Seeking Alpha

New 15%+ Yielding ETNs May Present New Opportunities

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Includes: BDCL, CEFL, MLPQ, MLPZ, MORL, MRRL, REML, SMHB, SMHD, YYY
by: Lance Brofman
Lance Brofman
Debt, REITs, macro, ETF investing
Summary

Very high current yields, above 15%, can be obtained from a portfolio consisting mainly of 2X-Leveraged ETNs.

Some new developments in the 2X-Leveraged ETN area can present new opportunities.

The zero commission policy adopted by many major brokerage firms may have implications for investors in the 2X-Leveraged ETN area.

New High Yielding 2X-Leveraged ETNs to Consider

I am always looking for ways to diversify the 15%+ current yield portfolio where the most important constraint is to only include securities with current yields above 15%. Other constraints are the typical retail IRA account restrictions, which preclude the use of short-selling, margin borrowing, most options strategies and futures contracts. Some brokerage firms also impose additional constraints on IRA accounts. I suspect that there are many individuals, particularly those either partially or totally retired, who either have somewhat similar constraints or might possibly benefit from adopting them. There is nothing magic about the 15%+ current yield threshold. Originally, in 2001, it was a 10% current yield threshold. It reached 30% in 2008 and 60% in March 2009.

When considering very high yielding securities, risk is always an important factor. There are no securities with current yields above 15% that are not very risky. I mainly use 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs to put my macroeconomic projections to use in the investment arena, while sticking to my 15%+ current yield constraint. Other than junk bonds and other securities issued by individual distressed entities, 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs are about the only game in town to obtain current yields above 15%.

A key tool in dealing with risk is diversification. Portfolios of assets will generally be more efficient than individual assets. Compare investing all of your money in one security that had an expected return of 10% with some level of risk, to a portfolio comprised of 20 securities each with an expected return of 10% and with same level of risk as the single security. The diversified portfolio would provide the exact same expected return of 10% but with less risk than the individual security. Thus, the portfolio is more efficient than any of the individual assets in the portfolio. This principle of diversification has been a premise for the boom in mutual funds, index funds, ETFs and ETFs.

Particularly useful for diversification purposes are securities that are not highly correlated with other securities in a portfolio. In that respect, it sometimes makes sense to consider securities that you normally would not touch with a proverbial "ten foot pole". There are three types of risks associated with the securities in the 15%+ current yield portfolio. These risks are: interest rate risk and credit risk. The reason I say that there are three types of risks, is that I break down credit risk into: macroeconomic credit risk associated with a weak economy and idiosyncratic risk associated with individual companies and industries.

The bulk of my 15%+ current yield portfolio has had and still has more exposure to interest rate risk than credit risk. However, many of the securities and 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs have some degree of both to interest rate risk and credit risk. The reason that I have much more interest rate risk exposure, is that I concluded some years ago that interest rates would be relatively lower for longer than most market participants were predicting.

This view regarding interest rates was my macroeconomic rationale for investing in UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2X Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (MORL)- the only 2x leveraged mREIT ETN in existence at that time. There were two reasons for my interest rate outlook then. As described in my June 21, 2013 Seeking Alpha article - Federal Reserve Actually Propping Up Interest Rates: What This Means For mREITs my view that interest rates would not increase as much as the consensus, was based on the premise that the Federal Reserve was not artificially reducing interest rates, as most believed, but rather keeping rates higher than a free market in risk-free securities would otherwise result in. The existence of $17 trillion in debt securities today with negative yields and the recent rate cuts by the Federal Reserve suggests this premise was at least partially correct.

The second reason I thought interest rates would stay lower for longer was set forth in my July 11, 2013 Seeking Alpha article, "A Depression With Benefits: The Macro Case For mREITs," was based on the premise that government policies shifting the tax burden from the rich and onto the middle class results in much more funds being available for investment relative to productive uses for those investable funds. This ultimately will sharply reduce economic activity as was the case in 2007. That was the other reason I concluded that interest rates would be relatively lower for longer than most market participants were predicting. Thus, originally I focused only on securities with significant interest rate risk but not much credit risk such as government agency mortgage-backed securities and ETNs based on indexes of them

Since 2013, my view regarding the path of interest rates, as set forth in the two Seeking Alpha articles cited above, has generally turned out to be correct, relative to the majority opinions of market participants held in 2013 and later. An investment in MORL on June 21, 2013 has had a total return of 149.19% assuming reinvestment of dividends, that is an annualized return of 15.43%. Over that same June 21, 2013 through to October 31, 2019 period, the S&P 500 (SPY) has had a total return of 116.90%, again assuming reinvestment of dividends, that was an annualized return of 12.94%.

