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Maxar Technologies Has 100% Downside Risk Once Investors Realize Earnings Are ~80% Overstated, And The CEO Has Overseen Two Accounting Debacles

|About: Maxar Technologies Ltd. (MAXR), Includes: NCR

Summary

Maxar's acquisitions of Space Systems Loral (2012) and Digital Globe (2018) are starting to fail. YTD organic sales are -12.7% and Adj Debt is $3.8bn with almost no FCF expected.

Earnings and EBITDA are inflated by 17% and 79%, respectively, from an aggressive M&A and accounting scheme to shift depreciable expenses to intangible expenses, which Maxar tells investors to ignore.

Maxar says it can deleverage,but debt is rising. It has to fund a $68m/yr dividend and $25m/yr debt amortization it cannot cover. The dividend should be cut or eliminated.

Maxar's CEO has embellished his role at NCR, a previous Spruce Point target that fell 40%. He has also obscured his association with two companies that restated financials and admitted material weaknesses.

Effective leverage stands at 5.8x vs. a 5.5x covenant. 100% share price decline is likely in the long-term, with a 45%-55% intermediate downside price target of $20-$25/sh on 20x normalized EPS and 8x EBITDA.

Report Entitled: "Falling Out of Orbit to Zero"

Spruce Point Capital Management is pleased to announce it has released the contents of a unique research report on Maxar Technologies, Ltd. (NYSE/ TSX: MAXR) ("MAXR" or "the Company") with a "Strong Sell" opinion and a long-term price target potential of 100%. Spruce Point has spent months conducting a critical forensic and fundamental analysis of the Company, formed through the acquisitions by MacDonald Dettwiler ("MDA") of Space Systems Loral ("SSL") in 2012, and DigitalGlobe ("DGI") in 2017.

Based on our analysis, we provide compelling evidence that Maxar is out of cash, on a credit-adjusted basis will be in excess of its debt covenant by year end, perpetuating a brazen intangible asset inflation scheme to overstate EBITDA and EPS by approximately 17% and 79%, and must cut its dividend or face digging a hole deeper into debt.

Maxar is run by Howard Lance, who came from NCR Corp, a company Spruce Point successfully exposed in 2015, which fell 40% after a failed process run to maximize shareholder value. CEO Lance appears to have embellished his role as COO of the entire company, whereas his role was limited to the Retail and Financial Groups. Furthermore, Lance has obscured from his biography his leadership roles at two companies requiring financial restatement after admitting material financial control weaknesses. As a result, we see up to 100% downside in Maxar's shares, with an intermediate risk to $20.00-$25.00 per share (45%-55% downside)

Our detailed research report is available on our website. We also encourage all of our readers to follow us on Twitter @sprucepointcap for regular updates. Please review our disclaimer at the bottom of this email.

Key Highlights of the Report Include:

MDA's Failed Acquisition of Space Systems Loral (NYSE:SSL)

Acquisition of SSL Poorly Timed: Acquired in 2012 when demand for geostationary satellites was robust, industry demand and backlog has dried up as orders decline as a result of new high-throughput satellites and low-earth-orbit (NYSE:LEO) constellations coming online

Obfuscation of Gross Margins and R&D Costs: MDA never provided clear disclosures about its satellite manufacturing gross margins. R&D costs have been buried as footnotes in its intangible asset account disclosures. Recent disclosure of contract losses tied to engineering costs suggest percentage-of-completion accounting abuse, a common issue in the aerospace and defense industry

Signs To Suggest $50m/yr of Earnings Overstatement Through Aggressive Intangible Asset Capitalization: MDA’s dependency on intangible asset capex grew significantly, and it capitalizes a materially higher % as in-process technology than peers. Capex to depreciation is running at 2x now vs. SSL pre-acquisition by MDA

Cash Flow Issues: From 2012-2017 average adjusted free cash flow was $30m and includes periods where MDA reported bank overdrafts as a result of cash deficiencies. Rising orbital receivables and DSOs, conversion of accounts receivables into notes payable from customers, and a material increase of accounts receivables due past 90 days all signal financial strain

Rapid Management / Director Turnover: MDA’s CEO, audit committee chair, and chief technology officer at SSL all resigned leading up to its eventual hiring of new CEO Howard Lance, who has an unremarkable past in our opinion

Warning: Maxar's CEO Howard Lance Brought In To Save The Day Associated With Multiple Companies Requiring Financial Restatement

Lance’s Association To NCR: Lance is a former Group COO/President of NCR, a successful Spruce Point target in 2015 that declined 40% after we highlighted numerous accounting concerns, and it failed to find a buyer after a strategic process. Lance's biography states he was COO of NCR, suggesting for the whole company, but in reality was COO only for the Retail and Financial Groups.

