The End Of The Central Bank Super-Bubble

Summary
- Central bank policy has lost effectiveness.
- China is in decline regardless of official data.
- The deflationary forces in the global economy and financial stability risks are too great.
- Oil remains oversupplied with a risk of increased production either from OPEC or US shale. Price upside and also inflation remain capped.
- Risk assets including gold are overvalued. Treasuries will not provide an adequate hedge. Long USD is the safest place to be.
Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize a misconception is involved. A twilight period ensues during which doubt grows but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia... A point is reached where the trend is reversed and becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.
- George Soros
The prevailing trend is central bank firewalls will always protect markets. The misconception is central banks have the ability to fix deeply ingrained deflationary forces/financial stability issues and that monetary policy ineffectiveness is a non-issue. The exponential rise in central bank balance sheets and subsequent tantrums on withdrawal since 2008 is a sign of this.
It’s become clear financial markets are being held up by central bank support, not global business and economic fundamentals. Markets may cheer this but undoubtedly massive central bank intervention is a symptom of an underlying problem. Therefore, not a reason to be optimistic. Simply put, if a patient is on life support, is that a good thing? The answer is a clear no.
The failure of the Bank of Japan is a perfect example of this. As is the ECB in being unable to generate 2% core inflation in the Euro-area despite massive expansion of the monetary base, large central bank balance sheet assets to GDP ratios, negative rates and unprecedented QE programs. Interestingly the Fed is actually the least accommodative comparatively yet USD bears love to latch onto the story that Federal Reserve QE printing and bond buying is debasing the USD. Yet the USD is still way up on a trade-weighted basis which I will touch on a bit more later.
Source: Robin Brooks, IIF
First off I will quickly start out by saying, if you look at total credit to US private sector in 2020, it has risen which is different from most recessions which makes me believe the K-shape theory. That is, credit is for one mainly being used for relief and replacing lost incomes/revenues, not excess spending or capital investment by the first group. The second, speculative financial activities encouraged by low rates from the other group. Neither of which is a good sign.
Next, China is very likely going into a hard-landing and this is one of the largest unfixable, deflationary problems for central banks. The inherent problem is China's investment, construction and supply-side growth model has run its course and is out of steam. The CCP can turn the factories and steel mills on at will, but the greater output from the industrial sector is pushed, the greater the overcapacity problem, the larger the inventory overhang (which drags on future growth) and also it creates increased diminishing returns to GDP. This is known as the incremental capital output ratio which has soared, meaning it is taking more RMB in fixed asset investment to produce the same amount of GDP growth. There is a large difference between investing in fixed capital assets to earn a sufficient return and investing in fixed capital assets simply to meet a GDP target. This is what it has degenerated to in China.
The answer for China is a consumer rebalancing where credit growth and aggregate demand is shifted onto the demand side of the economy and not the state controlled supply-side economy. The problem with this though, is the bank loans are lent to the old, industrial economy, so there will inevitably be a huge NPL problem because of the over-levered banking system relative to the size of the Chinese economy. I argue China must go through an economic and financial reset where their banking system is recapitalized and loan losses are absorbed by the PBOC, before a return to growth can occur.
Source: Zerohedge
Chinese GDP is around $14 trillion. Bank assets are around 300% the size of their economy conservatively. In 2007, in the United States, bank assets were around 65% of GDP as shown in the chart below, a far-cry from 300% currently in China. U.S. NPLs hit 5% in the financial crisis in 2008. China is arguably already at that non-performing loan ratio despite an official 2% NPL ratio. Most of the bad loans are being deferred by the CCP and PBOC to keep banks solvent for the short-term. So let's say hypothetically China's NPLs go to 5%. That would mean 15% of the Chinese economy is bad debt compared to 3.25% in the United States in '08. The reason is a relatively large banking system amplifies the ratio defaults, NPLs and unserviceable debt to the real economy.