MORL and later, UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Mortgage REIT ETN Series B (MRRL) and the Credit Suisse X-Links Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (REML) have been the core instruments in my 15%+ current yield constrained portfolio. However, I have been including other high-yield 2X Leveraged ETNs, that were not mortgage-based, for diversification purposes. These have been: the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA:CEFL), the UBS ETRACS 2x Leveraged Long Wells Fargo® Business Development Company ETN (NYSEARCA:BDCL), UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged US Small Cap High Dividend ETN Series B (SMHB) and previously ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged US Small Cap High Dividend ETN (SMHD), which is an earlier version of SMHB.

Two more high Yield 2x Leveraged ETNs were recently added as was described in The Implications Of The Collapse In The MORL-MRRL Spread published on November 1, 2019.

...I have recently taken small positions in two additional UBS 2X Leveraged ETNs: The ETRACS 2x Monthly Leveraged S&P MLP Index ETN Series B (MLPZ) and The ETRACS 2x Monthly Leveraged Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index ETN Series B (MLPQ). Unlike MRRL, the inclusion of "Series B" in the names of MLPZ and MLPQ does not indicate that there are companion UBS 2X Leveraged ETNs for MLPZ and MLPQ, as is the case with MORL and MRRL. My decision to buy small amounts of MLPZ and MLPQ was prompted by their decline in price and the increase in resulting increase in current yield, now around 19% for each as per UBS, additionally as is further discussed below, the recent reduction in retail commissions to zero, has impacted the behavior of some investors including me.

At this point in time, my purchase small amounts of MLPZ and MLPQ, does not indicate that I have followed the adage "investigate and then invest" with regard to them. I have not done significant research into them. Rather, it is a related to my belief in what George Goodman, who wrote and appeared on television under the name "Adam Smith" said: if you want to really learn about something, take a financial stake in it. As an example, he said, buy one corn future on the Chicago Board of Trade and you will find yourself up at 4:00 AM in the morning looking at weather patterns in Iowa.

Unfortunately, for me, and possibly for my readers at this point, Mr. Goodman said that prior to the internet and the tremendous amount of interesting information and opportunities to do fascinating research it provides. Also, as many people who are retired or semi-retired find out, there is not nearly enough available time for those books and other projects you thought could be easily finished after you stop working full-time. That said, I have purchased small amount of various securities for the express purpose of learning a lot more about them so that I could research and evaluate their use as possible diversifiers in the 15%+ current yield constrained portfolio and also write about them. However, I found that alone does not create the time necessary to research them as much as I would like. Other high yielding securities that I have taken this approach with were discussed in the article "More Candidates For The 15%+ Current Yield Portfolio."...

As per the UBS website, MLPZ and MLPQ now have the highest annualized current yields of all their ETNs. The annualized current yield for MLPZ is 18.99% and is 19.65% for MLPQ. There are a few points to be aware of regarding the dividends and current yields from most of the 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs. While typically called dividends, the payments from the 2X-leveraged ETNs are technically distributions of interest payments on the ETN notes based on the dividends paid by the underlying securities that comprise the index, pursuant to the terms of the indenture.

Taking expenses and fees from the net indicative (asset) value of the 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETN, rather than the income, will over time, reduce the net indicative (asset) value of those Leveraged High-Yield ETNs. The lower net indicative (asset) value, will in turn reduce the dividends. I described the how deducting expenses and fees from the net indicative (asset) value of a 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETN, rather than the income, impacts them in: Is An ETN Yielding 20%, Expected To Decline In Price By 4% A Year, Better Than One Yielding 15% Not Expected To Decline? , which included:

...To the extent that the dividends paid by 2x Leveraged ETNs, such as CEFL, are higher than they would be if the interest and tracking fees were taken from the dividend, the net asset value is expected to decline over time. This is separate and distinct from any return of capital associated with some of closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL is based. This factor was relatively very small when 3-month LIBOR was only 0.25% from 2010 through 2015. However, with 3-month LIBOR now at 2.75%, it is more significant. For example, the CEFL dividend yield on an annualized monthly compounded basis is now 19.75%, based on my projection of the March 2019 CEFL monthly dividend of $0.2547. That calculation is based on a projected annual CEFL dividend of $2.567. Adding the financing expense of 3.15% to the 0.50% annual tracking fee brings total expenses, including interest to 3.65%. If that was taken out of the dividends, rather than the net indicative value, the projected annualized monthly compounded basis would be 16.1%...."