Lance's Association To Other Accounting Failures: Various Lance public biographies obscure his roles as Chairman of the Board at Change Healthcare Holdings through 2017 and Harris Stratex (Nasdaq: HSTX, now called Aviat Networks (AVNW)). Both companies blindsided investors when informing them that the financial statements could not be relied upon, and material weaknesses of controls existed. 

Lance And Insiders Having Nothing At Risk: Ownership by insiders at MDA declined every year to virtually zero. Post the DigitalGlobe acquisition, insiders own a miniscule 0.50% of the stock, and have mislead investors about bonus compensation targets being tied to cash flow

Why Maxar Appears To Be A Complete Bust

Already Failing To Hit Projections: MDA historically didn’t give guidance, but projections from the May 2017 proxy statement from the DigitalGlobe acquisition show the combined company has performed miserably, and is missing internal expectations

Engaging In A Massive M&A Accounting Scheme Inflate Intangibles Further To Cover Past Problems: In Feb 2017, management said it didn’t identify any material inconsistencies in DigitalGlobe’s financials between GAAP and IFRS. It then backtracked and revised financials that artificially inflated revenues by 4-6% and EBITDA by double digits. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. We previously illustrated our concern that MDA appeared to be overcapitalizing costs by inflating intangible asset purchases. Thus, it came as no surprise to us when Maxar used the DigitalGlobe acquisition to inflate intangible assets even further. However, the $1.1 billion inflation was an order of magnitude that shocked us. MDA made reference to DigitalGlobe’s “world leading (satellite) constellation” as a strategic rationale of the acquisition – yet it impaired the satellite assets at deal closing, and inflated its intangible asset accounts by a commensurate $1.1 billion

Nonsensical Earnings That Conveniently Ignore Acquired Intangible Expenses: By impairing a depreciable asset and inflating intangibles, Maxar claims its Non-IFRS measures should exclude acquired intangibles. In our opinion, MAXR’s 2018 Adj. EPS expectation of $4.75/sh is pure fiction. Maxar has made numerous aggressive accounting choices (now extending depreciable asset lives twice in Q1 and Q2’18 for the same satellites it impaired) which inflate results. We estimate EBITDA and EPS are overstated by 17% and 79%, respectively

Numerous One-Time Gains Being Used, Some In A Non-Transparent Manner: It appears Maxar has accelerated recognition of investment tax credits, and amended its post-retirement benefit plan to book one-time gains. In the case of the benefit plan gain, Maxar booked a $24.6m gain in Q4’17 (flattering EBITDA by 13.5%), which was not fully disclosed across its investor communications, nor do we believe analysts have adjusted their models to account for it. As a result, we believe Maxar will have a large headwind in Q4’18 and disappoint

Abrupt CFO Departure A Bad Omen, New CFO Tainted: In February 2018, CFO William McCombe abruptly resigned less than 10 days before the March 2018 Investor Day. Former MDA CFO Wirasekara was appointed interim CFO until announcing Biggs Porter would join as CFO in July. Biggs is currently the subject of a shareholder lawsuit for his role as CFO at Fluor Corp where it's claimed he misled investors

DigitalGlobe A Ticking Time Bomb, Bull Case Likely To Disappoint: Maxar’s bull case for DigitalGlobe is predicated on two pillars: 1) Its contract with the National Geospace Agency (NGA) is priced too cheaply and is due for a price increase, and 2) There’s a huge opportunity for DGI outside of the U.S. government. Our research suggests both pillars seem unrealistic: it appears that DigitalGlobe is more likely to see prices decreases on the NGA contract and opportunities outside of the U.S. government seem limited, and have never lived up to expectations dating back to DigitalGlobe’s IPO

