Aspen Group Bear Case

Summary
- Questionable Financial Statements/Quality of Earnings.
- Flawed Business Model.
- Lack of regional accreditation.
- Negative regulatory environment for for-profits.
- Excessive Valuation.
This article was amended on 5/4/2020 to reflect a clarification related to the company's graduation rate.
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Questionable Financial Statements/Quality of EarningsQuality of ASPU's financial statements and earnings are highly suspect. Specifically, the company's accounts receivable is growing at a much faster rate than revenue increasing tenfold from $2 million in 2016 to $20.2 million in January 2020. DSO's have grown from 86.9 days to 163.1 days during this same period (See Table 1). DSO's are an indication of the quality of revenue and receivables.
Compounding this problem is Allowance for Doubtful Accounts which is only 8.2% of gross accounts receivable - much lower than other for-profits. The peer group has reserves consistently around 35% versus ASPU's 8.2% (See Table 2). Also, the peer group books around 5% of revenue for bad debt. ASPU's Bad Debt rate is only 1.9% YTD. And the peer group A/R is majority sourced from the government (i.e. Title IV, TA, VA) which have no default risk. ASPU's A/R are from students that defaults at a much higher rate, especially those student that drop or are inactive. So how can ASPU's bad debt rate be lower than the peer group?
APSU's accounts receivable has grown to an astounding 45% of annual revenue and $6.1 million is now long term which further increases default risk. This ballooning accounts receivable balance is a result of management's liberal payment program allowing students a low monthly cash payment plan that covers only half of earned revenue - similar to a negative amortization loan. As such, by all industry metrics a significant amount of APSU's accounts receivable will become uncollectable. But compounding this alarming growth of accounts receivable is management's extremely aggressive projection of future collections and reserves. Allowance for doubtful accounts and bad debt expense appear to be materially understated evidenced by a comparison to other publicly traded for-profits (See Table 2).
And assuming that financial statements are accurate since they were audited would be a big mistake. ASPU's auditor is a small local three man shop in Florida and not a Big 4 or regional accounting firm that you would expect from a public company.
http://www.secauditor.com/management.php
Accounts receivable is a potential ticking time bomb sitting on ASPU's balance sheet and if corrected will come crashing through the income statement in the form of a huge bad debt adjustment. And if accounts receivable is properly accounted for it could expose the true lack of profitability of ASPU's business model.
Table 1 | |||||
$ = Millions | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 TTM |
Revenue | $ 8.4 | $ 14.2 | $ 22.0 | $ 34.0 | $ 45.2 |
EBIT | $ (2.2) | $ (1.1) | $ (7.1) | $ (9.3) | $ (6.5) |
Bad Debt | $ 1.7 | $ 0.0 | $ 0.5 | $ 0.9 | $ 0.7 |
Bad Debt / AR | 85.5% | 0.9% | 6.6% | 6.2% | 3.2% |
Bad Debt % | 20.4% | 0.3% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 1.4% |
A/R Current | $ 2.0 | $ 4.4 | $ 6.8 | $ 10.7 | $ 14.1 |
A/R Long Term | $ - | $ 0.7 | $ 1.3 | $ 3.1 | $ 6.1 |
A/R Total | $ 2.0 | $ 5.1 | $ 8.1 | $ 13.7 | $ 20.2 |
A/R Revenue % | 24% | 36% | 37% | 40% | 45% |
A/R Revenue % ST | 24% | 31% | 31% | 31% | 31% |
A/R Revenue % LT | 0% | 5% | 6% | 9% | 13% |
DSO's | $ 86.9 | $ 130.9 | $ 134.7 | $ 147.5 | $ 163.1 |
Table 2 | |||||
$ = Millions | ASPU | STRA | APEI | PRDO | |
Gross Accounts Receivable | $ 22.0 | $ 84.2 | $ 17.5 | $ 84.9 | |
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts | $ 1.8 | $ 28.5 | $ 6.2 | $ 29.9 | |
Net Accounts Receivable | $ 20.2 | $ 55.7 | $ 11.3 | $ 55.0 | |
Allowance % of Gross A/R | 8.2% | 33.8% | 35.4% | 35.2% |
Flawed Business Model
ASPU has grown enrollments at a robust rate not because of anything proprietary. It is as simple as offering a tuition rate far below the competition and liberal payment plans. But the "fatal flaw" is that if you were to fully burden new student starts with the true costs of those enrollments it would result in a negative margin/loss. How can ASPU grow revenue 50%+ per year, double digit enrollments growth but still not be profitable or cash flow positive and be forced to multiple rounds of diluted capital raises? It seems pretty obvious.
ASPU's CEO likes to tout their marketing as a competitive advantage which is driving double digit enrollments growth. This is laughable if you knew the space. The large publicly traded peers have spent billion on developing very sophisticated marketing and student management systems and lead generation. He talks about Marketing Efficiency Ratio (MER) which is the multiple of revenue to the cost per start. Spoken like a true salesman and not a CEO. The correct method of valuing a new student start is a multiple of PROFIT not revenue. Giving away your service at a loss does not make you disruptive! If it were, the better capitalized competitors would lower their tuition rates and copy ASPU. But they won't because APSU's pricing and collection program is not profitable or sustainable. Nursing programs are very costly to operate given low student-to-teacher ratio requirements imposed by the nursing boards and costly nursing instructors and staff. This is the reason a low tuition rate will typically not cover this high cost program.
The CEO accumulated a large stock position from very generous stock grants and options. This has created huge incentive for bad behavior to pump up enrollments and the stock price. The CEO provides extensive commentary about enrollments and enrollments growth. However, there is very little discussion about student persistance and success. One of the primary factors in the demise of a number of the large for-profit postsecondaries was excessive growth in enrollments and poor student outcomes. I found two published graduation rates for Aspen University. The U.S. Department of Education (USDOE) published graduation rate for AU is 27% School | College Scorecard. The USDOE uses an eight year time-to-completion methodology. The graduation rates by program published on the company's website is the accreditor - DEAC - graduation rate using a 150% time-to-completion methodology. https://images.aspen.edu/wp/uploads/2019/12/DEAC-STUDENT-ACHIEVEMENT-DISCLOSURE-FOR-THE-PUBLIC_12.15.19.pdf Using these rates the weighted average graduation rate is 65%. Unlike the other for-profits APSU does not publish persistance rates which would be the best measure of projecting student success and graduation rates.
Lack of regional accreditation
Aspen University (AU) is accredited by DEAC and not by one of the regional accrediting bodies which is the gold standard of accreditation. The traditional non-profit colleges and universities all have regional accreditation. The problem with DEAC accreditation is that it is extremely difficult to transfer credits to a regionally accredited college or university. This is especially problematic for AU's students that complete prerequisites at AU but are not accepted into the core program. They will have a difficult time transferring these credits to another institution and will feel they wasted their time and money at AU. This is a common cause of action for the numerous class action lawsuits against for-profits.
Another issue of not having regional accreditation is that many employers do not consider the institution as being accredited. This penalizes student during the hiring process and tuition reimbursement programs.
It should also be noted that AU does not have full approval for the pre-licensure nursing program and is only provisionally approved. They need a successful site visit before being granted full approval. There is always a risk the visiting team could identify areas of concern during their visit and not grant full approval which would restrict their ability to grow enrollments.
AU has very liberal nursing admissions requirements. The minimum GPA for an applicant is 2.0 versus 2.75+ for the other for-profit colleges who also require an assessment test which AU does not. This "lower quality" student will negatively impact AU's NCLEX scores. When AU's nursing students graduate and take their NCLEX exams they will need an average minimum score no less than 10% of the national average. If they do not meet this minimum standard the nursing board will impose enrollment restrictions or possible suspension of new enrollments. This is a big exposure!
Negative regulatory environment for for-profits
The regulatory environment for the for-profit postsecondary education space is negative and has the potential to get much worse after the election. The current administration has been more favorable to the for-profits than the Obama administration and blocked some of the anti-for-profit education regulations. However, if the administration and and/or Senate turns blue then it could be lights out for the for-profits. It Biden picks Kamala Harris or Elizabeth Warren as his running mate it would be extremely negative. Harris was the California AG that was instrumental in shutting down Corinthian and Harris would like to shut down all for-profit institutions.
Excessive Valuation
Even discounting the previously presented issues, how does APSU justify a $200 million enterprise value?!? The company has never delivered a profit, accumulated tens of millions in accumulated losses and continues to burn through cash. And much of their growth and valuation is based on pre-licensure nursing which has yet to graduate one student that has successfully passed the NCLEX exam.
There have been recent transactions in the private market for for-profit education companies with very reputable nursing programs, growing enrollments and very profitable that have sold at much lower valuations than ASPU's current valuation. I would encourage you to refer to Kippington Capital's well written article (4/19/19) with a base case sum-of-the-parts valuation of $104 million or $5 per share. And this does not consider any of the above concerns raised in this article.
This article was written by
Analyst’s Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
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Comments (119)

