delivers. Likewise, MORL, MRRL, and REML investors might want to consider adding CEFL or BDCL in order to hedge the against a high real growth scenario. SHMD could be utilized by investors who want to only invest in one 2X leveraged ETN since it contains both interest rate sensitive components and credit risk sensitive components.
The yields on all of the high-yielding 2x leveraged ETNs like CEFL are still compelling. However, the uncertainty regarding economic variables means that significant event risks exist in addition to the risks inherent with the ETN's use of leverage. This is in addition to the leverage employed by many of the components that make up the indices upon which these ETNs are based. I am diversifying the large proportion of MORL, MRRL, and REML in my portfolio with some CEFL and BDCL since there is a small possibility of much stronger economic growth than I expect.
At any time there could be a perception on the part of many market participants that there will be much stronger economic growth. This should be considered by shorter-term investors. If something catastrophic were to occur, like severe protectionism or an oil shock, it would be expected that the stock market would decline sharply, but MORL, MRRL, and REML could do better as investors seek the safety of agency mortgage-backed securities and the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates. YYY is an unleveraged ETF that is based on the same index as CEFL for those that might want to benefit from a rising market in higher yielding securities but are more risk-averse.
In view of the uncertainty and risks, active traders might consider waiting until the impacts of the Iran decertification, protectionism, federal budget deficits and monetary policy on economic conditions become more clear. However, a lesson we can learn from the last few years is that waiting for price declines in high-yielding instruments like CEFL, MORL, MRRL, and REML can backfire, as the large dividends forgone by waiting exceeds the savings from a lower purchase price.
Another 2X leveraged ETN from UBS is ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged U.S. Small Cap High Dividend ETN (NYSEARCA:SMHD). It started trading on February 3, 2015. It is based on the Solactive US Small Cap High Dividend Index. The yield on SMHD exceeds both CEFL and BDCL and is only slightly less than MORL thus, I am keeping an eye on it and have taken a small long position in it. One interesting aspect of SMHD is that it may be an interesting diversifier for CEFL. This is because closed-end funds are excluded from SMHD. Originally, I looked at SMHD as a diversifier for MORL since SMHD has many equity issues that would do well in an environment of higher levels of economic activity. However, SMHD has a fairly large number of mREITs that are also in MORL. Since SMHD excludes closed-end funds there is no overlap with CEFL.
There are some concerns with SMHD. The tracking fee is a relatively steep 0.85%, as compared to 0.40% for MORL and 0.50% for CEFL. As with any high yielding instrument, there is usually some reason which it is trading at a level that results in a high yield. Thus, many of the components of that are depressed for various reasons. The three largest components of SMHD are: GameStop (NYSE:GME), MFA Financial Inc (MFA) and Tupperware Brands Corp (TUP).
All of which have had some problems in the past year but are still paying relatively large dividends. The components of the Solactive US Small Cap High Dividend Index upon which SMHD is based are selected based in part of the security's "Forward-Looking Distribution Yield," which is more useful than historical data, but in some cases involves educated guesses as to what the future dividends will be. I will be looking further into SMHD and have taken a position in it.
Presently, CEFL offers a reasonable relative opportunity to diversify a high-yield portfolio with a very high concentration on mREITs. The recent market declines have made all of the 2x Leveraged High Yield ETNs more attractive, as their yields are higher due to the lower prices. My calculation projects a December 2018 CEFL dividend of $0.2219. The implied annualized dividends based on the last three months would be $2.455. This is a 18.5% simple annualized yield with CEFL priced at $13.28. On a monthly compounded annualized basis, the yield is 20.1%.
If someone thought that over the next five years, equity markets and interest rates would remain relatively stable, and thus CEFL would continue to yield 20.1% on a compounded basis, the return on a strategy of reinvesting all dividends would be enormous. An investment of $100,000 would be worth $250,317 in five years. More interestingly, for those investing for future income, the income from the initial $100,000 would increase from the $21,100 initial annual rate to $50.421 annually.