A wave of defaults and 5% NPL ratio would also create a huge capital hole in China's banking system, where the only answer would be for the PBOC to print RMB and bail out their banks. In the above scenario, a reasonable estimate of China's banks' capital shortfall is around 15 trillion RMB given the size of China's economy at approximately 98 trillion RMB, bank assets at 300 trillion RMB and a 5% NPL ratio. This banking system recapitalization would at least triple the size of the PBOC's balance sheet and undeniably lead to downward pressure on the exchange rate and possibly an 8 or even 9 handle on USD/CNY.
PBOC assets, Source: Trading Economics.
And therein lies another problem. China has built up a large USD-denominated debt burden. So when the RMB depreciates against the USD due to a massive banking system recap and large scale printing of RMB, the real burden of that USD debt increases and this would weigh on Chinese corporate sector profitability, equity valuations and employment (which further weakens the consumer rebalancing thesis).
Source: Daniel Lacalle
China can hardly afford a strained corporate sector given they have the 2nd highest corporate debt to GDP ratio in the world at 159%. According to the Nikkei Asian Review:
Nonfinancial corporate debt climbed to 159.1% of GDP in the first quarter from 152.2% a year earlier, according to the Institute of International Finance, which counts 400 banks and financial institutions across the globe as members. The ratio is the world's second highest, behind only Hong Kong. In comparison, the proportion in the U.S. stood at 78.1%, in the euro area at 109.8%, 106.4% in Japan and 96.1% on average across emerging markets.
As for China's 2020 "recovery", I don't believe in it for two reasons. For one, it is more of the same unsustainable and inefficient growth even according to official statistics. Chinese retail sales growth and industrial production have flipped, meaning retail sales are now growing at a slower clip than industrial production, where the opposite was true in 2019 and the last several years before. Though both rates have drastically slowed since pre-Covid, this signals the consumer rebalancing thesis is failing.
Secondly, China has long been suspected of massaging official government economic statistics, though it has become more blatant than ever this year. According to Nick Marro of the Economic Intelligence Unit, based in Hong Kong covering Asian markets and economies:
China's FAI release today (Dec. 15, 2020) indicated further downwards revisions to historic series from Nov 2019 (by Rmb4.68trn), based on historic data from last month. This following the removal of Rmb3.6trn worth of historic investment in October. Without, Jan-Nov FAI would've been -6.4% YoY.
China Beige Book, a very reputable and respected independent surveyor of Chinese business economics has also backed up and confirmed this data. The reason trillions of RMB have gone missing from 2019 data is it lowers the baseline and reduces the hurdle for showing improving growth and economic activity in 2020. Also, the PBOC has "admitted" to revising down 2019 statistics on Wednesday 12/30/20. But as usual with the Chinese statistics, it still does not quite add up. According to Shezhad Qazi of China Beige Book:
Gross domestic product in 2019 was smaller by 435 billion yuan ($67 billion) than the initial estimate released in January, China’s statistics bureau said Wednesday. According to the latest estimate China’s nominal GDP was 98.7 trillion yuan in 2019. The manufacturing sector recorded the largest change — with value-added output reduced by 503.8 billion yuan from an earlier estimate. Yes, you read that correctly: the amount by which value added output was reduced is larger than the total amount by which GDP was reduced. Statistics with Chinese characteristics.
Moving on from China, I will now talk about oil prices, but as a transition I will say given my negative view on the Chinese economy and the fact it is one of the largest demand centers for commodities, I am not optimistic on crude. Inflationary and deflationary episodes rarely happen without a correlating rise or fall in oil prices, so it is an important topic. As I have clearly stated my negative views on global demand, I will generally focus on supply now.
First off, the last OPEC meeting was a total chaos. There is severe disagreement among members and with Russia. In the end, OPEC+ opted to increase production by 500K barrels per day and hold meetings every month to re-analyze and calibrate policy. The market was largely expecting a full output cut extension, so I was surprised not to see oil fall drastically on a let down of a total output cut extension for 3 more months.
So as of January 1, 2021, output cuts will be reduced (supply increased) by +500k bpd. OPEC+ will meet again on January 4 and this time Russia is making its views very clear. According to Bloomberg:
“To restore our output, that we’ve reduced a lot, the price range of $45 to $55 a barrel is the most optimal,” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told reporters in Moscow. “Otherwise we’ll never restore production, others will restore it.”