The Case For Bankruptcy

Deleveraging Plan Is A Fantasy And The Dividend Must Be Eliminated: Maxar is claiming it will deleverage and drive higher cash flow, but the numbers tell a different story: leverage is rising and cash overdrafts are being reported! In addition to a large interest expense and capex burden (which we believe will remain at $300m+/yr as opposed to declining per management), Maxar is committed to a $68m/yr dividend and must pay down $25m/yr of its Term Loan B. This means it has no excess cash flow to accelerate debt reduction. Maxar is borrowing money to pay the dividend. Maxar should immediately cut or eliminate the dividend and direct capital towards debt reduction

Covenant Breach Possible, $2bn Goodwill and Intangible Impairment Looms: Based on accepted analytical credit adjustments made by Maxar’s rating agency Moody’s, and reasonable year end projections, we estimate Maxar’s leverage will effectively exceed its leverage covenant by year end. On June 2018, Maxar was downgraded to B1/stable (and is BB negative by S&P)

Newly Disclosed $227m Damages Sought By Ukraine: For the first time in Q2’18, Maxar disclosed a Ukrainian customer filed its statement of claim in connection with an arbitration seeking recovery from the Company under a contract in the amount of approximately $227 million. Given Maxar’s strained liquidity, an adverse judgement could be a material adverse event in a worst case

Up To 100% Long-Term Downside On Normalized Financials: Maxar trades at 10.5x and 43x on our normalized 2018E Adj. EBITDA and EPS for a business we estimate is declining organically -12.7%, and dangerously levered 5.8x. Valued on its free cash flow, expected to produce $0-$50m, Maxar could be viewed as worthless. Using below industry average P/E and EBITDA multiples to reflect Maxar’s distressed state and specious financial statements, we estimate an intermediate trading range of range of approximately $20.00 - $25.00 per share (45%-55%)

Thank you very much for your continued interest in our investment research. 

Disclaimer

This research presentation expresses our research opinions. You should assume that as of the publication date of any presentation, report or letter, Spruce Point Capital Management LLC (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our subscribers and clients has a short position in all stocks (and are long/short combinations of puts and calls on the stock) covered herein, including without limitation Maxar Technologies, Ltd. (“MAXR”), and therefore stand to realize significant gains in the event that the price of its stock declines. Following publication of any presentation, report or letter, we intend to continue transacting in the securities covered therein, and we may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of our initial recommendation. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice, and Spruce Point Capital Management does not undertake to update this report or any information contained herein. Spruce Point Capital Management, subscribers and/or consultants shall have no obligation to inform any investor or viewer of this report about their historical, current, and future trading activities.

This research presentation expresses our research opinions, which we have based upon interpretation of certain facts and observations, all of which are based upon publicly available information, and all of which are set out in this research presentation. Any investment involves substantial risks, including complete loss of capital. Any forecasts or estimates are for illustrative purpose only and should not be taken as limitations of the maximum possible loss or gain. Any information contained in this report may include forward looking statements, expectations, pro forma analyses, estimates, and projections. You should assume these types of statements, expectations, pro forma analyses, estimates, and projections may turn out to be incorrect for reasons beyond Spruce Point Capital Management LLC’s control. This is not investment or accounting advice nor should it be construed as such. Use of Spruce Point Capital Management LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence, with assistance from professional financial, legal and tax experts, before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. All figures assumed to be in US Dollars, unless specified otherwise.

To the best of our ability and belief, as of the date hereof, all information contained herein is accurate and reliable and does not omit to state material facts necessary to make the statements herein not misleading, and all information has been obtained from public sources we believe to be accurate and reliable, and who are not insiders or connected persons of the stock covered herein or who may otherwise owe any fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality to the issuer, or to any other person or entity that was breached by the transmission of information to Spruce Point Capital Management LLC. However, Spruce Point Capital Management LLC recognizes that there may be non-public information in the possession of Maxar or other insiders of Maxar that has not been publicly disclosed by Maxar. Therefore, such information contained herein is presented “as is,” without warranty of any kind – whether express or implied. Spruce Point Capital Management LLC makes no other representations, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any such information or with regard to the results to be obtained from its use.