Aspen Group, Inc. Set to Join Russell 2000® Index and Russell® 3000 Index
www.aspu.com/...

June 2, 2020
Aspen Group, Inc. Pre-Announces 42% Increase in Q4 2020 Revenue to $14.5 Million and FY 2020 Revenue Increase of 45% to $49.5 Million; Higher LTV Programs now Represent 44% of Revenues.Full press release is on their website.









2. Matriculation rate of Prelicensure students to Core nursing program.
3. Current student census in Prelicensure Core nursing program and projected graduates and dates of graduation. Reason for discontinuing reporting of enrollment metrics for Prelicensure Nursing.
4. Nursing board site visit date and earliest date for possible increase in enrollment caps
5. Accounts receivables growth rate and reserve methodology. Are reserves adequate to cover future defaults?
6. Impact of Covid of enrollments and costs.
- Has loss of income for prospective students impacted new student enrollments
- Has monthly cash payments been impacted resulting in delinquencies, higher bad debt and/or drops due to non-payment?
7. Status of opening Tampa campus (Nursing board meeting was late April but no announcement on decision)
8. Status of Austin campus openingIt would be great if management could provide some transparency on the above.

It is easy to calculate the ARPU (Average Revenue Per Enrollment) for the quarters before Q3 and also for Q3 (only for Aspen University and ignoring USU). So ARPU was $11,200 (Q4), $12,500 (Q1), $13,350 (Q2) and $14,500 (Q3).
You can see that even though the company did not disclose hybrid enrollment that ARPU continued to increase significantly. The only logical conclusion is that the percentage of students in the higher priced hybrid programs increased.
So - NO, the company is not hiding hybrid enrollment numbers because they are lower.

















