- Realty Income is arguably the most famous REIT and is known as the "Monthly Dividend Company."
- This REIT's strategy has been honed and refined over many decades and market cycles. Its historical returns are undoubtedly impressive.
- Track records matter but our stress test takes no prisoners. A strong brand alone won't make tenants pay rent or convince lenders to be flexible.
- We dissect Realty Income's business model, operations, balance sheet, and valuation in the context of our new reality. We cannot know the REIT without knowing its tenants.
- The article starts with a refresher on investor psychology and how it relates to the analysis of a firm like Realty Income.
- Looking for a portfolio of ideas like this one? Members of Institutional Income Plus get exclusive access to our model portfolio. Get started today »
Gain Strength By Knowing Your Weaknesses
Investing is a never-ending battle against the pitfalls of human nature. We've gone to even greater lengths than normal to hammer this subject home in our more recent articles as we navigate the ongoing crisis. While the bulk of this material is concentrated in our subscriber only content, we decided to share this segment with our public followers given its immense importance in volatile times.
Human psychology and its relationship with investing is a major study area of the CFA Level III exam for good reason. It's also why we've cultivated and refined a framework to select and manage investments instead of relying on intuition. Through performing institutional due diligence on the likes of Blackstone (BX), Carlyle (CG), Starwood (STWD), Apollo (APO), Ares (ARES), and Bain Capital (BCSF), our lead portfolio manager has had the exceedingly rare opportunity to learn what makes these firms successful from a corporate governance and investment management point of view. We've carefully selected best practices from these top global credit and equity managers to form the investment philosophy and framework supporting Institutional Income Plus.
These pillars help alleviate common investor challenges such as:
- Selling at the bottom as fear overwhelms decision making capabilities;
- Stubbornly adding to a losing position; and
- Exiting a profitable position too early due to fear of losing unrealized gains.
Some of the less frequently mentioned but equally important are:
- Using hindsight to judge the merit of a past decision instead of the facts known at the time,
- Over or under-weighting data in order to confirm a pre-existing bias,
- Relying primarily or entirely on historical data to make judgments about the future, and
- Misappropriating timelines.
At one time or another, and perhaps unknowingly, we've all made these mistakes. We selected this set due to their relevancy to Realty Income (NYSE:O), some fallacies cause over-confidence in a stock and company's position while others result in overly pessimistic conclusions. Defining "over-confidence" or "overly pessimistic" is an inexact science but we don't let that overwhelm our decision making process: Uncertainty is unavoidable. As we work through Realty Income's analysis, we'll be referring back to these common challenges we must work to avoid but will never truly conquer. Fortunately, we do not have to.
Realty Income Track Record
This is an ideal section to begin with.
Source: Realty Income
Realty Income has increased earnings 23 out of 24 years or 95.8%. It hasn't been by pennies either. Realty Income generated compound annualized earnings growth of 5.1% since inception. The one down year was 2008 with a modest -2.1% decline.
Source: Realty Income
From a risk perspective, Realty Income's total shareholder return, or capital gains plus dividends, has resulted in one of the lowest downside risk volatility measures in all of the S&P 500. This measure ignores spikes upward in price which most investors are content with and provides a more useful indication of volatility (Another example of this is the Sortino Ratio. The difference between the Sharpe and Sortino Ratio is located here). Realty Income's stock is in the 98th percentile in risk-adjusted returns of all S&P 500 companies. Realty Income has never reduced its distribution.
To put Realty Income's 16.5% annualized return since inception, the S&P 500 and Nasdaq generated 10.1% and 10.3% annualized returns, respectively, over the same period. In other words, Realty Income has outperformed by the broader equity and technology stock indices by more than 50% since inception. It also outperformed the equity REIT index by a similar margin.
Let's take a step back. Since the mid-1990s, Realty Income has unquestionably generated impressive results in absolute and relative terms as well as remarkable consistency. That does confirm that the business model and execution has been excellent. It suggests potential strong performance in the future if we can identify and measure the levers Realty Income used to produce those returns. On the other hand, it does not guarantee that past performance will continue. The type of real estate, lease structure, or general consumer behavior always is susceptible to change. Investors tend to focus on this only when a notable exogenous stock to the system occurs. Instead, we should behave like machines and continuously evaluate these factors.