This report’s estimated fundamental value only represents a best efforts estimate of the potential fundamental valuation of a specific security, and is not expressed as, or implied as, assessments of the quality of a security, a summary of past performance, or an actionable investment strategy for an investor. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, nor shall any security be offered or sold to any person, in any jurisdiction in which such offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Spruce Point Capital Management LLC is not registered as an investment advisor, broker/dealer, or accounting firm.

Report Entitled "Falling Out of Orbit to Zero"

Spruce Point Capital Management is pleased to announce it has released the contents of a unique research report on Maxar Technologies, Ltd. (Nasdaq / TSX: MAXR) ("MAXR" or "the Company") with a "Strong Sell" opinion and a long-term price target potential of 100%. Spruce Point has spent months conducting a critical forensic and fundamental analysis of the Company, formed through the acquisitions by MacDonald Dettwiler ("MDA") of Space Systems Loral ("SSL") in 2012, and DigitalGlobe ("DGI") in 2017.

Based on our analysis, we provide compelling evidence that Maxar is out of cash, on a credit-adjusted basis will be in excess of its debt covenant by year end, perpetuating a brazen intangible asset inflation scheme to overstate EBITDA and EPS by approximately 17% and 79%, and must cut its dividend or face digging a hole deeper into debt. Maxar is run by Howard Lance, who came from NCR, a company Spruce Point successfully exposed in 2015, which fell 40% after a failed process run to maximize shareholder value. CEO Lance appears to have embellished his role as COO of the entire company, whereas his role was limited to the Retail and Financial Groups. Furthermore, Lance has obscured from his biography his leadership roles at two companies requiring financial restatement after admitting material financial control weaknesses. As a result, we see up to 100% downside in Maxar's shares, with an intermediate risk to $20.00-$25.00 per share (45%-55% downside)

Our detailed research report is available on our website. We also encourage all of our readers to follow us on Twitter @sprucepointcap for regular updates. Please review our disclaimer at the bottom of this email.

Key Highlights of the Report Include:

MDA's Failed Acquisition of Space Systems Loral (SSL)

Acquisition of SSL Poorly Timed: Acquired in 2012 when demand for geostationary satellites was robust, industry demand and backlog has dried up as orders decline as a result of new high-throughput satellites and low-earth-orbit (LEO) constellations coming online

Obfuscation of Gross Margins and R&D Costs: MDA never provided clear disclosures about its satellite manufacturing gross margins. R&D costs have been buried as footnotes in its intangible asset account disclosures. Recent disclosure of contract losses tied to engineering costs suggest percentage-of-completion accounting abuse, a common issue in the aerospace and defense industry

Signs To Suggest $50m/yr of Earnings Overstatement Through Aggressive Intangible Asset Capitalization: MDA’s dependency on intangible asset capex grew significantly, and it capitalizes a materially higher % as in-process technology than peers. Capex to depreciation is running at 2x now vs. SSL pre-acquisition by MDA

Cash Flow Issues: From 2012-2017 average adjusted free cash flow was $30m and includes periods where MDA reported bank overdrafts as a result of cash deficiencies. Rising orbital receivables and DSOs, conversion of accounts receivables into notes payable from customers, and a material increase of accounts receivables due past 90 days all signal financial strain

Rapid Management / Director Turnover: MDA’s CEO, audit committee chair, and chief technology officer at SSL all resigned leading up to its eventual hiring of new CEO Howard Lance, who has an unremarkable past in our opinion

Warning: Maxar's CEO Howard Lance Brought In To Save The Day Associated With Multiple Companies Requiring Financial Restatement

Lance’s Association To NCR: Lance is a former Group COO/President of NCR, a successful Spruce Point target in 2015 that declined 40% after we highlighted numerous accounting concerns, and it failed to find a buyer after a strategic process. Lance's biography states he was COO of NCR, suggesting for the whole company, but in reality was COO only for the Retail and Financial Groups.