• Aspen’s Allowance for doubtful accounts seems reasonable considering additional facts
• An expanded analysis of Aspen’s business reveals why it completed two rounds of capital raising and illustrates the Company's potential for significant future growth
• There are some compelling reasons and trends why going short Aspen could be a losing betThe author's Questionable Financial Statements section centers almost entirely around a discussion about A/R, bad debts and the Allowance for doubtful accounts. I agree that growth of A/R (as a % of revenues), especially long-term A/R, should be questioned. However, management has already addressed this issue. Let's look at the A/R data in Table 1. First, a minor typo - the A/R Revenue % LT row appears to show the short-term A/R (as a % of Revenue) and the A/R Revenue % ST appears to show the long-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) [the titles on these two rows need to be switched]. You will note that short-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) has been steady at 31% from 2017 through 2020 (TTM). That's almost 4 years of stability. However, the long-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) has increased during the same period from 5% to 13%. So, why did this occur and what did management do to correct it? Part of the reason for Aspen's high growth rate is its monthly payment plan (MPP), which allows students to pay an affordable fixed monthly amount (varies slightly depending on the degree being sought) independent of how many courses are taken at a time. In most instances, this results in students receiving their degree prior to making the final payment under the MPP. [Note: Some of the following information comes from the Q4 2019 earnings call in July 2019 - see link below this paragraph]. Prior to the USU acquisition in December 2017, the MPP for the Company's post-licensure degrees resulted in an average of 10 monthly payments remaining upon graduation (10-month tail). For students taking heavy class loads (thereby finishing their program quickly), this could result in more than 12 payments remaining after graduation. The portion of the (payment) tail that exceeds 12 months would then be included in long-term A/R. As the MPP was launched in the Spring of 2014, long-term A/R initially occurred (per Table 1) in 2017 when students (participating in the MPP) that took heavy class loads graduated. This would explain the long-term A/R for 2017. So, why then did long-term A/R % increase in subsequent years? When USU was acquired in December 2017, the purpose was to begin offering family nurse practitioner (FNP) degrees. Even though the cost of an FNP degree is more than twice as much (in total) as the Company's bachelors and masters post-licensure degree offerings, the monthly payment amount extended for the FNP degree was almost the same as the other two aforementioned degree offerings. Thus, the tail for the FNP degrees averaged 42 months after graduation, which was not sustainable. In the aforementioned earnings call in July 2019, the Company modified the payment plan for all new FNP students commencing August 1, 2019 whereby new students in the FNP program would be allowed to pay for the first year of the program ($9,000 cost) over 24 months (same monthly rate as before), but for year two of the program ($18,000 cost) will need to be paid from federal financial aid, cash resources, corporate tuition reimbursement, private loan funds or a combination thereof. To quote the earnings release, "This will eliminate our 42-month tail entirely and allows the University to get paid in full upon students’ graduation date." Bottom line is management has addressed the concern regarding growing long-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) and the Company should see the ensuing benefits from this change in the form of improved cashflows in just a few months commencing August 1, 2020 (beginning of fiscal Q2). From that point forward, long-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) should trend lower. Below is the link noted above - in particular, please see pg. 4, paragraph 3 through pg. 5, paragraph 3.content.equisolve.net/...The author also expressed concerns regarding Aspen's bad debts and the Allowance for doubtful accounts. Contrary to the author's position, A/R is not a "potential ticking time bomb", and Aspen's A/R is not from students that default at a much higher rate than its peers.
Aspen only extends its MPP to licensed individuals. Students seeking an initial degree (i.e., the Pre-Licensure BSN degree) are not allowed to participate in the MPP. Why is this significant? Because individuals possessing a license (e.g., nurses) are already employed and, when presented with an affordable monthly payment arrangement, are likely more able to pay for an increased degree than someone seeking their initial degree who does not yet have a license (e.g. high school graduates) and must rely on loans, grants, etc. A key point is that students in the MPP must be current (pay as they go) in order to continue taking courses. Per Aspen's most recent earnings announcement (Q3 2019) on March 10, 2020, the Pre-Licensure BSN program represented 14% of Aspen's quarterly revenues. Also note the Pre-Licensure BSN program (launched in July 2018) is Aspen's fastest growing revenue stream, having grown from 0% to 14% of Revenues in just 6 quarters. This leaves approximately 86% of Aspen's students eligible for the MPP, all of which are licensed individuals seeking to advance in their chosen profession. Hence, it appears that Aspen extends credit to customers (students) bearing less default risk than its peers. The MSN - FNP program (see above regarding the modification to this payment plan that is expected to result in the eventual elimination of the extended tail payment plan) represented 27% of Aspen's quarterly revenues (Q3 2019). Accordingly, as the Pre-Licensure BSN program continues to grow (see below) and the MSN - FNP payment plan modification goes into effect (collectively, these two revenue streams represent 41% of revenues as of Q3 2019), both long-term and short-term A/R (as a % of Revenues) should trend lower. The key takeaway is that Aspen's relatively low Allowance for uncollectible accounts may be justified given: (i) credit is extended only to licensed individuals; (ii) students must pay as they go in order to continue taking courses; and (iii) the fact that the monthly payment amounts are affordable.Let's expand on the business analysis. Aspen has experienced high growth for good reason. Per the March 16, 2020 Investor Presentation (pg. 10), the overall cost of each program ranges from 47% - 56% of the cost of competitor programs. Below is the link.content.equisolve.net/...Nursing programs represent 84% of Aspen's student body (pg. 7 of the Investor Presentation) and include the following degrees:1. RN to BSN (nurse with an associate’s degree seeking to obtain a bachelor’s degree)