Novak makes a good point. There is plenty of supply waiting to come back online whether it be from OPEC+ or elsewhere, but he was specifically referring to the United States shale industry. If OPEC maintains output cuts, North American shale producers will ramp up to fill that void and take market share. This will keep a lid on any price rise. Inventories are still elevated and there is not a shortage imminent by any means. So for those investors thinking we will inflate our way out of this in the short run, I must ask where do you stand on oil supply. There is also a material risk that Saudi Arabia, Russia or the UAE disagree again and engage in a major supply ramp-up price war. Also, Iran is looking to restore production with Biden in office and Libya is restoring output quickly and significantly.
The US dollar typically has a negative correlation with WTI. Deflationary episodes and oil price declines rarely occur without an appreciation in the USD in global FX markets. After spiking in March, the USD is down this year, but I believe it is one of the smartest places to be in a heightened risk, weak global growth and disinflationary or deflationary environment. As mentioned above, many emerging market economies have borrowed in USD so there is a great amount of foreign demand. Secondly, with the huge treasury issuance from the US government, primary dealers (mainly large banks) are drawing on USD reserves to absorb the supply of bonds from the United States government. The Federal Reserve through QE and bond purchases is helping to alleviate this but at the recent December meeting, Jerome Powell and the FOMC opted not to increase purchases.
The United States government has recently passed a large stimulus package, this will widen the deficit and government bond issuance even further. This divergence between increased US treasury holdings from Federal Reserve member banks and less USD reserve holdings is depicted below. The Fed missed their chance to ease this December in my opinion. Increased relief or stimulus provides less reason for more monetary policy accommodation to the real US economy unless the Federal Reserve explicitly wants to admit they are trying to control yields and financial markets more so.
I don't think EUR/USD can hit 1.25. We didn't get there in the 2017 synchronized global growth phenomenon when euro fundamentals were a lot more bullish with the ECB talking about raising rates and Eurozone economy outperforming. Currently, European PMIs, inflation and economic data are underperforming the United States, there are greater lockdowns there, and the ECB is more accommodative as measured by central bank assets to GDP and negative rates as well. I think the surge we are seeing in EUR/USD has the ECB ready to act against it as a stronger euro weighs on the export driven economies of Europe.
Lastly, despite my call for weaker inflation and global growth, I am surprisingly not optimistic on US Treasury prices. I will explain why. I anticipate a rise in real (inflation-adjusted) US yields despite a global downturn, meaning I expect global inflation and growth expectations to fall while US government yields still rise as bonds sell off due to an oversupply of issuance and a switch to the USD. This is exactly what happened in March 2020. Higher real rates also increase the appeal of the USD in FX markets as it becomes a higher yielding currency. Many central banks, especially in emerging markets, have more policy room to lower rates in the scenario of a global downturn. These divergent policy paths will narrow yield differentials and weaken carry trades and inflows to EM currencies.
An abrupt backing up in US yields is a large risk to the global economy. This would result in a stronger USD. Many global financial institutions and central banks hold a composition of USD and US treasuries. I believe the fundamentals greatly favor converting the latter into the former if or when real yields begin to rise again. This is a self-reinforcing process because as mentioned if you need USD, the easiest option is to sell US treasuries but in aggregate or mass this pushes up US yields which further causes the USD to appreciate as it becomes higher yielding leading to more forced treasury selling. There is one of the largest short interest from hedge funds and commercial traders on record against the USD. A rise in US yields or an appreciation of the USD could catalyze this process which has spillover effects to risk assets and emerging markets.
Powell specifically said stocks were expensive on a price/earnings ratio basis, but the risk-free government rate is so low it is essentially pushing investors out of the risk-curve. So, if I am right and US yields continue to move upwards (they've already bumped from around 0.50% to 0.90% since September), Powell has now already given the green light for stocks to sell off. Therefore the bond hedge will now work in reverse, in the sense that many believe bonds hedge equity market declines. I argue a bond sell-off and rise in yields will contribute to an equity market decline.
And finally, I will end with a couple of charts just showing the extremeness of speculation and stretched valuations in the US stock market. Thank you for reading.
Source: Crescat Capital
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