My years leading teams evaluating complex investment opportunities has resulted in a reliable and proven due diligence system. We apply that system to every holding in the Crisis and Baby Bond Institutional Income Plus portfolio. This is generally encompassed in an article published to subscribers shortly after earnings are released.
Due to the same psychological tendencies we've mentioned, it's rarely abrupt changes that bankrupt companies and surprise investors. It's the slow and steady demise that doesn't quite make the news. Sound familiar?
Information and trends flooding the major news channels are likely priced in and usually over-compensated for. Slow structural changes impacting a sector or individual company over time are far more dangerous. Humans don't notice slow changes over time unless they have a process to do so (Fred the frog pictured above must be one of WER's keen followers).
Source: Yahoo Finance
We'll use an example to hammer this point home. General Electric's (GE) share price is down over 80% since 2007 while the S&P 500 is up nearly 100%. As we've touched on before, GE's reliance on debt, financial engineering, and acquisitions were clear warnings signs as it tried to improve a deteriorating return on investment in many of its core divisions. But there was no single day or event that got everyone's attention. It never spent a month on the nightly news. There was no coronavirus moment. As a result, millions of shareholders continued to hold GE stock as it sank lower and lower over the years.
These investors were under-weighting data to confirm a pre-existing bias: GE is an American icon. It's a great company. It'll figure it out. Another investor trap was focusing too heavily on GE's historical returns. For decades, they had one of the better shareholder returns of large-cap U.S. stocks.
Source: Yahoo Finance
We'll respect Realty Income's track record but not let it blind us. With that, let's review its portfolio and operations to find and evaluate the levers that led to those past returns.
Portfolio and Operational Metrics
Source: Realty Income
Realty Income has never had less than 96.0% occupancy. If there was ever a time where they will not be able to hold that line, it's the first half of 2020. We can't rely on this historically durable occupancy rate to bolster their financial results in 2020. Instead, we need to break down the portfolio and analyze it as if Realty Income's impressive historical metrics do not exist.
Source: Realty Income
Realty Income's top 20 tenants represent 53.3% of annualized rental revenue. Importantly, those 20 tenants encompass 11 different industries and 60% are investment grade rated by a major agency.
Source: Realty Income
As the name suggests, Realty Income is primarily Retail (83.0%) followed by Industrial (11.5%) with only small allocations to Office (3.7%) and Agriculture (1.8%). The Retail exposure's percentage of investment grade tenants is below the portfolio average at 44.1%. Industrial and Office are the other way around with 79.9% and 86.5% investment grade tenants, respectively. This helps us know where to hone in on: Non-investment grade tenants in the Retail division. We'll include all tenants from a risk perspective but this is where the major problems are most likely to lie given the portfolio coupled with today's macroeconomic (and political) environment.
Source: Realty Income
Looking back in time to identify the drivers of Realty Income's out-performance, the above diagram represents a critical one. 96% of Realty Income's portfolio is protected against e-commerce threats and traditional recessionary downturns. Quick service restaurants, like Wendy's (WEN), represent 6.2% of the portfolio. In a recent article on Visa (V) for subscribers, we noted that the firm reported relatively strong transaction volumes for quick service restaurants with theme parks and movie theaters among the hardest hit. Though this carefully crafted mix of tenants and industries has certainly worked well for Realty Income overtime, nobody built their portfolios with the coronavirus in mind.
In order to understand Realty Income, we must know its key tenants' business models and financial durability. It's work, but it must be done.
The first five tenants are Walgreens (WBA) at 6.1% of the portfolio, 7-Eleven at 4.8%, Dollar General (DG) at 4.4%, FedEx (FDX) at 4.0%, and Dollar Tree (DLTR) at 3.5%. Given these facilities generally fall under the "essential" category, are backed by investment grade credit ratings, and several may be benefiting during the crisis (e.g. FedEx, Walgreens), we will estimate similar revenue and earnings from these tenants representing 22.8% of the portfolio as in 2019. We cross referenced Visa's credit and debit card transaction data which confirmed that companies like Walgreens are either flat or up year-over-year for Q1.
