2 Great Dividend Deals I Just Made For My Retirement Portfolio
Summary
- Each Friday my retirement portfolio mimics the Dividend Kings Phoenix portfolio daily buys.
- This Friday I bought PM and AMP, two undervalued high-yield blue chips with safe and growing income, trustworthy management, and strong double-digit long-term return potential.
- My personal Phoenix portfolio now consists of 16 companies, 11 of which are still potentially good buys today.
- No matter what happens with the economy or market in the short term (80% probability of a short-term market downturn), I'm confident in the quality of these Phoenix companies, whose average credit rating is "A, stable".
- Unless the economy is permanently destroyed, quality blue chips like these, as part of a diversified and prudently risk-managed portfolio, are a great way to achieve your long-term financial goals.
- Looking for a portfolio of ideas like this one? Members of The Dividend Kings get exclusive access to our model portfolio. Get started today »
Last week I explained why Federal Realty (FRT), Broadcom (AVGO), and Philip Morris International (PM) were on my short-term buy list for my retirement portfolio.
This week I explained why Ameriprise Financial (AMP) and two other world-class blue chips were added to the Dividend Kings' Phoenix watchlist. That's a collection of 60 top quality companies that are almost certain to rise from the ashes of this recession and soar to new heights.
Today, I want to reveal the two companies I recently bought for my retirement portfolio, as well as provide an update of what my personal Phoenix portfolio looks like.
How I'm Putting My Savings To Work In The Worst Recession In 75 Years
In early April I was able to transfer a large sum of money (my tax savings which will be replenished within 2 weeks) to my account allowing me to begin tracking the DK Phoenix portfolio's Friday buys.
Phoenix started with about $140K in buying power, initially invested 50/50 in SPTL (long-duration US treasuries), and 50% VGSH (1-3 year US treasuries).
Each day the DK Phoenix portfolio buys between 1 and 10 companies (depending on the market conditions), always at the potentially good buy or better price. That price is determined by the margin of safety adjusted for the quality of the company.
For example, for an 11/11 quality Super SWAN like JNJ, a mere 5% discount is sufficient to make it a potentially good buy (assuming its other fundamentals meet your personal needs).
For a riskier 7/11 average-quality company (not on the Phoenix list), such as VIAC, a 25% margin of safety is required for it to be a potentially good buy.
Anything between fair value and 24% discount on a 7/11 average-quality company is a potentially reasonable buy in our color-coding system.
(Source: Dividend Kings Research Terminal)
Potential good buys are green, potential reasonable buys are blue, anything between 1% and 32% overvalued is yellow (hold) and 33+% overvalued is a potential sell/trim price.
Why 33%? It's based on six years of observations that blue chips (such as O, FRT, MO, ABBV, and most midstream stocks) began bear markets soon after hitting 33% historically overvalued.
By no means does that mean that a company hitting 33% overvalued is a guarantee that its stock price is about to roll over. Bubbles can last many years, and the most overvalued I've seen any company become was Super SWAN dividend king American States Water (AWR), 120% overvalued before it plunged 20% in a week during the March market crash.
(Source: F.A.S.T Graphs, FactSet Research)
A Phoenix Watchlist company must have 4/5 above-average or better safety and 9+/11 blue chip or better quality.
- 3/11: high risk of bankruptcy even outside of recessions
- 4/11: very unsafe company
- 5/11: unsafe company
- 6/11: below-average
- 7/11: average quality (relative to S&P 500)
- 8/11: above-average
- 9/11: blue chip (5/5 safety and at least average/above-average business models and management quality/dividend corporate cultures)
- 10/11: SWAN (usually wide moat blue chips)
- 11/11: Super SWAN (very safety dividend + wide moat + excellent management) - as close to perfect as any company can get on Wall Street
45% of my quality scores are based on dividend safety, which I determine by looking at nine metrics.
- Payout ratio vs. safe levels for industry
- debt/capital vs. safe levels for industry
- debt/EBITDA vs. safe levels for industry
- Interest coverage vs. safe levels for industry
- Credit rating (long-term bankruptcy risk)
- Dividend Growth Streak (Ben Graham metric of quality)
- F score: advanced accounting metric for short-term insolvency risk
- Z score: advanced accounting metric for long-term bankruptcy risk
- M score: advanced accounting metric for detecting accounting fraud
(Source: Moon Capital Management, NBER, Multpl.com)
Using the S&P 500 as a proxy for the average quality US corporation, and then looking at historical dividend cuts during recessions, including average ones in the modern era, I estimate that
- below-average dividend safety (2/5) = over 2% dividend cut risk (normal recession)
- average dividend safety (3/5) = about 2% cut risk
- above-average safety (4/5): about 1% dividend cut risk
- very safe (5/5): about 0.5% dividend cut risk
This isn't a normal recession of course, but the worst in 75 years.