CEFL Components and Contribution to the Dividend
Name | Ticker | Weight | Price | NAV | Price/NAV | ex-div | dividend | frequency | contribution |
Eaton Vance Risk-Managed Diversified Equity Income Fund | ETJ | 4.57 | 9.17 | 9.39 | 0.9766 | 11/21/2018 | 0.076 | m | 0.0101 |
Liberty All Star Equity Fund | USA | 4.54 | 5.73 | 6.28 | 0.9124 | 11/15/2018 | 0.16 | q | 0.0337 |
Doubleline Income Solutions | DSL | 4.42 | 18.04 | 19.55 | 0.9228 | 11/14/2018 | 0.15 | m | 0.0098 |
Prudential Global Short Duration High Yield Fund | GHY | 4.34 | 13.13 | 15.66 | 0.8384 | 11/15/2018 | 0.0825 | m | 0.0072 |
Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fd | ISD | 4.3 | 13.35 | 15.89 | 0.8402 | 11/15/2018 | 0.085 | m | 0.0073 |
Eaton Vance Limited Duration Income Fund | EVV | 4.27 | 12.03 | 14.24 | 0.8448 | 11/8/2018 | 0.067 | m | 0.0063 |
Blackrock Corporate High Yield Fund | HYT | 4.25 | 9.6 | 11.17 | 0.8594 | 11/14/2018 | 0.072 | m | 0.0085 |
Cohen & Steers Quality Income Realty Fund Inc | RQI | 4.21 | 11.47 | 12.67 | 0.9053 | 11/13/2018 | 0.08 | m | 0.0078 |
Blackrock Multi-Sector Income | BIT | 4.2 | 16.04 | 18.4 | 0.8717 | 11/14/2018 | 0.1167 | m | 0.0081 |
Nexpoint Credit | NHF | 4.19 | 21.7 | 24.04 | 0.9027 | 11/20/2018 | 0.2 | m | 0.0103 |
Wells Fargo Advantage Income Opportunities Fund | EAD | 4.17 | 7.46 | 8.63 | 0.8644 | 11/13/2018 | 0.06097 | m | 0.0091 |
Western Asset High Income Fund II | HIX | 4.11 | 5.96 | 6.88 | 0.8663 | 11/21/2018 | 0.0455 | m | 0.0083 |
Aberdeen Total Dyn | AOD | 4.08 | 7.92 | 9.28 | 0.8534 | 11/21/2018 | 0.0575 | m | 0.0079 |
Nuveen Credit Strategies Income Fund | JQC | 4.05 | 7.59 | 8.86 | 0.8567 | 11/14/2018 | 0.0385 | m | 0.0055 |
Invesco Dynamic Credit Opportunities Fund | VTA | 3.92 | 10.89 | 12.79 | 0.8514 | 11/12/2018 | 0.0625 | m | 0.0060 |
Western Asset Emerging Markets Debt Fund | EMD | 3.8 | 12.21 | 14.44 | 0.8456 | 11/21/2018 | 0.1 | m | 0.0083 |
PIMCO Dynamic Credit Income Fund | PCI | 3.78 | 22.15 | 23.13 | 0.9576 | 11/9/2018 | 0.164063 | m | 0.0074 |
Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Domestic Debt Fund | EDD | 3.74 | 6.26 | 7.43 | 0.8425 | 9/27/2018 | 0.15 | q | |
Western Asset Global | EHI | 3.35 | 8.56 | 9.99 | 0.8569 | 11/21/2018 | 0.061 | m | 0.0063 |
Blackstone /GSO Strategic Credit Fund | BGB | 2.95 | 14.5 | 16.4 | 0.8841 | 11/21/2018 | 0.105 | m | 0.0057 |
First Trust High Income Long/short Fund | FSD | 2.84 | 13.78 | 16.17 | 0.8522 | 11/1/2018 | 0.105 | m | 0.0058 |
Western Asset High Income Op | HIO | 2.63 | 4.5 | 5.23 | 0.8604 | 11/21/2018 | 0.0265 | m | 0.0041 |
Brookfield R A Incm | RA | 2.38 | 19.92 | 22.89 | 0.8702 | 11/13/2018 | 0.199 | m | 0.0063 |