The next five tenants are a different story. LA Fitness is the largest privately-owned gym company in North America, Realty Income's sixth largest tenant, and represents 3.4% of the portfolio. As noted on its website, LA Fitness has closed all of its locations due to the coronavirus. In addition, it's not billing customers until a location opens in their area. That isn't good for the bottom line and reduces the cash flow available to pay rent to Realty Income. Earlier in April, the firm was in the news due to a lawsuit about keeping unearned fees. Other lawsuits have occurred so it's safe to assume LA Fitness will not be earning much income from customers until the situation changes.
"Effective April 16, 24 Hour Fitness will suspend all membership billings, including any additional services and fees, if we are unable to reopen clubs by that time. For the membership billings charged from March 17 through April 15, members will receive additional days of club access equal to the number of days paid for while the clubs were closed in their area."
As a private company and despite its scale, we have no way of reliably ascertaining its financial condition. I expect Realty Income may negotiate rent with LA Fitness while its gyms are closed which could be as high as 25% of 2020's total rent.
Next on the list is number seven, AMC Entertainment Holdings (AMC), at 3.0% of the portfolio.
Source: Yahoo! Finance
This snapshot of current news on AMC says it all. The stock's market capitalization is down to $467 million as of May 4 and yields 13.8%. When this article was posted for subscribers on April 23, AMC yielded 20% and was trading with a market cap of only $337 million. AMC was able to place $500 million in notes at 10.5% in a transaction designed to keep it solvent through the fall. We'd rarely consider that high of a required yield a positive but it is for AMC given the environment. Another weakness for AMC is a low to zero probability of receiving government aid. With states starting to open up around the nation, it's now feasible for AMC to survive though serious challenges lie ahead.
The ability for tenants to receive government aid is a variable few to no public equity analysts are discussing. My expectation and personal experience being within the industry is these individuals don't have a ton of business ownership experience. That goes both ways - most business owners aren't great at analyzing equities. I'm active in my local business community and have kept close tabs on how different businesses are embracing the government programs.
In general, they've all received or soon will receive hundreds of thousands of dollars in forgivable loans from government programs. Not one has said the process was arduous though there were delays for those that didn't apply quickly. This same situation should apply to LA Fitness locations as they have well under the 500 employee maximum and are structured as franchises.
An individual AMC location, however, will not qualify for similar loans since it is owned by the corporate parent. It's distressing to discuss which companies will survive and fail based on qualifying for government aid, but that's reality.
In aggregate, we think LA Fitness will pay the majority of its rent (~75%) in 2020 assuming a meaningful re-opening of the economy occurs sometime during the summer. It's hard to see gyms abiding by social distancing and other measures but they have a strong incentive to figure it out. Not to mention in many urban areas that's the only place many citizens have to go for exercise which is critical to their health. AMC is a different story. The recent debt offering is a plus but they face severe financial strains and a prolonged closure of the economy could result in insolvency. We put 2020's AMC's rents at 50% of 2019's levels.
As a common sense reminder, we are not "betting the house" on any one of these probabilities. Of course we don't know with certainty if AMC will ultimately survive, if coronavirus will return with a vengeance in the fall, or if politicians will decide nobody needs to go outdoors ever again. Instead, a few tenants will perform better than we expect, others will do worse, but on the projected cash flow figure at the firm-level is sufficiently reliable to form educated opinions about Realty Income's range of cash flow.
Next up is yet another movie theater.
Regal Entertainment Group is the largest movie theater chain in the U.S., but it's now owned by the U.K.-based company Cineworld, which purchased Regal in 2017. This $2.5 billion market cap company owns 790 theatres across 11 countries.
That description is a good start. In order to understand the risk associated with Regal, which represents the 8th largest portfolio holding and 2.9% of annualized 2019 rent, we have to get to know the parent.
Cineworld is the world's second largest cinema chain, with 9,518 screens across 790 sites in 11 countries: the UK, the US, Canada, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Israel, Hungary, Czechia, Bulgaria and Slovakia. The group's primary brands are Regal, Cineworld and Picturehouse, Cinema City and Yes Planet.
Cineworld (CNNWF) had revenues of over 4 billion pounds last year. Cineworld's stock has fallen from over $3 per share earlier in 2020 to $0.74 based on the ADR generating a market capitalization of just under $1 billion. Provided below are Moody's most recent comments on the company in December of last year:
"Cineworld's B1 corporate family rating will be weakly positioned in the rating category following the acquisition of Cineplex. While the acquisition will be strategically positive, it will result in high leverage for Cineworld of 5.6x on a 2019E Moody's adjusted Gross Debt/ EBITDA basis, pro-forma for the transaction," says Gunjan Dixit, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Cineworld.