Lance's Association To Other Accounting Failures: Various Lance public biographies obscure his roles as Chairman of the Board at Change Healthcare Holdings through 2017 and Harris Stratex (Nasdaq: HSTX, now called Aviat Networks (NASDAQ:AVNW)). Both companies blindsided investors when informing them that the financial statements could not be relied upon, and material weaknesses of controls existed.

Lance And Insiders Having Nothing At Risk: Ownership by insiders at MDA declined every year to virtually zero. Post the DigitalGlobe acquisition, insiders own a miniscule 0.50% of the stock, and have mislead investors about bonus compensation targets being tied to cash flow

Why Maxar Appears To Be A Complete Bust

Already Failing To Hit Projections: MDA historically didn’t give guidance, but projections from the May 2017 proxy statement from the DigitalGlobe acquisition show the combined company has performed miserably, and is missing internal expectations

Engaging In A Massive M&A Accounting Scheme Inflate Intangibles Further To Cover Past Problems: In Feb 2017, management said it didn’t identify any material inconsistencies in DigitalGlobe’s financials between GAAP and IFRS. It then backtracked and revised financials that artificially inflated revenues by 4-6% and EBITDA by double digits. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. We previously illustrated our concern that MDA appeared to be overcapitalizing costs by inflating intangible asset purchases. Thus, it came as no surprise to us when Maxar used the DigitalGlobe acquisition to inflate intangible assets even further. However, the $1.1 billion inflation was an order of magnitude that shocked us. MDA made reference to DigitalGlobe’s “world leading (satellite) constellation” as a strategic rationale of the acquisition – yet it visibly impaired the satellite assets at deal closing, and inflated its intangible asset accounts by a commensurate $1.1 billion

Nonsensical Earnings That Conveniently Ignore Acquired Intangible Expenses: By impairing a depreciable asset and inflating intangibles, Maxar claims its Non-IFRS measures should exclude acquired intangibles. In our opinion, MAXR’s 2018 Adj. EPS expectation of $4.75/sh is pure fiction. Maxar has made numerous aggressive accounting choices (now extending depreciable asset lives twice in Q1 and Q2’18 for the same satellites it visibly impaired) which inflate results. We estimate EBITDA and EPS are overstated by 17% and 79%, respectively

Numerous One-Time Gains Being Used, Some In A Non-Transparent Manner: It appears Maxar has accelerated recognition of investment tax credits, and amended its post-retirement benefit plan to book one-time gains. In the case of the benefit plan gain, Maxar booked a $24.6m gain in Q4’17 (flattering EBITDA by 13.5%), which was not fully disclosed across its investor communications, nor do we believe analysts have adjusted their models to account for it. As a result, we believe Maxar will have a large headwind in Q4’18 and disappoint

Abrupt CFO Departure A Bad Omen, New CFO Tainted: In February 2018, CFO William McCombe abruptly resigned less than 10 days before the March 2018 Investor Day. Former MDA CFO Wirasekara was appointed interim CFO until announcing Biggs Porter would join as CFO in July. Biggs is currently the subject of a shareholder lawsuit for his role as CFO at Fluor Corp where it's claimed he misled investors

DigitalGlobe A Ticking Time Bomb, Bull Case Likely To Disappoint: Maxar’s bull case for DigitalGlobe is predicated on two pillars: 1) Its contract with the National Geospace Agency (NGA) is priced too cheaply and is due for a price increase, and 2) There’s a huge opportunity for DGI outside of the U.S. government. Our work completed to date suggests both pillars seem unrealistic: it appears that DigitalGlobe is more likely to see prices decreases on the NGA contract and opportunities outside of the U.S. government seem limited, and have never lived up to expectations dating back to DigitalGlobe’s IPO

The Case For Bankruptcy

Deleveraging Plan Is A Fantasy And The Dividend Must Be Eliminated: Maxar is claiming it will deleverage and drive higher cash flow, but the numbers tell a different story: leverage is rising and cash overdrafts are being reported! In addition to a large interest expense and capex burden (which we believe will remain at $300m+/yr as opposed to declining per management), Maxar is committed to a $68m/yr dividend and must pay down $25m/yr of its Term Loan B. These means it has no excess cash flow to accelerate debt reduction. Maxar is borrowing money to pay the dividend. Maxar should immediately cut or eliminate the dividend and direct capital towards debt reduction