That means dividend cut risk may be 3 to 4X greater than the normal recessionary estimates. That's due to the fact that various economists expect US economic growth this year to be between -4% to -6% (an average recession is 1.4% peak contraction per the National Bureau of Economic Research).
Extrapolating the current economic forecasts that would mean that in the Great Lockdown Recession safety ratings would translate to
- below-average dividend safety (2/5) = over 10% dividend cut risk
- average dividend safety (3/5) = about 8% cut risk
- above-average safety (4/5): about 4% dividend cut risk
- very safe (5/5): about 2% dividend cut risk
Phoenix Watchlist Fundamental Quality/Safety Stats
- Average quality score: 10.1/11 SWAN quality vs. 9.6 average aristocrat.
- Average dividend safety score: 4.6/5 very safe vs. 4.6 average aristocrat (and about 6% current recession cut risk)
- Average max portfolio risk cap recommendation: 6.8% vs. 7% or less for the highest quality blue chips.
- Average payout ratio: 54% vs. 62% industry safety guideline.
- Average debt/capital: 44% vs. 44% industry safety guideline.
- Average yield: 3.3% vs. 2.1% S&P 500 vs. 3.1% aristocrats (2.4% NOBL ETF).
- Average dividend growth streak: 25.0 Years (Graham Standard of excellence is 20+, aristocrats are 25+).
- Average long-term analyst growth consensus: 9.8% CAGR vs. 6.3% CAGR S&P 500 20-year average (thriving companies with faster-expected growth than the broader market).
- Average return on capital: 130% (very high quality according to Joel Greenblatt).
- Average return on capital industry percentile: 87% (wide moat/highest quality according to Greenblatt).
- Average 13-year median ROC: 115% (stable quality/moat).
- Average 5-year ROC trend: +5% CAGR (relatively stable quality/moat).
- Average S&P credit rating: A vs. A- average aristocrat (about 0.7% 30-year bankruptcy risk).
(Source: University Of St. Petersburg)
The Phoenix watchlist is, in aggregate, a wide moat dividend aristocrat portfolio, with equal dividend safety but slightly higher quality and faster-expected growth rates. It also has superior valuations and slightly higher yield, resulting in higher expected long-term returns.
Mind you not everything on that list has been bought by the DK Phoenix portfolio because some companies never hit the good buy price.
And my personal Phoenix sub-portfolio, everything, such as the 13-companies I bought in April for my retirement portfolio, only buys what Phoenix buys on Friday's.
That's my personal asset allocation plan, designed to minimize regret during this bear market.
- buy 1 to 10 companies every Friday (or if the market hits -40%, -45%, -50%, etc.) forever
- buy $500 or $1000 per company (depending on market valuations/economic fundamentals)
- keep all buying power in t-bills/long-duration treasuries (store of value/hedge during a recession)
Many people are worried that the market is going to roll over and hit new lows soon.
Historically there is a high probability of that, specifically about an 80% chance that stocks will fall within the next few months.
That's because, at least on a forward P/E basis, the S&P 500 is about 35% overvalued and more than 1.3 standard deviations above its 25-year average.
BUT there is a big difference between a pullback/correction and then stocks trading in a flattish range for years before earnings catch up and another market crash.
(Source: Bespoke, Lance Roberts)
Since 1940 there have been 15 bear markets and just 42% of them have retested lows after a significant rally.
Go back to 1929 and the figure rises to 60% across 26 bear markets.
But either way you look at the historical data, the probability of stocks cratering to new lows is not close to 100%.
But even if the market does have very high pullback/correction risk right now (about 80%) once you wait long enough even the market's consensus total return potential doesn't look that bad.
(Source: F.A.S.T Graphs, FactSet Research)
7% to 9% CAGR is the market's historical total return, depending on the time frame. Buying the broader market today has similar consensus total return potential as the low end of that range.
But I'm not interested in owning the market, because my portfolio, like all DK model portfolios, has different goals.
This brings me to the two great dividend deals I just made for my personal Phoenix portfolio (Phoenix is a personalizable investing philosophy and you are encouraged to cherry-pick what companies work best for you).