Even though as is explained in "Applying Net Present Values And Internal Rates Of Return To 2X-Leveraged ETNs Yielding More Than 20%

...Deducting the fees and expenses from income rather than principal would not impact the actual returns received from investing in 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs. The expected decline over time of the net indicative (asset) value and dividends is a consideration. However, once the magnitude of this factor is understood, it should not be much of an impediment to investing in these 2x Leveraged High-Yield ETNs...

and:

...there are some investors who are uncomfortable with the fact that deducting expenses and fees are from the net indicative (asset) value means that it is unlikely that 2X Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETNs will pay their $25 face value at maturity.

New ETNs from UBS

On October 25, 2019 UBS introduced five new ETNs described in the press release below:

October 25, 2019 – UBS Investment Bank today announced that five new ETRACS Series B ETNs will begin trading on NYSE Arca®.

ETN Ticker ETN Name ETN CUSIP Underlying Index Bloomberg Ticker

(NYSEARCA:BDCY) ETRACS 2x Monthly Leveraged Wells Fargo Diversified Business Development Company Index ETN Series B 90269A112 WFDBDCPX

(NYSEARCA:LMLB) ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Wells Fargo MLP ExEnergy ETN Series B 90269A476 MLPXEPX

(NYSEARCA:HDLB) ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged US High Dividend Low Volatility ETN Series B 90269A484 SOLHDLV

(NYSEARCA:DJCB) ETRACS Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return ETN Series B 90269A450 BCOMTR

(NYSEARCA:CEFZ) ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN Series B 90269A468

YLDA BDCY is linked to the monthly compounded 2x leveraged performance of the Wells Fargo Diversified Business Development Company Index. LMLB is linked to the monthly compounded 2x leveraged performance of the Wells Fargo Master Limited Partnership Ex-Energy Index. HDLB is linked to the monthly compounded 2x leveraged performance of the Solactive US High Dividend Low Volatility Index. DJCB is linked to the performance of the Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return. CEFZ is linked to the monthly compounded 2x leveraged performance of the ISE High Income Index....

Of particular interest is CEFZ which is identical to CEFL, in the same way that MORL and MRRL are identical. The UBS website indicates an annualized current yield of 16.84% for CEFL. There is no annualized current yield shown for CEFZ. In the first month or two after inception, the monthly dividends from a new series B ETN are lower than its' older twin. However, after that both CEFZ and CEFL will pay identical dividends. Their net indicative (asset) values are already identical. In The Most Bullish Thing For A 2X Leveraged High-Yield ETN I said:

...there have been one-time events which have given windfall-type boosts to the prices of some 2x leveraged High-Yield ETNs. These events were the result of ETN sponsors stopping the creation and sales of new notes of a particular ETN series...

That article described the gains in value above net indicative (asset) values that holders of MORL and SMHD experienced when UBS ceased issuance and sales of them. This also allowed holders of MORL and SMHD to increase both current income and ultimate value by switching out of MORL and SMHD into MRRL and SMHB respectively. This was described in: Sell MORL, Buy MRRL and Sell SMHD Yielding 21.5%, Buy SMHB Yielding 23.6% ...

More active traders, have been able to gain arbitrage profits by trading back and forth between the old and new pairs when the spreads between them approached the extreme values of their ranges. While, MRRL and MORL are essentially identical, SMHD and SMHB are based on the same index and thus have identical components, but their base levels are not identical. Thus, arbitrage between SMHD and SMHB involves computing an equivalent value of SMHB in terms of SMHD. This is done by simply dividing SMHB by 1.53. The Chart I below shows the history of the spread between SMHD and the equivalent value for SMHB since November 8, 2018.