"Although the box office will likely not be particularly strong in 2020, we expect the company to de-lever towards 5.0x by the end of 2020 mainly helped by EBITDA growth from synergy realization as well as some debt reduction", adds Ms. Dixit.
The B1 rating falls under the "Highly Speculative" category indicating poor financial health prior to the severe impact from the coronavirus. Like AMC, we don't expect Regal to receive government aid. We are reducing Regal's 2020 rent by 50% in our stress test. If most states follow through on their plans to re-open in May, June and July, both theaters have a reasonable probability of survival and Realty Income will receive most anticipated rents even if they are deferred. Our underwriting assumes they permanently close the majority of under-performing locations in the near term.
Next on the list is Realty Income's ninth largest tenant Walmart (WMT) at 2.6%. This revenue is secure so we can immediately move on to Lifetime Fitness at number 10 representing 2.1% of last year's rent. This gym chain has taken a similar approach to LA Fitness and has shuttered its doors and stopped charging members. Lifetime is a private company backed by A heavy hitter in private equity: TPG. TPG also manages a BDC (TSLX) and mREIT (TRTX) we follow. Lifetime follows a more concentrated business model and is likely to fare better than LA Fitness during the crisis. That being said, it's possible they could negotiate rent concessions so we are reducing this firm's 2020 anticipated revenue by 25% as well.
Source: Realty Income
The next 10 tenants round out the top 20 responsible for 53.3% of Realty Income's annualized rental revenue. This includes several grocery store chains, such as Kroger (KR), convenience stores along the lines of CVS Health Corporation (CVS), and Home Depot (HD). This group is generally very well situated financially and operationally despite the current environment. We expect no material change in rents for this group of tenants. As another reminder, that doesn't mean we think their revenues or profits will be unchanged. A major collapse in those variables is required before a tenant fails to pay rent; a moderate reduction (e.g. Home Depot) is unlikely to influence Realty Income's rent collection.
Before we summarize the remaining tenants and compute rent predictions for 2020, let's look at Realty Income's retail exposure through another lens.
Source: Realty Income
Realty Income saw the forest for the trees and has systematically avoided e-commerce's impact more broadly and specifically the weakness in apparel retailers. Realty Income's management understands the slow death concept outlined previously. Would it have gyms and movie theaters among its top 20 tenants if it knew a virus-induced government-enforced shutdown of most economic activity was going to occur? Probably not. But it's glad to have an even greater allocation to pharmacy, convenience, and grocery stores. Visa's transaction data through mid-April showed these categories up 20% year-over-year.
To round out the remaining tenants and industry exposures we need the latest 10-K.
Source: SEC.gov 10-K and WER
Although time consuming, we restructured the table on page 15 of the 10-K so we can manipulate the data. The chart we created above shows all industries representing at least 1.0% of the portfolio.
Source: 10-K and WER
The above discount rates were then applied. We already discussed the largest items in detail but also reduced rents in the areas of Transportation Services, General Merchandise, Automotive, Childcare, Automotive Tire Services, Motor vehicle Dealerships, Financial Services, Healthy and Beauty, Shoe Stores, Crafts and Novelties, and Consumer Goods by 25% and Entertainment, Apparel Stores, and Restaurants - Casual Dining by 50%. Again, these are not intended to be exact figures but instead broad measurements of sensitivity to the ongoing crisis. These figures were derived using data from the companies themselves as well as independent third parties like Visa and Mastercard (MA).
Although correlated, this is not an estimate of how these properties' businesses will perform. Any reduction in rent assumes the businesses enter insolvency or are sufficiently close that Realty Income is willing to reduce rents temporarily. Another option for the REIT is to defer payments and/or amortize them over a longer period. This makes sense if forcing the tenant to pay rent today causes a greater loss in cash flow in the future. People understandably have a hard time differentiating between a company's business performance and its ability to service debt and pay rent.
I'll use an example to illustrate this point. As is often the case with Realty Income, let's say an individual tenant's lease obligations falls under the umbrella of a corporate guarantee. That tenant's profitability or lack thereof is irrelevant to Realty Income getting paid on the first of the month. The parent, CVS for example, gets to deal with that problem - not the landlord. Whether they re-sign the lease or agree to a rent bump at expiration is another topic.