Philip Morris & Ameriprise Financial: 2 Great Dividend Deals I Just Made For My Retirement Portfolio
- Philip Morris: bought 14 shares @ $74.35 on May 1st
- Ameriprise: bought 10 shares @ $111.43 on May 1st
Both companies are lower than I bought them last Friday. I don't care a lick because my savings + cash/bond holdings allow me to buy every Friday...forever.
The lower any of my holdings fall, the more I get to buy later. The goal of Phoenix is to opportunistically dollar-cost average through the bear market, no matter how long it lasts or how bad it gets.
I will be likely be buying PM and AMP several more times in the coming months, as Phoenix steadily rolls through the watchlist each day.
As long as the dividends are safe and growing, that's what matters to me.
Getting paid generous and safe income that keeps rising over time, eventually recouping all my initial investment and then some. Dividend stocks are like royalty deals on Shark Tank.
Why I Bought Philip Morris
- Payout ratio: 95% vs. 85% safe for tobacco companies
- debt/capital: 162% vs. 60% safe for tobacco companies
- debt/EBITDA: 2.6 (unchanged from last quarter) vs. 3.0 or less safe for tobacco companies Interest coverage: 20.9 vs. 18.2 last quarter vs. 8+ safe for tobacco companies
- Credit rating (also a proxy for long-term bankruptcy risk): A, stable (about 0.67% 30-year bankruptcy risk)
- Dividend Growth Streak: 11 years (should technically be a dividend king under new S&P aristocrat spin-off rule)
- F score - short-term solvency: 7/9 (up from 5 last quarter) vs. 4+ safe = very low short-term insolvency risk
- Z score - long-term bankruptcy risk: 4.39 (up from 3.93 last quarter) vs. 3+ very safe = very low bankruptcy risk
- M score - accounting fraud risk: -2.87 vs. -2.74 last quarter vs. -2.22 or less safe = very low accounting fraud risk
PM's leverage ratio remained stable in Q1 and its interest coverage ratio rose to nearly 21, 2.5X the safe level for tobacco companies.
It's F, Z, and M scores, the advanced accounting metrics that scan the 10-K and 10-Qs for signs of short and long-term bankruptcy risk and accounting fraud, similarly improved.
In Q1 PM had low bankruptcy and accounting fraud risk. Now its risks are very low across the board.
PM's dedication and ability to sustain its generous dividend was not only reaffirmed during the conference call but on May 6th.
We remain confident in our structural mid-term growth prospects and, when the current headwinds have passed, expect to resume growth consistent with our 2019 to 2021 currency-neutral compound annual growth targets.
Crucially, our organization, liquidity, and balance sheet are strong. We will continue to protect and support our employees, serve our consumers, and reward our shareholders, which includes our strong commitment to our dividend." - PM press release
In 2021 and 2022 analysts expect the payout ratio to fall to 90% and 86% respectively, with PM hiking the dividend 3% each year.
S&P has a stable A credit rating on PM, which translates historically into about 0.7% 30-year bankruptcy risk.
And here is S&P's most recent note about tobacco companies, from May 1st, explaining why it anticipates no changes in ratings from US tobacco companies.
Rating stability is anticipated in the U.S. tobacco sector. Near-term tobacco sales are expected to remain relatively firm, albeit volatile. Accelerated volume declines over the medium term is possible if disposable incomes remain depressed or health concerns increase due to the coronavirus pandemic.
We expect tobacco companies with very high cash flow and high dividends to continue to take price amid a secular decline." - S&P
The decades-long game of hiking prices faster than volume declines is one that Morningstar believes can continue for decades to come. Here's Morningstar explaining why it considers tobacco a viable industry for the next quarter-century.
A pack of 20 cigarettes (equivalent; a standard pack contains 25 sticks in Australia) now costs roughly $14.50, well above the $10.40 average retail price in the U.K., $5.50 in the U.S., and around $5.00 on average globally, according to the World Health Organization.
Assuming the Australia experience is applicable to price elasticity in other markets, it appears likely that there remains a great deal of headroom for price increases globally.
At 4% real pricing (based on the 6% nominal price/mix PMI has achieved over the past three years and 2% global inflation), this crude calculation suggests that it will be 2046 before global pricing reaches levels at which price elasticity increased in Australia.
This is comfortably longer than 20 years, the benchmark period that we expect wide-moat companies to continue generating economic rent." - Morningstar emphasis added
What about PM's 2020 earnings expectations falling 10% over the last 3 months? Indeed the pandemic has hurt this normally recession-resistant business.