Chart I SMHD - SMHB (equivalent), Zero Commissions

One recent development that probably impacted the spread and makes arbitrage transactions less costly, is the adoption of zero commissions by many major retail oriented brokerage firms. Transaction costs include commissions and bid/ask spreads. When dealing with small holdings, it is usually the commissions that are the bulk of the transaction costs. I think the decline in the SMHD - SMHB (equivalent) spread was prompted by many who were holding small positions in SMHD, but had held off on switching to SMHB, because they were unwilling to incur the commissions that such switching would entail.

For the MORL - MRRL spread, the zero commissions impact was more pronounced, as can be seen in Chart II below reproduced from the November 1, 2019 article. The likely reason that the adoption of zero commissions impacted the MORL - MRRL spread, more than the spread between SMHD and the equivalent value for SMHB, is that it is simpler to evaluate the MORL - MRRL spread.

Chart II MORL-MORL, Inception of Zero Commissions

https://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2019/10/27/571273-1572217267333559.png

from: The Implications Of The Collapse In The MORL-MRRL Spread

Those considering arbitrage between newer ETNs and those older ones. where new shares are not being created, should be aware of the possible zero commissions effects on the spreads. For those with small positions in the older ETNs, arbitrage may now make economic sense, now that transaction costs are lower, as a percentage of the potential gains. All investors engaging this type of arbitrage probably want to know if the zero commissions effects on the spreads are permanent or transitory. As both Charts I & II indicate, the spreads have somewhat bounced back from their zero commissions lows. This suggests that many of those with small positions in the older ETNs have mostly completed their transactions. Thus, it is likely that the spreads may return to their previous ranges.

Analysis of the November 2019 CEFL Dividend Projection

After the annual rebalancing, all but three of the CEFL components pay monthly dividends. Tortoise MLP Fund (NTG), Tortoise Energy Infrastructure (TYG), and Liberty All Star Equity Fund (USA) pay quarterly. None of the quarterly payers had ex-dividend dates in 2019. Thus, none of them will contribute to the November 2019 dividend. This calendar effect will tend to make the November 2019 dividend the one of the lowest monthly dividends of the year.

There were some changes in the dividends declared by the component closed-end-funds in the index upon, which CEFL is based. Seven components increased their dividends from the prior month: Blackrock Corporate High Yield Fund (HYT) increased its monthly dividend to $0.0779 from $0.0720. Blackrock Multi-Sector Income (BIT) increased its monthly dividend to $0.1237 from $0.1167. Blackrock Debt Strategies Fund Inc (DSU) increased its monthly dividend to $0.0711 from $0.0685. Templeton Emerging Markets Income Fund (TEI) increased its monthly dividend to $0.0579 from $0.0568. Invesco Dynamic Credit Opportunities Fund (VTA) increased its monthly dividend to $ 0.075 from $0.065. Invesco Senior Inc (VVR) increased its monthly dividend to $ 0.075 from $0.065. Eaton Vance Sr Fltg (EFR) increased its monthly dividend to $ 0.075 from $0.065

Three components decreased their dividends from the prior month: First Trust Intermediate Duration Prf.& Income Fund (FPF) ) reduced its monthly dividend to $0.132435 from $0.14250. Wells Fargo Advantage Income Opportunities Fund (EAD) decreased its monthly dividend to $0.024 from $0.023. Voya Prime Rate Trust (PPR) reduced its monthly dividend to $0.0245 from $0.026. This 7 to 3 ratio of more dividend increases to decreases is encouraging. From the data in the table below, I calculated a projection for the November 2019 monthly CEFL dividend of $0.1764. The table below shows the ticker, name, weight, dividend, ex-date, price, net asset value, and contribution to the dividend for the CEFL components that will contribute to the November 2019 dividend.

Conclusions And Recommendations

I am still cautiously bullish on CEFL as a diversifier for my holdings of 2X leveraged high yield ETNs that are based on mREITs. I am also more bullish now on CEFL, based on the possibility that there will be could period of strong economic growth, with low inflation and low interest rates, as was discussed in 18% Yielding CEFL And The Aggregate Supply Curve. There are, however, various political and policy risks that could cause the aggregate supply curve to shift back to the left.