Another situation is a company that's performing great operationally (higher revenues, rapid growth, et cetera) but is mismanaged financially at the corporate level resulting in unsustainable debt. Despite the individual store doing well, Realty Income's rent may be at risk if the parent company goes under.
Lastly, a business may be in a major jam for the time being, such as a gym franchise today, but is managed conservatively with four to six months of cash costs in the bank at all times also reinforced by a line of credit. Despite potentially generating only 10% or 20% of its normal revenue, that gym is going to stay in business through at least the end of the summer, all other things equal. By staying in business, the gym owner (provided they qualify) can likely obtain hundreds of thousands of forgivable loans from the government as well.
In all three of these scenarios, the specific tenant's business during the coronavirus shutdown does not accurately reflect its ability to pay rent.
Under the pessimistic scenario detailed above, Realty Income generates 86.6% of 2019's rent. This excludes several key factors:
- Many leases are structured with increases that tenants cannot escape. Walmart and Home Depot are not going to be able to re-negotiate their 10-year rent terms because of the current situation. We are excluding rent increases that will occur.
- Most of the industry exposures we discounted include investment grade tenants. Without a severe economic contraction well beyond what's foretasted (and what's foretasted is already fairly dire), these tenants also are unlikely to get out of their lease obligations. We assumed no tenants in the discounted areas fall under an investment grade corporate backing.
- Landlords often reclaim lost income from a defaulted lease during tenant bankruptcy proceedings. This is an operational legal obligation that generally must be satisfied prior to equity or debt holders receiving anything from the troubled company. We assume any lost rental income is permanent when that is not what usually occurs.
- Realty Income's business is focused on standalone buildings with a higher than average percentage of franchise business. Franchises are uniquely situated to benefit from government aid packages to support small businesses. We excluded any benefits from these provisions despite knowing with certainty some will be realized.
Source: 2019 10-K
Realty Income has 2.6%, 4.0%, and 5.8% of leases expiring in 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively. Despite the economic uncertainty, relatively few of Realty Income's tenants are in a position to negotiate their lease anytime soon. The average lease doesn't expire until 2028 to 2030, meaning rent increases tied to leases to stronger tenants are not being significantly impacted.
Now that we have a grounded understanding of Realty Income's tenant and rent picture, we can move on to the financials and implement what we've learned.
Source: 2019 10-K
As of the end of 2019, Realty Income was firing on all cylinders with double-digit growth in revenue, net income, funds from operations ("FFO"), and AFFO. Per share figures are not as favorable due to share dilution but were still strong with FFO per share up 5.4% from 2018. In fact, many of 2019's stats were superior to the impressive historical data points we started with.
Using our pessimistic scenario detailed above, FFO per share declines from $3.29 in 2019 to $2.85 in 2020. Occupancy and subsequently rental income would rebound over the next 12 months as lease work-outs and new tenants are sourced. Note that we are not claiming Realty Income will generate $0.71 in FFO in every quarter, Q2 will likely be rough with Q4 potentially "outperforming" due to rent deferrals from earlier in the year. Our estimates as well as the market's suggest Q1 2020 will be well above our pessimistic scenario's 2020 quarterly average. Using the same guidelines but assuming Lifetime and one of the movie theater companies pull through without defaulting on their leases (it doesn't matter which theater as the exposures are both approximately 3.0%), that figure rises to approximately $3.00 per share in FFO.
Although we do not underwrite stocks in this manner, if forced to bet, we think Realty Income's 2020 FFO per share will be higher than $3.0 rather than lower. To obtain a sizable margin of safety, however, we are sticking with our pessimistic scenario.
Source: 2019 10-K
In addition to $408.4 million in mortgage debt tied to acquisitions, Realty Income has the above notes outstanding. Their maturity dates range from 5.750% due in January 2021 to 4.650% notes due in March 2047. Realty Income has wisely staggered maturities and even taken advantage of UK-based debt to offset currency risk associated with its properties located there.
The below information summarizes Realty Income's credit rating and associated borrowing rates.