2. MSN (nurse with a bachelor’s degree seeking to obtain a master’s degree)
3. DNP (nurse with a master’s degree seeking a doctorate degree)
4. MSN - FNP (nurse with a BSN seeking a Family Nurse Practitioner master’s degree)
5. Pre-Licensure (non-licensed individual seeking an undergraduate degree)Prior to July 2017, Aspen offered programs 1 and 2 above (both 100% online). In July 2017, Aspen expanded its degree programs to include the DNP program (also 100% online). In December 2017, Aspen completed its acquisition of USU (December 1, 2017 press release) thereby adding its MSN - FNP program. The May 18, 2017 press release initially announcing the USU acquisition stated that Aspen acquired USU at a cost of $9,000,000 (50% of which was paid with Aspen shares) and that USU is a regionally accredited university. USU has a campus in San Diego. In January 2018, Aspen launched its Pre-Licensure BSN program with its initial Phoenix campus. Both the USU acquisition and the launching of the Pre-Licensure BSN programs were the reasons for the "multiple rounds of diluted raises" mentioned by the author. The capital raised was allocated towards growth initiatives that significantly increase the Company's growth potential by being able to offer nursing degrees at all levels. Note all three of the degree programs added in 2017-2018 offer degrees at a cost more than double the cost of the degrees from programs 1 and 2 above. And, on a percentage basis, they are growing faster as well. This explains why Aspen's revenues have been growing so robustly. Long-term growth comes at a short-term cost. For USU, capital was required for the acquisition and to improve operations. For the Pre-Licensure BSN program, capital was required to build out each new campus and ramp up operations. Two of the Pre-Licensure BSN campuses have begun operations in Phoenix, with two more campuses scheduled to open this calendar. Currently, the Company plans to open two more Pre-Licensure BSN campuses per year up to a total of 12 campuses nationally, each of which is expected to produce approximately $9,000,000 of annual revenue (once they reach full capacity; my understanding is this takes 3-4 years). Aspen's annual EPS losses were trending higher when the Company incurred a loss of ($0.10) per share in fiscal 2017. Then, due to the growth initiatives, both fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019 resulted in a loss of ($0.50) per share. The consensus for fiscal 2020 (per Yahoo Finance), which just ended April 30, 2020, is a loss of ($0.31) per share. The consensus for fiscal 2021, which just started, is a loss of ($0.06) per share. This is a positive trend that is expected to continue.Going short Aspen, the author's apparent position, also bears risks.First, you are betting against "smart money" (institutional investors).
On January 22, 2020, the Company closed on, "...2,415,000 shares of its common stock at a price to the public of $7.15 per share. The number of shares sold by Aspen includes 315,000 shares of common stock pursuant to an option granted to the underwriters to cover overallotments that was exercised in full. Net proceeds from the offering to Aspen are approximately $16 million." Note that subsequent to the closing of the offering at $7.15/share, Aspen's stock price climbed steadily to reach over $10/share in February and stayed well over $9.00/share until the Coronavirus pandemic ensued. Why did investors flock to Aspen? Just look at the growth potential of the Pre-Licensure BSN program alone - it is in its early stages with several years of high-margin growth potential.Second, you are betting against a very solid management team.
Mike Mathews, the CEO, has a vision of making college affordable again. He has a history of success, especially as it relates to marketing (see his bio in the Company's proxy statement). Combining internet marketing expertise with degree programs that cost approximately 50% of the competition, and adding in a monthly payment program (MPP)(which I'm not sure if any other universities offer), there should be little left to wonder why Aspen has such low customer acquisition costs.
Dr. Cheri St. Arnauld, the Company’s Chief Academic Officer, was previously the Provost, Chief Academic Officer of Grand Canyon University from 2008 to 2012. In a November 7, 2019 press release, the Company announced it had received its initial accreditation for its DNP program (just over 2 years after its launch in July 2017). "Aspen was required to operate the program for at least a year and to graduate its first cohort prior to granting this initial accreditation." Based on Dr. Arnauld's credentials and accomplishment at getting the DNP program accredited, it would appear the author's reference to the risk associated with Aspen obtaining accreditation for its Pre-Licensure BSN program is low.Third, you are betting the current valuation of the Company is too high.
Aspen is poised for continued revenue growth estimates of 25% - 30% for several years to come. Aspen's cash flows used in operations of $3.8 million for Q3 2019 YTD has improved by approximately 49% compared to the prior year period and this improvement is prior to the aforementioned modification to the MSN - FNP payment plan, which will begin positively affecting cashflows in Q2 2020. Per the Q4 2019 earnings release (pg. 5), "The result of this MPP program change for USU's FNP program is expected to reduce our operating cash requirements by over $2 million in fiscal year 2021 and much more in future fiscal years and therefore shortens the timeframe for the company to begin generating positive free cash flow on an operating basis." Aspen's estimated revenues for fiscal 2020 are approximately $62.3 million. Given a market cap of $150.1 million on Friday's close (May 1, 2020), Aspen is trading at 2.41 times fiscal 2020 estimated revenues. Investors will have to make their own determination as to whether the valuation is excessive. You have time to make up (or change) your mind as Q4 earnings (the Company's seasonally best quarter) are expected in early July.I am long Aspen Group.