Management highlighted some potentially weak markets as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak that we had not fully accounted for, so we are lowering our 2020 estimates accordingly...
...although this has no impact on our $102 fair value estimate. As things currently stand, we do not expect the pandemic to have material long-term implications for the business, but emerging markets may prove to be weaker than we had expected in the short term.
We regard the stock as being undervalued, and the lack of visibility into short-term performance is presenting a buying opportunity. At around 13 times 2020 earnings, PMI has one of the highest valuations in the tobacco group, but it is the quality play with a strong portfolio in both cigarettes and heated tobacco...
Our impression is that cigarette demand will be softer than usual during this period, but not enough to move the needle on valuation or present any liquidity risk.
There will likely be modest changes to the amount that smokers consume and the channels in which they shop, but most of these changes are likely to be temporary." -Morningstar (emphasis added)
Morningstar estimates PM's fair value at $102 because they aren't adjusting for this year's expected earnings/cash flow declines.
I am doing so with each fundamental update until September when I'll begin valuing all Master List companies based on 2021 consensus estimates. By then we'll have Q2 earnings come out and have more clarity with how the pandemic and various state/country restarts are going.
PM's 10% consensus cut in recent weeks has lowered its 2020 average fair value (based on EBITDA, earnings, operating cash flow, EBIT, yield, etc.) to $94.
At $71 today, PM is about 24% undervalued, which means that in addition to an above-average safe 6.6% yield long-term investors who don't mind owning a tobacco company can expect very strong long-term total returns.
- long-term FactSet growth consensus: 6.6% CAGR
- analyst growth consensus range growth range (FactSet, Ycharts, Reuters', 20-year analyst scorecard, and appropriate margin of error): 3% to 8% CAGR
- market historical fair value for PM growing at similar rates: 16 to 17 over the last 12 years
- Current forward P/E: 13.6
- discount to fair value: 24% = potentially strong buy
- 5-year total return potential: 11% to 17% CAGR
PM's business model is stable enough that analysts tend to do a good job of forecasting its earnings, within a reasonable margin of error.
(Source: F.A.S.T Graphs, FactSet Research)
Thanks to that generous, safe and growing yield, plus a nice discount to fair value, PM offers about 17% CAGR consensus total return potential through the end of 2022.
That's compared to 7% for the broader market, which is extremely overvalued historically speaking.
This is the kind of low-risk/high probability investment decisions I make. I don't strive to time the bottom, just make good to great deals with every company I buy.
Why I Bought Ameriprise
- Payout ratio: 28% vs. 50% safe for asset managers
- debt/capital: 45% vs. 20% safe
- debt/EBITDA: 1.9 vs. 1.5 (but just 0.2 net of cash)
- Interest coverage: 7.4 vs. 10+ guideline for asset managers Credit rating (also a proxy for long-term bankruptcy risk): A, stable (about 0.67% 30-year bankruptcy risk)
- Dividend Growth Streak: 14 years
- M score - accounting fraud risk: -2.36 vs -2.22 or less safe = low accounting fraud risk
As I explained in my last AMP article, the high debt/capital is due to AMP's legacy insurance business. Its shift to more lucrative asset management, while not risk-free, is one reason that S&P credits with earning a very strong A, stable credit rating.
Ameriprise's asset management business is why analysts expect it to grow about 10% CAGR over time which is its historical rate over the past 20 years.
We believe Ameriprise has built a moat surrounding its asset-management and wealth management businesses.
Since its 2005 spin-off from American Express, Ameriprise has gradually moved up the value chain to provide customized services and financial planning solutions to the mass affluent and affluent client groups. Ameriprise's focus on personal relationships helps the firm build on its switching-cost advantage.
The company's retention rate for advisors is over 90%, and the industry retention rate for financial advisors of their retail clients is also around 90%. By positioning itself as a one-stop shop for baby boomers, offering advice in financial planning, fund investment, and insurance purchase, the firm makes it that much harder for boomers to switch to another provider.
The size and scale of its operations, the strength of its brands, and the diversity of its AUM by asset class, distribution channel, and geographic reach also provide Ameriprise with a leg up over competitors. " - Morningstar
AMP's profitability is stable over time and about average for asset managers. That's why I rate it 2/3 on business model.
Similarly, the 14-year dividend growth steak, while impressive for a financial (it didn't cut in the Financial Crisis) doesn't warrant a 3/3 management quality score (neither does the profitability profile).