The borrowing interest rates under our revolving credit facility are based upon our ratings assigned by credit rating agencies. As of December 31, 2019, we were assigned the following investment grade corporate credit ratings on our senior unsecured notes and bonds: Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating of A3 with a "stable" outlook, Standard & Poor's Ratings Group has assigned a rating of A- with a "stable" outlook, and Fitch Ratings has assigned a rating of BBB+ with a "stable" outlook.
Based on our ratings as of December 31, 2019, the facility interest rate was LIBOR, plus 0.775% with a facility commitment fee of 0.125%, for all-in drawn pricing of 0.90% over LIBOR.
The major rating agencies haven't updated their outlooks as far as we can tell. Realty Income is in the small and elite club of A- rated REITs. Due to these factors, Realty Income enjoys among the lowest borrowing costs of any REIT.
Source: 2019 10-K
Realty Income's debt covenants are shown above. Three of the four covenants' compliance hasn't changed despite the ongoing crisis. The limitation of total debt divided by adjusted assets of <60% could be impacted if property values are written down due to nonpayment of rent. We can use the same math here and assume an extended shutdown could result in this ratio increasing to 45.7%. It would require a negative financial shock several times worse than our pessimistic scenario to reach, much less breach, this covenant. This is still the one to watch as Q1 and Q2 results are announced.
Valuation and Conclusion
Realty Income withdrew 2020 guidance and stated they drew down $1.2 billion on their credit line in a recent press release. It's clear management is in a "batten down the hatches" mind-frame. Between Realty Income's six senior officers and directors, upper management owned $49.8 million in stock as of Jan. 31, 2020. We didn't see any indication that additional purchases or sells have taken place since.
On the valuation front, we estimated a low-end 2020 FFO of $2.85 per share which should rise to over $3.00 in 2021; both figures are well under what Realty Income generated in 2019.
The stock's current yield of 5.6% is based on a $49.50 share price and $2.80 annual dividend. Realty Income can fully cover the current distribution rate even under our pessimistic scenario (1.01x coverage) which is no easy feat. This coupled with Realty Income just joining the Dividend Aristocrats index earlier this year means, be it hell or high water, management will resist cutting the distribution unless it's completely necessary. Realty Income is one of three REITs to have made it into the aforementioned index.
As subscribers know and contrary to popular opinion, whether a firm pays or reduces their distribution has minimal impact on investor total return long term. That being said, it's good to know Realty Income has the financial wherewithal to handle a tough 2020 without needing to reduce the distribution.
While Realty Income looks favorably priced in the post-Great Recession period, it's far from the depressed levels experienced in 2008 and 2009. This makes sense, however: The current crisis is not a banking/commercial real estate driven downturn. If we sit around waiting for 2008 valuations on REITs like W.P. Carey (WPC) and Realty Income, we'll never own shares and leave a lot of money on the table. If the stock does go that low, we'll be buying aggressively, but we can't responsibly underwrite unrealistic expectations.
We do need to focus on obtaining Realty Income only at highly attractive but realistic valuations. The stock usually trades at 18x to 24x FFO with anything above or below that range signaling severe under or over-pricing, respectively. Using 2019's FFO results in a current FFO multiple of 14x. Moving to the recent and 52-week low of $38.0 causes the multiple to fall to 10.7x or heavily distressed pricing. Underwriting to the much reduced $2.85 in FFO against a 17x multiple results in a $48.45 price target.
While we reserve our recently refined Crisis Buy Range for subscribers, this gives you a good idea of the stock's value.
The overarching objective in today's environment should be to allocate to quality companies at attractive prices and resist panic selling or letting our emotions influence our decision making process.
We hope this in-depth article on Realty Income and its tenants has been a worthwhile read. - WER Portfolio Managers
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This article was written by
Williams Equity Research ("WER") is led by two portfolio managers with 30 years of combined market experience as hedge fund analysts, traders, due diligence officers, and leading complex and alternative investment research for large institutions. The portfolio managers have a CFA, BS in Business, BA in Economics, and MS in Engineering between them as well as numerous security licenses. WER analyzes individual stocks across all asset classes and global markets with a specialization in income, commodities, international stocks, and special situations.
Institutional Income Plus, WER's marketplace service, is its primary focus and applies an institutional quality risk management framework to investment opportunities in REITs, BDCs, dividend stocks, and credit oriented Closed-end funds and interval funds.
Analyst’s Disclosure: I am/we are long O, WPC, V, MA. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.