My only correction would be that management on many occasions during CC mentioned that peak sales for a campus is more like $14M and not the $9M in the investor presentation.
Allowance as a % of Gross AR 8.0% 48.0% 35.3% 35.2%
Bad Debt as a % of Gross AR 4.0% 56.1% 22.3% 51.2%


- Title IV Receivable: 0%
- Student Receivable: 10%Inactive Students:
- Title IV Receivable: 0%
- Student Receivable
0 to 30 days: 50%
31 days to 60 days: 75%
61 days+ 100%There is a low reserve rate for active students since they know they will be dropped if they miss a payment. It is much more difficult to collect from inactive students especially dropped students. These percentages can and should be adjusted based on actual payment experience.of the institution's students. A good auditor will evaluate and sign-off on management's support for their methodology.



Anyway you slice and dice this you come to the conclusion ASPU is legit.





I answered my own question and confirmed that the pre-licensure nursing program costs $37,069 + $8,217 in fees for a total cost of $45,286. It is a three year program so the annual cost is $15,095. This is still low versus the peer group. And I still believe will be difficult to achieve margin given the difficulty to scale due to enrollment caps and high cost to operate this program.









seekingalpha.com/...
I explained exactly what you mentioned regarding A/R being nonsensical, and asked for the source for graduation rate which he provided and later realized how wrong he was... that didn't stop him from posting this article though which makes me question his integrity.