But 5/5 dividend safety and 2/3 business model and management quality still make it a 9/11 quality blue chip.
(Source: Investor Presentation)
AMP is competently run and very shareholder-friendly. That can be seen by the strong EPS growth since 2012 (18% CAGR) as well as returning $15 billion to investors via dividends and buybacks. That's courtesy of 90% FCF margins on its asset management business.
AMP has a rich history of being good to investors, stretching back to its 1894 founding in Minnesota (birthplace of such famous dividend aristocrats/champions such as MMM, HRL, TGT, MDT, and PII).
AMP's advisor business generates 90% of revenue from fees, from 10,000 registered investment advisor clients, who hold $300 billion in assets with the company. AMP is averaging $650,000 per year in revenue per advisor, a highly scalable and lucrative business (with good stickiness to boot).
Asset management is all about trust and reputation, and in this business, it's tough to beat Ameriprise.
(Source: Investor Presentation)
- AMP is regarded as #1 in its industry for customer service and thus has the highest customer loyalty.
- It has 107 4 and 5-star mutual funds as rated by Morningstar.
- In the UK it's ranked in the top 10 asset managers by client performance
(Source: Investor Presentation)
According to Ben Graham, Mr. Market is never wrong about a company in the long term. And AMP has been judged by the market to be the 4th best financial company in America since its spin-off.
- long-term analyst growth consensus: 9.8% CAGR
- analyst growth consensus range: 7% to 12% CAGR
- historical fair value P/E: 11.5 to 13.5
- current forward P/E: 7.3 (pricing in -3% CAGR long-term growth per Graham/Dodd fair value formula)
- discount to fair value: 35% = potentially very strong buy
- 5-year total return potential: 19% to 29% CAGR
(Source: F.A.S.T Graphs, FactSet Research)
Other than AMP's strong reputation for excellence and overall fundamental quality, it's the very low valuation that makes Ameriprise one of Chuck Carnevale's favorite financial names.
If AMP grows as expected through 2022, and returns to its historical fair value of just 12.6 P/E, then investors could see Buffett in his prime like returns of about 38% CAGR over the next 2.5 years.
(Source: F.A.S.T Graphs, FactSet Research)
AMP has a good chance of growing as expected, as it historically meets or beats expectations 82% of the time.
My Personal Phoenix Portfolio (Strong Companies Likely To Rise From The Ashes Of This Recession And Soar To New Heights)
(Source: Morningstar) - note portfolio is about 60% stocks/40% bonds, bonds not shown
Here are all the companies I've bought since the US plunged into the worst recession in 75 years.
(Source: Morningstar)
The reason Polaris is the biggest holding is that it's up 76% since I bought it near the 52 week low at $39 (it bottomed at $37 so far).
Some of my recent buys are down significantly but I'm not concerned. Since I'm buying steadily on a schedule, the lower their prices, the better the deals I'll make in the coming months.
Should the bear market drag into 2021 (economist Gary Shilling expects the market to finish down in 2020 and fall 40% in 2021) then I'll get to load up this portfolio with even better bargains.
(Source: Morningstar)
My personal Phoenix portfolio is trading at a very attractive 9.3 times cash flow and Morningstar estimates it's about 18% undervalued.
(Source: Dividend Kings valuation tool) green = potential good buy or better, blue = potential reasonable buy, yellow = hold
If anyone wants to use my personal Phoenix portfolio as a source of ideas for further due diligence, make sure you keep in mind that some of these companies are now overvalued (the yellow ones) and GOOG is merely a reasonable buy.
But the quality of these companies cannot be denied.
My Personal Phoenix Portfolio Stats
- Average quality score: 10.2/11 SWAN quality vs. 9.6 average aristocrat.
- Average dividend safety score: 4.7/5 very safe vs. 4.6 average aristocrat (and about 6% current recession cut risk)
- Average max portfolio risk cap recommendation: 6.8% vs. 7% or less for the highest quality blue chips.
- Average payout ratio: 56% vs. 65% industry safety guideline.
- Average debt/capital: 45% vs. 5% industry safety guideline.
- Average yield: 3.4% vs. 2.1% S&P 500 vs. 3.1% aristocrats (2.4% NOBL ETF).
- Average dividend growth streak: 24.4 Years (Graham Standard of excellent is 20+, aristocrats are 25+).