The yields on all of the high-yielding 2x leveraged ETNs like CEFL are still compelling. However, the uncertainty regarding economic variables means that significant event risks exist in addition to the risks inherent with the ETN's use of leverage. This is in addition to the leverage employed by many of the components that make up the indices upon which these ETNs are based.

In view of the uncertainty and risks, active traders might consider waiting until the impacts of policy on economic and political conditions become more clear. However, a lesson we can learn from the last few years, is that waiting for price declines in high-yielding instruments like CEFL, can backfire, as the large dividends forgone by waiting, exceed the savings from a lower purchase price.

I compute the average discount to book value of the CEFL components periodically. One problem is that the annual rebalancing of the index, where the components can be changed significantly, makes comparison with earlier values for the discounts to book value less useful. However, even with that caveat, a major driver of the price movements for CEFL and the closed-end funds in the index, has been the discounts to book value.

The previous highest average discount to book value I computed for the high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL and its unleveraged version, the YieldShares High Income ETF (YYY), was 13.8% on September 18, 2015. The lowest was 6.9% on July 28, 2016. Over a 0.86-year period, buying on September 18, 2015, and selling on July 28, 2016, the annualized gain, including reinvesting dividends for CEFL, was 31.74%. The best time to buy high dividend closed-end funds usually has been when the discounts to book value have been the largest. On October 25, 2019, the average discount to book value of the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL and YYY are based was 8.0%. This does not suggest that the average discount to book value says CEFL is a screaming buy. However, it could be due to the possibility that the low inflation, low unemployment and low interest rate environment being sustainable is already in the market.

As was discussed in: Bank Issues Could Impact 20% Yielding ETNs, a French court ordered Switzerland's largest bank to pay 4.5 billion euros ($5.1 billion) in fines and damages for helping wealthy French clients evade tax authorities. It is not inconceivable that zealous government authorities could impose such draconian fines and penalties, so as to cause the demise of one or more major financial institutions. That could impact the world economy in a way similar to the collapse of Lehman in 2008. More relevant is that UBS is the sole source of the interest and principal payments made by the ETNs it sponsors. The ETNs are notes and, thus, obligations of UBS.

That does expose the investor to some degree of credit risk. However, it is very different and of much less magnitude than the type of credit risk, one would face by buying a regular senior bond issued by UBS. If you were to buy a bond from UBS and something drastic happens causing UBS to be downgraded, to say BBB, you would suffer an immediate loss since the credit risk of the downgraded bond would be reflected in the market price. However, the net asset value of UBS redeemable ETNs such as MORL and CEFL would not be affected, and because shares of the ETN can be redeemed at net asset value, the market price of the ETN would not be impacted either. Even if the ability to redeem shares did not exist, the UBS credit risk with MORL and CEFL would be normally rather small. USB has a relatively high percentage of their revenue from fees for managing assets, which is a much more stable revenue base than making loans, underwriting or trading securities.

I still tend to believe that the massive tax-policy-induced increase in inequality will cause increasing excesses of loanable and investable funds above commercially reasonable ways to utilize those funds. This could still eventually result in an overinvestment cycle with a recession and that will ultimately, be very good for the 2X Leveraged ETNs that mostly avoid credit risk, like MORL, REML and MRRL. However, a recession might not be so good for those ETNs that take more credit and equity market risk.

The inception of CEFZ, which is identical to CEFL, in the same way that MORL and MRRL are identical, could be a precursor to UBS stopping or suspending the creation of new CEFL notes. There does seem to be an effort by UBS to move away from the older ETNs and get more investors into the Series B ETNS. This can be seen in the names of MLPZ and MLPQ. The inclusion of "Series B" does not indicate that there are older companion UBS 2X Leveraged ETNs for MLPZ and MLPQ, as is the case with SMHB and MRRL. Rather, it appears that all new ETNs from UBS will be "Series B" going forward. Any stopping or suspending the creation of new CEFL notes, would likely bring a windfall to CEFL holders and allow them to pick-up yield and eventual value, by switching into CEFZ.

Those seeking to maximize current yield may also want to consider that, as per the UBS website, MLPZ and MLPQ now have the highest annualized current yields of all their ETNs. The highest annualized current yield for MLPZ is 18.99% and for 19.65% for MLPQ.