Clearbridge Energy | CEM | 2.23 | 11.59 | 12.84 | 0.9026 | 11/21/2018 | 0.355 | q | 0.0182 |
BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Trust | BTZ | 1.92 | 11.59 | 13.45 | 0.8617 | 11/14/2018 | 0.067 | m | 0.0030 |
Alliancebernstein Global High Income Fund Inc | AWF | 1.68 | 10.84 | 12.7 | 0.8535 | 11/1/2018 | 0.0699 | m | 0.0029 |
Blackrock Debt Strategies Fund Inc | DSU | 1.58 | 10.41 | 12.07 | 0.8625 | 11/14/2018 | 0.0685 | m | 0.0028 |
Invesco Senior Inc | VVR | 1.42 | 4.12 | 4.8 | 0.8583 | 11/12/2018 | 0.0195 | m | 0.0018 |
Nuveen Real Asset | JRI | 1.06 | 14.7 | 17.25 | 0.8522 | 11/14/2018 | 0.106 | m | 0.0020 |
Eaton Vance Tax Ad D | EVT | 0.98 | 22.29 | 22.32 | 0.9987 | 11/21/2018 | 0.145 | m | 0.0017 |
This article was written by
Analyst’s Disclosure: I am/we are long CEFL, MORL, MRRL, SMHD, REML. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.
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Comments (47)
Payment Date Coupon Amount Ex-Date Record Date
12/24/2018 $ 0.2185 12/13/2018 12/14/2018
'
seekingalpha.com/...
12/24/2018 $ 0.2185 12/13/2018 12/14/2018
End date: 12/04/2018 12/04/2018
Start price/share: $59.01 $16.32
End price/share: $67.51 $13.74
Starting shares: 169.46 612.75
Ending shares: 194.58 837.06
Dividends reinvested/share: $9.38 $5.29
Total return: 31.36% 15.01%
Average Annual Total Return: 14.64% 7.25%
Starting investment: $10,000.00 $10,000.00
Ending investment: $13,137.41 $11,500.36
Years: 2.00 2.00Source: Dividend Channel
The one you tooted so much over and over !!!MORL 130% PG 30%--------------------------- MORL PG Growth of $10,000.00
With Dividends Reinvested
Click for detailed chart tool
Start date: 11/18/2013 11/18/2013
End date: 12/11/2018 12/11/2018
Start price/share: $18.09 $84.57
End price/share: $14.57 $93.91
Starting shares: 552.79 118.25
Ending shares: 1,578.88 139.02
Dividends reinvested/share: $17.98 $13.42
Total return: 130.04% 30.55%
Average Annual Total Return: 17.88% 5.40%
Starting investment: $10,000.00 $10,000.00
Ending investment: $23,009.02 $13,052.84
Years: 5.07 5.07
The stock you kept repeating about as being the Greatest investment in the history of the NYSE.If you can't remember go back in your 13,832 postings and do a search.
Growth of $10,000.00
With Dividends Reinvested DVYL vs CEFL Start date: 01/07/2014 01/07/2014
End date: 12/03/2018 12/03/2018
Start price/share: $40.82 $27.03
End price/share: $70.07 $13.86
Starting shares: 244.98 369.96
Ending shares: 346.62 869.71
Dividends reinvested/share: $19.27 $16.63
Total return: 142.88% 20.54%
Average Annual Total Return: 19.82% 3.88%
Starting investment: $10,000.00 $10,000.00
Ending investment: $24,284.63 $12,053.68
Years: 4.91 4.91DVYL is MORE then twice!