- Average discount to fair value: 16% vs. Morningstar estimate 18% vs. 35% overvaluation S&P 500
- average P/E: 17.7 vs. 22.0 S&P 500
- average PEG ratio: 1.96 vs. 2.59 S&P 500
- average 5-year dividend growth rate: 8.4% CAGR
- Average long-term analyst growth consensus: 9.0% CAGR vs. 6.3% CAGR S&P 500 20-year average (thriving companies with faster-expected growth than the broader market).
- Average return on capital: 85% (very high quality according to Joel Greenblatt).
- Average return on capital industry percentile: 84% (wide moat/highest quality according to Greenblatt).
- Average 13-year median ROC: 95% (stable quality/moat).
- Average 5-year ROC trend: +0% CAGR (relatively stable quality/moat).
- Average S&P credit rating: A vs. A- average aristocrat (about 0.7% 30-year bankruptcy risk).
- average 5-year total return potential: 3.4% yield + 9.0% CAGR growth + 3.5% CAGR valuation mean reversion boost = 15.9% CAGR (11% to 20% CAGR with 25% margin of error)
This collection of companies will serve my retirement portfolio well.
Not just likely supplying generous and growing income during the recession but long after, courtesy of growth that's expected to be superior to the broader market's.
(Source: Morningstar)
I'm not worried about diversification right now since my personal Phoenix portfolio is part of a much larger portfolio (I never sold anything I bought in recent years).
In addition, each Friday I'll keep adding companies to this portfolio.
The Phoenix watchlist (which changes each week as overvalued companies get replaced with reasonably priced ones) has exposure to all sectors, and eventually, my personal Phoenix portfolio will comply with my risk management guidelines.
Bottom Line: In A Sea Of Turmoil My Portfolio Plan Is A Beacon Of Calm
I don't know when this recession will end (blue chip economist consensus says June or July).
I most certainly don't know when the bear market will end (historically speaking 14-month median decline to bottom would be April 2021 and new record high February 2023), no one does.
Historical analysis can provide context, as can historical valuation analysis and forecasts from the leading reputable sources (such as Reuters', Refinitiv, FactSet, the blue chip economist consensus, NY Fed, Dallas Fed, Harvard, Congressional Budget Office, etc.).
Ultimately I don't care when stocks bottom, because to paraphrase Shark Tank's Kevin O'Leary "I'm a disciplined long-term dividend investor."
In the short term, I see a lot of risks pertaining to the pandemic, economy, and corporate fundamentals.
Never bet against America. That is as true today as it was in 1789, during the Civil War, and in the depths of the Depression... American magic has always prevailed, and it will do so again." - Warren Buffett
But as Buffett said at his annual Berkshire meeting presentation, betting against America has never been a winning wager. And if this time is different? Well, then we'll have far bigger concerns than the value of our portfolios.
To save and invest means to bet on a brighter tomorrow. I remain a cautious optimist in the medium-term (about gradually improving economic fundamentals) and a realistic bull about the future of the US and global economy.
Most of all, I'm 80% confident (Templeton/Marks confidence limit in finance) that my Phoenix companies will prove great stewards of my capital as well as anyone who buys them at a reasonable to attractive price within a diversified and prudently risk-manged portfolio.
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This article was written by
Adam Galas is a co-founder of Wide Moat Research ("WMR"), a subscription-based publisher of financial information, serving over 5,000 investors around the world. WMR has a team of experienced multi-disciplined analysts covering all dividend categories, including REITs, MLPs, BDCs, and traditional C-Corps.
The WMR brands include: (1) The Intelligent REIT Investor (newsletter), (2) The Intelligent Dividend Investor (newsletter), (3) iREIT on Alpha (Seeking Alpha), and (4) The Dividend Kings (Seeking Alpha).
I'm a proud Army veteran and have seven years of experience as an analyst/investment writer for Dividend Kings, iREIT, The Intelligent Dividend Investor, The Motley Fool, Simply Safe Dividends, Seeking Alpha, and the Adam Mesh Trading Group. I'm proud to be one of the founders of The Dividend Kings, joining forces with Brad Thomas, Chuck Carnevale, and other leading income writers to offer the best premium service on Seeking Alpha's Market Place.
My goal is to help all people learn how to harness the awesome power of dividend growth investing to achieve their financial dreams and enrich their lives.
With 24 years of investing experience, I've learned what works and more importantly, what doesn't, when it comes to building long-term wealth and safe and dependable income streams in all economic and market conditions.
Analyst’s Disclosure: I am/we are long AMP, PM. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Dividend Kings owns AMP, and PM in our portfolios.
Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.