Covenant Breach Possible, $2bn Goodwill and Intangible Impairment Looms: Based on accepted analytical credit adjustments made by Maxar’s rating agency Moody’s, and reasonable year end projections, we estimate Maxar’s leverage will effectively exceed its leverage covenant by year end. On June 2018, Maxar was downgraded to B1/stable (and is BB negative by S&P)

Newly Disclosed $227m Damages Sought By Ukraine: For the first time in Q2’18, Maxar disclosed a Ukrainian customer filed its statement of claim in connection with an arbitration seeking recovery from the Company under a contract in the amount of approximately $227 million. Given Maxar’s strained liquidity, an adverse judgement could be a material adverse event in a worst case

Up To 100% Long-Term Downside On Normalized Financials: Maxar trades at 10.5x and 43x on our normalized 2018E Adj. EBITDA and EPS for a business we estimate is declining organically -12.7%, and dangerously levered 5.8x. Valued on its free cash flow, expected to produce $0-$50m, Maxar could be viewed as worthless. Using below industry average P/E and EBITDA multiples to reflect Maxar’s distressed state and specious financial statements, we estimate an intermediate trading range of range of approximately $20.00 - $25.00 per share (45%-55%)

Thank you very much for your continued interest in our investment research. If you wish to no longer receive our updates, please unsubscribe at the link below

Disclaimer

This research presentation expresses our research opinions. You should assume that as of the publication date of any presentation, report or letter, Spruce Point Capital Management LLC (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our subscribers and clients has a short position in all stocks (and are long/short combinations of puts and calls on the stock) covered herein, including without limitation Maxar Technologies, Ltd. (“MAXR”), and therefore stand to realize significant gains in the event that the price of its stock declines. Following publication of any presentation, report or letter, we intend to continue transacting in the securities covered therein, and we may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of our initial recommendation. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice, and Spruce Point Capital Management does not undertake to update this report or any information contained herein. Spruce Point Capital Management, subscribers and/or consultants shall have no obligation to inform any investor or viewer of this report about their historical, current, and future trading activities.

This research presentation expresses our research opinions, which we have based upon interpretation of certain facts and observations, all of which are based upon publicly available information, and all of which are set out in this research presentation. Any investment involves substantial risks, including complete loss of capital. Any forecasts or estimates are for illustrative purpose only and should not be taken as limitations of the maximum possible loss or gain. Any information contained in this report may include forward looking statements, expectations, pro forma analyses, estimates, and projections. You should assume these types of statements, expectations, pro forma analyses, estimates, and projections may turn out to be incorrect for reasons beyond Spruce Point Capital Management LLC’s control. This is not investment or accounting advice nor should it be construed as such. Use of Spruce Point Capital Management LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence, with assistance from professional financial, legal and tax experts, before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. All figures assumed to be in US Dollars, unless specified otherwise.

To the best of our ability and belief, as of the date hereof, all information contained herein is accurate and reliable and does not omit to state material facts necessary to make the statements herein not misleading, and all information has been obtained from public sources we believe to be accurate and reliable, and who are not insiders or connected persons of the stock covered herein or who may otherwise owe any fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality to the issuer, or to any other person or entity that was breached by the transmission of information to Spruce Point Capital Management LLC. However, Spruce Point Capital Management LLC recognizes that there may be non-public information in the possession of Maxar or other insiders of Maxar that has not been publicly disclosed by Maxar. Therefore, such information contained herein is presented “as is,” without warranty of any kind – whether express or implied. Spruce Point Capital Management LLC makes no other representations, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any such information or with regard to the results to be obtained from its use.

This report’s estimated fundamental value only represents a best efforts estimate of the potential fundamental valuation of a specific security, and is not expressed as, or implied as, assessments of the quality of a security, a summary of past performance, or an actionable investment strategy for an investor. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, nor shall any security be offered or sold to any person, in any jurisdiction in which such offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Spruce Point Capital Management LLC is not registered as an investment advisor, broker/dealer, or accounting firm.

Disclosure: I am/we are short MAXR.