CEFL Components and Contribution to the Dividend

Name

Ticker

Weight %

Price

NAV

Price/NAV

ex-div

dividend

frequency

contribution

Nuveen Pfd Sec Income Fd

JPS

4.88

9.99

10.07

0.9921

10/14/2019

0.056

m

0.00767

First Trust Intermediate Duration Prf.& Income Fd

FPF

4.69

23.74

24.43

0.9718

10/1/2019

0.132435

m

0.007336

Brookfield R A Incm

RA

4.55

22.91

23.38

0.9799

10/15/2019

0.199

m

0.011082

Western Asset High Income Fund II

HIX

4.48

6.78

7.31

0.9275

10/17/2019

0.047

m

0.008708

DoubleLine Income Solutions

DSL

4.44

19.97

19.14

1.0434

10/16/2019

0.15

m

0.009351

Wells Fargo Advantage Income Opportunities Fund

EAD

4.32

8.18

8.96

0.9129

10/15/2019

0.05899

m

0.008735

BlackRock Corporate High Yield Fund

HYT

4.31

10.84

11.79

0.9194

10/11/2019

0.0779

m

0.008685

AllianceBernstein Global High Income Fund Inc

AWF

4.27

12.02

13.18

0.9120

10/3/2019

0.0655

m

0.006524

Aberdeen Total Dyn

AOD

4.23

8.38

9.56

0.8766

10/18/2019

0.0575

m

0.008138

Western Asset Emerging Markets Debt Fund

EMD

4.22

13.79

15.46

0.8920

10/17/2019

0.1

m

0.008581

Liberty All Star Equity Fund

USA

4.22

6.48

6.58

0.9848

7/25/2019

0.17

q

BlackRock Multi-Sector Income

BIT

4.2

17.17

18.3

0.9383

10/11/2019

0.1237

m

0.008485

Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fd

ISD

4.15

14.91

16.59

0.8987

10/10/2019

0.105

m

0.008195

Prudential Global Short Duration High Yield Fund

GHY

4.11

14.44

16.26

0.8881

10/10/2019

0.105

m

0.00838

Blackstone /GSO Strategic Credit Fund

BGB

4.06

14.07

15.02

0.9368

10/23/2019

0.111

m

0.008981

Eaton Vance Limited Duration Income Fund

EVV

3.99

12.72

14.36

0.8858

10/10/2019

0.07

m

0.006157

Cohen & Strs Infrstr

UTF

3.88

26.79

27.21

0.9846

10/15/2019

0.155

m

0.006295

Tortoise Mlp Fund

NTG

3.21

11.36

12.1

0.9388

8/22/2019

0.4225

q

NexPoint Credit

NHF

3.04

16.75

21.09

0.7942

10/23/2019

0.2

m

0.010178

Western Asset High Income Op

HIO

2.75

5.08

5.51

0.9220

10/17/2019

0.03

m

0.004554

BlackRock Debt Strategies Fund Inc

DSU

2.72

10.76

12.11

0.8885

10/11/2019

0.0711

m

0.00504

Templeton Emerg Mkts Inc Fd

TEI

2.6

9.02

9.92

0.9093

10/11/2019

0.0579

m

0.00468

First Trust High Income Long/short Fund

FSD

2.44

15.36

17.03

0.9019

10/1/2019

0.11

m

0.0049

Invesco Dynamic Credit Opportunities Fund

VTA

2.14

11.08

12.29

0.9015

10/15/2019

0.075

m

0.004062

Tortoise Energy Infr

TYG

1.8

18.83

19.87

0.9477

8/22/2019

0.655

q

Nuveen Fltg Rt Inc

JFR

1.67

9.54

10.79

0.8842

10/14/2019

0.0615

m

0.003019

Invesco Senior Inc

VVR

1.5

4.18

4.64

0.9009

10/15/2019

0.024

m

0.002415

Kayne Anderson Mlp

KYN

1.25

13.32

15.01

0.8874

10/23/2019

0.12

m

0.003158

Eaton Vance Sr Fltg

EFR

1.05

12.98

14.55

0.8921

10/23/2019

0.084

m

0.001905

Voya Prime Rate Trst

PPR

0.84

4.75

5.33

0.8912

10/9/2019

0.0245

m

0.001215

Disclosure: I am/we are long CEFL, MORL, MRRL, BDCL, REML, MPLQ, MLPZ. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.